THE IMPACT OF COVID-19 ON FORCED DISPLACEMENT AND ECONOMIC MIGRATION IN FRAGILE CONTEXTS

ASSESSMENT COMMISSIONED BY THE ISLAMIC DEVELOPMENT BANK

RESILIENCE & SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT DEPARTMENT
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<td>Community-Driven Development</td>
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<td>FCS</td>
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<td>FCV</td>
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<td>Internally Displaced Monitoring Center</td>
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<td>IDP</td>
<td>Internally Displaced Person</td>
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<td>International Finance Corporation</td>
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Context

There has been a steep rise in the number of refugees and IDPs in the recent decades affecting mainly five countries of origin and host ones. Internally displaced reached 79.5 million, refugees 26.4 million and IDPs 45.7 million.

The dynamics of conflict, ongoing hostilities and protection risks, with large parts of the displaced and conflict-affected populations in Democratic Republic of the Congo, Colombia, Somalia, Syria, Yemen, reaffirmed the need to ensure that humanitarian actors place social networks and protection as well as financing at the center of their work, which UNHCR led, in support of UN Country Teams, governments and local stakeholders. At the same time, the refugee crisis in Europe in 2015 were reminders of the continuum between internal displacement and refugee outflows.

IDPs are the “invisible majority” of forced migrants worldwide and account for more than 60 percent of those displaced by conflict and almost all of those uprooted by natural disasters. Protection and solutions for IDPs Protection remain the most fundamental challenge. During 2010-2019 100 million people at least were forced to flee their homes in the past decade, seeking refugee either in or outside their countries. 80 per cent of the world’s displaced people are in countries or territories affected by acute food insecurity and malnutrition – many of them countries facing climate and other disaster risk.

94 percent of forcibly displaced live out of camps, while 70 percent of displace are in rural areas. 85 per cent are hosted in developing countries, generally a country neighboring the one they fled. Five countries of origin (67 percent) account for two-thirds of people displaced across borders: Syria, Venezuela, Afghanistan, South Sudan and Myanmar. The main host countries are: Turkey 3.6 million but also have 400,000 refugees from other nationalities; Colombia 1.8 million; Pakistan 1.4 million; Uganda 1.4 million; and Germany 1.1 million.

40 percent of the world’s displaced are children. Between 9.3 and 13.2 million (33 – 47%) of all refugees, asylum-seekers and Venezuelans displaced abroad combined are children under the age of 18. There is an increased need for support for forcibly displaced children during the pandemic, raising particular concern over restrictions in access to health care and education.

The arrival of large numbers of people in specific locales creates both challenges and opportunities. Being able to transition from the humanitarian to the development stage is of essence, because considering this as a development opportunity, with all the benefits and conditions this entails for both refugees and host communities, can make a difference for both host countries as well as those of origin, in the event that root conflict subsides and they can return and therefore contribute to reconstruction and recovery of their homeland.

In theory, at least, refugee situations are resolved through the pursuit of three “durable solutions” to displacement: voluntary repatriation, local integration in host states or resettlement to third countries. Less than 1% of refugees are resettled each year, and even fewer obtain citizenship as part of formal local integration efforts. The failure to enable durable solutions and adequately implement the Global Compact for Refugees (GCR) has left 75 percent of refugees in situations of protracted displacement.

The health and socio-economic consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic are affecting the forcibly displaced and their host communities with increased risks of violence and conflict disproportionally with implications for their protection. As of April 1 2021, there were 154.8 million reported COVID-19 cases worldwide and 3.2 million deaths, the highest death toll in recent history.

Even as new migration flows and refugee movements have declined, the crisis has led to an increase in return migration. Initially the lockdowns and travel bans left many migrant workers stranded in their host countries, unable to travel back. More recently, however, return migration has been reported in all parts of the world in countries such as India, Egypt, Cambodia, Ukraine, Tajikistan and Philippines. Many international migrants, especially from the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries, returned to countries such as India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh. Some migrants had to be evacuated by governments. (IOM, 2019). Furthermore, rising unemployment in the face of tighter visa and mobility restrictions is likely to result in a further increase in return migration.
COVID-19

The Coronavirus has changed the immediate migration context but has not change the reality that confronted displaced people and affected countries face. This has disproportionately affected their jobs, livelihoods and living standards with barriers to healthcare, social protection and adequate documentation.

Migration flows are likely to fall, but the stock of international migrants may not decrease immediately. Under normal circumstances, migrants losing jobs would consider returning home. However, that has become nearly impossible because of travel bans and the suspension of transportation services. As a result, the rate of voluntary return migration is likely to fall, except in the case of a few cross-border migration corridors in the South (such as Venezuela–Colombia, Nepal–India, Zimbabwe– South Africa, and Myanmar–Thailand). Border closures may deny people seeking international protection the right to asylum. This could force people to return to situations of danger.

While the coronavirus crisis ravages many countries, the MENA region continues to bear the burden of widespread forced displacement due to conflicts in Syria, Iraq, and Yemen. In response, UNHCR has formulated a COVID-19 Emergency Response. It focuses on (i) continuing, adapting, and delivering protection and assistance to the most vulnerable; (ii) advocating for the inclusion of refugees, internally displaced persons (IDPs), and other marginalized groups in national public health and other responses; (iii) prioritizing immediate interventions to prevent infections; (iv) strengthening communication with communities; and (v) empowering individuals and families to make the best decisions on how to care for themselves, through cash-based assistance.

COVID-19’s socio-economic impact has weighed heavily on the world’s most vulnerable, including forcibly displaced and stateless people, exacerbated their vulnerability, isolation and exclusion, leaving them in critical need of solidarity and support.

Restrictions on movement and concerns about transmission of the virus have resulted in some solutions programs being almost entirely suspended. Consequently, the first half of 2020 saw a significant decline in the number of refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) who could avail themselves of a solution compared to the same period in previous years. As new migration flow is reduced to a trickle and return migration surges, 2020 may well become the first year in recent decades to mark an actual fall in the stock of international migrants.

Civil society, development actors, financial institutions, private sector and communities have joined hands to tackle the consequences of COVID-19. In various countries UN cluster approach is being used to share information, and plan responses.

Forced displacement is emerging as an important development challenge. The reason: extreme poverty is now increasingly concentrated among vulnerable groups including people who had to flee in the face of conflict and violence, and their presence affects development prospects in the communities that are hosting them.

COVID-19 poses and will continue to pose many challenges both in the short and long-term for all low- and middle-income countries. Nevertheless, these challenges are also compounded for low- and middle-income refugee-hosting countries. Although COVID-19 has affected all forcibly displaced and stateless people to some extent, their experiences vary based on age, gender and diversity.

The World Bank has predicted a 3.6 percent decline in global incomes per capita, causing the first increase in global poverty since 1998. Similarly, the IMF predicts that the negative impact of the crisis on low-income households will revert back the progress made in reducing extreme poverty since the 1990s. The World Bank projects that, in 2020, between 88 million and 115 million people could fall back into extreme poverty as a result of the pandemic, with an additional increase of between 23 million and 35 million in 2021, potentially bringing the total number of new people living in extreme poverty to between 110 million and 150 million.

The projected decline in remittances will be the steepest in recent history, certainly steeper than the decline (less than 5 percent) recorded during the global recession of 2009. In the midst of this sharp decline, the relative importance of remittance flows as a source of external financing for low (LMIC) and middle-income (MIC) countries is expected to rise. This is because foreign direct investment is expected to decline by even more, due to travel bans, disruption of international trade, and wealth effects.

For the medium and long-term restoring remittances, ODA and DFI can be one of the ways that may lead to recovery and growth. However, structural issues have to be addressed also, building back better and by leaving no one behind.

The major migration consequence of the COVID-19 pandemic is the loss of mobility. The dire economic consequences of the inability to move, which threaten the link between migration and development. Lockdown measures have weakened economies around the world, leading to mass layoffs and greater economic insecurity. In the case of forcibly displaced populations, who are often part of the informal labor market and excluded from social
safety nets, they have been impacted by the deterioration of countries’ economic situation.

Due to their situations (social, legal, economic) many refugees and host communities earn their livelihood through informal employment, often associated with micro, small and medium enterprises (MSMEs). Despite being vulnerable and isolated, these communities are also not included in any safety net and lack social protection – resulting in a more severe impact from the hit the informal economy has taken from COVID-19. The impact is further magnified for women, children, individuals living with a disability and the elderly.

The most highly impacted sectors were manufacturing, accommodation and food services, wholesale and retail trade, and real estate and business activities. Refugees work in highly impacted sectors, relative to 37 percent of the populations in host countries. Almost 1.6 billion informal economy workers are significantly impacted by lockdown measures and/or working in the hardest-hit sectors. Women have been impacted more than men due to the COVID-19 crisis and its impact on the informal economy. Globally, 42% women in high-risk sectors were impacted by COVID-19 more than men (32%).

The negative impact of the pandemic on employment may lead to increased competition for scarce resources and reinforce exclusion of the forcibly displaced from the labor market and expose them to conditions that are not in conformity with decent work principles.

COVID-19 will cause widespread loss of livelihoods among refugee populations, which will affect their self-reliance and increase protection concerns. Without jobs and access to income, many refugees may suffer from increased food insecurity, inability to pay rent, debt arising from vital health care costs, violence and a lack of ability to cope with shocks. Refugees are therefore more likely to turn to negative coping strategies including skipping meals, exploitative work, or child labor. Furthermore, their status as foreigners makes them subject to xenophobia and abuse, which in turn often translates into worse working conditions when compared to their national counterparts.

**Preliminary conclusions**

Despite negative perceptions surrounding migration, data show that forcibly displaced people are hard-working, entrepreneurial, employable, and creditworthy.

Several challenges are currently inhibiting investment in refugee founded and refugee supporting enterprises and funds. On the supply-side, investors and financiers often face challenges with identifying, assessing, and structuring deals in new and frontier markets, including identifying appropriate risk mitigation strategies. On the demand-side, refugee entrepreneurs often face barriers such as perceived higher risks, negative biases from financial and lending institutions, language and cultural hurdles, and lack of trust from host communities.

These investments can be deployed at three different stages of displacement and movement:

1. **Resilience**: "preventive" investments that reduce the risk of displacement or address root causes;
2. **Response**: investments that improve humanitarian and economic response capacity and innovation during emergencies and crises that bridge the humanitarian and development divide;
3. **Recovery**: investments that support economic inclusion and integration.

These 3Rs are also mentioned in Islamic Development Bank’s response strategy to COVID-19. When refugees flee a crisis, they receive initial emergency assistance and are offered a pathway towards reintegration into normal life. However, in practice, that rarely takes place since a reform designed just for emergency all too often endures.

The failure to enable durable solutions and adequately implement the Global Compact for Refugees (GCR) has left 75 percent of refugees in situations of protracted displacement.

Overcoming the encampment approach has allowed refugees the right to work and a significant degree of freedom of movement, giving refugees socio-economic autonomy and empowerment. This has been the case, for instance with the Uganda Self-Reliance Strategy, which is a relatively unique experiment formalized in 2006 with the Uganda’s Refugee Act. Skills transfers and entrepreneurship capacity in urban areas has benefited the host country, community as well as refugees transitioning from humanitarian assistance to development.

An Oxford study, conducted by the Refugee Study Center reveals six main variables that determine variations in refugees’ income levels:

1. **Regulation**: It has been shown that whether someone is in an urban area, a protracted camp or an emergency camp (incomes may vary from $120, $39 and $17 respectively)
2. **Nationality**: Culture makes a difference according to background and skills
3. **Education**: Additional years, levels and gender make a difference
4. **Occupation**: Self-employed non-farmers make the most and farmers the least.
5. **Gender**: often face inequality
6. **Networks**: The greater refugee Household (HH) access to wider national or international networks the greater income levels.

There are **policy implications** given that refugee barriers...
to participation have to be lowered, while culture of self-help and mutual support encouraged. Therefore, international organizations should move beyond the humanitarian approach towards a development on that prioritizes jobs, education, and economic empowerment of refugees. This in turn needs new forms of partnership that creates the incentive structures for host countries to allow refugees greater autonomy and the right to work. The different host country refugee policies are shaped by their politics and history and thus context specific. This might allow to shape the levers of policy change.

When pushed to offer greater economic participation to refugees the main concerns are related to development and security. The former relates to competition for economic resources: competition for jobs, downward pressure on wages, upward pressure on housing and depletion of scarce natural resources such as water. However, the key concern relates to national security.

The international recognition of the refugee crisis creates a potential opportunity for the Governments to appeal for the Multinational Corporations (MNC) relocation, through FDI, for reasons related to Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) and core business interests, which is a necessary condition. This also offers the basis on which host countries could appeal to regions and countries to provide trade concessions that allow market access, which is a sufficient condition. Therefore, the challenge for host countries and worldwide is how they can address the development and security concerns in host countries, while empowering refugees. This is a “win-win” proposition for all stakeholders, especially host countries, their host communities and refugees.

There are experiences in which refugees were able to work together with host communities, which is the case of Lebanon with Lebanese and Palestine.

It seems worth considering institutional building and management for medium and long-term at country level creating Presidential units to manage risks for development and building back better. It should also be noted that the jobs created by foreign firms, those that establish new production units and those that buy from established ones have a multiplier effect in terms of new jobs and income and its consumption of goods and services.

The pace at which the risks come down is undoubtedly associated with the speed at which the economy recovers. Therefore, helping the economy recover is a reasonable working premise to guide post-conflict policy, both that of post-conflict governments and international support.

Granting displaced populations non-discriminatory access to employment, social services and safety nets remains crucial to mitigate the negative effect of the pandemic.

Concluding initial remarks:

- Rescue requires primarily a humanitarian response.
- Autonomy requires mainly a development response.
- A route out of uncertainty requires inputs from post-conflict reconstruction and state-building.
INTRODUCTION

The coronavirus pandemic has reshaped the world as we knew it as well as all aspects of life. 154.8 million individuals have been infected by COVID-19 and over 3.2 million lives have been lost. While the impact of the pandemic has been severe and it has changed the immediate migration context, but it has not changed the underlying reality that migrants, countries of origin, and host countries all benefit from international migration. They can benefit more if states cooperate—with each other and with other stakeholders. Enhanced cooperation will both help stakeholder to deal with the crisis and move beyond it. International mobility should be seen not only as a casualty of the pandemic, but as one of the essential building blocks of recovery.

1. Global Compact for Migration makes the case for more robust and comprehensive international cooperation on migration and gives states a rich menu of actions to accomplish the objectives they adopted. Also, protecting and supporting refugees is an important responsibility of the international community.
A. INTRODUCTION

The coronavirus pandemic has changed the immediate migration context, but it has not changed the underlying reality that migrants, countries of origin, and countries of destination all benefit from international migration.

COVID-19, and the measures used to prevent or address the pandemic, have not affected all countries equally. Forcibly displaced people in fragile contexts are disproportionately affected by the crisis, having lost their jobs and means of livelihoods and at times lacking access to adequate living standards including housing, food, water and sanitation, education and access to health services. Barriers for accessing national health services include exclusion from public health care, high costs, lack of documentation and administrative hurdles.

For the medium and long term, after emergency response to the illness and destitution caused by the virus, restoring international migration is one of the quickest and surest ways to promote economic recovery from the devastation caused by the pandemic. Migrant remittances will help restore the national balance of payments in many countries, reboot purchasing power in emerging economies, and reduce pandemic-induced poverty. Remittance flows before the pandemic were three times the volume of official development assistance. Moreover, remittances go directly into the hands of household members, unmediated by bureaucracy and relatively immune to corruption.

This study constitutes a situational analysis on challenges and opportunities and maps best practices and constraints for economic recovery of refugee, migrant and displaced communities post COVID-19. Country case studies from across the world have been undertaken to analyze the impact of the COVID-19 on the informal sector and livelihoods of the forced displaced people and hosting communities. Assessment of opportunities, experience, lessons learned, and best practices provides practical recommendations for effective responses and recovery efforts to tackle the negative impact of the pandemic on the forced displaced populations in general and particularly on informal sector, which is critical for the livelihoods of forced displaced people, IDPs, migrants and host communities.

Recommendations from the study will support efforts for rebuilding livelihoods of forcibly displaced population and hosting communities and inform development actors including MDBs to respond within the context of this study to the negative impact of the pandemic.

The coronavirus pandemic has changed the immediate migration context, but it has not changed the underlying reality that migrants, countries of origin, and countries of destination all benefit from international migration.
METHODOLOGY

The study will use following approaches to conduct the proposed assessment:

(i) reviewing the existing literature on informal sectors, livelihoods related issues, challenges, opportunities, global practices, experience and lessons learned;
(ii) meeting with relevant authorities in selected member countries and conducting stakeholder’s consultations with the private sector, civil society organizations and research institutes to have primary information and data on the study; and
(iii) reviewing in depth the current response strategies of the MDBs and other humanitarian agencies and identify the gaps if any in leaving-no-one behind, and propose how to fill these gaps if available.
SITUATION ANALYSIS

1. Forced Displacement: a brief overview

According to UNHCR’s 2020 mid-term report, as a result of persecution, conflict, violence, human rights violations or events seriously disturbing public order there were 79.5 million forcibly displaced people worldwide of which 26.4 million were refugees, half of which are under the age of 18, 20.7 million refugees under UNHCR’s mandate, 5.7 million Palestine refugees under UNRWA’s mandate; 45.7 million internally displaced people (IDPs), and 4.2 million asylum-seekers. 3.6 million Venezuelans displaced abroad (UNHCR, 2019\textsuperscript{2} updated June 2020).

\textsuperscript{2} UNHCR. Global Trends of Forced Displacement in 2019.
Forced displacement is emerging as an important development challenge. The reason: extreme poverty is now increasingly concentrated among vulnerable groups including people who had to flee in the face of conflict and violence, and their presence affects development prospects in the communities that are hosting them. Large movements of people are also fueling xenophobic reactions, even in high-income countries, and this could threaten the consensus that is underpinning global economic growth.

In 2005, UNHCR worked with 6.6 million IDPs, a number that grew to about 15 million by 2010 and stood at more than 43.5 million at the end of 2019 – representing an almost 7-fold increase in only 15 years.

The outbreak of war in Syria in 2011 generated one of the largest displacement crises in recent history. Conflicts which occurred after the ‘Arab Spring’ in Libya, Yemen and elsewhere created massive protection needs and displacement that have lasted throughout the decade. The dynamics of conflict, ongoing hostilities and protection risks, with large parts of the displaced and conflict-affected populations in Democratic Republic of the Congo, Colombia, Somalia, Syrian Arab Republic, Yemen hard-to-reach areas, reaffirmed the need to ensure that
humanitarian actors place protection at the centre of their work, which UNHCR led, in support of UN Country Teams, governments and local stakeholders.

At the same time, the refugee crisis in Europe in 2015 and decreases in the internally displaced population in Syria around the same time were reminders of the continuum between internal displacement and refugee outflows. The protection of displaced people and those affected by conflict became paramount as escalating and renewed conflict also affected the Ukraine, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, South Sudan, the Central African Republic, Mali and Nigeria, with UNHCR engaged in operational response and coordination leadership. The conflict in Iraq, including the fall of Mosul, led to large-scale displacement and acute protection needs, particularly for ethnic and religious minorities, such as the Yazidis and presented challenges of a massive scale. The new and protracted displacement in Africa constituted an estimated 43 per cent of global conflict-related internal displacement at the end of 2019.

IDPs are the “invisible majority” of forced migrants worldwide (UN Emergency Relief Coordinator and Co-signatories, 2016). They account for more than 60 percent of those displaced by conflict and almost all of those uprooted by natural disasters; most countries that generate large-scale refugee flows are grappling with even larger IDP situations. Many refugees are displaced several times within their countries of origin before they seek asylum abroad, and many have family members who stay behind as IDPs for a range of reasons — for instance, some lack the resources to flee internationally. Others stay nearby to check in on homes and businesses or to care for relatives who are unable to make arduous cross-border journeys.

Between 2010-2019 100 million people at least were forced to flee their homes in the past decade, seeking refugee either in or outside their countries and only a fraction of those displaced found a solution with 3.9 million refugees returning to their country of origin, 1.1 million resettled by states, 322,400 naturalized by their countries of asylum, 122,600 refugees whose status ended as a result of cessation and 31 million internally displaced returning to their place of residence and 754,500 stateless persons obtaining or confirming nationality. Approximately 1% of the world population is displaced. Forced displacement has almost doubled since 2010 (41 million then vs 79.5 million now). 80 per cent of the world’s displaced people are in countries or territories affected by acute food insecurity and malnutrition — many of them countries facing climate and other disaster risk. More than three-quarters of the world’s refugees (77 per cent) are caught up in situations of long-term displacement — such is the situation in Afghanistan, now in its fifth decade.

94 percent of forcibly displaced live out of camps, while 70 percent of displace are in rural areas (Internal Displacement Monitoring Center, 2020). More than eight of every 10 refugees (85 percent) are hosted in developing countries, generally a country neighboring the one they fled. Five countries of origin (67 percent) account for two-thirds of people displaced across borders: Syria, Venezuela, Afghanistan, South Sudan and Myanmar.

40 percent of the world’s displaced are children. Between 9.3 and 13.2 million (33 – 47%) of all refugees, asylum-seekers and Venezuelans displaced abroad combined are children under the age of 18. There is an increased need for support for forcibly displaced children during the pandemic, raising particular concern over restrictions in access to health care and education.

4.2 million are stateless people, 2 million had made asylum applications and 107,800 resettled in 26 countries, while 5.6 million were returnees. Finally, the 2030 Sustainable Development commitment of “leaving no one behind” now explicitly includes refugees, thanks to a new indicator on refugees approved by the UN Statistical Commission in March 2019. (Global Trends Report UNHCR, 2019). Below is the map 2 of new displacement by conflict, violence and disaster in the first half of 2020 (UNHCR, 2020).

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3. According to UN Reform 2016 Refugee camps should be the exception, all refugee children should have the right to education, and refugees are a shared responsibility.
These included 26.0 million refugees: 20.4 million under UNHCR’s mandate and 5.6 million Palestine refugees registered with the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA). The global figure also included 45.7 million internally displaced persons (source: IDMC), 4.2 million individuals whose asylum applications had not yet been adjudicated by the end of the reporting period, and 3.6 million Venezuelans displaced abroad.

For details on the Venezuela situation, see page 10.


Consisting of more than 2.0 million new individual asylum claims and 382,200 refugees recognized on a prima facie or group basis. Some of these people may have arrived prior to 2019. Based on a global estimate from IDMC.
More than two thirds -67 per cent- of all refugees and Venezuelans displaced abroad came from just five countries: Syrian Arab Republic 6.6 million; Venezuela 3.7 million; Afghanistan 2.7 million; South Sudan 2.3 million; Myanmar 1.0 million. Turkey hosted the largest number of refugees worldwide, with 3.6 million people. Colombia was the second with 1.8 million, including Venezuelans displaced abroad. Turkey 3.6 million; Colombia 1.8 million; Pakistan 1.4 million; Uganda 1.4 million; Germany 1.1 million. The returned refugees: 22 per cent fewer than in the same period of 2019. More than 398,400 people were recognized as refugees, with Niger and Germany accounting for the highest numbers – which is still a small number considering the total number of refugees which are displaced – and do not have refugee status. The communities are left in limbo as they have no rights and many times are not eligible to benefit from programs aimed at refugees.

The arrival of large numbers of people in specific locales creates both risks and opportunities. In most situations, it transforms the environment for designing and implementing poverty reduction programs. In some exceptional cases, it creates new dynamics for the entire country and national development strategies have to be adjusted accordingly. Development actors should help host communities manage these new circumstances so that they can continue to reduce poverty, while providing an accepting environment for the forcibly displaced.

Being able to transition from the humanitarian to the development stage is of essence, because considering this as a development opportunity, with all the benefits and conditions this entails for both refugees and host communities, can make a difference for both host countries as well as those of origin, in the event that root conflict subsides and they can return and therefore contribute to reconstruction and recovery.

Protection and solutions for IDPs Protection remain the most fundamental challenge. Development actors’ overall objective is to help reduce poverty among both the forcibly displaced and their host communities, as part of a broader effort to achieve the United Nations’ Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). The focus is on tackling the medium-term socioeconomic dimensions of forced displacement. This is complementary to, but distinct from, the rights-based protection agenda and the urgent focus on short-term crisis responses. To support the forcibly displaced, development actors should help reduce—even eliminate—vulnerabilities. The forcibly displaced have often acquired vulnerabilities that are specific to them, such as catastrophic losses of assets or trauma. This affects their ability to seize economic opportunities, and it can trap them in poverty. Because such vulnerabilities set them apart from other poor people in the communities where they live, broad-based poverty reduction efforts may not suffice to relieve their plight and special interventions are needed. To support host communities, development actors should help manage the shock caused by an inflow of forcibly displaced persons.
In theory, at least, refugee situations are resolved through the pursuit of three “durable solutions” to displacement: voluntary repatriation, local integration in host states or resettlement to third countries. (WRC, 2019). Less than 1% of refugees are resettled each year, and even fewer obtain citizenship as part of formal local integration efforts. The failure to enable durable solutions has left 75 percent of refugees in situations of protracted displacement.

Development of impact-oriented solutions for refugees and IDPs require increased communication and collaboration between all stakeholders – including refugees and IDPs, local civil society, local government, the UN, financial institutions (led by platforms like the MDBs) and the private sector.

According to the missing migrants project, the recorded migrant’s deaths are the following:

**Figure 6: Recorded Migrant deaths by region - Source: Missing Migrants Project (IOM)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Africa</th>
<th>Americas</th>
<th>Asia</th>
<th>Europe</th>
<th>Mediterranean</th>
<th>Middle East</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2021</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2020</td>
<td>933</td>
<td>685</td>
<td>291</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>1,228</td>
<td>113</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2019</td>
<td>1,887</td>
<td>849</td>
<td>384</td>
<td>148</td>
<td>1,885</td>
<td>174</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2018</td>
<td>1,600</td>
<td>590</td>
<td>191</td>
<td>2,299</td>
<td>145</td>
<td>4,941</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>1,740</td>
<td>681</td>
<td>531</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>3,139</td>
<td>98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016</td>
<td>1,832</td>
<td>730</td>
<td>206</td>
<td>3,054</td>
<td>5,143</td>
<td>106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>1,034</td>
<td>1,519</td>
<td>944</td>
<td>137</td>
<td>6,702</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>623</td>
<td>496</td>
<td>853</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>3,283</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figure 7: Recorded Migrant deaths by region of origin - Source: Missing Migrants Project (IOM)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Europe</th>
<th>Africa</th>
<th>Middle East</th>
<th>Asia</th>
<th>Americas</th>
<th>Mixed/Unknown</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2021</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2020</td>
<td>1,642</td>
<td>153</td>
<td>360</td>
<td>613</td>
<td>420</td>
<td>3,193</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2019</td>
<td>2,041</td>
<td>170</td>
<td>191</td>
<td>796</td>
<td>1,899</td>
<td>5,118</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2018</td>
<td>1,674</td>
<td>275</td>
<td>177</td>
<td>426</td>
<td>2,389</td>
<td>4,941</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>1,674</td>
<td>189</td>
<td>488</td>
<td>650</td>
<td>3,276</td>
<td>6,287</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016</td>
<td>2,696</td>
<td>471</td>
<td>256</td>
<td>669</td>
<td>3,970</td>
<td>8,074</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>1,935</td>
<td>889</td>
<td>1,010</td>
<td>514</td>
<td>2,854</td>
<td>6,702</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>1,943</td>
<td>338</td>
<td>897</td>
<td>496</td>
<td>1,645</td>
<td>5,320</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The main causes are mainly drowning, presumed dehydration and hypothermia and also heart attack.
2. Mobility impact of COVID-19

There are 4.2 million asylum seekers worldwide. Asylum-seekers submitted 580,000 new claims. The United States of America was the world’s largest recipient of new individual applications (155,100) followed by Germany (49,000) and Spain (44,600). New claims were 33 per cent less than the same period in 2019.

As of April 2020, UNHCR recorded 5.6 million persons of concern from Syria (including asylum seekers, refugees, and IDPs). There were about 3.6 million Syrian refugees or asylum seekers in Turkey, 0.9 million in Lebanon, 0.7 million in Jordan, and 0.2 million in Iraq. According to UNHCR, about 300,000 in formal camps and another 150,000 in informal settlements. Also, about 190,000 persons had fled Yemen into countries in the region (mainly Oman, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, and Djibouti).

In countries where UNHCR was working to address internal displacement, 2.9 million IDPs were displaced. One-fifth of all newly displaced IDPs (574,600) were from the Sahel region5. New IDP displacements: 15 per cent fewer than in the same period of 2019.

822,600 displaced people returned to their areas or countries of origin, including 102,600 refugees and 635,000 internally displaced persons. In addition, 85,000 Venezuelans returned from neighbouring countries6.

The health and socio-economic consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic are affecting the forcibly displaced disproportionately with implications for their protection. Over 52% of the world’s refugees live in fragile contexts and six out of the ten top developing countries hosting refugees are exposed to high or very high structural COVID-19 risk as per the INFORM COVID Risk Index (INFORM, 2020). As of April 2021, there were 147 million reported COVID-19 cases worldwide and 3.1 million deaths, the highest death toll in recent history, the previous highest being the so called Spanish flu in 1918.

Migration flows are likely to fall, but the stock of international migrants may not decrease immediately. In 2019, there were around 272 million international migrants (including 26 million refugees). Under normal circumstances, migrants losing jobs would consider returning home. However, that has become nearly impossible because of travel bans and the suspension of transportation services. As a result, the rate of voluntary return migration is likely to fall, except in the case of a few cross-border migration corridors in the South (such as Venezuela–Colombia, Nepal–India, Zimbabwe–South Africa, and Myanmar–Thailand). In other words, more people will stay on in their host country than is typical. (IOM, 2019 Even as new migration flows and refugee movements have declined, the crisis has led to an increase in return migration. Initially the lockdowns and travel bans left many migrant workers stranded in their host countries, unable to travel back. More recently, however, return migration has been reported in all parts of the world in countries such as India, Egypt, Cambodia, Ukraine, Tajikistan and Philippines. Many international

of March 2020, Iraq itself had huge numbers of IDPs: about 300,000 in formal camps and another 150,000 in informal settlements. Also, about 190,000 persons had fled Yemen into countries in the region (mainly Oman, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, and Djibouti).

Border closures may deny people seeking international protection the right to asylum. This could force people to return to situations of danger. As of 13 May 2020, UNHCR estimated that 161 states had partially or fully closed their borders to contain the spread of the virus. Up to 91 of them are making no exception for people seeking asylum (UNHCR, 2020).

While the coronavirus crisis ravages many countries, the MENA region continues to bear the burden of widespread

As new migration flow is reduced to a trickle and return migration surges, 2020 may well become the first year in recent decades to mark an actual fall in the stock of international migrants.

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5. The Sahel region covers Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania and Niger
forced displacement due to conflicts in Syria, Iraq, and Yemen. In response, UNHCR has formulated a COVID-19 Emergency Response. It focuses on (i) continuing, adapting, and delivering protection and assistance to the most vulnerable; (ii) advocating for the inclusion of refugees, internally displaced persons (IDPs), and other marginalized groups in national public health and other responses; (iii) prioritizing immediate interventions to prevent infections; (iv) strengthening communication with communities; and (v) empowering individuals and families to make the best decisions on how to care for themselves, through cash-based assistance (UNHCR, 2020).

As new migration flow is reduced to a trickle and return migration surges, 2020 may well become the first year in recent decades to mark an actual fall in the stock of international migrants. Amid travel bans and restrictions on cross border mobility set in place since March 2020 in several countries, a smaller number of people crossed borders during the first six months of 2020.

According to the provisional results of Germany’s migration statistics, the number of people arriving in the first half of 2020 was down 29 percent (Destatis 2020). Australia predicts that net migration numbers will fall from 154,000 in the 2019–20 financial year to a net loss of 72,000 in 2020–21, a first since World War II (SBS News 2020). According to the OECD International Migration Outlook 2020, issuances of new visas and permits in OECD countries fell by 46 percent in the first half of 2020 compared with the same period in 2019, registering the largest drop ever recorded (OECD 2020c).

Also, cross border movement of refugees and asylum seekers seems to have declined due to the crisis, although more recent data are not yet available. The number of first time asylum seekers to the 27 European Union countries (EU 27) fell from a peak of around 162,050 in October 2015 to around 29,415 in August 2020. The number of persons awaiting a decision on their asylum cases fell from about 1.2 million in September 2016 to just around 0.34 million in August 2020.

3. International response to forced displacement amidst COVID-19

Refugees and internally displaced populations were vulnerable and faced multiple barriers even before the onset of COVID-19. COVID-19’s socioeconomic impact has weighed heavily on the world’s most vulnerable, including forcibly displaced and stateless people, exacerbated their vulnerability, isolation and exclusion, leaving them in critical need of solidarity and support. Despite an urgent appeal from the U.N. Secretary-General on 23 March 2020 calling for a global ceasefire to address the pandemic, new displacement has not halted. While COVID-19 has temporarily led to a reduction in the number of new asylum-seekers due to movement restrictions and border closures (Map-3), including when no exceptions are made for admission to territory, the underlying factors leading to conflict in situations globally remain unaddressed.

Political crises and conflict have created new humanitarian emergencies further raising the number of those forcibly displaced. Achieving durable solutions for forcibly displaced populations has become even more challenging, as conflicts go unresolved and insecurity remains widespread in many countries of origin. At the same time, resettlement countries are accepting smaller numbers of refugees, and host countries are struggling to integrate displaced populations.

Restrictions on movement and concerns about transmission of the virus have resulted in some solutions programs being almost entirely suspended. Consequently, the first half of 2020 saw a significant decline in the number of refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) who could avail themselves of a solution compared to the same period in previous years. Therefore, an increasing number found themselves in protracted and long-lasting displacement situations.

Civil society, development actors, financial institutions, private sector and communities have joined hands to tackle the consequences of COVID-19. In various countries UN cluster approach is being used to share information, and plan responses. In others, more informal mechanisms are at play. Funds required for a full-fledged recovery are scant, and therefore the need to invest in sustainable community-led responses is critical.
4. Social and economic impact of COVID-19

COVID-19 poses and will continue to pose many challenges both in the short and long-term for all low- and middle-income countries. Nevertheless, these challenges are also compounded for low- and middle-income refugee-hosting countries. In order to examine the macroeconomic effects of COVID-19 on countries that host large numbers of refugees, we used the projected growth rates from the April 2020 IMF World Economic Outlook (WEO) from the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The sample consists of the 15 EMDEs hosting the most refugees, asylum-seekers, displaced Venezuelans abroad, and other people under UNHCR’s mandate who have travelled over national borders (“refugees”), compared with other EMDEs and the world. This ‘major refugee-hosting country’ sample covers 59 percent of the world’s refugee population and has more than five times the number of refugees as a percent of the total population (1.6 percent) as the global average. The study examined the change of the projected growth rate between 2019 and 2020. This provides a rough estimate of the macroeconomic effect of COVID-19 accounting for the differences in growth rates beforehand.

The World Bank has predicted a 3.6 percent decline in global incomes per capita, causing the first increase in global poverty since 1998. Similarly, the IMF predicts that the negative impact of the crisis on low-income households will revert back the progress made in reducing extreme poverty since the 1990s. Economic growth is falling in Africa (1.8 percent), Asia and the Pacific (2.7 percent), and Latin America (11 percent) (WEO, 2020). This decline, alongside the effects of a 6 percent decline in high-income countries, is decreasing working hours and earnings, and increasing informality. 68 percent of workers live in countries with recommended or required workplace closures, including nearly all employers and own-account workers in lower-middle income countries. This has led to a 4.5 percent drop in working hours, equivalent to approximately 130 million full-time jobs, estimated to increase to 10.5 percent in the second quarter.

These impacts are projected to be magnified for refugees and those living in conflict areas, where, under current conditions, curfews and restrictions on movement “may cause more suffering than the disease itself,” according to Kurt Tjossem, regional vice president for East Africa at the IRC. For example, the World Food Program (WFP) is estimating these job closures, combined with declining agricultural output, disrupted supply chains, and reduced aid. This will likely lead to 265 million more people facing acute food shortages by the end of 2020.

Overall, major hosting countries were growing slower than other low- and middle-income countries before the pandemic and are projected to experience almost equal declines in growth in 2020. In 2019, major hosting countries grew at 1.0 percent, compared to 3.7 for EMDEs overall. For 2020, the IMF projected growth of -3.2 percent for major hosting countries in 2020, relative to -1.0 percent for all EMDEs, in the April 2020 WEO. The decline in growth from 2019 to 2020, much of which can be attributed to the impacts of COVID-19, is therefore slightly less severe in major hosting countries than in all EMDEs (4.2 percentage points relative to 4.7 percentage points respectively).
Nevertheless, because refugee-hosting countries started at a lower growth rate relative to EMDEs, their growth, on average, will be lower. The projected decline in growth varies across major refugee-hosting countries, from 6.7 percentage points in Peru to 1.4 percentage points in Uganda. Iran is the only major refugee-hosting nation projected to experience faster growth, with a 1.6 percentage point gain.

The IMF projects a significant recovery in 2021, and the average projected changes between 2020 and 2021 for major-hosting EMDEs are the same as for all EMDEs. EMDEs are projected to grow at 6.6 percent and major-hosting EMDEs at 4.4 percent in 2021, representing 7.6 percentage point year over year recoveries for both groups. However, the IMF revised its projections downwards by 0.7 percentage points for all EMDEs in the June 2020 forecast, indicating a slower global economic recovery. Such recovery remains contingent on the implementation of effective policies, the containment of the pandemic, the extent of supply chain disruptions, and other factors.

The World Bank’s analysis of the impact of COVID-19 has shown that pandemic-related job losses and deprivation worldwide are hitting already-poor and vulnerable people hard, while also altering the profile of global poverty by creating millions of “new poor.” The World Bank projects that, in 2020, between 88 million and 115 million people could fall back into extreme poverty as a result of the pandemic, with an additional increase of between 23 million and 35 million in 2021, potentially bringing the total number of new people living in extreme poverty to between 110 million and 150 million. Three factors account for this anticipated increase: the COVID-19 pandemic, armed conflict and climate change. These phenomena are expected to acutely impact a substantial number of countries that host forcibly displaced populations or are source countries for displacement.

For instance, conflict across the Sahel region in Africa remained one of the major drivers for new displacement in the first half of 2020. Massive security problems caused by armed groups prevail. Thousands of women have been raped as part of the dynamics of violence. More than 3,600 schools in the past few years have been destroyed or closed.

In addition, given the increasing impact of climate change on conflicts in this part of the continent, strengthening the regional capacity to respond to population movements through initiatives such as the Bamako Process remains critical to help rapidly address the challenges the region is facing.

Significant new displacement has also been registered during the first half of this year in the Syrian Arab Republic (Syria), the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Mozambique, Somalia and Yemen, among other locations, due to continued, new or increasing violence. While a full picture is yet to be established, UNHCR estimates that global forced displacement has surpassed 80 million at mid-2020. International protection and access to asylum, therefore, continue to be life-saving for many. Forcibly displaced populations have also been severely impacted by restricted access to international protection and basic services.

Although COVID-19 has affected all forcibly displaced and stateless people to some extent, their experiences vary based on age, gender and diversity. Stateless people have also been impacted by COVID-19. Given their inability to prove their nationality or to present an identification document, stateless people have struggled to access urgently needed medical and social services. The suspension of services such as birth registration in some countries has also increased the risk of statelessness for newborns. Good practices can, however, be found in Central Asia, where countries have taken a fully inclusive and non-discriminatory approach to stateless people in terms of testing and treatment.

Positively, the implementation modalities of national asylum procedures have been changed as a result of COVID-19, with more than 100 countries adapting registration procedures for new applicants. UNHCR has worked with State authorities to introduce remote asylum application procedures by mail, phone, email and web-based to help guarantee individuals’ right to seek protection and effective access to asylum procedures. The use of digital technologies has boosted confidence in these new approaches. They have proved to be highly successful in promoting remote access to asylum systems and referral and counselling services.

Lockdown measures have weakened economies around the world, leading to mass layoffs and greater economic insecurity. In the case of forcibly displaced populations, who are often part of the informal labor market and excluded from social safety nets, they have been impacted by the deterioration of countries’ economic situation. In Rwanda, for instance, most of the 12,000 urban refugees in employment lost their jobs due to business closures. In Morocco, among the 44 per cent of the refugee heads of

The World Bank’s analysis of the impact of COVID-19 has shown that pandemic-related job losses and deprivation worldwide are hitting already-poor and vulnerable people hard, while also altering the profile of global poverty by creating millions of “new poor.”
household with jobs, the vast majority (87 per cent) have had to stop working during the lockdown. As a result of the deepening economic and financial crisis, and the COVID-19 pandemic, the proportion of refugees living in Lebanon under the extreme poverty line has jumped from 56 per cent to over 75 per cent.

Remittance Flows Are Expected to Decline in 2020 and 2021. Based on the trajectory of economic activities in many large, migrant hosting countries, especially the United States, European countries, and the GCC countries, remittance flows to LMICs are expected to register a decline of 7.2 percent to $508 billion in 2020, from $ 554 billion in 2019, followed by a further decline of 7.5 percent to $470 billion in 2021.

In the midst of this sharp decline, the relative importance of remittance flows as a source of external financing for low and middle-income (LMIC) countries is expected to rise. This is because foreign direct investment is expected to decline by even more, due to travel bans, disruption of international trade, and wealth effects of declines in the stock prices of multinational companies. FDI flows $534 billion and overseas development assistance (ODA) around $166 billion. The gap between remittance flows and FDI is expected to widen further as the decline in FDI is expected to be sharper. This Brief estimates that FDI could fall by more than 35 percent. Private portfolio flows through stock and bond markets could fall by over 80 percent.

Thus, the projected decline in remittances will be the steepest in recent history, certainly steeper than the decline (less than 5 percent) recorded during the global recession of 2009. This outlook for remittances indicates a more gradual but more prolonged decline (continuing into 2021) than the WB April outlook that expected a drop of around 20 percent to $445 billion in 2020 with a recovery in 2021 (World Bank 2020c), which forecast a sharper decline in 2020 followed by a modest recovery in 2021. According to these projections, in 2020, in current US dollar terms, the top remittance recipient countries are expected to be India, China, Mexico, the Philippines, and Egypt, unchanged from 2019. As a share of GDP for 2020, the top five recipients would be smaller economies, including Tonga, Haiti, Lebanon, South Sudan, and Tajikistan.

Figure 8: Estimates and projections of remittance flows to Low and Middle Income Regions (World Bank – KNOMAD)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>487</td>
<td>531</td>
<td>554</td>
<td>445</td>
<td>470</td>
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<td>128</td>
<td>134</td>
<td>143</td>
<td>147</td>
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<td>138</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>55</td>
<td>61</td>
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<td>89</td>
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<td>33</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Asia</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>118</td>
<td>132</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>115</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-Saharan Africa</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World</td>
<td>437</td>
<td>597</td>
<td>643</td>
<td>694</td>
<td>714</td>
<td>572</td>
<td>602</td>
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</table>

(Growth rate percent)

<table>
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<th></th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>-15</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>-19.7</td>
<td>5.6</td>
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<tr>
<td>East Asia and Pacific</td>
<td>-4.8</td>
<td>-0.5</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>-13.0</td>
<td>7.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>Europe and Central Asia</td>
<td>-14.7</td>
<td>-0.5</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>-13.0</td>
<td>7.5</td>
</tr>
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<td>7.4</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>9.9</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>-19.3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Middle-East and North Africa</td>
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<td>-1.2</td>
<td>12.1</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>-19.6</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Asia</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>-5.9</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>12.1</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>-22.1</td>
<td>-5.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-Saharan Africa</td>
<td>-0.2</td>
<td>-8.3</td>
<td>-9.3</td>
<td>13.7</td>
<td>-0.5</td>
<td>-23.1</td>
<td>-4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World</td>
<td>-5.1</td>
<td>-0.9</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>-19.9</td>
<td>-5.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: World Bank-KNOMAD
Note: See appendix A in World Bank (2017) for data and forecast methods. Projections for 2020 and 2021 are based on methods described in the appendix to this Brief. e = estimate, f = forecast.

7. COVID-19 Crisis through a Migration Lens. Migration and Development Brief 32 April 2020. WBG
A survey conducted in Jordan showed that only 35 per cent of refugees said they had a secure job to return to after the lifting of COVID-19 restrictions. To mitigate the lost income, UNHCR has scaled up cash assistance programmes globally, reaching some 3 million vulnerable people during the first six months of 2020. Granting displaced populations non-discriminatory access to employment, social services and safety nets remains crucial to mitigate the negative effect of the pandemic.

As countries across the world are increasing the coverage of social protection and jobs programmes in response to COVID-19, there is an opportunity to include forcibly displaced persons and other vulnerable groups into social safety nets from the outset, social assistance transfers consisting of cash-based and in-kind measures are the most widely used interventions - 60.7% of global responses. Aligning the cash and voucher assistance programmes currently being scaled-up by the international community with the national social assistance transfers by harmonizing the targeting criteria, transfer mechanisms and monitoring systems would lay the grounds for a more inclusive and equitable process.

The international community and refugee-hosting countries could also work together to turn national policy commitments for inclusion made towards the Global Compact on Refugees (GCR)8 into practice (UNHCR, 2020). In the meantime, some good practices in the COVID-19 response are emerging in different countries. In most Middle Eastern countries for example, where refugees are largely included in the national preparedness and response, governments are adapting in various ways.

The post-World War II international agreements on the governance of migration are designed to help people on the move, due to persecution. This situation is now different from internal conflict and civil wars with respect to world or international wars, due to the protracted duration, security risks entailed and its impact on livelihoods and human capital, to displaced, whether voluntary or forced, regarding the former, which requires a new vision and approach from UN Agencies, MDBs, SCOs, IFIs and the private sector, as well as to promote cooperation among countries dealing with the consequences of movement. But the major migration consequence of the COVID-19 pandemic is the loss of mobility. The dire economic consequences of the inability to move, which threaten the link between migration and development, are beyond the frame of these agreements. The most recent addition to the migration governance toolbox—the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly, and Regular Migration—does, however, include some commitments that can help states respond to the acute stage of the pandemic’s disruption of mobility. Several of its other commitments will be essential in restoring international migration.

International travel was the major vector of the virus’s spread across borders before community transmission took hold. The travel bans, flight suspensions, and border closures states instituted in an effort to stop the spread of COVID-19 ensured a nearly complete halt to international migration starting in March 2020. Some migrants were stranded in countries of destination while others, without permanent residence permits, were required to return to their countries of origin, and still others chose to return after losing their jobs and incomes abroad.

The negative impact of the pandemic on employment may lead to increased competition for scarce resources and reinforce exclusion of the forcibly displaced from the labor market. Refugees in most developing countries already have limited access to formal employment, if they ever did. Globally, it is estimated that up to 50% of refugees who have work are employed in temporary or transient roles (UNHCR, 2019). In such situations, not only will refugees be more exposed to conditions that are not in conformity with decent work principles (ILO, 2020), but they will also have limited or no access to unemployment benefits or social protection schemes in the long-run.

Economic and social impacts are not limited to diminishing employment options. Forcibly displaced persons who are unable to work, including female heads of households, unaccompanied and separated children, elderly persons, and persons with disabilities will find it harder to cope (United Nations, 2020).

In the absence of refugee entitlements to social protection systems, they will be even more impacted by the shock of the pandemic. Having to depend largely on humanitarian assistance or negative coping mechanisms such as skipping meals or increasing debt, they will be falling deeper into precarity. In particular, the most vulnerable amongst them often depend on their own savings, support networks and cash and voucher assistance programmes provided by the international community.

5. Impacts of COVID-19 on Refugee Livelihoods within Hosting Countries.

Refugees often face barriers to economic inclusion. Most refugees hosted in low and middle-income countries face de jure restrictions (whereby refugees are not afforded the same rights in law as citizens) and/or de facto barriers (whereby the law says refugees can work, but there are practical barriers that prevent them from exercising such rights) that prevent their full economic inclusion. Refugees may be limited to specific sectors, as in Jordan, or work permits may rarely be issued in practice, as in Kenya and

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8. The Global Compact on Refugees (GCR) was proposed in 2018 to establish a more predictable and equitable sharing of burdens and responsibilities among United Nations Member States when it comes to fulfilling these obligations.
Turkey. In countries like Peru or Colombia, some displaced Venezuelans have work permits, but in practice they struggle to formalize their employment. Few countries permit refugees to work in the public sector. Other restrictions affect freedom of movement, a necessary component of refugees’ economic inclusion. In countries such as Ethiopia and Chad, refugees are confined to camps, and therefore do not have the ability to fully integrate.

Since low and middle income economies house a high number of refugees and displaced populations, they are limited in offering/enhancing safety nets for groups hardest hit from COVID-19. The scope and scale of responses is also limited by the resources these countries have. In Jordan, 35 percent of Syrian refugees who were employed before COVID-19 have lost their jobs, compared to 17 percent of Jordanian citizens. In Lebanon, 60 percent of Syrians have been permanently laid off due to COVID-19, relative to 39 percent of Lebanese citizens. The data, however, is so far limited from most countries and regions.

6. Highly impacted sectors

A comparative analysis of the potential economic impact of COVID-19 on refugees versus host populations based on their sectors of employment across a wide geographic range was undertaken by the ILO. Data from 8 large EMDE refugee-hosting countries\(^9\) from 2015-2019 showed the most highly impacted sectors were manufacturing, accommodation and food services, wholesale and retail trade, and real estate and business activities. These sectors encompassed approximately 436 million enterprises and 30 percent of GDP worldwide before COVID-19. Many of these are small struggling enterprises themselves, without access to credit, other assets, or government stimulus packages, and will likely be unable to bounce back from COVID-19 related closures.

Overall, the results from the study show that before COVID-19, refugees were 60 percent more likely to be working in the sectors highly impacted by COVID-19 and the economic downturn. 60 percent of employed refugees...
work in highly impacted sectors, relative to 37 percent of the populations in host countries. Meanwhile only 7 percent of refugees work in the lowest impacted sectors, like education and public administration, compared to 19 percent of hosts.

The concentration of refugees in highly impacted sectors is sometimes a result of limited economic inclusion or restrictive laws that push refugees to work in specific industries. For instance, Jordan, one of the first countries to implement reforms to expand work opportunities for refugees, left many sectors off limits for Syrian refugees, pushing them to informality or unemployment. Overall, 46 percent of hosts compared to 20 percent of refugees work in these “low” and “low-medium” impacted sectors across our sample.

**Figure 10: Percentage of employment in highly impacted sectors among refugees and host population by country**

Percentage of employment in highly impacted sectors among refugees and host populations by country.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Mediterranean</th>
<th>Middle East</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Turkey*</td>
<td>74%</td>
<td>56%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia*</td>
<td>80%</td>
<td>64%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda*</td>
<td>52%</td>
<td>40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon*</td>
<td>62%</td>
<td>48%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru*</td>
<td>58%</td>
<td>42%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan*</td>
<td>62%</td>
<td>48%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia*</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>38%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>32%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**% Employed in Highly Impacted Sectors**

Not. The percentage of employed workers ages 15 and older in each country working in the most highly impacted sectors as defined by the ILO. Accommodation and food services, manufacturing, real estate, business and administrative activities, wholesale and retail trade, and repair of motor vehicles. Each sample is weighted according to the individual survey design. Countries are ordered by the size of their refugee population. Asterisks indicate the differences between refugees and host populations are statistically significant at the 5 percent level.

### 7. Informality

Almost 1.6 billion informal economy workers are significantly impacted by lockdown measures and/or working in the hardest-hit sectors—76 percent of all informal workers (ILO). These workers are projected to see a decline in earnings of 60 percent globally, with low- and lower-middle-income countries experiencing an 82 percent decline. Many informal workers lack job security and access to a pension account, as well as other benefits. Given the large proportions of informal workers in low- and middle-income countries, relative poverty in these regions is projected to increase by at least 34 percentage points.

Data shows that low and lower-middle income countries have a high percentage of informal employment within their total employment – 88% and 85% respectively. The figure below also shows that 68% (out of 88%) of informal employment in low income countries and 80% (out of 85%) informal employment was impacted as a result of COVID-19. The UN estimates that 207 million people could be pushed into extreme poverty by 2030 due to the medium to long term impacts of COVID-19.

Indeed, COVID-19 has heavily disrupted refugees’ livelihoods and forced many to choose between earning a living or prioritizing their health.
Figure 11: Proportion of informal employment significantly impacted by lockdown and social distancing measures by country income group.

Note: Estimates based on the analysis of national household survey data from 129 countries representing 90 per cent of global employment. Detailed results by income group and by region are available in Table A2 and Table A3 (See Annex).

Figure 12: Gender differences in the impact of the crisis

Gender differences in the impact of the crisis in the informal economy: Women are over-represented in high-risk sectors (2010, percentage)

Note: Based on the analysis of national household survey data from 129 countries representing 90 per cent of global employment. Groups of sectors classified according to the impact of the crisis on economic output follows the classification presented in table 1 in ILO Monitor: COVID-19 and the world of work. Third edition.
Women have been impacted more than men due to the COVID-19 crisis and its impact on the informal economy. Globally, 42% women in high-risk sectors were impacted by COVID-19 than men (32%). 28% women were impacted in high-risk sector in low-income countries, as compared to 17% men. COVID-19 related closures and interruptions to businesses, schools and other activities meant increase in unpaid care work, reduced reliance on support networks and led to an impact on women’s employment. Discrimination against women can also be an issue to be considered in this context.

Data also shows that high risk sectors constitute 45%, 42%, 31% and 18% of employment in high, upper-middle, lower-middle and low income countries respectively; while 9%, 30%, 44% and 68% of employment in high, upper-middle, lower-middle and low income countries respectively is at low-medium risk. Agriculture solely constitutes the low-medium risk employment. In analyzing this data, due consideration should be given to the fact that already vulnerable communities may not necessarily have the choice to go to work or to stay home and stay safe from COVID-19. Therefore, statistical evidence of employment across various social and economic groups needs to be correlated with qualitative data from the ground.

The following data shows that the incidence of relative poverty amongst informal workers is high in comparison...
to formal workers. A rise in poverty impacts many other domains of life including housing, health, food security, education etc. and push communities towards adopting negative coping mechanisms. Increased poverty also means that these communities may not be able to access testing and treatment services for COVID-19.

Figure 14: Labor income and relative poverty among informal workers as a result of COVID-19

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Median monthly labour earnings (2016 PPP$)</th>
<th>Relative poverty (incidence within group)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All</td>
<td>Formal workers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>By Income Group</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High-income countries</td>
<td>2673.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Upper-middle-income countries</td>
<td>608.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lower-middle-income countries</td>
<td>545.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>By Region</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>585.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin America and the Caribbean</td>
<td>522.2</td>
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<td>North America*</td>
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<tr>
<td>Asia and the Pacific</td>
<td>662.7</td>
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<tr>
<td>Europe and Central Asia</td>
<td>1862.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World</td>
<td>1218.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Estimates are based on weighted averages from 63 countries with data collected on a time interval between 2016 to 2019 representing 65 per cent 01 global employment. Labour Income includes Income from own-account workers, employer, self-reputed earnings and wages of wage employees. The estimates exclude unpaid family workers who are not usually asked to declare monetary earnings. Wherever possible, estimates include labour incomes from Jobs other than the main Job the original local currency values have been converted to constant 2016 PPP dollars. Relative poverty is defined as the proportion of workers with monied, labour income that fall below 50% of the median monthly labour income in the population. North America includes the United States and Canada. Latin Amer. and the Caribbean includes all other econom. in the American continent among the 64 counwes ata for Arab States 6 not available.
8. Additional Impacts of COVID-19 on Refugees’ Incomes

COVID-19 will cause widespread loss of livelihoods among refugee populations, which will affect their self-reliance and increase protection concerns. Without jobs and access to income, many refugees may suffer from increased food insecurity, inability to pay rent, debt arising from vital health care costs, and a lack of ability to cope with shocks. Refugees are therefore more likely to turn to negative coping strategies including skipping meals, exploitative work, or child labor. Furthermore, their status as foreigners makes them subject to xenophobia and abuse, which in turn often translates into worse working conditions when compared to their national counterparts.

Indeed, COVID-19 has heavily disrupted refugees’ livelihoods and forced many to choose between earning a living or prioritizing their health. The need to earn a living pushes refugee workers to keep working, despite quarantine measures. As COVID-19 affects businesses and economic activity around the world, refugees already facing challenges to their economic inclusion will continue to remain among the most vulnerable and marginalized. Their lack of access to social protections and economic systems of the countries that host them will only be magnified by the pandemic.

Education

In line with “Refugee Education 2030” the inclusion of refugees in national response plans and ensuring that refugees have meaningful access to support programmes has been a key element of the COVID-19 response. Nevertheless, some 1.8 million refugee children and youth in 57 countries were not attending school because of closures intended to limit the spread of coronavirus, as of September that families have access to these programmes, supporting more than 744,000 children and youth with distance/home-based learning. Even before the pandemic, refugee children were at a grave disadvantage in terms of access to education. COVID-19 has worsened the situation, with a refugee child being twice as likely to be out of school as a non-refugee child. UNHCR remains deeply concerned by the lasting effect of the pandemic on education - as many as half of all refugee girls in secondary school may not return to class without greater socio-economic support to their families, water, sanitation and hygiene measures in schools, as well as catch-up learning opportunities.

According to a survey of 1400 refugees in 8 countries conducted by Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC), 73% of respondents felt they were less likely to send their children to school due to their economic situation.

Food Security

Since the pandemic’s onset, global hunger has reached its highest level in decades and, if left unchecked, will almost certainly exacerbate the outbreak’s death toll. Recent estimates suggest that in 2020, COVID-19 will add 83 million to 132 million people, if not more, to the rolls of those without adequate food to meet their nutritional needs. In developing countries, the number of people suffering food insecurity is expected to nearly double this year, to 265 million.

Figure 15: Percentage of respondents less likely to send their children to school due to their economic condition

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>83%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>71%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>83%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>82%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>74%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>55%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Venezuela</td>
<td>42%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Three out of four displaced people surveyed by NRC said they were less likely to send their children to school

10. The Pandemic Has Made Hunger Even More Urgent to Address Food Insecurity Could Be a Long Lasting Side Effect of COVID-19 By Sara Bleich and Sheila Fleischhacker November 4, 2020
Prior to the pandemic, 2 billion people—or about one-quarter of the global population—lacked regular access to enough safe and nutritious food to grow and develop normally. Prior to the pandemic, international agencies estimated that 21.3 percent of the world’s children had stunted growth, meaning that they were too short for their age; 6.9 percent were wasted, meaning that they were too thin for their height; 5.6 percent were overweight; and at least 340 million suffered from micronutrient deficiencies.

About 60 percent of the world’s chronically food-insecure people live in countries riven by conflict. For children, the number is as high as 75 percent. Refugees displaced by war are especially vulnerable to food insecurity. Poor nutrition can weaken the immune system and put refugees, particularly those living in crowded camps, at higher risk of COVID-19. Prolonged conflicts can also disrupt food supplies, causing food prices to fluctuate and sometimes spike. The figure below maps the risks for refugees facing the COVID-19 induced recession:

**Figure 16: Mapping risks for refugees in COVID induced recession**

- **COVID-19 INDUCED ECONOMIC RECESSION**
  - **INCOME LOSS RISK**: Low safety net coverage, lack of assets, limited coping strategies
  - **LIVING STANDARDS AND PROTECTION RISKS**: Refugees are mostly active in the informal economy (related to de jure and de facto lack of right to work) and in sectors highly impacted by lockdowns and global recession.
  - **NON-LABOR INCOME**: Refugees have limited access to national safety nets; humanitarian needs are increasing and only partially met; and remittances sent to refugees might decrease.
  - **HOUSING**: Those housed outside of refugee camps have precarious housing conditions and a high risk of eviction; unimproved and crowded housing conditions might increase the likelihood of disease transmission.
  - **FOOD SECURITY**: Disruption in food aid logistics; reduced food consumption as coping strategy during economic stress.
  - **HEALTH**: Refugees living in crowded housing and with limited access to health care and sanitation may increase exposure; need to include refugees in supply of protective measures; increased out-of-pocket health costs to address both COVID-19 and non COVID-19 related symptoms.
  - **EDUCATION**: Refugees’ children going to school are affected by school closure, like most students globally; lack of access to schooling has a significant lasting impact on their future productivity, incomes, and opportunities.

This creates the need for timely and accurate data

The availability of adequate and timely information has become more important than ever in order to assess the pandemic’s impact on forcibly displaced populations. To mitigate these data gaps, humanitarian and development organizations have been collecting data remotely, such as through telephone surveys, self directed surveys and remote key informant interviews. Datasets detailing the impact of COVID-19 on forcibly displaced populations in Lebanon, Kenya, Mauritania and Zambia are already available in UNHCR’s Microdata Library, with more datasets being curated.
9. Ongoing efforts and good practices

Ongoing advocacy is underway to ensure refugees are included in national social protection, with a number of countries already including refugees in social safety nets, and others extending social protection schemes to reach informal workers. Inclusion in national social protection schemes is being seen in Armenia, Republic of Congo, Mauritania, South Africa, Turkey, Uruguay, and the European Union to name a few.

The pandemic has seen the emergence of opportunities and good practices. Refugee employment and entrepreneurship in high demand sectors is being facilitated through collaboration with governments, private sector and development actors.

The European Qualifications Passport for Refugees (EQPR), issued by the Council of Europe in partnership with UNHCR has proved a powerful tool for supporting refugees’ skills validation and access to employment and higher education in the health sector and beyond. Employment of refugee doctors and health workers throughout Europe and Latin America has supported refugees’ employment and has enabled refugees to support the host country in fighting COVID-19.

UNHCR’s partnerships with 21 financial service providers (FSPs) in 14 countries, offering them support through socio-economic data sharing, advocacy and logistics. Six of these FSPs have received capital at zero-interest by Kiva, through their microfinance crowdfunding platform. Kiva established partnerships with additional 6 FSPs to extend their loan products to refugees. Over 17,000 refugee borrowers have been served by the 12 FSPs using Kiva’s capital.

UNHCR, the World Bank’s Partnership for Economic Inclusion and 13 non-governmental organizations are scaling up the “graduation approach” through the Poverty Alleviation Coalition. Of the 35 countries targeted by the Coalition, funding is confirmed in Bangladesh, Ecuador, Jordan, Kenya, Peru, Somalia and Mozambique, for which the main donors are PRM, GIZ, GAC, DFID, EU Trustfund and DEVCO, Novo Nordisk Foundation and OSF. This initiative supports inclusion of the most vulnerable populations in rebuilding livelihood and improve their self-reliance.

The MADE51 partnership model enabled refugee’s production of essential items such as community masks in Armenia, Bangladesh, Cameroon, Egypt, Jordan, India, Kenya, Malaysia, Pakistan, Uganda and others reach local and international markets through local social enterprises.

Various countries example Australia and New Zealand extended or waived fees of seasonal and temporary workers stranded due to mobility restrictions. Ecuador extended the deadline for Venezuelan refugees to apply for a humanitarian visa until the end of the state of emergency while Chile’s online system extended visas and stay permits for 6 months automatically upon request. Uganda waived off fines for overstaying visas.

Ukraine passed legislation to ensure IDPs received social protection benefits during lockdown. Turkey continued trainings, certifications and authorizations for refugee health professionals free of charge. Humanitarian actors in Burkina Faso, Guinea, Chad and Liberia continue to pay teacher’s stipends to refugee teachers during the schools closures to ensure income continuity.
MAPPING KEY ACTORS

Work for refugees and displaced communities brings together a diverse set of actors. Some support through channeling funds, others by implementing and monitoring initiatives or generating knowledge and documenting learning. While supporting refugees and displaced communities has remained central to humanitarian actors and their responses, there is a growing body of data which supports holistic responses to refugees which bridge the gaps between emergency relief and development. This study takes a holistic view of the key actors involved along with a brief description of their key roles.
1. Civil society

Across the globe, civil society has engaged in dynamic action to counter anti-immigrant narratives and views, and there is increasing interest amongst the public in engaging and participating in these efforts (Crawley and McMahon, 2016). ‘Civil society’ in this context includes organizations who provide legal advice, research, and advocacy services, as well as those who bring immigrant and host communities together. These groups often involve, or are set up by, refugees and immigrants themselves.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Platforming and promoting migrant voices</th>
<th>The VOICES Network is a UK initiative that has been instrumental in amplifying more immigrant voices in public debate with a network of refugee and asylum seeker ambassadors spanning the UK (British Red Cross, 2020).</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Myth-busting</td>
<td>In the US, Teaching Tolerance provides free resources – including classroom lessons, webinars, podcasts and policy guides – to schools and other education institutions, with one toolkit devoted to myth-busting on immigration (Teaching Tolerance, 2020).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aiming to change the frame of the debate</td>
<td>In Peru, IOM and UNHCR are coordinating the #TuCausaEstMiCausa campaign spanning civil society, the private sector, and others and designed to increase solidarity towards Venezuelan immigrants through social media, community workshops, and street theatre performance (IOM and UNHCR, 2018).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Promoting social cohesion by utilising contact theory</td>
<td>Welcoming America is one such organisation in the US organisation that builds on contact theory to bring immigrants and US born community members into direct contact, often for the first time, through local gatherings (Welcoming America, 2020).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lobbying to change the policy environment and build public support for reform</td>
<td>NGOs across the globe are working to hold their governments to account on immigration. For example, the Refugee Council of Australia represents over 200 Australian organisations and has spoken out on a range of policy issues over the last three decades, with a strong focus on campaigning against the conditions in Australia’s offshore migrant processing system, Nauru and Manus (Cornish, 2016).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. The private sector

Private sector engagement is a new and emerging trend in the context of public engagement on immigration. Larger multinationals can be far more active in this space. This is in part due to greater capacity and resources, from awareness training to the availability of guidance in different languages. The private sector plays an increasingly active role in publicly engaging on immigration issues – sometimes explicitly with a view to influencing public perceptions – with businesses of all sizes, across all geographies and all sectors, employing migrant labor. The scale and type of their engagement varies, and often sits within Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) efforts but moves through core business activities promoting inclusive and sustainable growth.

| Publicly promoting the value of immigration | In the US, President Trump’s 2017 travel ban was met with vocal opposition from business, with companies including Starbucks, Google, Amazon, and Facebook speaking out against the ban. Mark Zuckerberg, CEO of Facebook, posted ‘we are a nation of immigrants, and we all benefit when the best and brightest from around the world can live, work and contribute here’ in response (Graham, 2017). Public corporate support for immigration has primarily focused on showcasing the benefits of highly-skilled migration. |
| Proactively and promoting hiring refugees and migrants | Many businesses are actively promoting the recruitment of refugees and migrants, albeit often with a focus on high-skilled immigration. For example, in the US, 30 percent of Chiobani Yogurt’s workforce are refugees due to a concerted effort by founder Hamdi Ulukaya, himself a Turkish migrant (Alesci, 2018). |
| Lobbying for policy reform | The UK post-Brexit has seen business becoming increasingly vocal on the importance of immigration. In January 2020, UK government plans for a points-based immigration system ending low-skilled visas received widespread pushback from the private sector, with an open letter sent to the Home Secretary by the Confederation of British Industry (CBI) and over 30 other leading trade associations (CBI, 2020). |
| Directly supporting and contributing to integration and social cohesion efforts | In Uganda the Mastercard Smart Communities Coalition has developed an ICT hub in Rwamwanja Refugee Settlement that brings new learning and entrepreneurship opportunities to the southern area of the settlement and host community as part of the Coalition’s work with refugee and host communities across East Africa (Smart Communities Coalition, 2018). |
| Participating and building coalitions for change | In Germany, Bertelsmann Stiftung and seven other foundations fund the Expert Council of German Foundations on Integration and Migration which develops reports, policy briefings and policy recommendations to promote Germany as a country of immigration and integration (Mosel et al., 2019). |

3. Humanitarian and Development Actors

These include donors, non-government organizations, the UN and other platforms and bodies which come together to ‘respond’ to the needs of refugees and displaced communities. Humanitarian actors respond to immediate and emergency needs which are sometimes referred to as lifesaving assistance example transitional shelter, hygiene kits, cash assistance, cash for work, food baskets, immediate medical attention etc. Development actors can provide financial
resources with a medium-term perspective as well as a range of analytical and advisory services. They have access to economic policymakers, who are not traditional counterparts for humanitarian agencies. They can inform public debates and policy formulation, and help strengthen institutions. They can also develop innovative financing solutions to leverage a strong private sector response.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Provide emergency relief</th>
<th>Refugees arriving in host country are provided shelter in a refugee camp. A refugee family receives a cash voucher to meet immediate needs.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Undertake coordination and response planning</td>
<td>UN clusters carry out meetings to coordinate responses to meet needs of displaced communities - this avoids duplications and enables synergy and referral system building.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discourage government policies that induce forced displacement</td>
<td>Organizations form an alliance, conduct research and inform governance on the social and economic impact of the displacement.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Help host countries and host communities prepare</td>
<td>Donors make funding available for disaster preparedness to enhance in-country institutional capacity and emergency response mechanisms.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strengthen the resilience of those who stay behind</td>
<td>Communities are supported in developing and implementing an early warning system to support them minimize damages from flash floods.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Both humanitarian and development actors have their limitations. Humanitarian actors are not mandated or equipped to deal with needs of communities over a medium to long term, while development actors may not be mandated or equipped to deliver urgent assistance in environments with significant security risks or engage in some issues that are critical to the displacement agenda, especially in the political or legal arena. The most effective and efficient approach therefore is a nexus between humanitarian and development approach. Literature also suggests a triple nexus approach between humanitarian action, development action and peace – so further displacement due to conflict can be prevented while the current affected are supported through a robust approach to reintegrate and resettle.

4. Financial Institutions

Financial institutions are an important stakeholder and actor is preventing and addressing the impacts of conflict. Tailored support from financial institutions can support post conflict reconstruction, revival of economy, enhancing access to financing especially for MSMEs, engagement for a more robust and dynamic role of the private sector and developing multi-stakeholder partnerships for long term solutions to issues faced by refugees, displaced communities and host communities. Financial institutions provide support to low and middle income countries through different envelopes and can play an active role in strengthening preparedness and supporting resilience.

Collaboration and increased cooperation between financial institutions can support private sector-led growth through tailored initiatives to catalyze and de-risk investments both pre and post conflict settings. Increased access to finances and financial inclusion of refugees and displaced communities can elevate the scope of interventions from individuals to markets at large.

| Provide financial support to low and middle-income countries | For International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) countries, the Global Concessional Financing Facility has provided more than $3 billion in concessional assistance to middle-income countries affected by refugee crises. |
| Support national systems for prevention of conflict and violence | Engaging with various partners to build institutional capacity at national, subnational, and local governments, local (MSMEs), and multilateral and multinational private sector firms to leverage financing to incentivize investments and influence policy reform that address the root causes of FCV |
| Support job creation and promote inclusive economic growth | The World Bank’s FCV Strategy recognizes the importance of achieving impact at the market and sector levels requires an integrated approach in which the World Bank, IFD, and MIGA operate in a complementary manner, both upstream and downstream, to deliver investments and help create jobs. The strategy therefore emphasizes the WBG’s role in strengthening the enabling environment for tailored financing architecture for countries impacted by FCV. |
| Systematize partnerships with humanitarian, development, security, and peacebuilding actors at the country level | Coordination and cooperation for a more impact-oriented response including conducting joint assessments, pooling funds and evaluating models which proved effective for scale etc. |

5. Refugee and Displaced Communities

Recognizing the importance and centrality of refugee and displaced communities as an active and critical part of the key actors and stakeholders involved in the rebuilding process is critical. Without this recognition and resultant participation, there is no ownership and therefore no sustainability in programs for any type of recovery and rebuilding. Communities must have an active role in all the following processes.
The forcibly displaced people (FDP) were already vulnerable before the crisis, and in diverse conditions. This was due to a lack of assets, limited job opportunities, restricted access to social safety nets, and reliance on humanitarian assistance. The forcibly displaced live in very diverse conditions, depending on their legal status, demographic characteristics, the country where they live, and their location in camps or in urban settings, among other factors. FDPs are often located in poorer, marginalized regions (or such parts of major cities) where the economic consequences of the pandemic may vary. The extremely thin evidence base on FDPs’ pre-existing living conditions and the impact of the current crisis on their lives (and on host communities) is a constraint to the design and delivery of programs targeting the right populations with the support they need.
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Partly as a result of these restrictions, most refugees work in the informal economy and in sectors that the ILO has deemed “highly impacted” by the pandemic. COVID-19 is therefore likely to lead to widespread loss of livelihoods and an increase in poverty among this population.

Therefore, to create the conditions necessary for economic inclusion, a wide range of barriers that refugees typically face—including legal, administrative, practical, discriminatory, and social barriers—must be removed and/or lowered. These include the inability to obtain proper identification including work permits or business licenses, restricted freedom of movement, difficulty accessing financial services including social safety nets, a lack of job opportunities, unsafe working conditions, poor access to childcare, and more.

The concentration of refugees in highly impacted sectors is sometimes a result of limited economic inclusion or restrictive laws that push refugees to work in specific industries.

The Islamic Development Bank (IsDB) selected eight countries, seven are among its Member Countries which are: Jordan, Pakistan, Turkey and Lake Chad Basin (LCB) which consists of four countries including Niger, Chad, Nigeria and Cameroon. The eighth country in the case study is Ethiopia which is non-member country but hosts a significant number of refugees from MCs.

The concentration of refugees in highly impacted sectors is sometimes a result of limited economic inclusion or restrictive laws that push refugees to work in specific industries.

Turkey hosts the largest number of persons under temporary and international protection in the world. There are 4 million Refugees and asylum-seekers in Turkey including over 3.6 million Syrian nationals with Temporary Protection and around 400,000 refugees and asylum-seekers of other nationalities. Over 98% of Syrian refugees live across Turkey in 81 provinces with less than two percent residing in the seven remaining Temporary Accommodation Centres (TACs).

Turkey’s refugee response is based on a comprehensive legal framework, in particular the Law on Foreigners and International Protection (2013) and the Temporary Protection Regulation (2014). According to Turkish legislation, refugees with temporary protection have the right to health insurance, however, they can only access free health services in the same city where they registered for temporary protection. Syrians living under temporary protection have engaged in informal jobs with substandard payments. According to the in-country study, the process of acquiring residence papers is practical and affordable; refugees and forced displaced people can get work permits; they are included in social protection mechanisms and safety nets; they have the capacity to report on human right violations; and have access to decent work conditions.

The Government of Turkey leads the response and has shouldered the bulk of the financial burden of hosting Syrians under temporary protection. As the situation remains protracted, there is a need for increased and sustained international responsibility sharing, in line with the core principles of the Global Compact on Refugees, to address the continued needs of Syrians under temporary protection, persons under international protection, the communities which host them and the institutions which respond to the needs of both.

Through its collaboration with the Vocational Qualifications Authority, UNHCR translated the National Vocational Qualifications and Vocational Qualification Standards of 13 industry sectors into Arabic to facilitate the certification of refugees. In collaboration with the Ministry of National Education, UNHCR supports PECs to increase the access of refugees under temporary protection to vocational training. The Gaziantep Chamber of Commerce and UNHCR teamed up for awareness-raising activities and organized a job fair to bridge the gap between Syrian job seekers and the Turkish private sector. Such activities contribute to knowledge-sharing and networking for job seekers enabling them to make connections with potential employers, mentors, and peers. Gaziantep hosts the majority of Syrian entrepreneurs in Turkey.

Agriculture work access does not require work permit though. Due to the large informal economy in Turkey (40 percent), most of the refugees work in the informal sector
and only 3 percent have a work permits, so many works without proper wage and protection. UNHCR’s cooperation with the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) in its Agricultural Livelihoods Programme continued for its third year in collaboration with the provincial directorates of the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry. Vocational training on bakery, cattle care, harvesting fruit crops, food processing, greenhouse production, and fruit seedling reached 1,078 beneficiaries in 2019.

In support of self-reliance and in response to difficult socio-economic conditions, UNHCR has been working through its partners to provide online vocational courses, Turkish language courses, soft skills online training and online entrepreneurship training. Given additional COVID-19 access restrictions, most of the training courses are being provided online.

UNHCR promotes and prepares for durable solutions for refugees. This entails working with public institutions, particularly İŞKUR, the Turkish Employment Agency, private companies and development actors to improve refugees’ access to self-reliance opportunities. To enhance the self-reliance of refugees, UNHCR provides financial and administrative support to refugees through its partners to obtain work permits and open businesses. Refugees continue to benefit from soft skills and entrepreneurship training, vocational courses and Turkish language courses, most of which have transferred to online platforms. Eight Public Education Centres (PEC) are also being renovated and refurbished for vocational and lifelong skills training. İŞKUR and UNHCR and distributed to job seekers and business owners; as were over 35,000 İŞKUR Guide to Employment Booklets and brochures with step-by-step information on the work permit application process.

The rights to work are not functional enough for the Syrians under temporary protection, and more than 95 percent of the Syrians working at present are working informally. All projections indicate that as 1-1.2 million Syrians in Turkey managed to survive by working informally, their financial need from the state has decreased and they are contributing to the Turkish economy. Many international institutions, notably the World Bank, have expressed that Turkey pursued the right policy by not forcing the Syrians to stay in camps and allowing their employment (even though informally), which has in turn allowed Syrians to make a contribution to the economy and facilitated refugees to lead a life compatible with human dignity, and suggested that it could be referred to as a “developmentalist refugee policy”.

The informal economy seems to have played an important role in enabling Syrians to live in Turkey in a relatively problem-free manner. More importantly, it has also played an important role in enabling Syrian refugees to work without creating unemployment among local Turks.

Syrian entrepreneurs, of course, have made significant contributions to the economic cohesion of the Syrians in Turkey. Syrians can open up businesses in Turkey in accordance with the Turkish Code of Commerce. In businesses that are formally registered in Turkey, the owner of the business can officially apply for work permits. Although some are comprised only of self-financing micro-level businesses, the number of businesses established by Syrians in Turkey has been increasing. Syrian businesses comprise the highest number of foreign companies established in Turkey in 2017 and 2018.

According to the declaration by the Ministry of Trade, it is noted that the number of companies with at least one partner of Syrian origin was 15,159 as of 26 February 2019. It is estimated that this figure is even higher when including firms established informally. The main sectors of these Syrian companies established include wholesale, real estate and construction sectors. Some research suggests that the Syrian Joint Capital has exceeded 100 million dollars.

Close to 1,330 individuals benefited from UNHCR’s Entrepreneurship Support Programme in 11 cities across Turkey; the main goal of which is to provide knowledge and necessary tools for existing and potential entrepreneurs to start, develop or register their businesses. The trainings cover information on legal procedures for establishing a business or license, access to finance, cash and in-kind grants, and business start-up support. The most common economic activities in which refugees and FDP participate are: Agriculture, construction and manufacturing.

Since 2015, the 3RP (Resilience, Response and Recovery Plan) in Turkey has contributed to the mobilization of more than US$ 4.5 billion, in particularly increasing support to and through public services and to municipalities where 90% of Syrians under temporary protection live.

3RP partners continue to support the Government of Turkey in meeting the most pressing basic needs of persons under temporary and international protection along with vulnerable host community members through cash and in-kind assistance. The multi-purpose cash assistance scheme, the Emergency Social Safety Net (ESSN), will continue to provide essential support to around 1.7 million vulnerable individuals under temporary protection, and is now funded outside the 3RP.

Refugees, displaced populations and host communities typically support themselves through: remittances, cash support / grants, family and social networks, external Aid, Cash for work, Social protection or safety nets, Income and wages from jobs, self employments, MSMEs-Entrepreneurship.

The 3RP report indicates that the 38% of the refugee households report increased level of stress and 13% increased level of conflict within the household which requires immediate protection concerns for especially women as most refugee women would avoid reporting such incidents to the police because they fear deportation or increased domestic violence.
The UN COVID-19 assessment and mapping and response plan got developed with a specific funding request. New modalities got established notably online systems to provide online and blended trainings and SMEs got supported in digital economy. National and local authorities started remote/digital service delivery incentives. Financial institutions (MDBs) support public institutions, private sector is involved in the refugee market and response trying to link the social and business objectives and creation of new jobs and civil society tries to support with limited space for advocacy and funding and a strong focus on women empowerment.

Conclusions

Turkey’s proven ability to embrace and accommodate more refugees than any other country constitutes the foundation of what can be seen as a best practice in migration management. The role of Turkish civil society should not be understated throughout this process as myriad CSOs have repeatedly exhibited a remarkable degree of adaptability in the face of adversity and a strong commitment to sustaining and improving communal harmony, even amid the COVID-19 pandemic. Nonetheless, the high degree of overall social acceptance of refugees can still be considered fragile, and as the pandemic has shown, refugees’ and host communities’ economic access may well be the Achilles’ heel of Turkey’s robust refugee response efforts.

In order to address the long-term socio-economic needs of vulnerable host and refugee communities in Turkey while also providing a powerful method of social harmonization, CSOs and local governments need to modify their interventions to move away from a “burden” approach to an “opportunity” approach. Instead of viewing the refugee community as a liability, UN Agencies, CSOs would do well to highlight their untapped human capital, and emphasize the different ways in which they can become active participants in the economic life of the country they are living in.

Recommendations:

- Promoting joint economic ventures for refugees and Turkish citizens.
- Developing and implementing internship and apprenticeship programs for refugees and host communities, while matching supply with demand.
- Communities that increase individual employability and marketability.
- Designing and instating capacity building programs for Turkey-based CSOs that empower the creation of opportunities for the most vulnerable of refugees, such as women, children, and unemployed youth.
- Creating gender-friendly employment contexts wherein women are provided access to language training courses and affordable day care for children and the elderly.
- Establishing entrepreneurship and micro-business trainings depending on the needs of the labor market, particularly in the digital sphere.
- Promoting investments and incentives for enterprises and businesses from countries of origin of FDP, MNC together with appropriate trade policies for production of goods and services to attend the needs of domestic and international markets with active participation of FDP and their host communities.
- Explore and provide an enabling environment for active participation of the Diaspora in the livelihoods and wellbeing of FDP.
- Contribute to close the digital gap and introduce digitalization for institutional, employment and innovation in MSMEs.
- Enhance the strategies, policies and operations of MDBs and IFIs in the growth and development space for FDP.
- Creating platforms for coordination between government representatives, international nongovernmental organizations, and smaller CSOs rooted in the local communities to facilitate exchange of information and best practices.
- Despite the outbreak of COVID-19 and the restrictions imposed on interpersonal contact, social cohesion should be at the front and center of all livelihoods interventions in order to ensure a smooth transition from the humanitarian assistance perspective to the medium and long-term development perspective.

Jordan

Jordan hosts 1.3 million Syrians, of which 662,166 are registered with UNHCR, making it the second largest per capita refugee hosting country in the world. Jordan has always viewed hosting refugees through a utilitarian political lens. The Syrian refugee influx has provided it with further opportunities to leverage international support to its benefit. While Jordan undoubtedly has been burdened by hosting an increasingly vulnerable Syrian refugee population, its responses to the crisis have demonstrated its understanding of the significant relationship between the hosting of refugees, increased international aid, and the opportunities provided for nation building.

The Jordan Compact represents a milestone in this process. In the Jordan Compact, issued at the conclusion of the London donor’s conference for Syria and the region in February 2016, the Government of Jordan (GoJ) declared that in the coming years it would allow potentially as many as 200,000 Syrians to obtain work permits in Jordan.

The Jordan Compact has run up against three main underlying dynamics that have shaped Jordan’s political
The plan to employ refugees in special economic zones and to boost Jordan's economy by attracting investments through trade concessions has proven hard to roll out when confronted by several complexities. Success often has been bought at the expense of harsh working conditions and low wages, which have deterred Syrian refugees from taking up employment there.

Informal employment was found to be widespread in Jordan, mainly among Syrian refugees. The level of informal employment is exhibited by the type of employment contract, duration of contract, and social security coverage that the workers have. Fifty-five per cent of surveyed workers in Jordan reported that they had short-term employment agreements (temporary, seasonal, or irregular). The precarious type of work including temporary, seasonal and irregular, is more prevalent among Syrians (69 per cent) compared to Jordanians.

The donor-driven push to formalize (Syrian) refugee labor stands in tension with the long-established dynamics of an informalized labor market, and with the interests of the actors for whom this informalized or semi-formalized system works. The institutional conditions for refugees and displaced communities aren’t sufficiently inclusive due to the fact that the process of acquiring residence papers isn’t practical nor affordable.

The impact of COVID-19 in Jordan is significant, with deteriorating conditions impacting both refugees and host communities, with high increases in unemployment, food insecurity, risk of eviction, Gender Based Violence (GBV), and a decline in access to education and health services. Three quarters of the general population reported difficulties in meeting even their basic needs like food and rent, while this exceeded 85 percent for the most vulnerable. Additionally, Jordan was faced with the burden of increased refugees, whereby the government had to increase spending to accommodate the increasing population. The influx of refugees put pressure on the limited available resources, especially in the education, health, and infrastructure sectors and led...
to increased unemployment. The Jordan Response Plan (JRP) 2020–2022 includes a COVID-19 pillar, and each project comprises refugee, host community as well as an institutional and capacity building component.

Expanded access to work permits alongside the expansion of social security coverage to informal microenterprises and self-employed workers will help longer-term self-sufficiency of workers. However, the recovery from COVID-19 induced increase in unemployment and underemployment, particularly within the informal sector where most of the refugee community and vulnerable Jordanians are employed.

The key challenges faced by migrants, refugees and IDPs and host communities are: Work permits; Household and welfare conditions (access to housing or shelter, health, food security and nutrition, education, WASH and basic social and economic services, social protection, loss of income); jobs and livelihoods conditions (formalization, informality, decent work conditions); Micro, Small and Medium Enterprise (MSMEs) Entry barriers for urban and rural activities; gender: Women and girls’ conditions (in terms health, childcare, GBV, social protection, employment and access to jobs and income); youth employment (Skills, TVET, matching jobs); risks (Health, livelihoods, housing, food security, social security and protection); limited access of technology (digital skills, connectivity, digital devices); and limited access to financial services (banking services, micro-finance schemes). Therefore the COVID-19 pandemic has had a high impact and completely changed the situation on ground.

Refugees, IDPs and host communities typically support themselves through: Cash support / grants; family and social networks; external Aid; social protection or safety nets (only host communities); income and wages from jobs (not in line with decent work standards); self-employments, MSMEs-Entrepreneurship. Most common economic activities are: Agriculture; food and beverage industry; retail; construction activities; manufacturing.

Legislation and policy action includes Defense Law orders that prevent employers from terminating employees’ contracts, however, reduction of salaries to a maximum of 30% if the employee agrees was allowed. The responses by government and stakeholders weren’t sufficiently inclusive for refugees and host communities.

Due to the pandemic response resulting in diminished income generating opportunities for PoCs, with the corresponding inability to meet rent obligations leading to increased eviction notices. Community Support Committees (CSCs) across Jordan. CSCs continue to support refugee communities through community engagement activities, information sharing, and food/non-food item distributions.

EU Funds (EUF) are based on inclusive policies and strategies that benefit all communities in Jordan. Humanitarian and development actors contribute to strengthening national systems and institutions helping to address protection risks. Against the backdrop of the National Social Protection Strategy, the objective is to ensure that the services provided are supporting the development of an equitable social protection system accessible to Jordanians and non-Jordanians on the basis of needs and vulnerabilities in line with assessment results.

During 2020, a total of 109 home-based businesses (HBBS) were registered, of which 77 were Jordanian owned and 32 Syrian-owned, while 70 more were licensed (53 Jordanian and 17 Syrian owned). In addition to UNHCR’s regular cash assistance program, which reaches 33,000 refugee families monthly, including 3,000 non-Syrian families, during November and December.

Based on the assessment of work, household vulnerabilities in Jordan through ILO-FAFO assessments conducted in April and October 2020, findings show that almost half of the workers who were in employment before the COVID-19 outbreak were out of work during the early weeks of the crisis. The majority said they did not have any forms of savings to tap into, and that the level of cash and in-kind assistance they received was limited. Assessed by type of contract, the level of informal employment was higher among Syrians (52 percent) than Jordanians (35 percent). Social security coverage for Syrian respondents was limited to 24 percent, while 63 percent of Jordanians had social security coverage facilitated by their employer.

The Ministry of Labor (MoL) issued a new National Employment Charter and made changes to the open and closed/restricted professions that refugees can access. The list of closed professions had been extended, which impacted refugee labor, including semi-skilled and high skilled, where many refugees are reported to work in the informal sector, which is often associated with poor work conditions. In addition, the cumulative number of work permits issued to Syrian refugees in Jordan, according to UNHCR, reached around 165,000 (45 percent of the working age population) thus verifying that Jordan is one of the country’s leading the way when it comes to refugee employment. Jordan needs to reduce its reliance on low-paid migrant workers in labor-intensive sectors such as agriculture, construction, and low-end services. These sectors need to be made more accessible and more attractive to both Syrian refugees and vulnerable Jordanians.

Digi#ances is a project by the Central Bank and GIZ that aims at digitizing cross-border remittances through JoMoPay and promoting the usage of digital financial services in Jordan.

Strategies for Inclusion of Refugees, FDPs and Host Communities

Livelihoods strategies: The immediate impact of COVID-19 highlights the critical need to bridge differences and find opportunities to complement humanitarian
and development approaches, international, national, government and civil society collaborations, to improve the lives and livelihoods of the most vulnerable.

**Awareness of work rights:** While refugees have a high level of knowledge about the application process for agricultural and construction permits, there is limited information about the process for applying for permits in other sectors open to Syrian refugees. Rules on social security rights and entitlements are a particular source of confusion. Syrian refugees in Jordan continue to pursue livelihoods in a restricted legal and policy space. Complex requirements and high costs make it hard for refugees to establish home-based businesses (HBBs), which have been promoted as an entry point for women into the labor force.

**Interventions focused on decent work outcomes:** This includes the provision of legal awareness sessions, information and counselling to workers, heads of workers and employers on rights and obligations under the labor law and to community based organizations (CBOs) on decent work best practices and advocacy, as well as legal assistance through mediation, and community-based approaches to improving decent work outcomes.

**Job placement and matching interventions:** This covers a number of sectors, including the manufacturing sector, by using technology supported matching systems through Project Match, and engagement with employers.

**Interventions focused on vocational training.** Including on building beneficiaries’ skills on market information and employers’ needs. Additionally, vocational training are also used to enhance the skills of beneficiaries’ willing to take the self-employment pathway, for instance on renewable and green energy.

**Home-based Businesses (HBBs) support.** This includes business skills training, business growth grants, mentorship, and support with formalizing HBBs, in order to support refugees and vulnerable Jordanians to generate income and assets.

The Durable Solutions Platform (DSP’s) espoused by a joint group of SCOs highlights the need to integrate more meaningful outcomes into livelihoods interventions and policy frameworks

**Successful experiences**

Jedad is a business-to-business networking initiative that aims to boost access to market and sales opportunities for micro and small enterprises (MSEs) in Jordan. Many Syrians who were entrepreneurs in Syria have now, as refugees in Jordan, lost their businesses and their supplier and customer networks. New Syrian entrepreneurs in Jordan also lack local networks. In addition, Syrian entrepreneurs do not have knowledge about how to run a firm in Jordan. Overall, refugees’ connections with the Jordanian local economy are weak and would benefit from networking opportunities. At the same time, for Jordanian entrepreneurs and potential entrepreneurs, the presence of refugees provides an opportunity to tap into Syrian business skills and ideas. There are a number of openings for exploring holistic livelihoods approaches in Jordan, including a current discussion around graduation models and potential social security expansion; the recently announced flexible work permit expansion to Syrian refugees in 21 occupational families; and the increased experience supporting women with home-based businesses (HBBs).

**Key gaps and Policy Recommendations:**

• Underlying structural challenges in the economy, including informality and lack of decent work, affect all vulnerable workers in Jordan.

• Refugees face distinct vulnerabilities because of their legal status, which makes them more fearful of seeking justice and can limit their access work opportunities.

• Legal awareness sessions and legal assistance has proven critical for the achievement of positive decent work outcomes.

• Focused messaging to the most vulnerable persons on the benefits versus potential risks of formalization is critical, especially for HBBs.

• A community-based and collaborative approach at the local level, enabling relevant stakeholders to act collectively, can lead to positive decent work outcomes.

• Further coordination and stronger linkages among operational actors is needed to support livelihoods outcomes, avoid duplication of programs and improve coherence when dealing with the private sector.

• Increasingly tailored approaches towards job placement increase positive retention outcomes, while mentorship and coaching motivates workers to stay active in the labor market.

Operational evidence from IRC’s Project Match has shown a higher employment rates when job search support interventions are tailored to groups by gender (male/female), nationality (Jordanian/Syrian), amount of formal work experience, and education level (skilled/ non-skilled).

**Some recommendations include:**

1. People in formal and decent work are relatively less affected in times of crises. Hence, formalization of work among different segments of society including refugees should be promoted to achieve inclusive and decent jobs for all. The Jordan Compact could be revitalized through the promotion of protective measures at work places.

2. In the context of fiscal constraints, governments should develop a clear and transparent approach to support micro, small and medium enterprises that are providing jobs for a substantial number of workers in both formal and informal sectors.
Pakistan hosts 1.4 million registered Afghan refugees, holding a valid Proof of Registration (PoR) card issued by the Government of Pakistan. They are one of the largest refugee population in the world and, after 40 years of forced displacement, also one of the largest protracted refugee population under UNHCR’s mandate, of which 31 percent live in camps and 69 percent in refugee villages. Refugees are registered in the Afghan National Registration (ANR) database managed by the National Database and Registration Authority (NADRA) and issued with Proof of Registration (PoR) cards. Since the majority of refugees reside in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (58%) and Baluchistan (23%), where the lowest living standards and the highest multidimensional poverty index are recorded, it is evident that most of the Afghan refugees are severely affected by the unprecedented events surrounding the COVID-19 pandemic.

The Afghan Citizen Card (ACC) registration process was initiated by the Government of Pakistan in 2017–2018 to register and document undocumented Afghans in Pakistan. ACCs are identity documents issued by the Government which allow undocumented Afghans to temporarily remain in Pakistan until they return to Afghanistan to obtain a passport and Pakistani visa. ACCs provide protection from arbitrary arrest, detention or deportation. The Afghan Citizen Cards (ACC) expired on the 30 June 2020. The Ministry of States and Frontier Regions (SAFRON) submitted a recommendation to the Federal Cabinet for an extension which has yet to be agreed. Currently around 0.4 million undocumented Afghans are estimated to reside in Pakistan.

Poverty and insecurity forced many Afghan refugees to return to Afghanistan despite unfavorable circumstances and uncertain futures awaiting them. Refugees and internally displaced communities mostly earn their livelihoods from unskilled work through daily wage jobs and many men, women and children work in the informal economy to make ends meet. Other than their wages they rely on remittances, cash support / grants, family and social networks, external aid, cash for work and social protection or safety nets (not applicable in case of refugees). Lack of documentation and absence of work permits restrains them from earning an income, and forces them to live in circumstances where dire needs are unmet.

According to Gallup poll finding where 44 percent of Pakistanis report being laid off, taking a salary cut, or getting unpaid leave due to the pandemic. Most refugee and displaced communities do not have access to internet, banking services or other financial services. They also do not possess adequate digital skills to navigate the post COVID virtual world. In the case of refugees, the causes are institutional but for the internally displaced communities, the causes are security related.

For refugees, inclusion is a major institutional issue which need to be addressed to mainstream them into national responses and provide them access to decent work (formal job market and informal jobs). Very few organizations work with Afghan refugees and the work is strongly regulated due to security concerns. Not much funds are allocated to provide services to Afghan refugees by the government and other institutional donors also shy away from work with Afghan refugees as they do not feature as high priority of the government. With the meager funds available, investment in human capital is limited as programming has been unable to move towards development and remains primarily humanitarian despite 2 generations of Afghan refugees having lived in Pakistan. Afghan refugees are unable to report human rights violations and they live in situations where it is not possible to adhere to COVID-19 safety measures. Example if 5 households of 10 members per family need to use one washroom, there is hardly room for the luxury of social distancing or adequate sanitization.

**Key Gaps and Policy Recommendations:**

MSMEs were severely impacted by the pandemic which also caused many refugees and displaced communities to lose their jobs. This is alarming because of the critical role MSMEs have in driving economic growth, revenue generation, and employment for daily wages and especially unskilled labor. The problem MSMEs faced was the lack of capital, and their employee’s main problem was the absence of social protection nets – so the MSMEs and their employees did not have the resilience to stand the shock the pandemic brought. The government’s decision to lift some of the lockdown restrictions was determined by the need to support low-income people and small businesses. There hasn’t been any tangible support announced for MSMEs yet.

Poverty and increased level of poverty amongst refugees and displaced communities is the serious and perhaps most pertinent structural problem. Households often rely on one income as women are restricted to the domestic sphere and losing the wages for even one day may mean, there is no food on the table for dinner. Due to inflation, refugee and displaced communities reported having 2 meals or sometimes even less before COVID-19 Undoubtedly the vulnerability and insecurity has exacerbated due to COVID-19.

Refugees and displaced communities are trapped in the cycle of poverty, limited opportunities and isolation. This can in part be attributed to the disconnect between the humanitarian and development programming on ground and also to the fact that projects are sporadic and short term, so they fail to perform at scale and generate an impact which is significant and long-term. Innovative and flexible programs, at scale are required to make a difference.
The involvement of the private sector also seems limited in Pakistan. Some telecom companies like Jazz and Telenor are stepping forward as they are interested in expanding coverage and extending facilities like mobile wallets etc. to vulnerable communities – but they seldom have access to refugee and displaced communities.

Refugees and displaced communities need to be actively consulted and involved in decision making that concerns them i.e. policy level or program implementation level. Without recognizing those as a prime stakeholder and without their ownership initiatives will not sustain, and the cycle of short term projects will continue with little impact.

Lake Chad Region

The Lake Chad region comprises of 4 countries i.e. Niger, Chad, Nigeria and Cameroon. Violence in the region has disproportionately affected borderlands and caused temporary border closures resulting in restricted cross border trade and migration movements.

The crisis currently affecting the Lake Chad Basin states results from a complex combination of factors, including conflict with Non-State Armed Groups, extreme poverty, underdevelopment and a changing climate, which together have triggered significant displacement of populations. According to IOM, as of 25 February 2021, Cameroon, Chad, Niger and Nigeria were hosting an estimated 5,118,035 affected individuals made up of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs), Refugees (both in- and out-of-camp), Returnees (Former IDPs and Returnees from abroad) and Third Country Nationals (TCNs). 76 per cent of the affected population (representing 3,880,984 individuals) were located in Nigeria, while 11 per cent resided in Cameroon (561,296 individuals), 8 per cent in Chad (409,610 individuals) and 5 per cent in Niger (266,145 individuals).

Across the region, the COVID-19 pandemic had a severe impact on the livelihoods of refugees and IDPs, exacerbating existing vulnerabilities and exposing them to heightened protection risks, including incidences of gender-based violence and rising poverty levels, adversely impacting the protection environment.

The COVID-19 response has been limited in the region because of the region being initially/economically strained, high levels of poverty, ongoing conflict and displacement and lack of institutional capacity. Refugees were expected to abide to the measures out in place for containing COVID-19 while all relief provided to refugees was through humanitarian aid, mostly by UNHCR, other UN organizations or international and national NGOs operating in the area.

Key Gaps and Policy Recommendations:

The challenges of instability and conflict in the region are deep and prolonged. COVID-19 has further aggravated the situation. There is a need to address both the short-term issues of the displaced through immediate humanitarian approaches. However, the longer-term prospects of development are no less urgent. The crisis poses a substantial threat to development progress, including achieving the Sustainable Development Goals, in areas from which displacement occurs as well as in the hosting countries. An adequate response requires strong partnerships between humanitarian and development actors to address preparation, response, recovery, and prevention under a shared framework that goes beyond financing support.

Advocacy, coordination, capacity-building and partnership between national and international agencies is ongoing at ground level but can be strengthened.

UNHCR will aim to reduce the risks of gender-based violence and improve the quality of the response through enhanced community-based prevention and response and survivor-centered protection. However, this is inextricably linked to stability and multi-stakeholder partnerships.

Restarting resettlement activities suspended due to COVID-19 measures is an urgent need - fast-tracking departure procedures for refugees under consideration; and advocating increased quotas of refugees benefiting from third-country resettlement programmes are options to catalyze the process.

Seeking additional opportunities for education and health integration as well as livelihoods, with a focus on securing access to land and socioeconomic opportunities is necessary and this requires all stakeholders to join head, hands and resources.

Addressing governance issues remains critical for all interventions to be impactful. Ensuring inclusive and diverse teams in all stakeholders would also be a milestone towards productive discussions and actions.

Work on peace building especially promoting a civilian approach to COVID-19 responses and de-militarise the delivery of services to vulnerable groups and promoting the integration of human rights protocols in COVID-19 containment strategies in LCB territories is required.

Ensuring a greater role for the private sector in the region is critical as is facilitation of the establishment of a cross-border trade corridor adapted to COVID-19 prevention measures to boost food security, livelihoods, and increase the capacity to withstand COVID-19 shocks in vulnerable communities and populations in LCB territories.
Ethiopia

Ethiopia is the third largest refugee-hosting country in Africa, sheltering 801,349 registered refugees and asylum-seekers as of 31 January 2021. 90 percent of the population live in refugee camps and 10 percent out of camps.

The large number of forcibly displaced populations, refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) also renders the risk of virus transmission more acute, as refugees are particularly vulnerable owing to their limited resources and access to basic public services. Both groups often rely on aid and/or informal work for their subsistence, with no access to national social protection mechanisms.

Ethiopia has made far-reaching changes to its refugee policies. In 2016, it made “nine pledges” at the Leaders’ Summit on Refugees held in New York aimed at helping refugees gain greater mobility; improving access to services, especially education; expanding access to livelihoods, jobs, and irrigable land; and facilitating the local integration of long-term refugees. In February 2019, the Ethiopian parliament adopted a new refugee proclamation (no. 1110/2019) to facilitate the implementation of its pledges. Secondary legislation that will give effect to the proclamation is under preparation.

Refugees and FDPs have been significantly impacted due to the pandemic. Ethiopia did not have the resources to address refugee needs even before the pandemic. And with COVID-19 demanding greater investment in health (testing, COVID-19 related information dissemination, dealing with outbreaks of COVID-19, and creating social protection nets for communities) reduced resources even further. In April 2020, a joint report by Ethiopia Jobs Creation Commission and the ILO estimated the job losses in Ethiopia to range between 1.34 million to 6 million, depending on the spread of the virus and the effectiveness of economic measures taken by the Ethiopian Government.

While Ethiopia's new legislation enables inclusion for refugees at various levels (example: to access services and the job market), the implementation is proving to be a time taking process. The political instability and waves of internal conflict have not helped this agenda. According to UNHCR’s August 2020 situation report, Ethiopia’s Job Creation Commission reported the loss of 330,000 jobs in the country over four months. This negatively affects employment opportunities for refugees despite Ethiopia’s favorable policy directives allowing refugees to work.

The World Bank’s report on the Impact of Refugees on Hosting Communities in Ethiopia; A social Analysis (2020) reports that over 80% refugees rely on aid to meet their needs and women seldom access the labor market. Apart from aid, refugees meet their needs through remittances, wages, agriculture and services – all of which have been severely affected due to COVID-19, rendering this group even more vulnerable.

The ‘Ethiopian Jobs Compact’, is a joint agreement between the Ethiopian Government, the EU and other donors (the World Bank, DFID, and the European Investment Bank). It is one of the main instruments supporting ambitious job creation plans: 100,000 jobs, of which 30,000 for refugees in the framework of the Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework (CRRF) will be created through investment in 3 industrial parks. The aim is to support the industrialization, employment, and refugee policies of the government so that decent jobs can be created for Ethiopians and refugees.

UNHCR, UNDP and various organizations working on the ground report that refugees are facing multiple barriers and constraints. The economic impact for refugees and FDPs relates to job losses due to closure or downsizing of businesses. Employment loss was concentrated in specific sectors especially in urban settings. The drop in income from remittances has been significant and will continue to be a prolonged impact as it is linked to the global economic crisis. The level of poverty has increased with many refugees, FDPs and host populations being
at risk of falling under the poverty line. The economic impact manifests itself in other sectors like food security, education, health and protection.

Refugees and host communities are not recognized as central stakeholder broadly and play a submissive ‘aid accepting’ role in the bigger picture. NGOs working on the ground could organize communities and build their capacity to participate in the decision making processes affected their lives but there are no such fora reflected in the literature reviewed. Within the refugee and host communities, recognition or inclusion is limited.

**Key Gaps and Policy Recommendations:**

Ethiopia is facing an acute refugee crisis and the conflict in Tigray has made the situation on ground further sensitive. Considering the number of refugees needing support and the fact that 80% are reliant on aid for livelihoods. Involving refugees in the local economy is not only critical but also a missed opportunity which can benefit Ethiopia, and the region.

While Ethiopia has a welcoming stance to giving refugees access to jobs but tangible implementation of the legislation should be catalyzed. This will support Ethiopia in dealing with the COVID-19 crisis and bouncing back from it.

Access to finance remains a key concern on the ground as many MSME’s have access to very little credit. Access to credit is even lower for women led MSMEs. According to UNDP’s report on COVID’s Impacts on MSMEs in Ethiopia liquidity provided to the traditional commercial banking sector is unlikely to find its way to MSMEs and the only option in this regard would be to channel relief through MFIs which are closer to this category of firms and more familiar with their specific gender and operating conditions and sectors. The response to COVID-19 provides an opportunity to bring these digital technologies to Ethiopia.

Organizations on ground voiced the need for provision of workspaces for home-based businesses (HBB), targeting in particular women, youth and refugees, whose businesses are less resilient along with provision of business development and management training to strengthen enterprises’ resilience and capacity to deploy other measures to cope with the crisis.

Provision of cash support and long term support for health, education and youth skills building has been highlighted by organizations on the ground. Multi-sectoral programs like school feeding programs or education/vocational training linked to market access could be potential ways of moving forward.

At a policy level, provision of tax exemptions to retain employees and awareness raising initiatives in refugee-hosting areas about the process for registering companies, and creating incentives like training, coaching and subsidies could be options to encourage refugees to contribute to the MSME economy. The importance of promoting joint ventures between Ethiopian nationals and refugees can never be overemphasized under any circumstance or for any other sectoral response.

Apart from long term recommendations like bridging the humanitarian development divide and targeted programming for economic support of vulnerable groups, policy level recommendations include:

1. Providing tax exemptions for registered companies who commit to keeping their employees.
2. Carry out contextualized assessments of the root causes of informality in Somali and Tigray to better understand the challenges faced by forcibly displaced people in transitioning to formality.
3. Support MoLSA in raising awareness on how to register companies. With Ethiopia’s Refugee Proclamation being underway, local authorities can look into organizing awareness-raising campaigns on the benefits of business registration in refugee hosting areas.
4. Reduce inequalities by promoting refugees’ integration.
5. Promote freedom of movement for refugees to avoid a sudden decrease in demand. Refugees account for an important share of the customers for businesses located in refugee hosting areas.
6. Target inclusive and youth led measures for skills building and remote learning opportunities. Youth is disproportionately affected by the pandemic by the combined effect of the closure of educational institutions and reduced demand for labor. COVID-19 has made it even more difficult for the youth to look for jobs, especially as digital technology is not widely used owing to poor connectivity and affordability issues. Supporting youth centres by providing access to the internet connection would give the youth the opportunity to engage in remote learning activities that can be used to help them get a job.

**Colombia**

In the last five years, the exodus of people from Venezuela has become the second largest displacement in the world. More than 5.4 million have fled, with 1.7 million, or 30 percent, ending up in nearby Colombia, fleeing violence and economic deprivation at home. The Government of Colombia has been incredibly generous towards this population, enacting several rounds of work permits which granted the right to work, move, and formalize their status for three main reasons:

1. Solidarity.
2. Vulnerability.
3. Practicality.

Those who arrived before 31 January will now be allowed to stay in the country for a decade and apply for resident status, which will allow them to legally work. All Venezuelans who enter regularly through a border crossing with the official stamp over the next two years will also be eligible under the new scheme. It is believed the move would reduce the exploitation of Venezuelan workers.
The forcibly displaced people (FDP) were already vulnerable before the crisis, and in diverse conditions. This was due to a lack of assets, limited job opportunities, restricted access to social safety nets, and reliance on humanitarian assistance. The forcibly displaced live in very diverse conditions, depending on their legal status, demographic characteristics, the country where they live, and their location in camps or in urban settings, among other factors. FDPs are often located in poorer, marginalized regions (or such parts of major cities) where the economic consequences of the pandemic may vary. The extremely thin evidence base on FDPs' pre-existing living conditions and the impact of the current crisis on their lives (and on host communities) is a constraint to the design and delivery of programs targeting the right populations with the support they need.

11. Highly vulnerable yet largely invisible Forcibly displaced in the COVID-19-induced recession UNHCR December 2020
The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) has estimated that 70 percent of refugees live in countries with restricted or no right to work, 66 percent in countries with restricted or no right to freedom of movement, and 47 percent in countries with restricted or no right to bank accounts. Partly as a result of these restrictions, most refugees work in the informal economy and in sectors that the ILO has deemed “highly impacted” by the pandemic. COVID-19 is therefore likely to lead to widespread loss of livelihoods and an increase in poverty among this population.

Therefore, to create the conditions necessary for economic inclusion, a wide range of barriers that refugees typically face—including legal, administrative, practical, discriminatory, and social barriers—must be removed and/or lowered. These include the inability to obtain proper identification including work permits or business licenses, restricted freedom of movement, difficulty accessing financial services including social safety nets, a lack of job opportunities, unsafe working conditions, poor access to childcare, and more. Some of these barriers apply to other vulnerable populations, such as host communities, as well, but the challenges are typically most acute for refugees. Overall, the projections suggest that refugees are in countries which are growing slower and are hit almost as hard by COVID-19 on the macroeconomic level as other low-income and low-middle income countries (LIC and LMIC countries, respectively).

Refugees often face barriers to economic inclusion, the may be limited to specific sectors, while other restrictions affect freedom of movement, a necessary component of refugees’ economic inclusion and therefore do not have the ability to fully integrate. The concentration of refugees in highly impacted sectors is sometimes a result of limited economic inclusion or restrictive laws that push refugees to work in specific industries. The ILO projects even greater impacts on those within the informal sector. It is estimated that almost 1.6 billion informal economy workers are significantly impacted by lockdown measures and/or working in the hardest-hit sectors. The gap between FDP and host communities varies between countries.

Women are over-represented in the informal economy at large, and within this, overrepresented in highly impacted sectors and being FDP were they face a heavy burden. Youth has also been overly affected, being also a large part of the population in these countries. Facing severe conditions in terms of access to education at all levels aggravated by COVID-19 lockdown, access to connectivity, smartphones, laptops and tablets and aggravated by the digital divide.

The pandemic has also impacted other sources of income such as remittances and loss of jobs and livelihoods, which led to borrow more money now than before the pandemic. The loss of income, coupled with limited access to social safety nets, a drop in remittances, limited saving potential and increased debt, is having profound combined knock-on effects on these communities. One affected area is access to food with people having to skip meals. Loss of income is also affecting access to other basic services such a paying rent and facing eviction; children being less likely to be sent to school because of the current economic situation, and also cut in medical and health expenses.

Research done by Columbia University for Jordan, identified vulnerabilities that cut across the livelihoods, education and social protection sectors, many of which uniquely affect refugees, such as legal and civil documentation. Finally, current ongoing work from UNDP and ILO have identified the importance and actual and potential role played by Diasporas and also the role of digitalization. COVID-19 has accelerated the pace of digitalization and deepened inequalities between those who can keep up and those who cannot, by creating a digital gap. To continue working amidst lockdowns, workers and businesses have had to adopt digital tools or risk losing their means of livelihood. Companies brought operations online and implemented remote and flexible working arrangements.

Governments have also had to embrace digitalization, to continue providing critical information and services to people during the pandemic. UNDP has supported this transition by equipping governments with digital infrastructure, supporting micro and small businesses to bring their businesses online, and equipping people with digital skills. While there were many successes, we have also witnessed the risk of leaving those most vulnerable, including forcibly displaced people, behind, without interventions to help them be part of the digital transformation journey.

Because people on the move have been hit particularly hard by the COVID-19 crisis and are more likely to be affected by the digital divide, it is key to invest in initiatives that address the needs of those furthest behind, especially youth and women. Youth who lack digital skills and who live in remote areas with weak digital infrastructure are at risk of not being able to capture education, training and job opportunities created through technology. Women are also at risk of being left behind with 327 million fewer women having access to smartphone and mobile internet than men worldwide.

UNHCR and Microsoft: preparing to launch a coalition on digital work for refugees

Global consortium on digital work for refugees

Partnerships. Global consortium on digital work for refugees

Some examples of the use of digital technology are:

The Future of Work Lab: National Skills Portal (skills.gov.bd) in Bangladesh, Turkey and Jordan.

eCommerce platform (eKShop): Connecting products made by 30 Rohingya women and packaged by 15 women from the host community to Thailand and other markets. This platform is now being scaled up to serve migrants from Venezuela in Colombia.

Adaptation in other country contexts

- Turkey: designing digital work platform pilot enabling Syrian refugees to access online freelancing work, linked to large-scale platforms such as UpWork, Fiverr.
- Colombia: adapting the eCommerce platform to enable migrant entrepreneurs at the border with Venezuela to better access markets.

Partnerships.

Provide remote employment opportunities to refugees at scale.

The Migrant Union Digital Livelihoods for People on the Move UNDP

The refugee employment & skills initiative (Kakuma & Dadaab Refugee Camps, Kenya; Jordan; Gaza; Somaliland) Multi-Sectoral Partnerships Pathway What Is It: RESI Provides Intensive ICT And Online Consulting Skills Training To Help Refugees Work As Competitive Online Freelancers. Through The Online Work Platform Up work. RESI was formed as a partnership between the International Trade Centre (ITC) & the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC), plus the technology company Samasource & online work platform Upwork. ITC provides the development, market, and trade experience while NRC offers protection and addresses local barriers through dialogue and advocacy. Technical experience and a direct pathway to the private sector are offered by, respectively, Samasource & Upwork.

About the case studies

The Islamic Development Bank (IsDB) selected five countries or regions among its Member Countries which are: Ethiopia, Lake Chad Basin (LCB), Jordan, Pakistan and Turkey. These four host countries and LCB are of different size, relative levels of development, population, fragility or not, ongoing conflict, violence and insecurity or not, institutional and governance capacities, historic and political background, cultural and ethnic circumstances,
language barriers, diversity and origin of FDP, conditions regarding the Global Compact for Refugees (GCR), the presence, participation and role of refugees, IDPs, migrants and host communities, economic, social, institutional and other conditions faced when COVID-19 crisis struck and the attention provided by the EU, ODA, MDBs, IFIs, INGOS, UN Humanitarian and Development Agencies, to name a few.

Therefore, the in-country field work was based on available secondary information from different sources that, in some cases were from February 2021. Contacts with key informants from INGOs and UN Humanitarian and Development Agencies as well as a questionnaire prepared for that purpose answered by experts on the ground. The names and credits will follow.

However, as expected in a task with limited time, under lockdown conditions, in some cases facing conflict and insecurity as we speak and thus based, when possible, on telephone or digital surveys, of such different selected cases, due to the aforementioned reasons, will not necessarily be homogeneous and comparable but provides an overview that allows to understand what are the strengths and weaknesses, what works and doesn’t, the gaps, lessons learned and conclusions and recommendations while moving forward.

The credits are to the MDBs Platform for Economic Migration and FDP all the kind support received from INGOs and UN Agencies and others. While the responsibility and possible shortfalls are ours.
THE IMPACT OF COVID-19 ON FORCED DISPLACEMENT AND ECONOMIC MIGRATION IN FRAGILE CONTEXTS

TURKEY

COUNTRY SNAPSHOT

Total refugees: 4,000,000
Registered Syrian Refugees: 3,653,619
Refugees from other origin: 320,000
In-camp Syrian Refugees: 2%
Out of Camp Syrian Refugees: 98%
Human Development Index Ranking: 54
Gender Inequality Index Ranking: 68
Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Extremism percentile: 10
Context

History of refugees in Turkey

The largest group of refugees has been Iranians (until the Syrian civil war). The first influx was the Iranians fleeing from the Iranian Revolution, which arrived at the beginning of 1980. The Iran–Iraq War began on the same year. Revolution and War brought a combined influx from Iran. 1980 to 1991, when a total of 1.5 million Iranians became refugees in Turkey. These refugees weren’t recognized as asylum seekers under the terms of the Geneva Convention, because they entered and stayed as tourists; making them Iranian diaspora. The Bahá’í Faith had about 350,000 believers in Iran. According to the UN Special Representative, since 1979, many members of this community have left Iran illegally, due to state sanctioned persecution of Bahá’ís, often to go to Turkey and if possible to the West from Turkey.

During the same period, 51,542 Iraqis (Iraqis in Turkey) became refugees in Turkey. The Iran–Iraq War and Kurdish rebellion of 1983 caused first large influx of refugees from the region. About 450,000 Kurds were on the mountainsides where Turkey-Iraq border. The final tally for Gulf War was at least 1 Million people fled (almost 30% of the population) to Iran, Turkey and Pakistan. Refugee numbers greatly increased in the following years of War in Afghanistan especially in regards to Afghans and Iraqis.

As of January 2010, 25,580 refugees and asylum seekers remain in the country. Of these, 5090 Iranians, 8940 Iraqis, 3850 Afghans and 2700 «other» (including Somalis, Uzbeks, Palestinians and others). As of January 2011, 8710 Iranians, 9560 Afghans, 7860 other. As of January 2012 7890 (Iranians, Afghans, and other). Refugees of the Syrian Civil War in Turkey are the Syrian refugees originated from Syria. Turkey is hosting over 3.6 million «registered» refugees and delivered aid reaching $30 billion (total between 2011 and 2018) on refugee assistance.
Turkey hosts the largest number of persons under temporary and international protection in the world. There are 4 million Refugees and asylum-seekers in Turkey including over 3.6 million Syrian nationals with Temporary Protection and close to 320,000 international protection status holders and around 400,000 refugees and asylum-seekers of other nationalities15. Over 98% of Syrian refugees live across Turkey in 81 provinces with less than two percent residing in the seven remaining Temporary Accommodation Centres (TACs). 315 Refugees departed for resettlement in January, 79 per cent of whom are Syrians. UNHCR provided 465 submissions for resettlement consideration in the first month of 2021. 86,300 Households received one off COVID-19 emergency cash payments by end of January.

Some 44% of Syrian refugees within the region are female. Some 49% of host community populations within the region are female. Some 45% of Syrian refugees within the region are below the age of 18. Some 45% of host community populations are below the age of 24.


This definition contains a geographical limitation clause, as Turkey only grants refugee status to individuals from European countries. Individuals outside of European countries are assessed under the “conditional refugee” status and the status of temporary protection is provided to “foreigners who have been forced to leave their country, cannot return to the country that they have left, and have arrived at or crossed the borders of Turkey in a mass influx situation seeking immediate and temporary protection.” According to Turkish legislation, refugees with temporary protection have the right to health insurance, however, they can only access free health services in the same city where they registered for temporary protection15.

Under the Law when allocating refugees, the Directorate General of Migration Management (DGMM) allocates refugees, conditional refugees and ones with subsidiary protection to slightly more remote cities known as “satellite cities”. However, many refugees choose to reside in the major cities where there are often more job opportunities. Syrians living under temporary protection have engaged in informal jobs with standard payments. According to the in-country study, the process of acquiring residence papers is practical and affordable; refugees and forced displaced people can get work permits; they are included in social protection mechanisms and safety nets; they have the capacity to report on human right violations; and have access to decent work conditions.

The Law on Foreigners and International Protection, and the Temporary Protection Regulation, continue to provide a strong legal framework for the legal stay, registration, documentation and access to rights and services for foreigners in Turkey. Refugees can have access to work permit but with restrictive measures such as the working in the registered locations and in some specific sectors only. Agriculture work access does not require work permit though. Due to the large informal economy in Turkey (40 percent), most of the refugees work in the informal sector and only 3 percent have a work permits, so many work without proper wage and protection. More work will be done this year to try to capture facts/data around decent work and sustainable jobs as for now there is little monitoring.

However, recent assessments underscore the high vulnerability of female headed households across almost all the indicators studied and show how women are far more dependent than men on assistance. Around one in five female headed households had no income source other than the ESSN (Emergency Social Safety Net) or humanitarian assistance. The ESSN support around 1.7 million vulnerable persons.

Regarding reporting human rights violations, there are barriers such as languages, rights awareness, and others that might limit people’s protection and enforcement. Both with the Law on Foreigners and International Protection number 6458 and the Regulation on Temporary Protection there has been significant legal and administrative changes for the protection of refugees. In addition to that UNHCR, Amnesty International and many other national and international NGOs offer helplines and legal counselling on the cases of human right violations.

Key Trends

UNHCR continues to carry out the one-off COVID-19 Emergency Cash Assistance in cooperation with DGMM and through the service provider PTT. By the end of January, UNHCR had reached close to 86,300 households with cash payments. The third round of post-distribution monitoring for the COVID-19 emergency cash, covering a sample of 545 households across the country was completed. The sample represents almost 60,000 beneficiary households who received their assistance between October and December 2020. In January, UNHCR

15. Under this law, a refugee is defined as “a person who as a result of events occurring in European countries and owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his citizenship and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of that country, or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it, shall be granted refugee status upon completion of the refugee status determination process.”

16. COVID-19 barriers and response strategies for refugees and undocumented migrants in Turkey Şevkat Bahar Özvarış a, İiker Kaya b, Deniz Mardin c, Sibel Sakarya d, Abdullahin Ekzayez e, Kristen Meagher e, Preeti Patel e
UNHCR promotes and prepares for durable solutions targeting 85,000 households was launched. In cooperation with DGMM, UNHCR launched a COVID-19 emergency cash assistance scheme, initially for 20,000 refugee households impacted by the pandemic, as a response to immediate economic hardship. The assistance is in line with the one-off cash support to vulnerable citizens of Turkey and avoids duplication with existing social safety schemes. By early September, over 20,000 households had received the cash transferred through the Turkish Postal Service (PTT) and a subsequent phase targeting 85,000 households was launched.

UNHCR promotes and prepares for durable solutions for refugees. This entails working with public institutions, particularly İŞKUR, the Turkish Employment Agency, private companies and development actors to improve refugees’ access to self-reliance opportunities. UNHCR works closely with the Presidency for Turks Abroad and Related Communities (YTB) with regards to higher education and language training for higher education preparation.

To enhance the self-reliance of refugees, UNHCR provides financial and administrative support to refugees through its partners to obtain work permits and open businesses. UNHCR supports İŞKUR through interpreters who have helped to register over 7,000 refugees in their database as job seekers and provided counselling services to over 8,600 refugees, and through the procurement of a software system to match job seekers to employers. Refugees continue to benefit from soft skills and entrepreneurship training, vocational courses and Turkish language courses, most of which have transferred to online platforms. Eight Public Education Centres (PEC) are also being renovated and refurbished for vocational and lifelong skills training.

As Syrians started to leave the camps and migrate to urban centers after 2013, the process of including them in the economic activity started organically. For those living outside the camp, it has not been possible to provide them with regular and continuous financial support since 2011, except for very exceptional cases. Thus, it became inevitable that many would begin to work in urban areas. As the number of Syrians who started to work in the informal sector reached into the 400,000’s, the Turkish state needed to make relevant arrangements, and the right to work was issued to the Syrians living in Turkey under Temporary Protection from 15 January 2016. In line with this regulation, Syrians who are registered in Turkey for a minimum of 6 months would enjoy the right to work at the proportion of 1 Syrian to 10 Turks at a work place, based on the employer’s demand, and under the condition that the Syrians receive at least the minimum wage.

However, despite this step being critically important for the economic activities and cohesion of Syrians in Turkey and providing Syrians the opportunity of formal employment, it failed to have the expected effect in terms of ensuring informally working Syrians moved into formal employment. According to the declaration by the Ministry of Family, Labor and Social Services on 31 March 2019, the number of Syrian citizens who have been issued a work permit in Turkey is 31,200. On the other hand, the research shows that the total Syrian labor force participation rate in Turkey is more than 30 percent, i.e. a minimum 1.2 million Syrians are working. Considering the Syrians in Turkey working de facto, these figures evidently indicate that the rights to work are not functional enough for the Syrians under temporary protection, and more than 95 percent of the Syrians working at present are working informally.

Informality is thus not only the undesired reality of the Turkish economy. According to May 2019 data of TURKSTAT, the rate of those working “without being bound to any social security institution” i.e. “informally” among active, working Turkish citizens is 34.4 percent. That is, more than 10 million Turkish citizens among the “labor force” over the age 15, comprising 32.3 million workers in total, are working “informally” in Turkey. All projections indicate that as 1-1.2 million Syrians in Turkey managed to survive by working informally, their financial need from the state has decreased and they are contributing to the Turkish economy.

Many international institutions, notably the World Bank, have expressed that Turkey pursued the right policy by not forcing the Syrians to stay in camps and allowing their employment (even though informally), which has in turn allowed Syrians to make a contribution to the economy and facilitated refugees to lead a life compatible with human dignity, and suggested that it could be referred to as a “developmentalist refugee policy”. It is thus inferred that informal economy creates a significant opportunity and space for Syrians, although it is not sustainable and very controversial in terms of whether it provides a “decent job”. This success is an important reason for the considerably high level of existing social acceptance in Turkey regarding Syrians, despite such acceptance being “fragile”. The informal economy seems to have played an important role in enabling Syrians to live in Turkey in a relatively problem-free manner. More importantly, it has also played an important role in enabling Syrian refugees to work without creating unemployment among local Turks.
Syrian entrepreneurs, of course, have made significant contributions to the economic cohesion of the Syrians in Turkey. Syrians can open up businesses in Turkey in accordance with the Turkish Code of Commerce. In businesses that are formally registered in Turkey, the owner of the business can officially apply for work permits. Although some are comprised only of self-financing micro-level businesses, the number of businesses established by Syrians in Turkey has been increasing. Syrian businesses comprise the highest number of foreign companies established in Turkey in 2017 and 2018. According to the declaration by the Ministry of Trade, it is noted that the number of companies with at least one partner of Syrian origin was 15,159 as of 26 February 2019. It is estimated that this figure is even higher when including firms established informally. The main sectors of these Syrian companies established include wholesale, real estate and construction sectors. Some research suggests that the Syrian Joint Capital has exceeded 100 million dollars.

The Impact of COVID of Refugees, FDPs and Host Communities

The economic impact of the COVID-19 health crisis has understandably derailed a fragile 2019 economic recovery in Turkey. Current account deficit in Turkey reappeared quickly in 2020 Q2 through contraction in trade and tourism. The collapse in global demand took a heavy toll on Turkey's merchandise trade.

Trade through Global Value Chain trade was disproportionately affected. External pressures and containment measures combined into a sudden halt in domestic output in April-May. Manufacturing was affected significantly, including large, export-intensive industries. Services, which tend to be more resilient than manufacturing during economic shocks, were also not spared. All service sectors contracted in April except for ICT. Manufacturing showed some signs of a rebound in June – reflective of a base effect from nearly three months of closure – but services have remained relatively muted.

Real sector impacts have exacerbated labor market challenges that were already in motion prior to the pandemic. The COVID-19 shock has significantly aggravated declining trends in labor force participation and employment. Employment levels have declined by 2 million jobs compared to February 2020 while labor market participation has shrunk by 1.9 million workers over the same period. Declining labor force participation rates coupled with government measures have kept unemployment rates relatively stable at around 12-13 percent despite relatively large job losses. This reflects a significant deterioration in labor market conditions, including a fall in demand from employers and a rise in discouraged workers, including among the youth.

The Government of Turkey leads the response and has shouldered the bulk of the financial burden of hosting Syrians under temporary protection. As the situation remains protracted, there is a need for increased and sustained international responsibility sharing, in line with the core principles of the Global Compact on Refugees, to address the continued needs of Syrians under temporary protection, persons under international protection, the communities which host them and the institutions which respond to the needs of both.

The COVID-19 pandemic does not just pose a health risk; due to the virus transmission mechanism many activities that involve close human contact have been banned or restricted. As a result, economic activity and, thus, the labor market has been severely disrupted. Lower demand and business closures decreased the number of people working and, thus, households' income. In order to protect workers and their jobs, especially the ones belonging to the most vulnerable groups, governments reacted increasing aid packages and easing social protection mechanisms. Firm survey analysis illustrates the severity of the impact across different types of enterprises. Among the worst affected include small and young firms; and enterprises in the accommodation, transport and storage, and education sectors.

Economic support from the government helped to keep businesses afloat, which implemented 10 work hour and wage reductions. By June, when restrictions were lifted, two thirds of enterprises reopened their doors. The authorities' economic policy response to COVID-19 was swift and comprehensive. Preliminary analysis seems to suggest that Turkey's short-term containment measures and economic support may have helped to balance the health and economic impacts of COVID-19. Turkey's economic policy package included various fiscal, monetary, and financial measures. On fiscal policy, Turkey confronted COVID-19 with growing imbalances but with more fiscal space to respond than many peer countries. Automatic stabilizers played a role in the fiscal response. Discretionary policies provided added support to health, households and businesses.

Turkey since the beginning of the pandemic protected the workers from losing their jobs. In fact dismissals were banned for the “first time ever” and some laws were amended to facilitate employer's access to a set of alternative pathways that would enable the continuation of the existing employment relationships. These actions include annual leave, collective leave, unpaid leave, and reduced working hours. In fact, some of these policies have been renewed several times, signaling the ongoing nature of the COVID-19 crisis. For instance,) the ban on

17. Syrian Refugees in Turkey. Prof. Dr. M. Murat ERDOĞAN TAGU – Turkish-German University Director of the Migration and Integration Research Center. Konrad Adenauer Stiftung. September 2019.
18. 3RP Syrian Refugee, Resilience and Response Plan.
19. Turkey Economic Monitor 2020: Adjusting the Sails. WBG. WDC.
dismissals and the authorization that allows companies to send their workers on unpaid leave has been extended to January 17, 2021.

This employment protection approach can be deemed successful and have indeed minimized the impact of the pandemic on employment levels among formal employees. In fact, thanks to these measures employment went down by 9.6 per cent in Turkey. However, these success stories hide the existence of several million workers who were not working in spite of being counted as employed. In Turkey in December 2020, the Turkish Statistical Institute started to release figures on hours worked and absentees from the Household Labor Force Survey. Turkstat figures estimate that only 20.45 million people were actually working in April 2020 even though figures on total employment for the same month reached 25.61 million. In addition, there is a sizeable reduction in the average number of weekly hours worked by those who remain working which should also be considered when calculating the impact of COVID-19 on the labor market, yet it is also neglected when one just looks at employment figures.

What this new data shows is that, as a result of the employment protection measures applied in Turkey, employment losses might only represent the tip of the iceberg in terms of impact in economic activity. It is important to estimate the full impact of the pandemic on hours worked in Turkey. This is done not only calculating employment losses, which was already done in the December, but also taking into account the losses derived from reductions in working hours among those who continue working and from the excess number of absentees (i.e. workers on paid/unpaid leave that would not have been on leave without the pandemic)\(^\text{20}\).

The need of continued support is more important than ever due to the devastating impact of the COVID-19 pandemic, notably regarding the loss or reduction of livelihoods and income for persons under temporary and international protection as well as host communities. As a result of the pandemic, vulnerabilities and basic needs have increased, while humanitarian and development partners have adapted service delivery modalities to continue maintaining their support for the worst affected households and individuals.

The increase in domestic food prices, lower incomes and increasing unemployment have significant impact on overall food security and access to healthy food by the poor. In trying to cope with the burden during this pandemic, poor people have reduced their dietary diversity, reduced the numbers of meals a day and are spending less on essential items such as education and health care. These impacts have hit female-headed households particularly hard.

Despite the impacts of the pandemic, Turkey has continued to provide Syrians under temporary protection with access to basic services through the public institutions at national and local levels. Turkey’s Law on Foreigners and International Protection and its Temporary Protection Regulation provide for a strong legal framework for the stay, registration, and strengthened access of persons under temporary and international protection to national services. The registration of Syrians under temporary protection by the Ministry of Interior’s Directorate General of Migration Management continues, as do spontaneous and self-organized returns of Syrians under temporary protection who are processed under voluntary return procedures as regulated by the legal framework.

Since 2015, the 3RP (Resilience, Response and Recovery Plan) in Turkey has contributed to the mobilization of more than US$ 4.5 billion, in particularly increasing support to and through public services and to municipalities where 90% of Syrians under temporary protection live. 3RP partners provide support to the Government of Turkey in complementarity with other actors, such as the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies and the Turkish Red Crescent as well as international financial institutions. The latter have increased their financial support to national and local public institutions for service delivery, job creation and business development. Local actors are at the forefront of Turkey’s response and require additional support in the coming period to deal with the twin stresses of hosting large numbers of persons under temporary and international protection and the pandemic, which have stretched services.

In terms of technical support and service delivery, 3RP partners work with several line ministries and public institutions to provide targeted protection and assistance alongside a complementary, resilience based development approach. People with specific needs, including women and children at risk as well as persons with disabilities face heightened vulnerabilities due to the pandemic and will be a 3RP priority in 2021-22 in line with the Regional Strategic Overview 2021-2022 December 2020 25 with the principle of the sustainable Development Goals of “leaving no one behind”. 3RP partners support the Ministry of Family, Labor and Social Services to provide targeted protection assistance, including the prevention of and response to gender-based violence.

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protection assistance, including the prevention of and response to gender-based violence, psychosocial support and access to legal and other specialized services, such as safe spaces and shelters.

3RP partners continue to support the Government of Turkey in meeting the most pressing basic needs of persons under temporary and international protection along with vulnerable host community members through cash and in-kind assistance. The multi-purpose cash assistance scheme, the Emergency Social Safety Net (ESSN), will continue to provide essential support to around 1.7 million vulnerable individuals under temporary protection, and is now funded outside the 3RP. The cash assistance provided by 3RP partners will therefore focus on vulnerable households that do not meet the ESSN criteria and those who are in camps, as well as complementary emergency and one-off support to people in urgent need.

Health sector partners support the Ministry of Health which manages a network of Migrant Health Centres that provide primary health services alleviating the pressures placed on hospitals, including the response to COVID-19, while reducing language barriers and increasing human resource capacity to increase access to healthcare. Education is another 3RP priority in Turkey, and 3RP partners support the Ministry of National Education in promoting the inclusion of Syrians under temporary protection and children under international protection in the national education system, with more than 760,000 Syrian children of school age enrolled in formal education and over 37,000 students attending tertiary education. This support includes the Conditional Cash Transfer for Education programme.

Large, crowded cities and urban areas such as Istanbul, Gaziantep, and Hatay pose severe challenges for all health responses, including COVID-19. The COVID-19 response for refugees in Turkey is based on the country’s previous experiences in dealing with infectious diseases among refugee populations.

With 98 percent of registered refugees residing in urban settings and the vast majority of COVID-19 cases occurring in urban settings, cities play an important role in determining how migrants in Turkey access health services. For example, major cities such as Istanbul, Ankara, and Izmir are not considered satellite cities and applicants for temporary protection can only reside in these cities temporarily pending their referral to a satellite city. This means they risk losing access to free health services provided in satellite cities.

In Turkey’s satellite cities, access to free health services was changed only prior to the COVID-19 outbreak. In satellite cities, people with temporary protection previously had the same rights as Turkish citizens regarding access to health care until the end of 2019, when new legislation (effective from 1 January 2020) was approved obliging this group to pay for their health insurance.
Migrants seeking to obtain a residency permit are required to purchase public or private health insurance. However, undocumented migrants have no such option, and most have to pay for all health services including emergency care. Family Health Centers and Migrant Health Centers (MHC), however, provide primary health care (PHC) services free of charge, irrespective of the legal status of migrants.

In recent years, the Turkish Government’s spending on humanitarian assistance, internally on refugees within Turkey and internationally on humanitarian aid, has surpassed all developed countries both in actual amount (USD$ 8,399 million in 2019) and as per gross national income (GNI) (0.79% of GNI in 2019). However, the COVID-19 pandemic imposes additional political and economic challenges that significantly hinder the country’s capacity to meet the needs of all populations.

Some of the most vulnerable groups, refugees and undocumented migrants in particular, face additional challenges in accessing essential services such as health care. The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) International Bioethics Committee emphasizes the need to take note of vulnerable groups in countries’ mitigation responses to the COVID-19 pandemic, with an emphasis on isolation and quarantine measures that risk creating stigma for refugee groups.

**Key Stakeholders**

Government: The government did its best to continue providing services such as health, education, ESSN support and short work allowance for those who lost their income/jobs during the pandemic and developed remote and digital services as mitigation mechanisms. Humanitarian Agencies: 3RP assessment and response with separate fund raising mechanism in 2020 and new modalities of support of education (online system), protection, basic needs intervention (cash, in kind support). Humanitarian/development nexus. Development Agencies: 3RP assessment and response with separate fund raising mechanism in 2020 and new modalities; support of SMEs; livelihood (training, job access), support to municipalities services. CSO/NGOs: Very active on the ground as 3RP partners in all sectors but facing challenges to reach the most vulnerable and could not organise their activities as usual due to the social distance. Social cohesion activities for instance got mostly stopped. Private sector: Mobilized by the provision of short-work allowance by the government and social security payment support by the donors contributed to avoiding the massive layoffs. Private sector advocacy gained momentum for pandemic-relief policies on the labor market. MDBs: Mobilization of extra/emergency funds for COVID-19 related response interventions. Donors: Donors showed some flexibility in reallocation of funding from current programs to help respond to the COVID-19. Special appeal for the COVID beside the 3RP.

There has been an increased poverty and vulnerability and insecurity. However, there hasn’t been a process of return to the country of origin or migration process. COVID-19 Socio-economic recovery plan and task team established the humanitarian/development nexus. Provision of job retention and social assistance for those that lost their income/jobs.

Refugees, displaced populations and host communities typically support themselves through: remittances, cash support / grants, family and social networks, external Aid, Cash for work, Social protection or safety nets, Income and wages from jobs, self-employsments, MSMEs-Entrepreneurship.

Currently 1.4 million Syrians are provided unconditional cash transfers for their costs such as rent, utilities and food under Emergency Social Safety Net. However, these financial support programs come short of ensuring quality living conditions. Most Syrian households can only afford living in substandard and overcrowded housing conditions with limited access to safe water and sanitation. On the other hand, Syrians living in temporary accommodation shelters have easy access to utilities and services including education, healthcare and e-vouchers for food.

The Regulation on Work Permits of Foreigners under Temporary Protection adopted in 2016, grants Syrians under temporary protection the right to apply for work permits and access to formal employment, with the aim of promoting self-reliance. In addition, Syrians under temporary protection can work in seasonal agriculture or animal husbandry within the scope of work permit exemptions. 3RP partners work on the supply and demand side with a range of public institutions and the private sector to increase employability and promote self-reliance through job placement, support to various businesses and market linkages. Finally, given the risk of rising social tensions due to the impacts of COVID-19 on access to employment and assistance, 3RP partners in Turkey will continue to support the Government’s efforts to strengthen socio-economic inclusion and reinforce social cohesion based on Turkey’s National Harmonization Strategy and Action Plan.

Over 80,000 booklets featuring Frequently Asked Questions on Work Permits, were jointly developed by the Directorate General of International Labor Force of the Ministry of Family, Labor and Social Services, İŞKUR and UNHCR and distributed to job seekers and business owners; as were over 35,000 İŞKUR Guide to Employment Booklets and brochures with step-by-step information on the work permit application process.

Refugees were also assisted with vocational development. In 2019, a total of 2,888 persons were reached through vocational, language and skills-building training targeting existing labor market gaps delivered by UNHCR’s partners. Through its collaboration with the Vocational Qualifications Authority, UNHCR translated the National Vocational Qualifications and Vocational Qualification Standards of 13 industry sectors into Arabic to facilitate the certification of refugees. In collaboration with the Ministry of National Education, the UNHCR supported the Ministry of National Education’s efforts in realizing the harmonization of the qualification systems by working in 13 industry sectors to facilitate the certification of refugees and employers. As part of these efforts, UNHCR led the complete translation of the Qualifications and Vocational Qualification Standards of existing labor market gaps delivered by UNHCR’s partners.
Education, UNHCR supports PECs to increase the access of refugees under temporary protection to vocational training. In 2019, about 1,000 individuals benefitted from vocational training, while eight Public Education Courses (PECs) in Ankara, Bursa, Kayseri and Konya received equipment for technical vocational training.

UNHCR’s cooperation with the Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) in its Agricultural Livelihoods Programme continued for its third year in collaboration with the provincial directorates of the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry. Vocational training on bakery, cattle care, harvesting fruit crops, food processing, greenhouse production, fruit seedling reached 1,078 beneficiaries in 2019 in Adana, Bursa, Gaziantep, Izmir, Manisa, Kişl, Mersin and Şanlıurfa. The Gaziantep Chamber of Commerce and UNHCR teamed up for awareness-raising activities and organized a job fair to bridge the gap between Syrian job seekers and the Turkish private sector.

Such activities contribute to knowledge-sharing and networking for job seekers enabling them to make connections with potential employers, mentors, and peers. Gaziantep hosts the majority of Syrian entrepreneurs in Turkey.

Close to 1,330 individuals benefited from UNHCR’s Entrepreneurship Support Programme in 11 cities across Turkey; the main goal of which is to provide knowledge and necessary tools for existing and potential entrepreneurs to start, develop or register their businesses. The trainings cover information on legal procedures for establishing a business or license, access to finance, cash and in-kind grants, and business start-up support. The most common economic activities in which refugees and FDP participate are: Agriculture, construction and manufacturing.

Since the pilot program rolled-out in 2019, nearly 25,000 beneficiaries - including refugees and Turkish citizens - have benefited from active labor market programs carried out under the Employment Support Project for Syrians under Temporary Protection and Turkish Citizens Project. This number is more than what was anticipated at the outset of the program, thanks to the tireless efforts of the Turkish Employment Agency (ISKUR) to diversify its employment services for a growing profile of jobseekers - including Syrians under Temporary Protection and their host communities, who have faced tremendous challenges with changing demographics and labor markets in their provinces as thousands of Syrians fled their own war-torn country and found refuge in Turkey.

The project offers a menu of active labor market programs, including job counseling, language training, skills training and, applied training programs. As of October 2020, more than 18,000 people have benefited from the applied training programs, while about 7,000 have been placed in language and skills training programs. About one quarter of those attending applied training programs are women, while nearly 90 percent of beneficiaries attending skills training courses are women and youth. Except for Turkish language courses, which aim to eliminate the language barrier and facilitate integration of refugees, the programs build on ISKUR’s existing employment support services and all the hard work over the last 18 months have borne fruit, with many success stories highlighting the integration of vulnerable communities.

The 45.45 million Euro project is financed by the European Union under the framework of the EU Facility for Refugees in Turkey. The project is implemented by the Ministry of Family, Labor and Social Services of the Republic of Turkey and Turkish Employment Agency. The World Bank provides project implementation support to these public institutions which take a lead in increasing qualified employment and contribute substantially to shaping of the labor market policies in Turkey.

Syrians living under temporary protection are allowed to work in agriculture and animal husbandry, however many other sectors require a work permit that is hardly obtained due to bureaucratic and financial burden it brings upon employers. 64% of Syrian households in urban settings live under poverty level and 18 percent below extreme poverty.

According to UN Women, only in Istanbul violence against women has increased by 38% since the beginning of pandemic response measures in March 2020. The 3RP report indicates that the 38% of the refugee households report increased level of stress and 13% increased level of conflict within the household which requires immediate protection concerns for especially women as most refugee women would avoid reporting such incidents to the police because they fear deportation or increased domestic violence. In August 2020, DGMM and UNHCR have launched an information campaign countrywide available in Arabic, Farsi, Turkish and English to provide messages regarding prevention and response to sexual and gender-based violence, mental health and referral pathways of services for mental health and psychosocial support. It is particularly important for Syrian women as only 20% of Syrian women can speak Turkish.

The key challenges faced by migrants, refugees and IDPs and host communities are work permits, household and welfare conditions (access to housing or shelter, health, food security and nutrition, education, WASH and basic social and economic services, social protection, loss of income), jobs and livelihoods conditions (formalization, informality, decent work conditions), gender: women and girls’ conditions (in terms health, childcare, GBV, social protection, employment and access to jobs and income), youth employment (Skills, TVET, matching jobs), risks (Health, livelihoods, housing, food security, social security and protection), limited access of technology (digital skills, connectivity, digital devices) and limited/No access to financial services (banking services, micro-finance schemes).

COVID-19 pandemic had a high impact on the informal economy and completely changed the situation on ground. Their effect on refugees, FDP and host communities has been job losses, and increased vulnerability, especially for women. Impacts on education have also been severe.
There was an increase in negative coping mechanisms to deal with the impact, gender inequities heightened and levels of VAWG elevated, food security and nutrition. The particularly negative coping mechanisms have been: child labor, early marriage, selling assets and body parts like kidneys, sex trafficking and abuse.

The gatekeepers/stakeholders in-country include national government, local government, UN and other international organizations (ILO etc), financial institutions (MDBs) and the private sector.

The national government aims to achieve social stability, economic growth and funding from international donors (e.g. EU). Local government supports social stability and cohesion and funding to deliver services to both refugees and host community as well as capacity building despite struggling with their own budget which are not inclusive for refugees. UN and other international organizations (ILO etc) are responding via the 3RP which includes research for impact, quality assurance, coordination, policy work, financial resource, and support to national and local institutions. Financial institutions (MDBs) support public institutions, private sector is involved in the refugee market and response trying to link the social and business objectives and creation of new jobs and civil society tries to support with limited space for advocacy and funding and a strong focus on women empowerment. Civil society needs more space. There is limited space for media to express freely. Social media plays an important role in information and misinformation on refugee status and situation and it needs to be supported to convey a more positive narrative regarding the large refugee presence. Communities are also a key stakeholder and they need to be involved and consulted.

The UN COVID-19 assessment and mapping and response plan got developed with a specific funding request. New modalities got established notably online systems to provide online and blended trainings and SMEs got supported in digital economy. National and local authorities started remote/digital service delivery incentives. Movement restrictions and curfew with closure of bars, restaurants, domestic cleaners etc. which has affected many refugees working in these sectors adversely. The responses by government and stakeholders were inclusive for refugees and forced displaced people. Although they were not included in the process but they will benefit from the response.

There been specific calls for funding by donor agencies – in general and in regard to economic recovery especially the informal sectors:

- EU Facility for Refugees in Turkey (FRIT II) not allocated to the 3RP which could undermine the resilience building efforts done in the past
- The informal sector is not discussed enough as the focus is on formal employment. There is no real appetite from the aid community to discuss it openly.
- Work permit policy is a great breakthrough but could be amended to be more flexible and open to more sectors
- The private sector has not been engaged enough with particularly no strong link between Syrian and Turkish companies
- Most of the refugees who benefit from the ESSN do not want to work officially in usual temporary job lest to loss the social protection benefit
- The 3RP is a mixed of humanitarian and development (nexus) but the funding is still largely short term and in 2020 only 53% got funded which leave many needs unattended.
- There is still a lack of awareness on the work permit and formalization of work as well as other legal procedures on both refugees and employers.

The budget and programming size of the MDBs is growing in Turkey (mostly due to the EU Facility for Refugees in Turkey (FRIT II) and therefore as per the 3RP coordination mechanism, several consultations took place with them to ensure complementarity and discussions are taking place to try to have reporting on the same tools. Stronger priority is given to the work with municipalities and private sector notably in regard to livelihood and economic recovery/growth. Referral mechanisms across 3RP sector and outside is getting reinforced. A mapping of all refugee related responses within and outside of 3RP is underway with valuable contributions from IFIs.

There are several important gaps within the ongoing responses – in general and in regard to economic recovery especially the informal sectors:
There are many UN and INGOs and think tanks reports and assessments, with strong recommendations towards bridging the aforementioned gaps. However, it is not easy to influence policy in Turkey. One good practice is the establishment of the Economic Recovery Task Force established to deal with the COVID-19 socio-economic impacts and the Emergency Response Plan lead by WHO to deal with the pandemic.

Successful experiences

The objective of the Transition to Formality Programme (KİGEP) is to increase formal employment levels for Turkish citizens and Syrians under Temporary Protection (SuTP) through the incentives provided to employers. Out of 2.1 million Syrians of working age in Turkey, one million are estimated to participate in the labor market and mostly working informally in low-skilled and low paid jobs, especially in the textile industry and service sector, as well as in agriculture and construction. The COVID-19 pandemic, in addition to being a health crisis, hit these sectors hard and affected both refugees and host communities socially and economically.

The programme aims to prevent the loss of rights that may occur due to informal employment, ensure that Syrian and Turkish workers work in better conditions and prevent unfair competition. The strategic goal of the programme is to foster a “formal employment culture” through an employment support method. KİGEP is funded by the European Union Regional Trust Fund (EUTF) and US Department of State, Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration (USBPRM) under the Refugee Response Programme of the International Labor Organization (ILO) Office for Turkey. The Programme has been implemented in close cooperation with the Directorate-General for International Labor Force (DG-ILF) of the Ministry of Family, Labor and Social Services and the Strategy Development Department of Social Security Institution (SSI). Additionally, SSI Provincial Directorates of Adana, Bursa, Hatay, İstanbul and Konya where KİGEP was implemented have contributed significantly to the programme as liaison and application offices.

The Transition to Formality Programme (KİGEP) that is equally targeting refugees and host community members. Implemented over 3 years and extended under the name KİGEP “Plus”, the employers are supported to retain formal employment and uphold access to social protection for their workers through the reimbursement of social security premiums and work permit fees for Syrian workers. So far, and the first phase of KİGEP and now KİGEP Plus have supported over 5,000 Syrian and Turkish employees through this simple scheme. Over 200 companies are supported in 10 cities, most of them in Istanbul, where the total number of Syrians is the highest (over half million Syrians). The top sectors that have benefited from KİGEP are manufacturing, including textile and furniture production, and food production.

KİGEP is implemented in close cooperation with the Social Security Institution (SSI) under the Turkish Ministry of Family, Labor and Social Services. SSI strongly supports ILO’s effort on extending the social security to all in line with its own institutional goals. KİGEP is currently implemented within the project “Promoting Decent Work for Syrians under Temporary Protection and Turkish citizens”, financed by the Federal Republic of Germany through KFW Development Bank and by another ILO project funded by USBPRM.

The Programme has covered the expenses of social security premium support payments for Turkish citizens and newly recruited Syrian workers for up to six months and work permit expenses of Syrian workers. In order to benefit from the support, enterprises must employ their workers without interruption, pay their social security premiums and be debt-free against the SSI.

**Nakış** is a textile company specialized in home textile, embroidery, quilting and brode, and it has been operating since 1976. The family company, like many other family businesses in Izmir, is currently run by the founders’ son. The company now proves to honour its name while surviving the crisis in various ways like diversifying both its products as well as exporting markets, and keeping the COVID-19 protective measures tight at the same time. As the company started to produce N-95 masks for COVID-19 protection with a new machine acquired during the first days of the pandemic, to compensate the losses in their orders. The company employs 70 employees, both blue and white collars, including Syrian blue collars working there for over a year.

**PEP-Promotion of Economic Prospects. BMZ and GIZ PEP-Promotion of Economic Prospects Creating employment opportunities for the host community and Syrian refugees in Turkey.** The programme focuses on improving resilience for households, communities and Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises (MSMEs), along with the development of better socio-economic conditions including social cohesion and environmental sustainability measures. PEP is enhancing its continued support to refugees and the host community within the context of COVID-19. The Programme takes several measures to alleviate the socio-economic impact, such as providing short-term compensation for unemployment and suspended trainings and organisation of online trainings supporting small businesses financially in terms of rent, social security and minimum salary, contributing to municipality-run soup kitchens and delivering in-kind support for particularly vulnerable families, as well as assisting the production of masks and face shields. Areas of activity include Employment and Skills Development, Entrepreneurship and Start-up Support and Strengthening the Business Environment.
Policy Response

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<tr>
<th>Economic Stability Shield ($38.3 bln) announced in March 2020 increasing Credit Guarantee Fund limit for SMEs and companies needing liquidity, credit packages for social purposes for disadvantaged citizens, increasing loan limit for houses under 500 thousand lira &amp; reducing the minimum down payment.</th>
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<tr>
<td>TSKB and World Bank agreed on a loan of $250 million to support the SMEs during the COVID-19.</td>
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<td>The Central Bank of Turkey cut the policy rate cut to inject liquidity into markets and improve the cash flow of firms. in March and April 2020</td>
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<td>Cuts in municipality budgets were postponed for 3 months allowing access to $445 million in additional funding.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The companies whose cash flow have deteriorated will be provided financial support.</td>
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<tr>
<td>The Credit Guarantee Fund limit is increased from 25 bln TRY to 125 bln TRY to provide loans for SMEs and Tradesmen Credit Card is provided with a limit of 25,000 TRY without any payments for 3 months.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Turkish public bank Halkbank postponed credit, interest &amp; debt payments for 3 months of businesses and artists negatively affected.</td>
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<tr>
<td>The administration increased the Credit Guarantee Fund limit from $3.8 bln to $7.7 bln, and credit will first be given to businesses and SMEs with a collateral deficit and need of liquidity.</td>
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<tr>
<td>With a new legislation, the Wealth Fund will be able to inject cash or take over private companies facing difficulty due to COVID pandemic.</td>
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<tr>
<td>1.6 million Craftsmen is provided with a support of 26 bln TRY. 700 thousand craftsmen is benefited from a total of 17,3 mln TRY credit.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tariffs raised in textile, shoes and leather to protect domestic producers. Utility debts postponed for households and workplaces whose activities are stopped due to COVID-19.</td>
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<tr>
<td>7 bln TRY personal finance credits is allocated.</td>
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<tr>
<td>The bonuses for eid-al-fitr for the retired persons were paid in advance.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Social Support Grant Program has been initiated under 3 phases. 6.2 million households were granted with 1,000 TRY social assistance and lowest pension amount is increased to 1,500 TRY/month.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Public banks introduced long-term credit mechanisms targeting the households with a monthly income less than 5000 TRY.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Municipalities established help-lines to assist citizens who are under strict orders to stay at home and provides food and cash supports to citizens who lost their jobs.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Monthly amount to Social Benevolent and Solidarity Associations increased to 180 mln TRY from 135 mln TRY to protect the most disadvantaged and vulnerable groups.</td>
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<tr>
<td>The Ministry of Family, Labor and Social Services provides secure places to homeless people to protect them from COVID-19.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nursing homes for elderly and disabled people will provide service without seeking for any criteria of eligibility for 3 months.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Donations to solidarity Campaign exceeded 2 billion. 1.6 billion of the total amount has been disbursed to families in need of urgent support.</td>
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<tr>
<td>2.234 thousand primary and secondary school students will receive conditional cash transfers for education (75 TRY for girls, 50 TRY for boys, 150 TRY for orphans).</td>
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<tr>
<td>Government eased application criteria for short-term work allowance (60% of a minimum wage) to protect employment &amp; employers. Total amount of the support has exceeded 16.5 billion TRY.</td>
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<tr>
<td>The President extended the short-term employment allowance until 31 October 2020.</td>
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<tr>
<td>1170 TRY monthly payment provided to employees forced to take unpaid leave amid novel coronavirus and could not benefit from short-time work starting 15 March 2020.</td>
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</table>
A new “normalization support programme” on 1 August 2020. 1,103 TRY will be deducted from the social security premiums employers pay SSI, in case the employees shift to normal working hours.

One-time cash transfer of 2,500 TRY for workers in TV and cinema industry by Istanbul Foundation for Culture & Arts and Trade Union of TV & Cinema Workers.

Monthly minimum wage support of 75 TRY continued to be provided to all employers (around 7.8 million) until the end of 2020.

Despite physical classes being cancelled to prevent infection, public schools will continue to pay untenured teachers and qualified instructors, who normally receive hourly wages.

New legislation (Act No. 7244), Turkish Government banned layoffs to secure employment and aims to protect employees who are not eligible for short-labor pay and are put on unpaid leave. The most recent presidential decree extended the layoff bans for another 2 months until 17 November 2020.

KOSGEB increased the maximum limit of “investment and management credit” to 3 Million TRY. Accordingly, payback period was levelled up to 60 months from 48.

Public banks introduced 4 new loan packages to strengthen the demand side of the automobile industry, construction industry, general consumption and tourism with lower interest rates than the Turkish banking system.

Credit payments for firms who are facing cash flow disruptions due to coronavirus was postponed for three months.

Credit payments of craftspeople and artisans to state lender Halkbank was delayed for three months without interest.

Turkish Exim Bank introduced Turkish Lira Rediscount Credit Programme to deliver low interest credits to SMEs and bigger companies to support exports.

Ministry of Industry and Technology announced “Triple Protection Package” supporting SMEs through grants to SMEs producing PPE, postponement of the payments of SMEs Development Organization, and extension of deadlines for project implementation.

Development Agencies announced loan programs to assist business in need of urgent cash.

All enterprises were exempted from the environment sanitation tax and advertisement tax for the period of business shutdown.


Health professionals could use the public transport free of charge. 32 thousand new health professionals were employed. 8,635 contracted employees and 5,865 regular workers will be employed in university hospitals.

40 thousand beetroot producers will be paid in advance on 3 April 2020 of nearly 250 mln TRY.

The credit payments of farmers equaling to 6 bln TRY are postponed for 6 months without any interest.

The rent payments of agricultural lands for 51 thousand farmers is postponed for 6 months.

14 million square meter public land will be opened to the use of farmers in selected cities to grow certain types of products, where women and young farmers will be given priority.

**Key Gaps and Policy Recommendations**

Turkey’s proven ability to embrace and accommodate more refugees than any other country constitutes the foundation of what can be seen as a best practice in migration management. The role of Turkish civil society should not be understated throughout this process as myriad CSOs have repeatedly exhibited a remarkable degree of adaptability in the face of adversity and a strong commitment to sustaining and improving communal harmony, even amid the COVID-19 pandemic. Nonetheless, the high degree of overall social acceptance of refugees can still be considered fragile, and as the pandemic has shown, refugees’ and host communities’ economic access may well be the Achilles’ heel of Turkey’s robust refugee response efforts. Considering this, the symbiotic relationship between gainful employment and social cohesion needs to be emphasized in the design and implementation of international and local humanitarian aid and protection programs.
In order to address the long-term socio-economic needs of vulnerable host and refugee communities in Turkey while also providing a powerful method of social harmonization, CSOs and local governments need to modify their interventions to move away from a “burden” approach to an “opportunity” approach. Instead of viewing the refugee community as a liability, UN Agencies, CSOs would do well to highlight their untapped human capital, and emphasize the different ways in which they can become active participants in the economic life of the country they are living in. This can be accomplished by strengthening the link between humanitarian assistance and long-term development goals and by fostering resilience and self-reliance, which in turn would contribute to greater social cohesion. A few recommendations for this approach are the following:

- Promoting joint economic ventures for refugees and Turkish citizens
- Developing and implementing internship and apprenticeship programs for refugees and host communities, while matching supply with demand
- Communities that increase individual employability and marketability
- Designing and instating capacity building programs for Turkey-based CSOs that empower the creation of opportunities for the most vulnerable of refugees, such as women, children, and unemployed youth
- Creating gender-friendly employment contexts wherein women are provided access to language training courses and affordable day care for children and the elderly
- Establishing entrepreneurship and micro-business trainings depending on the needs of the labor market, particularly in the digital sphere
- Promote investments and incentives for enterprises and businesses from countries of origin of FDP, MNC together with appropriate trade policies for production of goods and services to attend the needs of domestic and international markets with active participation of FDP and their host communities
- Explore and provide an enabling environment for active participation of the Diaspora in the livelihoods and wellbeing of FDP
- Contribute to close the digital gap and introduce digitalization for institutional, employment and innovation in MSMEs
- Enhance the strategies, policies and operations of MDBs and IFIs in the growth and development space for FDP
- Creating platforms for coordination between government representatives, international nongovernmental organizations, and smaller CSOs rooted in the local communities to facilitate exchange of information and best practices.
- Despite the outbreak of COVID-19 and the restrictions imposed on interpersonal contact, social cohesion should be at the front and center of all livelihoods interventions in order to ensure a smooth transition from the humanitarian assistance perspective to the medium and long-term development perspective
### COUNTRY SNAPSHOT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Registered Refugees from Syria:</th>
<th>In-camp refugees:</th>
<th>Out of camp refugees:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>663,507</td>
<td>127,663</td>
<td>535,844</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Human Development Index Ranking:</th>
<th>Gender Inequality Index Ranking:</th>
<th>Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Extremism percentile:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>102</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>33.33</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Context

History of refugees in Jordan: In 1948, two years after Jordan’s independence, the Kingdom was affected by an influx of 506,200 Palestinian refugees. In 1967, Jordan welcomed another 390,000 refugees and displaced persons – 345,000 from the West Bank and 45,000 from the Gaza Strip. After that year refugee movements to Jordan continued, though in fewer numbers. Lebanese people sought refuge in Jordan during the Lebanese Civil War (1975-1990); in 1991 and 2003 refugees from Iraq arrived in Jordan due to the Gulf War and the Iraq War; in 1982, Syrians fled to Jordan as a result of a massacre in the Syrian city of Hama. While there are no data on how many Syrian refugees arrived at that time, the Norwegian Research Foundation (FAFO) estimated that the number of Iraqis who entered Jordan was somewhere between 450,000 and 500,000. Looking at the latest Census results (see below) it becomes clear that many of them must have eventually left Jordan, e.g. in order to return to their country of origin. Since March 2011 unprecedented numbers of forced migrants from Syria have arrived in Jordan because of the Syrian Civil War or the so called Syrian Crisis.

Increases in international aid have previously accompanied refugee influxes into the Kingdom. Jordan is a country accustomed to negotiating its survival through foreign aid, and moments of refugee influx have provided opportunities for it to capitalize on international support. Unsurprisingly, Jordan has demonstrated the most sophisticated regional response to the Syrian refugee crisis of all the major neighboring host countries. Led by the Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation, Jordan demonstrated its willingness to use the Syrian population as a lever to garner international development aid through the Jordan Response Plan for the Syria Crisis, which is described as “the first nationally-led response of its kind, joining refugee and development responses in one comprehensive national plan.”

Jordan has always viewed hosting refugees through a utilitarian political lens. The Syrian refugee influx has provided it with further opportunities to leverage international support to its benefit. While Jordan undoubtedly has been burdened by hosting an increasingly vulnerable Syrian refugee population, its responses to the crisis have demonstrated its understanding of the significant relationship between the hosting of refugees, increased international aid, and the opportunities provided for nation building21.

Jordan hosts 1.3 million Syrians, of which 662,166 are registered with UNHCR, making it the second largest per capita refugee hosting country in the world. In December, registration and other legal and protection activities continued through remote modalities. UNHCR continued

to share information on such modalities with Population of Concern (PoCs) through different means, including the Jordan Help site, the Helpline and social media pages. While Jordan is not a signatory to the 1951 Convention, it warrants a favourable protection environment for Syrian refugees safeguarding key fundamental human rights through national frameworks. Jordan actively supports and implements global mechanisms addressing the Syria crisis, while also adhering to the principles and priorities outlined in the 2030 Agenda, the Global Compact on Refugees (GCR) and the World Humanitarian Summit.

Refugee response planners no longer frame Syrian refugees merely as objects of humanitarian care. Increasingly, they are portrayed as enterprising subjects, whose formal integration into labor markets simultaneously can create self-sufficient actors and cure the economic woes of host countries.


Jordan Compact: The Jordan Compact represents a milestone in this process. In the Jordan Compact, issued at the conclusion of the London donor’s conference for Syria and the region in February 2016, the Government of Jordan (GoJ) declared that in the coming years it would allow potentially as many as 200,000 Syrians to obtain work permits in Jordan. Syrians’ formal labor market participation rapidly transformed from being a taboo topic into the new benchmark by which the government now would be held facing international community.

Long-standing features of political economy in Jordan have been under-appreciated by most of the actors involved in designing the scheme, many of whom lack experience with (Jordanian) labor market issues, and/or with the lives and survival strategies of (Syrian) refugees. Specifically, in its unfolding, the Jordan Compact has run up against three main underlying dynamics that have shaped Jordan’s political economy for decades: (a) zonal development strategies with Special Enterprise Zones (SEZ), which have been a central but highly problematic feature of growth strategies in the country, (b) a nationally-segmented labor market that builds on specialized, precarious migrant labor, and (c) the relevance of informal labor and the political creation of informality.

The plan to employ refugees in special economic zones and to boost Jordan’s economy by attracting investments through trade concessions has proven hard to roll out when confronted by several complexities. The vision of refugee employment in SEZs is also at odds with a perspective that emphasizes not just work for Syrian refugees, but decent work. Success often has been bought at the expense of harsh working conditions and low wages, which have deterred Syrian refugees from taking up employment there. Some Jordanians benefit from employing migrant workers (and/or Syrians), this tends not to lead to improvements in Jordanian job prospects. The donor-driven push to formalize (Syrian) refugee labor stands in tension with the long-established dynamics of an informalized labor market, and with the interests of the actors for whom this informalized or semi-formalized system works.

The institutional conditions for refugees and displaced communities aren’t sufficiently inclusive due to the fact that the process of acquiring residence papers isn’t practical nor affordable. Acquiring work permits is possible although limited instances and dependent on work sector, mainly for agriculture, construction and manufacturing jobs. Refugees/host communities aren’t included in social protection mechanisms and safety nets. They cannot report Human Rights violations. And they do have access to decent work and decent work conditions. However, some systems exist, but they are greatly challenged. Access to decent work and decent work conditions has decreased over the past year for refugees and host communities alike, especially in light of the COVID-19 pandemic. According to 2020 FIND study that IRC was part of, access to sustainable formal work remains a challenge (16% of interviewed Syrians had work permits) and informal work provides low and unstable income. Refugees without work permits fear being detained and forcibly relocated to closed refugee camps or deported to their home country, especially non-Syrian respondents. Many reported exploitation, including long working hours, lower pay, and denied or delayed payment.

Key Trends

The distribution of remotely renewed Asylum Seeker Certificates (ASC) at UNHCR’s registration centres continued through the month of December, reaching a total of 7,968 families. As a result, some 29,667 refugees were able to renew their ASCs and collect them from the Amman, Irbid, Mafraq and EJC registration centres. The show rate for the ASCs’ delivery process was high reaching a rate of 84%. UNHCR registration teams across Jordan continue to renew ASCs and add newborn babies to existing cases through remote modalities. Since January 2020, a total of 199,218 individuals (61,186 families)
have renewed their ASCs across Jordan. By the end of 2020, it was anticipated that 400,000 PoCs would be in possession of expired documentation. The Government of Jordan announced a decision to consider ASCs issued by UNHCR to refugees in Jordan, valid until 30 June 2021, regardless of the expiry date.

Due to the pandemic response resulting in diminished income generating opportunities for PoCs, with the corresponding inability to meet rent obligations leading to increased eviction notices. Community Support Committees (CSCs) across Jordan. CSCs continue to support refugee communities through community engagement activities, information sharing, and food/non-food item distributions.

During 2020, a total of 109 home-based businesses (HBBs) were registered, of which 77 were Jordanian owned and 32 Syrian-owned, while 70 more were licensed (53 Jordanian and 17 Syrian owned). UNHCR and its partner Blumont continued to support this process and worked towards connecting HBBs to various established platforms to access larger markets. Additionally, Blumont provided 74 HBBs with seed grants to develop and maintain their businesses.

In addition to UNHCR’s regular cash assistance program, which reaches 33,000 refugee families monthly, including 3,000 non-Syrian families, during November and December, UNHCR Jordan also distributed a total of USD $12.6 million in winter cash assistance, assisting a total of 46,265 refugee families in urban settings, including 13,882 non-Syrian families.

During December, UNHCR established Connected Learning Hubs in three juvenile centres operated by the Ministry of Social Development, while multipurpose rooms were established in four schools, to support the Ministry of Education’s blended and online education programming. UNHCR continued to support online learning through the Kolibri platform. Since January 2020, more than 17,000 users, from camps and urban settings, have accessed the Kolibri platform in Jordan.

Throughout 2020, a total of 3,663 individuals were submitted for resettlement and all slots available during the year were utilized through the implementation of remote processes. While UNHCR’s original annual target was 5,500, the confirmed number of places for 2020 was 3,455 (more were submitted to ensure all resettlement spots are filled). According to UNHCR (December 2020), 10% refugees are in need for settlement.

The Impact of COVID on Refugees, FDPs and Host Communities

The impact of COVID-19 in Jordan is significant, with deteriorating conditions impacting both refugees and host communities, with high increases in unemployment, food insecurity, risk of eviction, Gender Based Violence (GBV), and a decline in access to education and health services. The pandemic has undone the progress of previous years, with indicators in some sectors like food security now equating to those of 2014. Pre-existing challenges such as water scarcity, weak infrastructure especially WASH facilities for refugees, and heavy reliance on food imports have also been exacerbated.

Three quarters of the general population reported difficulties in meeting even their basic needs like food and rent, while this exceeded 85 percent for the most vulnerable. Only 2 percent of refugee households can meet their essential food needs without any negative coping strategies, which include cutting down on meals, pulling children out of school, early marriage and sending family members to beg. Already the percentage of children going out to work rather than attending school has increased from 1 percent in 2019 to more than 13 percent in 2020.

Additionally, Jordan was faced with the burden of increased refugees, whereby the government had to increase spending to accommodate the increasing population. The influx of refugees put pressure on the limited available resources, especially in the education, health, and infrastructure sectors and led to increased unemployment which put a huge burden on the government and the country’s infrastructure. Accordingly, Jordan had to rely more on international aid which worsened its public debt records which was also affected by the US cut of funds for UNRWA.

Among refugees living in host communities, food insecurity has reached 24 percent compared to 14 percent in 2018. The deterioration in camps has been even more exponential. Since the onset of the pandemic, refugee households in camps with insufficient food consumption increased from 5 percent to 19 percent between 2019 and 2020, reaching the worst levels since 2014. Female headed refugee households in both camps and communities are particularly affected. The impact on Jordanians is also significant; more than 55 percent of Jordanian households have started to reduce their food intake and adopt negative livelihood coping strategies, compared to around a third in 2019. Much of the deterioration has been caused by the loss of income and access to livelihoods opportunities.

These findings speak to the inequalities and protection risks exacerbated by COVID-19. Expansion of social security mechanisms is a national priority recognizing the
necessity to enhance the private sector and to promote employment opportunities for Jordanians and non-Jordanians alike with a specific focus on the promotion of decent work. Emerging initiatives such as the creation of a multi-donor Emergency Unemployment.

EU Funds (EUF) are based on inclusive policies and strategies that benefit all communities in Jordan. Humanitarian and development actors contribute to strengthening national systems and institutions helping to address protection risks. Against the backdrop of the National Social Protection Strategy, the objective is to ensure that the services provided are supporting the development of an equitable social protection system accessible to Jordanians and non-Jordanians on the basis of needs and vulnerabilities in line with assessment results.

Commendably, the Jordanian Government ensured the inclusion of all populations on its territory within its national COVID-19 response plans, highlighting the imperative to address the mid- to long-term structural and socio-economic challenges that equally affect host and refugee populations in need. Moreover, the Jordan Response Plan (JRP) 2020-2022 strongly encourages a mid- to long-term approach and aims to address vulnerabilities at individual, household and community levels to tackle the root causes of fragility and to ensure that ‘resilience’ remains at the core of the crisis response. The JRP includes a COVID-19 pillar, and each project comprises refugee, host community as well as an institutional and capacity building component.

Gender is also critical to these endeavors. A holistic approach is needed to promote an enabling legal and policy environment to tackle demand and supply side. The Regional Strategic Overview 2021-2022 December 2020 identified 29 barriers that impede women’s social and economic empowerment and participation. The regularization of micro, small and home-based business and the promotion of sectors where a preponderance of women work, will be key. Humanitarian and development actors support the Government’s commitments under new financing schemes 10 to further expand formal employment opportunities including for refugees.

Expanded access to work permits alongside the expansion of social security coverage to informal microenterprises and self-employed workers will help longer-term self-sufficiency of workers. However, the recovery from COVID-19 induced increase in unemployment and underemployment, particularly within the informal sector where most of the refugee community and vulnerable Jordanians are employed.

Therefore, there is a need to invest in strategies that will prioritize national employment while concurrently supporting access to refugee employment. Although temporary job creation allows recently unemployed and young people to have an immediate income, the need for longer term development of sustainable employment opportunities for all is vital. For the most vulnerable, the transition from dependence to self-reliance requires graduation from social assistance programs. Current assistance programs that effectively provide for basic needs will have to be complemented by active labor market policies (ALMP) that support lower skilled workers (especially women) reenter the labor market and economic opportunities.

The focus must shift beyond social assistance to include job creation and economic growth, where refugees and host communities can partake, helping to reinforce social cohesion. Jordan has taken remarkable strides to implement the Jordan Compact, which serves as a positive example for other protracted displacement contexts. The support to host countries must be accompanied by efforts to expand resettlement and complementary pathways and to find lasting burden sharing solutions.

Jordan is one of the driest countries in the world, with water scarcity being a major barrier to the achievement of SDGs and the pursuit of economic prosperity. The challenge at the national level is reflected at the micro level in Syrian refugee camps and the long-term sustainability of the camps, which are heavily reliant on declining groundwater reserves. Camp operations require broader and holistic planning and need to transition to more sustainable delivery modalities through Governmental entities that integrate ‘islanded’ communities into national systems, supported technically and financially through longer term development ODA channels focusing on humanitarian development, sustainability and climate sensitive programming.

Collective efforts and high-level advocacy for equitable access to quality and inclusive education for those most disadvantaged, as well as evidence for strategic response planning and programming remain necessary. The continued full school closures can have an adverse impact on children’s well-being and exacerbate their learning loss. Going forward, a continued dialogue and close collaboration between humanitarian and development actors is essential in order to unlock additional opportunities for Jordanians and non-Jordanians including refugees through initiatives with longer term, secured financing. Furthermore, prioritizing a postCOVID-19 recovery process to stimulate the economy, build more resilient systems and strengthen institutional capacities, including the ‘front line’ municipalities, is instrumental to the long-term well-being of Jordanians and non-Jordanians including refugees.

Economic Impact of COVID-1923: The unprecedented economic shock emerging from COVID-19 pandemic has exacerbated existing structural weaknesses in the Jordan economy as well as unresolved social challenges while putting pressure on country’s fragile macroeconomic

stance. By March 2021 there were 407,600 total cases and 4,800 deaths (World Coronavirus update FT). Over the medium term, growth is projected to remain on a low plateau unless Jordan's deep structural issues and economic challenges are addressed quickly and comprehensively.

Remittance levels amounting to USD 3.7 billion in 2019, slowed as falling oil prices caused economic restructuring in Gulf countries, where large numbers of highly skilled Jordanian workers have traditionally found employment. According to MoPIC, as of late 2019 ODA totaled USD 3.35 billion. Dependent on Official Development Assistance (ODA), remittances and FDI.

Poverty in 2010 amounted to 14.4% (national poverty line). The declines in households’ labor and remittances incomes due to the COVID-19 economic shock are expected to increase poverty in the near-term by 11 percentage points, although the government emergency response through cash transfers and continued expansion of the social safety net can help mitigate about a third of that increase.

Labor market indicators for the second quarter of 2020 reflect the significant disruptions of the COVID-19 crisis. The already elevated unemployment rate has risen to 23% in Q2-2020 compared to 19.3% in Q1-2020. The COVID-19 pandemic, whose full impact is still unfolding, has had a significant impact on livelihoods of households and host communities in Jordan. The current crisis exacerbates existing vulnerabilities and is likely to reproduce and intensify pre-existing inequalities.

Refugees, IDPs and host communities typically support themselves through: Cash support / grants; family and social networks; external Aid; social protection or safety nets (only host communities); income and wages from jobs (not in line with decent work standards); self-employsments, MSMEs-Entrepreneurship

Most common economic activities are: Agriculture; food and beverage industry; retail; construction activities; manufacturing.

The key challenges faced by migrants, refugees and IDPs and host communities are: Work permits; Household and welfare conditions (access to housing or shelter, health, food security and nutrition, education, WASH and basic social and economic services, social protection, loss of income); jobs and livelihoods conditions (formalization, informality, decent work conditions); Micro, Small and Medium Enterprise (MSMEs) (Entry barriers for urban and rural activities); gender: Women and girls’ conditions (in terms health, childcare, GBV, social protection, access to jobs and income); youth employment (Skills, TVET, matching jobs); risks (Health, livelihoods, housing, food security, social security and protection); limited access of technology (digital skills, connectivity, digital devices); and limited access to financial services (banking services, micro-finance schemes). Therefore the COVID-19 pandemic has had a high impact and completely changed the situation on ground.

This has affected refugees, IDPs and host communities the following way. They were the first to lose jobs and are more vulnerable than before; refugees/ host communities
had to adopt negative coping mechanisms to deal with the impact; gender inequities have heightened and levels of VAWG have elevated; food security and nutrition needs have heightened; and education for school aged children/youth has been severely affected. Some of the negative effects have been: More engagement in exploitative labor; visible increase in incidents of child labor; and reduced food intake. Further debt.

The gatekeepers/stakeholders in-country are: The national government; UN and other international organizations (ILO; UNDP and others); financial institutions (MDBs); CSOs; and media. National government ensures national security; Jordanians’ wellbeing/socio-economic development; regional and global political reputation; international donor funding from IMF, the World Bank, ECHO and others. Local government ensures local security; Jordanians’ wellbeing/socio-economic development; funding from national government and local reputation management. UN and other international organizations (ILO; UNDP and others) contribute to beneficiaries’ socio-economic wellbeing; safety and security at all programmatic levels; trust from national local government authorities, reputation locally and internationally; international donor funding. Financial institutions (MDBs) support through trust in government national and local institutions capacity and transparency while INGOs and NGOs implement solid programs for beneficiaries; national and international vulnerability assessments and other evidence-based reports.

The Private sector is concerned mostly with profit, reputation with government, society and all actors; investment opportunities, CSR branding. The Civil society supports through increased financial support; more human rights’ follow up on cases and fair trials especially concerning cases of GBV; trust from Government; access to beneficiary areas; national and international funding for programs; solid partnerships with INGOs, being included in local and national meetings regarding beneficiaries – civil society’s voice to be heard. Media is mostly government owned or allied (save a few) and is motivated by topics concerning national security; local socio-economic challenges; Government-led meetings and events; border security and political issues with Israel/OPT and Syria; IMF/World Bank/ECHO and other international funding in support of Jordan. Other not for profit organizations support access to beneficiary areas; national and international funding for programs; solid partnerships with INGOs; being included in local and national meetings regarding beneficiaries – civil society’s voice to be heard. The communities are supported through cash assistance; provision of quality free educational and health services; better job opportunities; safer communities for women and children suffering from GBV; more support for vocational training for youth; more services and less stigmatization of Persons with Disability (PWD)

Based on the assessment of work, household vulnerabilities in Jordan through ILO-FAFO assessments conducted in April and October 2020, findings show that almost half of the workers who were in employment before the COVID-19 outbreak were out of work during the early weeks of the crisis. The majority said they did not have any forms of savings to tap into, and that the level of cash and in-kind assistance they received was limited. Assessed by type of contract, the level of informal employment was higher among Syrians (52 percent) than Jordanians (35 percent). Social security coverage for Syrian respondents was limited to 24 percent, while 63 percent of Jordanians had social security coverage facilitated by their employer. To mitigate the negative economic effects of these COVID-19 control measures, the government of Jordan has implemented a policy response package. Allowances for social cash transfers were increased for poor households.

The county has been facing a difficult external environment because of the political situation in the region, especially the conflicts in Iraq and Syria, which led to an increase in the economic, social and security burdens on Jordan. Additionally, Jordan was faced with the burden of increased refugees, whereby the government had to increase spending to accommodate the increasing population. Exclusion is also reflected in citizens’ lack of trust in governmental institutions and limited participation in decision-making processes.

The unemployment share improved to 11 percent by September 2020, falling short of the pre-lockdown level. Labor Force Participation Rate 54.2 percent. The share of employed refugees dropped more during lockdown than in other groups. Their employment share decreased by 28 percentage points during lockdown, relative to a 19-percentage point decrease for non-refugees.

The COVID-19 pandemic, whose full impact is still unfolding, has had a significant impact on livelihoods of households and host communities in Jordan. The current crisis exacerbates existing vulnerabilities and is likely to reproduce and intensify pre-existing inequalities. The crisis overlaps with other crises Jordan has been facing: regional instability, significant refugee inflows and population increases, years of low economic growth and a fiscal crisis and the impact of climate change.

Basic social indicators data released in 2019 provided new insights on vulnerable populations. According to the Vulnerability Assessment Framework, Population Study (UNHCR, 2019), 40 percent of the Syrian refugees in Jordan were identified as highly vulnerable in basic needs; with a further 55 percent classified as severely vulnerable. Overall, 59 percent of vulnerable Jordanian households were at risk of food insecurity and 11 percent were food insecure. During 2019, Syrian refugees continued to have access to legal work through free work permits in the agricultural, construction and manufacturing sectors. Additionally, Syrian refugees had the opportunity to register home based businesses in certain key sectors such as food processing, tailoring and handicrafts.

However, towards the end of 2019, the Ministry of Labor (MoL) issued a new National Employment Charter and made changes to the open and closed/
restricted professions that refugees can access. The list of closed professions had been extended, which impacted refugee labor, including semi-skilled and high skilled, where many refugees are reported to work in the informal sector, which is often associated with poor work conditions. In addition, the cumulative number of work permits issued to Syrian refugees in Jordan, according to UNHCR, reached around 165,000 (45 percent of the working age population) thus verifying that Jordan is one of the country’s leading the way when it comes to refugee employment. However, more needs to be done in improving access of women to the labor market and supporting non-Syrian nationalities.

Jordan needs to reduce its reliance on low-paid migrant workers in labor-intensive sectors such as agriculture, construction, and low-end services (Assaad and Salemi, 2019). These sectors need to be made more accessible and more attractive to both Syrian refugees and vulnerable Jordanians. There is a need for funding for training, TVET and apprenticeships for Syrians and Jordanians in these sectors and support employment in Jordan. Jordan’s youth had some of the world’s lowest employment rates prior to the COVID-19 pandemic and ensuing economic downturn. Young people now face additional obstacles on their path to decent work and adulthood, another blow to a country that has acted as a shock absorber and safe haven in a highly unstable region. Jordan’s youth are generally well educated, therefore support to connect them to goods and service jobs is critical.

Based on the assessment of work, household vulnerabilities in Jordan through ILO-FAFO assessments conducted in April and October 2020, findings show that almost half of the workers who were in employment before the COVID-19 outbreak were out of work during the early weeks of the crisis. The majority said they did not have any forms of savings to tap into, and that the level of cash and in-kind assistance they received was limited. Informal employment is widespread, mainly among Syrian refugee respondents. Few workers have been working during the lockdown - and one third of Syrians lost their jobs. Almost one-third of Syrians (34 percent) who lost their job had a verbal agreement with their employer, compared to those with written contracts (29 percent). And only 4 percent of the respondents reported to have worked during the lockdown. According to UN Women the main impact for women was on health, GBV, food security, economic insecurity, and child education.

75 percent of the population feel this will impact their incomes and livelihoods. 72 percent of households reported impact and basic needs, while vulnerable HH reported that 85 percent were being affected. 76 percent and 85 percent of general and vulnerable household, were being respectively affected in terms of food prices. While financial resilience and thus savings was on average 66 percent, 1-2 weeks for both kind of HHs. Approximately 50-68 percent have lost their livelihoods and 29 percent in the formal sector and 99 percent in the informal sector have lost their jobs. Schools were closed and few had access to distance learning. Financial resilience was between 1 week and 1 month.

Refugees employed prior to lockdown faced a similar 73 percent decrease under lockdown, and a shallower recovery to 25 percent below their baseline by September. Employment for high-wage workers performed relatively better during and after the lockdown, with 42 percent and 15 percent drops from their baseline, respectively. Wage earning partially recovered after the easing of lockdown restrictions but remained 19 percent below their baseline.

Low wage workers and refugees earned only a small fraction of their pre-lockdown earnings during restrictions. Less educated workers also faced steep declines in earnings and hours during lockdown. Highly educated and high wage service workers saw relatively larger reductions in hours worked after lockdown compared with other workers, but smaller reductions in earnings. About 10% of working respondents skipped meals or reduced portions. Borrowing and spending savings were the two most popular financial coping methods.

In Jordan, most of the surveyed respondents during COVID-19 lockdown were working in the manufacturing sector (31 per cent), followed by construction (23 per cent). The majority of Jordanians were working in the manufacturing sector (41 per cent), while most Syrians (37 per cent) were employed in the construction sector – although 41 per cent of the employed Syrian women were working in the manufacturing sector. Overall, the significant refugee population in Jordan has placed strain on the country’s economy, infrastructure and public services across all sectors, including education, health, housing, water, municipal services, and electricity supply. In the context of high unemployment, sluggish growth and limited fiscal space, creating sustainable livelihoods and responding to the refugee crisis have been particularly challenging for the resource-constrained country.

The Central Bank and its partners have taken serious
leaps into enabling refugees – a prominent target group—and financially include them. Special programs are being designed to outreach to refugees by digital financial services. Major step was to enable the UNHCR card as a valid identification card accepted for opening digital wallets for refugees on JoMoPay. This will provide them with a financial tool that enables payments of goods, services and utilities, money transfers, receive salaries, repay loans, deposits and withdrawals with Dinarak, manage account through mini statement and financial planning for emergencies.

Digi#ances is a project by the Central Bank and GIZ that aims at digitizing cross-border remittances through JoMoPay and promoting the usage of digital financial services in Jordan. This project mainly targets low income Jordanians and Syrian refugees, where the financial needs of refugees have been assessed, and a pilot project was launched in partnership between GIZ and Payment Service Provider in Irbid and Mafraq to serve refugees. This is done simultaneously with the launch of financial literacy program for these target groups; particularly refugees in highly refugees populated areas.

Finally, the present COVID-19 crisis can also be an opportunity to build back better by bolstering the capacity of vulnerable groups and deepening economic and social reforms for greater equality, wellbeing and inclusion by promoting green economic growth, improving sustainable supply chains and circularity, introducing digital economy for MSEs, social entrepreneurship, health and education services. The use of COVID-19 recovery as an opportunity to invest in women and ensure that they can be equal contributors in society through bridging the gender divide and addressing gender inequalities.

This is particularly important for young women who face tremendous inequities, resulting in disparities in education, protection, employment and political/public participation. It is also an opportunity for reviewing national youth strategies to ensure their greater inclusion and participation, promote a new vision for education that meets the ambition of the SDGs, and develop special plans for youth reintegration into the education system, training and the job market. Recovering with the SDG framework in mind is about reducing inequality, sustainability, social, economic integration, and leaving no one behind.

Informal employment was found to be widespread in Jordan, mainly among Syrian refugees. The level of informal employment is exhibited by the type of employment contract, duration of contract, and social security coverage that the workers have. Fifty-five per cent of surveyed workers in Jordan reported that they had short-term employment agreements (temporary, seasonal, or irregular). The precarious type of work including temporary, seasonal and irregular, is more prevalent among Syrians (69 per cent) compared to Jordanians. About 39 per cent of the employed respondents reported that they only had verbal agreements with their employers, while 4 per cent had neither a written nor a verbal agreement with their employers. The level of informal employment is higher among Syrian refugees (52 per cent) than among Jordanians (35 per cent).
Social security coverage for Syrians is limited to only 24 per cent, while 63 per cent of Jordanians reported to have social security coverage facilitated by their employer. Health insurance coverage for Syrian workers was 15 per cent, compared to 42 per cent of the Jordanian workers. Only 30 per cent of the surveyed Syrians had valid work permits. There is substantial disparity on work permit ownership across male and female respondents, with 21 per cent of females having a valid work permit, compared to 38 per cent of the male respondents. Furthermore, the percentage of female respondents who never had a work permit is 60 per cent compared to 40 per cent of the men.

The presence of informal employment among Syrian refugees are primarily explained by the structural constraints that they face in the labor market. In Jordan, where a relatively flexible work permit system exists, Syrian refugees are still only allowed to work in restricted occupations and sectors that are often characterized by a high degree of informality, such as construction, agriculture, and services. Consequently, the type of work that Syrian refugees are able to access in the labor market are limited and informal.

Impact on Jobs: In Jordan, one-third of the Syrian workers had lost their jobs permanently due to the crisis. While 35 per cent of all Syrians who were in employment before the crisis lost their jobs permanently, only 17 per cent of Jordanian workers reported to have been permanently dismissed. The majority of those who reported to be unemployed prior to the crisis stated that they continued to be unemployed (92 per cent) during the crisis, while the remaining (8 per cent) reported that they were no longer looking for work. Further, workers with a written contract have lower anticipation of losing their jobs (40 per cent) compared to those with a verbal agreement (57 per cent) or no contract (59 per cent). Similarly, more workers with irregular types of employment (59 per cent) are concerned about the risks of losing their jobs as a result of the on-going crisis. This again highlights the fact that workers in informal employment are most vulnerable and most affected by the crisis.

These findings illustrate that workers in informal work arrangements have been impacted the most from the crisis. Employment formalised through written contracts plays an important role in times of crises by reducing the vulnerability of workers from losing their jobs - be it temporarily or on a permanent basis. This becomes even more important for refugee populations already experiencing challenges in finding stable work to sustain themselves and their families.

Reduction of HH Income: In Jordan, there is a considerable decrease in household income, mainly among Syrian refugees working in informal arrangements; a substantial number of workers (92 per cent) reported that their household income had decreased due to the crisis brought about by the coronavirus. This is particularly pronounced among Syrian respondents, of whom 95 per cent reported a decline in household income. For those individuals with verbal employment agreements, 97 per cent claimed that their income has declined as a result of the coronavirus crisis. This implies that the COVID-19 pandemic substantially affects household income and more proportionately those households whose members are working in informal arrangements.

Limited Protection: In Jordan, almost half of the employed respondents (48 per cent) anticipate that they might lose their jobs in the coming months if the measures imposed to mitigate the COVID-19 virus stay in place. Syrians have somewhat stronger anticipation of losing their jobs (52 per cent) compared to Jordanian workers (45 per cent). Surveyed workers with written contracts have lower anticipation of losing their jobs (40 per cent) compared to those with verbal agreement (57 per cent) or no contract (59 per cent). Similarly, more workers with irregular types of employment (59 per cent) are concerned about the risks of losing their jobs because of the crisis. This highlights the fact that workers in informal employment are most vulnerable and most affected by the crisis.

Impact on MSMEs

In Jordan, over half of the surveyed enterprises (52 per cent) remained confident that they will weather the crisis and resume profitability, while 20 per cent were not confident of their economic resilience and robustness. However, asked about their pre-crisis financial situation, 25 per cent of enterprises indicated that they were losing money and 46 per cent indicated that they were breaking even, suggesting that many enterprises had financial difficulties even before the lockdown measures. Apprehension is higher amongst home-based and micro enterprises. Furthermore, a limited number of surveyed enterprises reported that they were operating as usual during the time of the survey while 39 per cent were operating with reduced staff or hours and 51 per cent of them reported to have closed temporarily.

Around one-third (30 per cent) of the enterprises indicated that they would not be able to stay operational for more than a month under the current situation, while 36 per cent indicated that they would be able to remain operational up to 3 months. Only 5 per cent said they believed they would remain operational for more than 3 months. The capacity of business enterprises to survive the economic crisis will depend on multiple factors including how agile companies are in ensuring business continuity and adapting their business processes, yet only 25 per cent of the 1,191 enterprises in Jordan indicated that they had a business continuity plan in place.

Required support for HH and businesses

In Jordan, 6 out of 10 workers expressed that cash support to families who have lost their source of income was an important measure to minimize the adverse impact of the crisis. The majority (67 per cent) of the enterprises in Jordan indicated that they were not aware of any support packages or measures available to them that mitigate the impact of the crisis. Around 12 per cent of the enterprises...
indicated that the government is subsidizing pay — 16 per cent among small enterprises and 21 per cent among enterprises with 100 workers or more. Eight per cent of the enterprises reported that they were accessing soft loans while 5 percent of them have access to credit. Furthermore, 53 per cent of enterprises in Jordan consider direct financial support as the most essential support needed to cope with the situation at this stage. Sixty per cent of micro businesses and 43 per cent of enterprises with more than 100 workers indicated a need for direct financial support. To better cope with the crisis, 42 per cent of all survey enterprises reported that wage subsidy is an essential mechanism.

Key Stakeholders

**Government:** Inclusion of Syrian refugees in reduced payment rates for MoH services, recognizing that the same services are very stressed as a result of COVID. The government is also supporting the roll-out of vaccines to Syrian refugees in a camp setting. 

**Humanitarian Agencies:** Continuing programming and delivery of essential services through different modalities. 

**Development Agencies:** Continuing programming with refugee’s inclusion within host communities yet not in camps. 

**SCOs/NGOs:** Continuing programming and delivery of essential services through different modalities. Providing more direct assistance due to economic impact of COVID. 

**Private sector:** There has been an increase in termination of contracts for Syrian refugees and for those working without a contract through the black market. 

**MDBs:** The World Bank has increased funding to the Government of Jordan to support COVID-19 affected communities, especially for economic recovery and early childhood development programs. 

**Donors:** Provided funding to COVID response interventions. 

The government and stakeholders have supported distributions to vulnerable families from the National Aid Fund (NAF) that is run by the Ministry of Social Development. 

Himmat Watan (a Nation’s Effort) Fund Committee was created to also support with cash assistance for needy families in Jordan during the COVID-19 pandemic’s onset. ILO and UNDP are working with FAFO for a phone based survey targeting a representative sample of 30,000 workers and 300 employers on the impact of the crisis. UN country teams are providing technical expertise in social protection to the Social Security Corporation, the Ministry of Labor and the Ministry of Social Development to shape the policy responses required to limit the negative impact on employment of the crisis.

Legislation and policy action includes the **Defense Law** orders that prevent employers from terminating employees’ contracts, however, reduction of salaries to a maximum of 30% if the employee agrees was allowed. The responses by government and stakeholders weren’t sufficiently inclusive for refugees and host communities. Although they were not included in the process but they will benefit from the response. There been specific calls for funding by donor agencies – in general and in particular for economic recovery. Although not many, Citi Foundation and the Swiss Development Cooperation issued calls for proposals specifically related to mitigating the economic impact on vulnerable communities. Existing partnership have included COVID-19 support activities rather than forming new partnerships specifically for COVID-19.

**Key gaps in the ongoing responses**

The informal sector has been hard hit by COVID-19, especially related lock downs. The lack of business loans and support has resulted in some closures as well as a move away from decent work and towards more exploitative practices. The large focus on quick employment at the national level has detracted from the creation of a longer term recovery plan. There is also not enough legislation covering Syrian refugees without work permits. Inclusion of civil society voices in national governmental and international UN/INGO livelihoods discussions and agreements is needed, such as within the JRP and Brussels Conferences on the Future of Syria. JONAS and other local NGO and civil society networks have been advocating for bridging these gaps and as a result their voices will be included in the Day of Dialogue section of the Brussels Conference V end of March 2021.

Are there been any good practices or partnership models in responding to COVID-19 and enabling inclusive approaches to address needs of refugees, IDPs and host communities. Example multi-stakeholder partnerships, public-private initiatives, strong policy level inclusion of refugees/displaced communities. The models that exist are mostly centered on humanitarian programming and have not evolved to sophisticated partnerships. The Jordan INGO Forum (JIF) worked in partnership to tackle COVID-19 in tandem with CBOs and Government entities. JONAS has provided the same for the national NGO network model in Jordan.

**Strategies for Inclusion of Refugees, FDPs and Host Communities**

**Livelihoods strategies:** The immediate impact of COVID-19 highlights the critical need to bridge differences and find opportunities to complement humanitarian and development approaches, international, national, government and civil society collaborations, to improve the lives and livelihoods of the most vulnerable. While more evidence needs to be gathered on the economic impact of COVID-19, it will be critical to commit to ensuring sufficient support for livelihoods programming and conducive policies, including necessary adaptation to respond to the emergency.

**Awareness of work rights:** While refugees have a high level of knowledge about the application process for agricultural
and construction permits, there is limited information about the process for applying for permits in other sectors open to Syrian refugees. Rules on social security rights and entitlements are a particular source of confusion. While many Syrians would like to formalize their working arrangements, they face numerous problems including unregistered businesses which are unable to sponsor them, unwilling employers who cite costs and complexity, leading many Syrians to work in those sectors informally.

Syrian refugees in Jordan continue to pursue livelihoods in a restricted legal and policy space. Complex requirements and high costs make it hard for refugees to establish home-based businesses (HBBs), which have been promoted as an entry point for women into the labor force. Syrians who wish to establish a business outside of their home and who lack required capital must register as an investor and engage a Jordanian sponsor in a “joint venture”, being exposed to the financial and legal risks of a joint venture. Closed employment occupations and sectors tend to restrict livelihood opportunities for skilled and highly educated refugees.

Interventions focused on decent work outcomes: This includes the provision of legal awareness sessions, information and counseling to workers, heads of workers and employers on rights and obligations under the labor law and to community based organizations (CBOs) on decent work best practices and advocacy, as well as legal assistance through mediation, and community-based approaches to improving decent work outcomes.

Job placement and matching interventions: This covers a number of sectors, including the manufacturing sector, by using technology supported matching systems through Project Match, and engagement with employers.

Interventions focused on vocational training. Including on building beneficiaries’ skills on market information and employers’ needs. Additionally, vocational training are also used to enhance the skills of beneficiaries’ willing to take the self-employment pathway, for instance on renewable and green energy. Vocational trainings in the Azraq and Zaatar camps in 2019 included tailoring, welding, carpentry, jewelry making, mobile maintenance, barber, beautician and air conditioning maintenance.

Home-based Businesses (HBBs) support. This includes business skills training, business growth grants, mentorship, and support with formalizing HBBs, in order to support refugees and vulnerable Jordanians to generate income and assets. These interventions were specifically targeted to support women and youth to leverage their skills and knowledge to generate income, and have helped women in starting or expanding businesses in sectors as diverse as plumbing, beekeeping, textiles, upholstery, catering, confectionaries and handicrafts. Business counseling efforts are geared towards teaching business owners to use revenues from the business to sustain it and not only to cover their basic needs.

The Durable Solutions Platform (DSP’s) espoused by a joint group of SCOs highlights the need to integrate more meaningful outcomes into livelihoods interventions and policy frameworks. On decent work for example, the emphasis should shift towards metrics that capture quality and conditions of work as well as meaningful changes in a household’s financial wellbeing. In order to improve the positive impact of interventions, robust labor market assessments and private sector data are required.

Successful experiences

Jedad25 is a business-to-business networking initiative that aims to boost access to market and sales opportunities for micro and small enterprises (MSEs) in Jordan. The initiative focuses on refugee and women entrepreneurs. It contributes to the holistic approach of the World Bank Group, Development partners, and the Government of Jordan to addressing the refugee crisis by shifting the paradigm from humanitarian assistance to a strategy of job creation and inclusive growth led by the private sector.

Many Syrians who were entrepreneurs in Syria have now, as refugees in Jordan, lost their businesses and their supplier and customer networks. New Syrian entrepreneurs in Jordan also lack local networks. In addition, Syrian entrepreneurs likely do not have knowledge about how to run a firm in Jordan. Overall, refugees’ connections with the Jordanian local economy are weak and would benefit from networking opportunities. At the same time, for Jordanian entrepreneurs and potential entrepreneurs, the presence of refugees provides an opportunity to tap into Syrian business skills and ideas. Hence entrepreneurs of both countries would benefit from networking in similar sectors (horizontally) and in upstream or downstream sectors (vertically). Preliminary evidence points towards shared livelihoods services contributing to positive social relations and social cohesion outcomes for Syrian refugees and Jordanian host communities. There are a number of openings for exploring holistic livelihoods approaches in Jordan, including a current discussion around graduation models and potential social security expansion; the recently announced flexible work permit expansion to Syrian refugees in 21 occupational families; and the increased experience supporting women with home-based businesses (HBBs). The impact of COVID-19 is still not fully understood, but it can be anticipated that many people of concern will continue to be employed in the informal sector. This is the case of the BRAC experience successfully implemented and adapted in Asia, Africa, LAC and the US.

The Central Bank of Jordan (CBJ) lowered the interest rates by 0.5 point on March 3rd (from 4% to 3.5%), and further by 1 point on March 16th (from 3.5% to 2.5%).

CBJ rescheduled loans for sectors affected by the virus at no cost until the end of 2020;

CBJ reduced the cash reserve requirement from banks from 7 to 5% to release an additional liquidity of around 550 million Jordanian dinars.

The government postponed collecting sales tax from all local sectors and companies in the food supply and health sectors until they sell their goods, rather than upon signing contracts.

The government allowed the companies listed under the Jordan Customs Department’s (JCD) golden and silver lists to pay only 30% of their customs fees.

A bank account to receive donations from the private sector and individuals at CBJ was set up.

The government allowed the private sector to resume work if there is a “pressing logistical, economical, or health need”.

The IMF approved approx $1.3 billion Extended Fund Facility to mitigate the impacts of the virus on vulnerable economic sectors/individuals in March 2020

Enterprises suspended old age contribution for 3 months starting March 1, 2020 while maintaining coverage for maternity, unemployment, death, and occupational health.

Enterprises were allowed to pay social security contributions in instalments until end of 2023 without any interest or penalties.

Enterprises could utilise 50% of the maternity fund income of 2020 to provide in-kind support to the needy (i.e. elderly and daily compensated workers).

“Himmat Watan” initiative was set up.

The National Aid Fund provided monthly cash aid and supplementary support & delivered emergency cash and relief aid to an additional 50,000 households, with the support of the army.

Tkiyet Um Ali, a national CSO, delivered regular in-kind assistance to 30,000 families per month in addition to emergency and relief aid.

“Solidarity 1 Programme” provided 50% of employees’ salaries ranging from JD165 to JD500 while employer paid 20% of salary at a maximum of JD250

“Solidarity 2 Programme” targeted companies not enrolled in SSC for employees to receive a monthly unemployment wage at JD150

“Musaned Programme” allowed subscribers to receive advance payments from their unemployment credits.

Daily wageworker without social protection could benefit from the bread subsidy families with two members received JD70 for 1-month, while households with more members received JD136.

CBJ established a fund for soft loans/low interest loans, with the Jordan Loan Guarantee Corporation acting as guarantor on the loans for SMEs.

Companies accessing these loans cannot fire workers during the duration of the loan.

E-wallets were promoted instead of cash/paper bills.

Source: RYSE consortium danish refugee consil

Policy Response

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E-wallets were promoted instead of cash/paper bills.
Key gaps and Policy Recommendations:

- Underlying structural challenges in the economy, including informality and lack of decent work, affect all vulnerable workers in Jordan.

- Refugees face distinct vulnerabilities because of their legal status, which makes them more fearful of seeking justice and can limit their access to work opportunities.

- Legal awareness sessions and legal assistance has proven critical for the achievement of positive decent work outcomes.

- Focused messaging to the most vulnerable persons on the benefits versus potential risks of formalization is critical, especially for HBBs.

- A community-based and collaborative approach at the local level, enabling relevant stakeholders to act collectively, can lead to positive decent work outcomes.

- Further coordination and stronger linkages among operational actors is needed to support livelihood outcomes, avoid duplication of programs and improve coherence when dealing with the private sector.

- Increasingly tailored approaches towards job placement increase positive retention outcomes, while mentorship and coaching motivate workers to stay active in the labor market.

Operational evidence from IRC’s Project Match has shown a higher employment rates when job search support interventions are tailored to groups by gender (male/female), nationality (Jordanian/Syrian), amount of formal work experience, and education level (skilled/non-skilled).

Some recommendations include:

1. People in formal and decent work are relatively less affected in times of crises. Hence, formalization of work among different segments of society including refugees should be promoted to achieve inclusive and decent jobs for all. The Jordan Compact could be revitalized through the promotion of protective measures at work places.

2. In the context of fiscal constraints, governments should develop a clear and transparent approach to support micro, small and medium enterprises that are providing jobs for a substantial number of workers in both formal and informal sectors.
ETHIOPIA

COUNTRY SNAPSHOT

Registered refugees: 801349
Refugees in camps: 90%
Refugees out of camps: 10%

Human Development Index Ranking: 173
Gender Inequality Index Ranking: 125
Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Extremism percentile: 10.95
Context

Ethiopia is the third largest refugee-hosting country in Africa, sheltering 801,349 registered refugees and asylum-seekers as of 31 January 2021. The overwhelming majority of refugees originate from South Sudan, Somalia, Eritrea and Sudan. However there are approximately 12 countries of origin, but predominantly from the countries formerly mentioned. It is estimated that approximately 90 percent live in camps and 10 percent out of camps. The Oromo, Amhara, Somali and Tigrayans make up more than three-quarters (75%) of the population, but there are more than 80 different ethnic groups within Ethiopia, most speak English taught at school. Eritrean refugees comprise 22% of the total refugee population in Ethiopia and come from a similar cultural background. Before the conflict erupted in the Tigray region in November 2020, UNHCR had registered 96,223 Eritrean refugees in the Tigray region, sheltered mainly in four refugee camps in the western part of the region (Mai-Aini (21,682), Adi-Harush (32,167), Shimelba (8,702 refugees) and Hitsats (25,248)). As of 11 February, more than 5,000 refugees from Shimelba and Hitsats camps have relocated in Mai-Aini and Adi Harush.

There were also 8,424 refugees residing in the Tigray region benefitting from the Government’s Out of Camp Policy, allowing refugees to live in communities. The remaining Eritrean refugees outside Tigray live predominately in the Afar region (approximately 51,800) and in the capital Addis Ababa (approximately 30,722). Due to conflict in the Tigray region, the situation in Ethiopia is rapidly evolving and the number of people of concern is on the rise. Access to people in need is limited. Women, children and elderly being the most vulnerable during the crisis.

POPULATION OF CONCERN

Countries of Origin

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nationality</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>South Sudanese</td>
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<td>Other Nationalities</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

At the end of January 2021 Ethiopia hosted over 801,000 refugees and asylum seekers, mainly sheltered in 26 refugee camps established in five Regional States. There is a sizeable group of refugee and asylum seekers living out of camp, including over 35,000 who are registered as urban refugee in the capital Addis Ababa.
The Tigray region declared a state of emergency on 26 March 2020 to prevent the spread of the virus, before the nationwide state of emergency was implemented in April. Movements within the region were prohibited, as well as gatherings, including weddings and festivities. Bars, nightclubs, coffee shops, large markets and non-essential public offices were closed. Small and medium enterprises and restaurants were subject to restrictions such as mandatory facilities and social distancing.

The number of passengers in public transport was limited to eight in minibuses and one in bajaj (three-wheeled motorized vehicles). For people entering the region, a systematic screening was implemented, with a mandatory 14-day quarantine in government hotels.

On 24 April 2020, government officials announced a relaxation of these measures, which included the reopening of public offices, the lifting of travel restrictions between woredas within the state and an easing of restrictions imposed on small and medium enterprises as well as bars and restaurants.

The Somali region has been the second-most affected area after the capital city, Addis Ababa. The region presents a high level of vulnerability owing to movement between Addis Ababa, Djibouti and Somaliland and the weakness of the healthcare system, characterized by shortages of medical personnel and medical supplies. The Somali regional government has not taken specific measures, apart from the ones imposed at the federal level. However, the region has set up a COVID-19 hotline and established a multi-sectoral steering committee to ensure coordination between the different government agencies and partners in the COVID-19 response.

While Ethiopia has taken early and ambitious measures to limit the impact of the pandemic, the country has been faced with socio-political and environmental challenges, and experiences a high level of economic vulnerabilities: slowing growth; unabated inflation; a debt reaching 61 per cent of the country’s GDP in 2018; structural deficit of the trade balance; and high levels of unemployment are features that limit the ability of the Ethiopian economy to cope with shocks. A joint report by Ethiopia Jobs Creation Commission and the ILO had estimated in April 2020 the magnitude of job losses in Ethiopia to range between 1.34 million to 6 million jobs, depending on the spread of the virus and the effectiveness of economic measures taken by the Ethiopian Government. In urban areas, a recent survey conducted by the same organizations showed that the crisis is having a disproportionate impact on the weaker members of the population such as the least educated, greatly affecting informal workers. While they are among the most at risk of losing their livelihoods and see their income decrease, they account for a significant share of the employment in the country. This is particularly true in rural areas, where the self-employed, often informal, are the majority.

Although Ethiopia has one of the largest safety net programmes in the region, it remains minimal and insufficient to cover the needs of the millions of households who are currently exposed to poverty and food insecurity. This unprecedented shock comes at a time when Ethiopia’s ongoing reforms are jeopardized by political instability and social unrest. Over the past years, Ethiopia has faced repeated natural disasters such as droughts and floods, increased intercommunal violence triggering waves of internal displacement, and major desert locust invasions. The pandemic and its effects are an additional factor of instability in a country in transition.

The Somali region has been the second-most affected area after the capital city, Addis Ababa. The region presents a high level of vulnerability owing to movement between Addis Ababa, Djibouti and Somaliland and the weakness of the healthcare system, characterized by shortages of medical personnel and medical supplies.

The Somali and Tigray regional states of Ethiopia are among the country’s main regions where refugees have sought shelter. Located at the border with Somalia and Somaliland, the Somali region has received a large influx of refugees since the early 1990s as the result of ongoing conflict and natural disasters (notably drought) affecting neighboring countries, and welcomes as of 30 September 2020 a total of 199,945 refugees, making it the country’s second-largest refugee hosting region. The protracted

27. Addis Standard, Tigray Region relaxes COVID-19 State of Emergency, 2020. Note that regions of Ethiopia are divided into zones, themselves organized in woredas (or districts), composed of several kebeles.
situation of Somali refugees in Ethiopia, together with the deep historical and socio-cultural ties they entertain with host community members, has facilitated the integration of refugees among the local host communities. The Somali regional state is also host to the Qoloji refugee camp, known to be the country’s largest displacement site with 78,000 internally displaced Ethiopians who have been chased out of the Oromia region owing to inter-ethnic tensions. The Tigray region, on the other hand, has registered as of 30 September 2020 96,223 refugees, predominantly of Eritrean nationality, settled across four camps. Just like Somali refugees, Eritrean refugees also suffer from protracted exile, as many of them fled their country in the 1990s to avoid conscription in the national service programme. The military service’s indefinite duration and its reputation for endorsing slavery-like practices have pushed many to consider migration as their only exit option.

At the same time, the Somali and Tigray regions face various socio-economic challenges that undermine the livelihoods of both host communities and refugees. High unemployment levels, limited natural resources, and the predominance of subsistence-based, informal activities among hosts and refugees, as they mainly rely on agro-pastoral production, characterize the Somali region’s socio-economic fabric. Nonetheless, owing to the strong social cohesion between refugees and hosts, refugee markets are well integrated, and refugee enterprises can tap into the consumer base constituted by local host communities to further expand and create new business opportunities. The Tigray region’s economy is also largely based on agriculture and subsistence farming, with three out of four Tigrayans living in rural areas. This high dependency on agriculture, together with poor infrastructure and limited resilience capacities, puts the region at risk of external shocks, such as adverse climate-related events. With their fragile labor markets and the enduring pressure from hosting large refugee populations for protracted periods, the Somali and Tigray regions are ill-prepared for dealing with the economic consequences of a health crisis of unprecedented magnitude.

While Ethiopia has taken early and ambitious measures to limit the impact of the pandemic, the country has faced various socio-political and environmental challenges along with economic vulnerabilities including slow growth, high rates of inflation, a high debt (61% of GDP), and high unemployment rates. These factors can limit Ethiopia’s capacity to fight COVID-19 and its impact especially for vulnerable groups like refugees, forcibly displaced communities and host communities. According to UNHCR, Ethiopia has just 7% of the total funding required to meet the needs of refugees and displaced communities.

Key trends

Ethiopian government recently closed Shimelba and Hitsats refugee camps and relocated refugees to Mai Aini and Adi Harush camps. According to UNHCR, refugees in these camps were suffering from a dire lack of basic needs and high experiences of trauma. Organizations on the ground report that the local population is sometimes equally or more vulnerable than the refugees – which can contribute to friction between refugees and host communities.

UNOCHA’s Access Snapshot (February 28th, 2021) reports 4.5 million people in need for food aid and 61,500 new Ethiopian Refugees in Sudan since November 2020.

The ongoing lack of access to Shire is constraining humanitarian assistance to refugees and internally displaced persons. UNHCR is systematically working to increase staffing levels in the camps. Telecommunications have partially resumed in Mekelle, and basic services -including healthcare and banking- are beginning to be restored. However, the majority of roads to and within the Tigray region remain inaccessible. This poses serious challenges to the delivery of assistance by humanitarian actors.

Ethiopia has made far-reaching changes to its refugee policies. In 2016, it made “nine pledges” at the Leaders’ Summit on Refugees held in New York aimed at helping refugees gain greater mobility; improving access to services, especially education; expanding access to livelihoods, jobs, and irrigable land; and facilitating the local integration of long-term refugees. In February 2019, the Ethiopian parliament adopted a new refugee proclamation (no. 1110/2019) to facilitate the implementation of its pledges. Secondary legislation that will give effect to the proclamation is under preparation.

The social and political context in Gambella remains complicated due to a long history of conflict among groups over land and political power. The presence of refugees is a significant component of these dynamics.

Ethiopia has had over 162,800 cases of COVID-19 and 2,400 deaths. COVID-19 has also been reported in refugee camps. Over 2300 lives have been lost in Ethiopia due to COVID-19.

The Impact of COVID of Refugees, FDPs and Host Communities

Refugees and FDPs have been significantly impacted due to the pandemic. Ethiopia did not have the resources to address refugee needs even before the pandemic. And with COVID-19 demanding greater investment in health (testing, COVID-19 related information dissemination, dealing with outbreaks of COVID-19, and creating social protection nets for communities) reduced resources even further.

In April 2020, a joint report by Ethiopia Jobs Creation Commission and the ILO estimated the job losses in Ethiopia to range between 1.34 million to 6 million, depending on the spread of the virus and the effectiveness of economic measures taken by the Ethiopian Government.
Various organizations have reported a disproportionate impact of the pandemic on vulnerable population such as the least educated, greatly affecting informal workers. While they are among the most at risk of losing their livelihoods and see their income decrease, they account for a significant share of the employment in the country. This is particularly true in rural areas, where the self-employed, often informal, are the majority. Although Ethiopia has one of the largest safety net programmes in the region, it remains minimal and insufficient to cover the needs of the millions of households who are currently exposed to poverty and food insecurity. This unprecedented shock comes at a time when Ethiopia’s ongoing reforms are jeopardized by political instability and social unrest. The One UN Joint Assessment on the Socio-economic impacts of COVID reports that the Consumer Price Index (CPI) for 2020 could potentially go well above 20% while food price inflation could approach 30%+. 2 million more people (conservatively) are estimated to fall into poverty while there will be a rise in the scale of the Productive Safety Net Programme (PSNP) + Urban Productive Safety Net Programme (UPSNP) from 9 million to close to 10 million beneficiaries and, in the worst case, 12 million and perhaps as high as 15 million. A 10-15% loss of employment/livelihoods will lead to a cumulative loss of perhaps 1.6 - 2.4 million jobs/livelihoods depending on the severity and duration of the crisis, mostly in urban areas. In the worst-case, 3.2 - 4 million could lose their jobs/livelihoods. Production might drop by 30% if producers revert to the extensive production system for cash crops.

In the agriculture sector significant income losses in livestock and horticulture are expected as are supply chain disruptions. This would negatively impact food availability, access and utilization. Construction was identified as one of the sectors which will be hardest hit while manufacturing will be impacted due to shut down or sharp drop in production capacity and reduced employment in industrial parks.

Modelling work by United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) suggests that, in the best-case scenario, Ethiopia’s growth will be reduced by 1.2%, in the mid-case scenario by 2.4% and in the worst-case scenario by 4.5%.

Manufacturing sub-sectors such as textiles and garment (T&G) and leather and leather products will be hit hard while the impact on the flower industry will be catastrophic. The impact on tourism will mean high likelihood of closure of businesses and large-scale loss of jobs/livelihoods, in both the formal and informal sectors, especially in urban areas.

The report estimated significant and prolonged forex losses from tourism are very likely. According to UNDP’s Survey Report on COVID-19 Impacts on MSMEs in Ethiopia, there are 1.5 million MSMEs in the country which employed 4.5 million people and generated 40.7 billion (birr) in monthly sales before the partial lockdown. Even before the pandemic hit the ground hard, these MSMEs had laid off approximately 2.2 million people and lost 28.5 billion in monthly sales revenue. 37% of MSMEs (51% in Oromia) have already been closed. The ‘brightest stars’ (firms with enormous growth potentials) burnt out fastest. These enterprises are mostly owned by women and youth and sustain about 6.3 million household members. 85% of the enterprises are micro, with utmost vulnerability to shocks. The socio-economic impacts being felt across Ethiopia already are wide-ranging and serious, with the potential to become severe, depending on the combination of the pandemic’s trajectory, the effects of counter-measures and underlying and structural factors.

70% of MSEs had no access to credit and had to rely on their own funds. Of the enterprises that had access to loans, the unsurprising finding was that Micro Finance Institutions (MFIs) were the main source of both investment and working capital. Size of enterprise matters in gaining access to a loan. About 40% of medium-size enterprises had access to investment loans while only 22.5% of micro firms had the same. This puts smaller businesses at more risk and also negatively impacts women and their ability to run and grow enterprises. Of the 40% of MSEs who were respondents of the study, had applied for a loan and 30% had been rejected - mostly due to the inability of MSEs to provide a guarantor and/or collateral.
The severity of the global recession driven by the COVID-19 pandemic will cause a significant slowdown of the Ethiopian economy in the coming years. It is almost certain that GDP growth will drop to below 3% in FY 2019/20 and there is a high probability of close to zero or even negative growth in FY 2020/21. Even if the key sectors of agriculture and construction remain relatively unaffected and the immediate damage appears to be controlled, there are medium to long-term effects that may prove more serious than actually thought, such as the impact of school closures.

The slowing down of the economy will have a negative impact on government revenues which, together with approved measures on the expenditure side, will drive the budget deficit (excluding grants) in the range of 6-7% of nominal GDP in FY 2019/20 and FY 2020/21. A budget deficit of this size is difficult, if not impossible, to finance issuing new domestic government debt. In order to lower the deficit (including grants) to the number expected by the latest IMF forecast (and IMF programme), the government needs to secure additional grants or concessional loans of approximately 1.5% of nominal GDP in FY 2019/20 and 2-3% of nominal GDP in FY 2020/21. Otherwise, it may be forced to consolidate its expenditure by approximately the same amount.

Fiscal consolidation would have additional consequences for the medium to long-term economic development of the country, especially if it impacts expenditure on education and training. Schools have been closed since March with potentially significant impact on school drop-outs, future level of average years of schooling, and Ethiopia’s economic development. Real-time evidence already shows that the crisis has real effects on children, including increases in child marriages, sexual violence, as well as intimate partner violence and violence against children. Any cut to expenditure in this area would exacerbate the problem.

The closure of the education sector has a significant impact on long-term economic growth and must, as such, be properly included in any economic analysis. As a result of slower economic activity, the financing gap in the government budget will also be wider than expected.

**Inclusion levels of Refugees, FDPs and Host Communities**

While Ethiopia’s new legislation enables inclusion for refugees at various levels (example: to access services and the job market), the implementation is proving to be a time taking process. The political instability and waves of internal conflict have not helped this agenda. According to UNHCR’s August 2020 situation report, Ethiopia’s Job Creation Commission reported the loss of 330,000 jobs in the country over four months. This negatively affects employment opportunities for refugees despite Ethiopia’s favorable policy directives allowing refugees to work.

The World Bank’s report on the Impact of Refugees on Hosting Communities in Ethiopia: A social Analysis (2020) reports that over 80% refugees rely on aid to meet their needs and women seldom access the labor market. Apart from aid, refugees meet their needs through remittances, wages, agriculture and services – all of which have been severely affected due to COVID-19, rendering this group even more vulnerable. Inclusion of refugees in services like health and education, or addressing food security and access to markets is all inevitably linked to economic inclusion.

**Chart: Source of livelihood currently and before displacement**

Source: Pape, Petrini, and Iqbal 2018.
The ‘Ethiopian Jobs Compact’ is a joint agreement between the Ethiopian Government, the EU and other donors (the World Bank, DFID, and the European Investment Bank). It is one of the main instruments supporting ambitious job creation plans: 100,000 jobs, of which 30,000 for refugees in the framework of the Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework (CRRF) will be created through investment in 3 industrial parks. The aim is to support the industrialization, employment, and refugee policies of the government so that decent jobs can be created for Ethiopians and refugees.

The EU has been actively engaged with the government in policy dialogue on the investment climate and investment promotion, on business exchange, as well as on the Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework (CRRF), labor administration, and job creation agenda. The Government of Ethiopia made important progress in several areas so far, adopting important policies such as the 10-year Investment Promotion Strategy, the Industrial Park Development Corporation (IPDC) Transformation Plan, the Labor Proclamation, and several working procedures on refugees’ rights to work.

With the outbreak of COVID-19, the government adopted a series of measures to contain the pandemic in Ethiopia, including the declaration of a 5-month state of emergency. The consequences of the COVID-19 crisis will go far beyond health and will have an important impact on employment and the economy. Plausible assumptions suggest that 750,000 to 1.5 million workers could be affected across Ethiopia in sectors such as horticulture and manufacturing, jeopardizing the country’s economic development efforts.

Recognizing these challenges, the EU rapidly mobilized an additional €6 million (in addition to the already committed €50 million) to support the Government of Ethiopia in mitigating the socio-economic impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on workers in vulnerable employment. This will be achieved through direct support to a newly established emergency social protection scheme integrated into the long-running social programme - the Urban Productive Safety Net Programme (UPSNP). The newly-mobilized funds will support the Urban Job Creation and Food Security Agency (UJCFSA), under the Ministry of Urban Development and Construction, with the provision of cash handouts to mitigate the negative economic effects of the pandemic on selected vulnerable households.

Key Barriers and Constraints faced by Refugees, FDPs and Host Communities

UNHCR, UNDP and various organizations working on the ground report that refugees are facing multiple barriers and constraints. The economic impact for refugees and FDPs relates to job losses due to closure or downsizing of businesses. Employment loss was concentrated in specific sectors especially in urban settings. The drop in income from remittances has been significant and will continue to be a prolonged impact as it is linked to the global economic crisis. The level of poverty has increased

Source: Author’s calculation based on Skills Profile Survey 2017.

Source: Author’s calculation based on Skills Profile Survey 2017.

Source: Author’s calculation based on Skills Profile Survey 2017.
with many refugees, FDPs and host populations being at risk of falling under the poverty line. The economic impact manifests itself in other sectors like food security, education, health and protection. Organizations working with communities on ground believe that the economic impact has also contributed to increased levels of violence against women and girls.

The refugees and FDPs were faced with many pre-existing barriers including stigma and discrimination which were exacerbated due to COVID-19. The health related impact includes reduced access to sexual and reproductive healthcare, especially health services for pregnant women, and younger children. Mental health and psychosocial wellbeing have also been of great concern especially amongst refugees and IDPs. Health issues have been compounded by limited or inadequate access to WASH services – and reports cite many refugees do not have access to safe and reliable water sources. Food insecurity and precarity of living conditions have been impacted negatively by the pandemic.

Education has been another sector severely hit by COVID-19 especially in the case of refugees and FDPs. Children/youth with disabilities are even harder hit. Stigma and discrimination impacted access to education for refugees prior to COVID but the virus spreading and myths around the spread, the discrimination has heightened, cutting many refugees off from education and health services.

According to UNICEF’s policy brief titled Mitigating the socio-economic impacts of COVID-19 in Ethiopia, with a focus on vulnerable groups, the three most affected sectors in the informal economy are tourism, textile and garments and floriculture. More than 80% of workers in these sectors are women. Women constitute 74% of employment in tourism. 80% of the workers in the rapidly growing textile and garment sector and 85% of workers in the floriculture industry. The vulnerability of women to the income losses is accentuated by the fact that significant gender gaps in wages and productivity exist in Ethiopia. Many women constitute an important proportion of domestic workers – who have also lost jobs because of fear of spreading the virus. The economic activities conducted by refugees in the camps are food, hairdressing, HBB and other small personal services mainly informal self-employment and microbusinesses.

Negative coping mechanisms have included skipping meals, small crimes, increased conflict within the refugee community or within refugee and host communities and cutting down expenses on dire needs.

Key Stakeholders

The Government of Ethiopia, Agency for Refugees and Returnees Administration (ARRA) and UNHCR are the key actor on the ground.

Within the Government of Ethiopia, the Ministry of finance is a key stakeholder as it serves as the liaison body between the banks. The job creation commission of Ethiopia is also a major actor – which worked to increase employment through jobs and through supporting and promoting MSMEs, especially as a response to COVID’s impact. The Regional Health Bureaus are leading information, awareness raising and management of COVID-19.

Other organizations including UNDP, UNOCHA, UNICEF, WHO, ILO along with many other international and national organizations are operational on the ground in various sectors including livelihoods regeneration, education, health, nutrition, food security, WASH, protection and more.

According to UNOCHA, in February 2021, 84 international aid workers (62 UN and 22 INGO) have been cleared to deploy in Tigray, and over 100 national aid workers have been moved from other parts of Ethiopia to respond to the crisis. Partners’ cargo requests through the Logistic Cluster (WFP) are cleared by the National Disaster Risk Management Commission (NDRMC) and by the Agency for Refugees and Returnees Administration (ARRA) to be distributed as part of humanitarian response.

Various donors are contributing to the response and according to UNOCHA’s donor contributions 2015-2020, the largest donors over the past few years have been the Germany, UK, USA and Sweden.

Refugees and host communities are not recognized as central stakeholder broadly and play a submissive ‘aid accepting’ role in the bigger picture. NGOs working on the ground could organize communities and build their capacity to participate in the decision making processes affected their lives but there are no such fora reflected in the literature reviewed. Within the refugee and host communities, recognition or inclusion is limited.

The federal government has implemented a series of health emergency and economic support measures, despite extremely limited budgetary resources. Aware of the dramatic impact that a total lockdown would have on the economy in a country where most people have no safety net and no other choice but to go to work every day to subsist, government officials have opted for an unconventional approach, focusing on cost-effective preventive measures. On 8 April, Ethiopian authorities declared a nationwide state of emergency and since then has implemented a number of ambitious programmes to ease the socio-economic impact and limit the spread of the COVID-19 pandemic, by means of the following four main pillars:

Supporting the healthcare system and reducing the spread of infections: The priority of the government has focused on strengthening the capacities of the healthcare system. In March 2020, Ethiopian authorities injected ETB5.3 billion to support the healthcare system
and called in retired and in-training medical personnel, in addition to volunteers. Public universities have been converted into quarantine and isolation centres while a temporary hospital facility of 1,000 beds was established in the Millennium Hall in Addis Ababa, one of the largest conference centres in the country.

**Reducing the spread of infections:** Initial measures included the closure of land borders, closure of schools, nightclubs and entertainment businesses. A mandatory two-week quarantine in designated hotels was established for all people entering the country. The Ethiopian government postponed the elections initially planned for 29 August 2020 and prohibited all gatherings of more than four people, including for religious purposes.

Ethiopian authorities promoted social distancing, advocated teleworking where possible, and made face masks mandatory in public spaces. The Ministry of Health coordinated public awareness campaigns around washing hands and social distancing. Large-scale screening was undertaken, as well as the distribution of water and soap.

**Supporting households and vulnerable groups:** The authorities have also implemented a number of bold measures aimed at protecting individuals and households from the socio-economic impacts of the pandemic. The most emblematic measures in this regard are the prohibition of layoffs, included in a tripartite protocol between the employers’ confederation, labor unions, and the government, as well as the prohibition of rent increases and the eviction of lessees.

In addition, in April, the Prime Minister’s Office announced a US$1.64 billion Multi-Sectoral Response Plan, which included US$635 million for emergency food distribution to 15 million vulnerable individuals not covered by the Productive Safety Net Programme (PSNP), as well as US$282 million for provision of emergency shelter and non-food items. The Response Plan also entails US$293 million for the nutrition and protection of vulnerable groups such as refugees and IDPs. However, according to the International Monetary Fund, the amount actually spent has not yet reached those levels. Lastly, the Urban PSNP has been extended to cover 500,000 additional beneficiaries for three months, while the Urban PSNP will be extended to 16 additional cities.

**Supporting enterprises:** In April 2020, the Council of Ministers approved a series of economic measures to support enterprises. The package includes the following fiscal measures:

- Forgiveness of all tax debt prior to the 2014–2015 fiscal year;
- Tax amnesty on interest and penalties for tax debt pertaining to 2015/2016–2018/2019;
- Exemption from personal income tax withholding for four months for firms who commit to paying employee salaries despite not being able to operate.

Macro-economic interventions also include the injection by the Central Bank of Ethiopia of ETB15 billion in liquidity to private banks and ETB33 million to the Commercial Bank of Ethiopia to prevent bankruptcies.

In terms of sectoral measures, the set of interventions introduced by the government shows a clear focus on manufacturing exporters, who are being affected by the reduction in global demand. Those measures have included logistic subsidies, such as free rail transportation and reduced freight charges. The border with Djibouti has remained opened to exchanges of commercial goods. In addition, exporters have exceptionally been allowed to sell their products in local markets, while the minimum price of certain items, such as horticulture products, have been lifted.

Lastly, the government has repurposed production in factories and industrial parks with the objective of exporting COVID-19 personal protective equipment (PPE). To support this initiative, the government has removed taxes on raw materials required for the production of COVID-19 items. In June, companies based in the Hawassa Industrial Park, the largest in the country with 35,000 employees, started producing protective equipment such as face masks.

However, support to SMEs has been limited, while the informal sectors, which account for a significant share of employment in the country, have not benefited from any intervention.

At regional level the government responses are summarized as follows:

**Tigray region:** The Tigray region declared a state of emergency on 26 March 2020 to prevent the spread of the virus, before the nationwide state of emergency was implemented in April. Movements within the region were prohibited, as well as gatherings, including weddings and festivities. Bars, nightclubs, coffee shops, large markets...
and non-essential public offices were closed. Small and medium enterprises and restaurants were subject to restrictions such as mandatory facilities and social distancing. The number of passengers in public transport was limited to eight in minibuses and one in bajaj (three-wheeled motorized vehicles). For people entering the region, a systematic screening was implemented, with a mandatory 14-day quarantine in government hotels.

On 24 April 2020, government officials announced a relaxation of these measures, which included the reopening of public offices, the lifting of travel restrictions between woredas within the state and an easing of restrictions imposed on small and medium enterprises as well as bars and restaurants.

Somali region: The Somali region has been the second-most affected area after the capital city, Addis Ababa. The region presents a high level of vulnerability owing to movement between Addis Ababa, Djibouti and Somaliland and the weakness of the healthcare system, characterized by shortages of medical personnel and medical supplies. The Somali regional government has not taken specific measures, apart from the ones imposed at the federal level. However, the region has set up a COVID-19 hotline and established a multi-sectoral steering committee to ensure coordination between the different government agencies and partners in the COVID-19 response.

Good Practice Identified:
The UNHCR’s report on Cash Programming and COVID: Emerging Field Practices recognizes UNHCR Ethiopia’s practice of adjusting its cash assistance to refugees in urban settings as a good practice.

The transfer value of the cash grant was being increased by UNHCR Ethiopia to cover additional soap, sanitizer and water in light of COVID-19. The transfer will include a two-month advance payment with a top-up coupled with information campaigns to ensure that refugee cash recipients are aware of the COVID related impacts and plan the use of the cash provided accordingly. This preparedness measure aims to prevent refugees from cash withdrawal challenges linked to restrictions, and access to the markets and sufficient goods and services. Above all, it is anticipated that cash recipients will stay at home and hence protect themselves, their families and communities from the exposure to COVID-19.

As the UNHCR Reception Centre will remain temporarily closed, UNHCR has also adjusted its complaints and Feedback mechanism so to ensure that protection staff receive complaints and provide feedback over the UNHCR landlines and the protection complaint email account.

Policy Response

Federal Government put in place various sets of measures to contain the spread of COVID-19

The Ministerial Committee made 15 billion Ethiopian birr (over USD 455 million) available by the National Bank of Ethiopia for private banks to address debt relief and liquidity challenges.

The minimum price set for flower exports has been removed

Tax exempted and foreign currency provision prioritized for import of materials and equipment to be used in the prevention and containment of COVID-19

Value Added Tax returns expedited.

“Reverse COVID-19 from Africa” initiative launched from support of the Chinese online trading company, Alibaba and other donors for PPE provision

2,240 children urban destitute children were provided shelter in partnership with private donors.


A tripartite COVID-19 Workplace Response Protocol is put in place.

Government allocated a total budget of ETB 5 billion for distribution of masks, soap, alcohol solutions and other items in critical locations.

The Federal government workers were directed to work from home with effect from 25 March 2020. Each Ministry was mandated to determine critical staff.

Toll-free telephone numbers have been introduced for the public to be able to get access to more information on COVID-19 in 4 local languages (Amharic, Afaan Oromo, Tigrigna and Somaligna).

Government buses have been made available free of charge to help control crowding in public transport.

Special buses are designated to take public servants to work.

General elections planned to take place in August this year have been postponed.
Key Gaps and Policy Recommendations:

Ethiopia is facing an acute refugee crisis and the conflict in Tigray has made the situation on ground further sensitive. Considering the number of refugees needing support and the fact that 80% are reliant on aid for livelihoods – it is apparent that involving refugees in the local economy is not only critical but also a missed opportunity which can benefit Ethiopia, and the region.

While Ethiopia has a welcoming stance to giving refugees access to jobs but tangible implementation of the legislation should be catalyzed. This will support Ethiopia in dealing with the COVID-19 crisis and bouncing back from it.

Access to finance remains a key concern on the ground as many MSME’s have access to very little credit. Access to credit is even lower for women led MSMEs. According to UNDP’s report on COVID’s Impacts on MSMEs in Ethiopia liquidity provided to the traditional commercial banking sector is unlikely to find its way to MSMEs and the only option in this regard would be to channel relief through MFIs which are closer to this category of firms and more familiar with their specific gender and operating conditions and sectors. This has important implications for the design of relief measures and their ultimate cost: insisting on guarantees and collateral will leave a high proportion of MSEs out of the safety net. At the same time, the absence of these features will not only require greater follow-up and oversight but also a potentially higher likelihood of write-downs. These risks need to be balanced carefully – and this is possible, using prior track record in making payments e.g. for rental and for use of other services such as telecoms. Many countries are using non-financial measures of credit worthiness by mining data from multiple sources and using artificial intelligence (AI) to develop credit profiles of potential customers. The response to COVID-19 provides an opportunity to bring these digital technologies to Ethiopia.

Organizations on ground voiced the need for provision of workspaces for home-based businesses (HBB), targeting in particular women, youth and refugees, whose businesses are less resilient along with provision of business development and management training to strengthen enterprises’ resilience and capacity to deploy other measures to cope with the crisis.

Provision of cash support and long term support for health, education and youth skills building has been highlighted by organizations on the ground. Multi-sectoral programs like school feeding programs or education/vocational training linked to market access could be potential ways of moving forward.

At a policy level, provision of tax exemptions to retain employees and awareness raising initiatives in refugee-hosting areas about the process for registering companies, and creating incentives like training, coaching and subsidies could be options to encourage refugees to contribute to the MSME economy. The importance of promoting joint ventures between Ethiopian nationals and refugees can never be overemphasized under any circumstance or for any other sectoral response.

Apart from long term recommendations like bridging the humanitarian development divide and targeted programming for economic support of vulnerable groups, policy level recommendations include;

7. Providing tax exemptions for registered companies who commit to keeping their employees.

8. Carry out contextualized assessments of the root causes of informality in Somali and Tigray to better understand the challenges faced by forcibly displaced people in transitioning to formality. Refugees and IDPs are more likely to be working in the informal sector than their host counterparts, owing to the hurdles they face in entering the formal labor market, such as the difficulty of getting a work permit or a business licence. Informality is one of the main explanatory factors for the precariousness that refugees live in, be they unregistered business-owners or informal workers.

9. Support MoLSA in raising awareness on how to register companies. With Ethiopia’s Refugee Proclamation being underway, local authorities can look into organizing awareness-raising campaigns on the benefits of business registration in refugee hosting areas. There is space for multiple stakeholders to create the right incentives for business registration – linking the opening of a bank account to business management training. Setting up one-stop shops for business registration can also contribute to wider information-sharing, while centralizing the procedural aspects of formalization. Joint initiatives by refugees and host communities can have positive outcomes for both groups.

10. Reduce inequalities by promoting refugees’ integration into the local economy.

11. Promote freedom of movement for refugees to avoid a sudden decrease in demand. Refugees account for an important share of the customers for businesses located in refugee hosting areas. In the Tigray region, refugees’ movements have been restricted following the start of the pandemic. As a result, exchanges and transactions between refugees and hosts have stopped, and many businesses in the host communities have suffered from reduced demand. While improved access to water and soap, and awareness-raising and large-scale screening are essential to reduce the spread of infections, movement restrictions have a severe socio-economic impact that further aggravates the business climate.

12. Target inclusive and youth led measures for skills building and remote learning opportunities. Youth is disproportionately affected by the pandemic by the combined effect of the closure of educational institutions and reduced demand for labor. Even before the pandemic, the youth was characterized by a higher level of under- and unemployment and was facing a highly competitive labor market where candidates who have experience are often given priority. COVID-19 has made it even more difficult for the youth to look for jobs, especially as digital technology is not widely used owing to poor connectivity and affordability issues. Supporting youth centres by providing access to the Internet connection would give the youth the opportunity to engage in remote learning activities that can be used to help them get a job.
PAKISTAN

COUNTRY SNAPSHOT

- Registered Afghan Refugees: 1,435,445
- Afghans registered in refugee villages: 444,471
- Afghans registered outside refugee villages: 991,828
- Number of internally displaced persons: 16000
- Human Development Index Ranking: 154
- Gender Inequality Index Ranking: 135
- Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Extremism percentile: 3.33
Context

Pakistan is affected by multiple crises, including the Afghan refugee crisis, internal displacement due to internal insurgency and counterinsurgency operations or natural disasters. According to UNHCR, Pakistan hosts the 2nd highest number of refugees in the world – which has severely constrained the country especially as the pandemic hit and more resources were required to protect citizens and national economy.

Forty years ago, Afghans began fleeing the violence in their country and seeking refuge across nearby borders. More than 400,000 people fled the violence of the Communist-led Taraki and Amin government, crossing over into Pakistan. The numbers progressively swelled after the Soviet invasion on Christmas Eve in 1979. By the end of 1980, there were more than four million Afghan refugees in Pakistan. Over the next four years, that number grew further still, with more than five million refugees in Pakistan and Iran.

Afghan refugees represent one of the world’s largest protracted refugee population. Pakistan hosts 1.4 million registered Afghan refugees i.e. they hold a Proof of Registration (PoR) Card and are considered Persons of Concern (PoC) by UNHCR as well as approximately 800,000 Afghan Citizen Card Holders and approximately 300-500,000 undocumented Afghans. 69% of registered Afghan refugees reside in urban areas and 31% in the remaining 54 refugee villages (RVs). Of this population, 54% are male, 46% are female, 43% are children, 51% are adults and 5% are at least 60 years old.

According to UNHCR, at the end of 2020, there were also 5,181 mandate Afghan refugees without PoR cards, 680 non-Afghan refugees (mostly Somalis), around 15,300 asylum-seekers and 123 others of concern registered with UNHCR. Various sources estimate that almost 0.5 million undocumented Afghans are also living in Pakistan as well as an undetermined number of Afghans with expired visa and/or passports. Organizations working on the ground believe that the undocumented refugees remain extremely vulnerable, at most risk of deportation and face multiple protection issues. Many children under 5 are unregistered. There have been facilitated returns over the past years and some civil society organizations and UNHCR continue to work for Afghan refugees in Pakistan. For those born in Pakistan, the Nationality Act entitles them to citizenship, however implementation of the legislation has witnessed various challenges.

Pakistan dealt with massive internal displacement in the past decade with over 600,000 households having been displaced due to conflict pertaining to insurgency/counterinsurgency activities in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) and the former Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). Majority of the displacement communities have returned to their places of origin although access to these regions remains restricted for aid agencies due to security concerns. The returnees have limited access to basic services (e.g. health, education) and livelihood opportunities.

According to Labor Force Survey 2017-18, there are 61.7 million employed workers in Pakistan, of whom 23.8 million are agricultural workers and 37.9 million are non-agricultural workers. Of the country’s 37.9 million non-agricultural workers, 27.3 million (72 per cent) work in the informal sector, while only 10.6 million (28 per cent) are employed in the formal sector. Out of the total of 61.71 million employed, 48.17 million are males while 13.54 million are females, 40.75 million are residing in rural areas while 20.96 million are residing in urban areas. The provincial disaggregation shows that 37.60 million are...
in Punjab, 14.44 million in Sind, 7.17 million in KP and 2.51 million are in Balochistan. Youth aged 15-29 years makes up 23 million of the employed.

Pakistan has issued a National Action Plan for COVID-19 to guide the country’s health preparedness and response. The government has focused on balancing social cohesion and support for livelihoods with managing the public health impacts.

Already fragile, Pakistan is facing a serious economic challenge. Initial lockdowns to curtail the spread of the virus and global downturn have damaged the government’s medium-term economic prospects. Instead of a projected GDP growth rate of 2.1 per cent, Pakistan’s economy contracted by 0.4 per cent in 2019-20. The World Bank estimates negative growth of 0.2 per cent in 2020-21. Government stimulus packages in response to COVID-19 are expected to worsen the country’s challenging debt position.

The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) projects 126 million people in Pakistan are vulnerable to the socio-economic impacts of COVID-19. Prior to the pandemic, 60 million people lived in poverty, 50 million of whom were in need of humanitarian assistance (including the Afghan refugees).

Pakistan’s food security is also fragile and at risk from severe flooding and locust attacks. If left unchecked, the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) warns the current swarm of locusts, could remain in the Indus region for up to three years and put millions at risk of starvation.

Women and children will be most affected by COVID-19. Pakistan consistently ranked near the bottom of global gender equality indices prior to the pandemic. UNDP estimates that over the next year, COVID-19 could put 1.6 million more women at risk of violence, 8 million could lose access to contraceptives, and 4.7 million could give birth without an attendant.

The number of children permanently out of school in Pakistan is expected to reach 30 million. Routine immunizations may remain sporadic for between 17 million and 26 million children under five. Targeted polio vaccination drives have resumed, though Pakistan will face an uphill battle to eradicate polio with new cases emerging.

Disruption to livelihoods and essential service delivery has the potential to fuel religious extremism and social discontent. In addition to its own citizens, Pakistan also hosts around 2.6 million Afghans who remain in Pakistan.

The Government of Pakistan with support from partners has responded to COVID-19 pandemic through establishing coordination structures at all levels. For instance, the government has constituted a high-level National Coordination Committee chaired by the Prime Minister. The Committee comprises of all relevant Federal Ministers, Chief Ministers and Provincial Health Departments. The Committee is responsible for overall coordination of COVID-19 response in the country.

A National Command and Control Centre has been established to ensure effective coordination between the federal and provincial government. At provincial levels, Task Force chaired by Chief Minister on COVID-19 has been formed. The National Disaster Management Authority with Provincial Disaster Management Authorities are the leading operational agency for overall COVID-19 response. Ministry of Foreign is supporting in coordination of international support/assistance.

Key trends

During 2021, UNHCR estimates that up to 58,000 individuals may choose to voluntarily repatriate, primarily to Afghanistan. Around 25,000 children will be registered. From 31 January to 13 February 2021, 273 undocumented Afghan migrants returned to Afghanistan, including 34 through the Torkham border point and 239 through the Chaman border point.
Card (ACC) registration process was initiated by the Afghan Citizen Card (ACC) holder: children and adolescents. The Afghan Citizen Card (ACC) holder remains a prominent issue in the Afghan refugee population in Pakistan. The Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Baluchistan provinces are home to the majority of Afghan refugees, who are dispersed across the country but reside primarily in these areas.

Afghan refugees are one of the largest and most protracted refugee populations in the world, and, after 40 years of conflict, still face significant challenges. According to UNHCR, there are approximately 1.4 million Afghan refugees in Pakistan, making it one of the largest refugee populations in the world. Almost two-thirds of the registered Afghan refugees and asylum seekers in Pakistan are holding a valid Proof of Registration (PoR) card issued by the Government of Pakistan. They are one of the largest refugee populations in the world and, after 40 years of forced displacement, also one of the largest protracted refugee populations under UNHCR’s mandate. Almost two-thirds of the registered Afghan refugees and asylum seekers in Pakistan live in urban or peri-urban areas alongside their host communities. Afghan refugees are dispersed across the country, but the majority reside in the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Baluchistan provinces. The refugee population is predominantly comprised of women, children, and adolescents.

Afghan Citizen Card (ACC) holder: The Afghan Citizen Card (ACC) registration process was initiated by the Government of Pakistan in 2017-2018 to register and document undocumented Afghans in Pakistan. ACCs are identity documents issued by the Government which allow undocumented Afghans to temporarily remain in Pakistan until they return to Afghanistan to obtain a passport and Pakistani visa. ACCs provide protection from arbitrary arrest, detention, or deportation. The Afghan Citizen Cards (ACC) expired on the 30 June 2020.

The Ministry of States and Frontier Regions (SAFRON) submitted a recommendation to the Federal Cabinet for an extension which has yet to be agreed. The current long delay in extension of PoR Cards is unprecedented. Meanwhile, SAFRON issued a formal notification instructing relevant governmental departments, including law enforcement agencies, to refrain from any harassment or adverse action against PoR and ACC holders while the decision of the Federal Cabinet is pending. UNHCR has shared the formal notification with its partners for further dissemination. The Government of Pakistan announced the issuance of new smartcards for Afghan refugees who are Proof of Registration (PoR) cardholders. The Chief Commissionerate for Afghan Refugees (CCAR)/Ministry of States and Frontier Regions (SAFRON) and the National Database and Registration Authority (NADRA), with the support of UNHCR, will start the exercise, “Document Renewal and Information Verification Exercise” (DRIVE), from 1 April 2021.

Undocumented Afghan: An individual of Afghan origin in Pakistan who (i) has no valid documents (PoR card, ACC or Pakistani visa); (ii) possesses an Afghan national identity card (Tazkira); or (iii) has no passport, or has a passport with an expired Pakistani visa, or no visa at all. Currently around 0.4 million undocumented Afghans are estimated to reside in Pakistan.

Temporary Displaced People (TDP): Over 5 million people were displaced from their homes due to the security operations led by the Government of Pakistan against non-state armed actors in the northern region of Pakistan. The tribal areas that have since been merged into the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province, were severely affected with mass displacements, damaged infrastructure, and disruption of economic activity. Life came to a complete standstill in the eight tribal agencies since the crises started in 2008.

In March 2015, after the blanket security operations came to an end, and only targeted operations in areas still harboring non-state actors were undertaken as needed, the Government of Pakistan announced safe, voluntary, dignified, and assisted returns for the displaced families back to their areas of origin in the Newly Merged Districts formerly known as the Federally Administered Tribal Areas. By 2019, almost 95% of the displaced families have returned home. However, majority of the areas lack basic social services and livelihoods opportunities. Humanitarian assistance is still being provided to the TDPs and returnees including a TDP Camp.

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European Union-funded project “Displacement Tracking Matrix Regional Evidence for Migration Analysis and Policy (DTM REMAP)”.
Achieving safe and quality health services during an outbreak depends on the availability of an adequate workforce, in terms of numbers, skills, and relevant medical supplies, equipment and material for infection prevention and control. These elements are essentially important in containing and responding to COVID-19 and maintaining a continuum of care. Therefore, the biggest humanitarian needs in this pandemic are the protection of health workers. Frontline staff (midwives, nurses, obstetricians and anaesthesiologists etc.), need to be prioritized as critical and lifesaving and they should be provided with personal protective equipment if they are treating patients with COVID-19.

The availability of medical supplies, testing kits and medicines is the second biggest humanitarian need in the country. With the limited medical facilities available, most cases are at risk of going without being detected, resulting in a higher number of infected cases in the country.

A quarter of the population (around 53 million people) lives below the national poverty line and around two-fifth (around 84 million people) are multi-dimensionally poor. Similarly, food insecurity is also very high and between 20-30% population (40 to 62 million people) is in some form of food insecurity in Pakistan.

An estimated 36.43 million people are persistently and chronically vulnerable to food insecurity and also highly exposed to natural hazards and shocks which is also true for the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic. An additional 2.45 million people may become vulnerable to food insecurity as a result of any medium scale shock. However, given the scale of this emergency, while the situation is still evolving, one could anticipate a substantial increase in the number of extremely food insecure people in the country, requiring a scaled-up response by humanitarian partners through both in-kind and cash modalities.

Pakistan is the fifth most affected on the list of countries by impacted by climate change. Prior to the outbreak of COVID-19 Pakistan, a series of climatic shocks combined to make those already facing social exclusion and vulnerability due to poverty and displacement, acutely vulnerable to the virus and its impact.

The Impact of COVID of Refugees, FDPs and Host Communities

Local organizations from the ground report that due to an already strained economy and limited resources, vulnerable groups have been further marginalized and their situations aggravated. Data disaggregated by residency status is unavailable. In particular, livelihoods, food security and access to health and education has been severely impacted for refugees and displaced communities. Levels of gender based violence have risen, and women and young girls have been the hardest hit.

Poverty and insecurity forced many Afghan refugees to return to Afghanistan despite unfavorable circumstances and uncertain futures awaiting them. Refugees and internally displaced communities mostly earn their livelihoods from unskilled work through daily wage jobs and many men, women and children work in the informal economy to make ends meet. Other than their wages they rely on remittances, cash support / grants, family and social networks, external aid, cash for work and social protection or safety nets (not applicable in case of refugees). Lack of documentation and absence of work permits restrains them from earning an income, and forces them to live in circumstances where dire needs are unmet.

Many Pakistani migrant workers returned home from all across the world, a large majority returning from the Middle East, due to job losses and their inability to support themselves in the countries they worked in during the lockdown. This meant lower incoming remittances and more vulnerable families in need of support to meet their day to day needs.

The internally displaced communities in Pakistan earn livelihoods through agricultural activities (fruits, dry fruits and tobacco) and retail services (spare parts for vehicle, cross border trade with Afghanistan, and small shops). These self-employment initiatives or small businesses were hardest hit by the pandemic. Border closures with Afghanistan halted cross border trade via land – while other sectors struggled as the supply-demand arrangements for good/materials hung in limbo due to the pandemic.

Nutrition programmes have been greatly hampered due to the pandemic leaving millions of women and children in need of nutrition support in Drought-affected Sindh and Balochistan. Over 200,000 pregnant and lactating women and 400,000 children are among the most vulnerable in need of regular nutrition support, financed through the GHRP. UNICEF, in collaboration with the World Food Programme (WFP) and the World Health Organization (WHO) will intensify efforts on integrated life-saving nutrition services, including community management of acute malnutrition and infant and young child feeding, in health facilities and/or mobile/satellite sites to address severe acute malnutrition (SAM) cases.
The Government is securing essential life-saving equipment and supplies from abroad, supported by WFP logistics support services upon arrival in Pakistan. Due to inadequate capacity in Supply Chain infrastructure and preparatory needs, immediate assistance is required to facilitate access to these life-saving supplies and safe storage. Logistics has become an immediate humanitarian need to support the process.

During this pandemic, protection needs of women and children have significantly heightened as women and children may be at higher risk of intimate partner violence and other forms of domestic violence due to heightened tensions in households and communities. The domestic burden placed on women also becomes exacerbated, making their share of household responsibilities even heavier. All vulnerable groups including refugees and TDPs are disproportionately affected by the COVID-19 pandemic. The pre-existing vulnerabilities of such groups are further aggravated by the related stressors, including family anxieties, the disruption of means of income generation and subsistence activities, due to social distancing and government lockdown measures.

**Macro-economic effects**

The Government is facing a huge challenge in curtailing the spread of the COVID-19, while struggling to minimize the socio-economic impacts of the outbreak at the same time. The lockdowns are having repercussions on the employment and, consequently, people's livelihoods. As such, it is having implications on food production, the entire value chain including marketing, distribution and even the consumption due to lack of livelihoods opportunities and majority of the population having subsistence earnings. The lockdown and global economic shock has the potential to throw up to 125 million people in Pakistan below the poverty line. This will disproportionately impact the vulnerable and marginalized groups, such as women and children, daily-wage workers, small and medium enterprises, agriculture, and other the informal sectors.

The immediate economic shock is further exacerbated by the human cost in terms of mental trauma of death of a relative and fear of encountering the virus, and isolation or loss of academic progress for students.

**Indirect effects on people**

Effects on health and survival: The Government has imposed a lock down across the country whereby all the hospitals and health facilities are closed except for emergency services. This measure was taken to reduce the spread of virus. However, its implication is lack of access to OPD, immunization, preventive health care, lifesaving EmONC Services, pre- and post-natal care etc. This will potentially result in increases in mortality, particularly maternal and child mortality.

The impact of the COVID-19 outbreak on acute care services in Pakistan with under-resourced health system is likely to be substantial. SRH service delivery is expected to be severely impacted, contributing to a rise in maternal and newborn mortality, increased unmet need for contraception, and increased number of unsafe abortions and sexually transmitted infections. It is critical to ensure that all women have access to safe birth, Antenatal care and post-natal care services.

**Effects on society and human development:** The Government has instructed all the public and private educational institutions (schools, colleges and universities) across the country to remain closed till end of May 2020. Similarly, all the examinations have also been postponed accordingly, resulting in massive disruption to learning.

Effects on livelihoods: The current situation of lockdown and uncertainty is having the following implications on the livelihoods:

- All the markets except the outlets from groceries/edible items are closed. The intercity/district/province public transport has been banned thus affecting the ability of many people to access affordable markets. Only the goods transportation carrying food or medical emergency items are allowed with the condition of adopting protective/preventive measures.
- Prospects for the economy and the quantity and quality of employment have also deteriorated rapidly. Initial ILO estimates point to a significant rise in unemployment and underemployment in the wake of the virus.
- The decline in economic activity and constraints on people’s movements has impacted both manufacturing and services coupled with declining labor supply because of quarantine measures and a fall in economic activity which resulted into significant increase in poverty.

Informal sector workers are most vulnerable and many of them lost their jobs due to the prevailing lockdown situation across the country.

- In the case of the agriculture sector, farming activities are primarily carried out by the self-employed either on their own land or as sharecropper/ a contract cultivator or on someone else’s land. Although, the Government has announced that the lockdown is not applicable on transportation or sale of agricultural inputs, yet, these farming households are facing disruption in the supply chain of vital agricultural inputs like seeds, fertilizers and pesticides, etc.
- An extended lockdown will also adversely affect smallholder farmers in terms of reduced purchasing power for daily food items, inputs for kharif plantation and feed for livestock. Most of the farmers store wheat for the household consumptions for the rest of the year. However, due to losses of income from reduced sale of livestock and livestock products and vegetables/fruits produce and other non-farm work, they may sell their wheat stocks.
As a coping strategy in these times of despair, the farmers would soon turn to negative coping mechanisms, particularly liquidation of their assets; mainly poultry, livestock and other valuable assets, to meet the food supplies and other essentiality of life.

Small entrepreneurs, shopkeepers and small factories owners and laborers who are directly dependent on income sources from daily trade and economic activities in rural and urban areas are also experiencing a sharp decrease in their earnings.

Most affected population groups

Women and children from the disadvantaged households, home-based workers, domestic workers, daily wage earners (small shops, self-employed persons and families) and especially pregnant women, are among the most impacted during this pandemic.

Nearly half of households in the country rely on agriculture and livestock as their primary and/or secondary source of livelihood. Some 22% are dependent on daily wage labor (skilled/unskilled non-agricultural labor, forestry workers). Around 62% of households in the poorest wealth quintile rely on farm labor and daily wage as livelihood strategies (33% on farming - small/medium/large farming, livestock, fishing and agricultural labor) and 29% on wage labor (skilled and unskilled non-agricultural work).

The Newly Merged Districts (NMDs) are particularly vulnerable - according to the Comprehensive Food Security and Livelihood Assessment (CFSLA) Report 2019, a majority (65%) of the households are dependent on unsustainable livelihood strategies (daily wagers), while the remaining (35%) depend on somewhat sustainable sources.

Pakistan hosts approximately 1.4 million Afghan refugees who are registered in the Afghan National Registration (ANR) database managed by the National Database and Registration Authority (NADRA) and issued with Proof of Registration (PoR) cards. Since the majority of refugees reside in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (58%) and Baluchistan (23%), where the lowest living standards and the highest multidimensional poverty index are recorded, it is evident that most of the Afghan refugees are severely affected by the unprecedented events surrounding the COVID-19 pandemic. UNHCR estimate that more than 70,000 Afghan refugees are Persons with Specific Needs (PWSN) and face additional challenges (children at risk, women at risk, single parents, older persons at risk, and persons with serious medical conditions). Additionally, there are growing numbers of extremely vulnerable refugee families whose livelihoods have been severely affected by the COVID-19 pandemic, particularly daily-wage earners that require urgent support.

According to a phone survey by Centre for Global Development, more than half (58 percent) of the respondents report a reduction in income during the lockdown period. This finding is similar to a Gallup poll finding where 44 percent of Pakistanis report being laid off, taking a salary cut, or getting unpaid leave due to the pandemic. Income shocks are prevalent across all education levels, with 62 percent of respondents who have no education reporting a reduction in income compared to 48 percent of respondents who have more than secondary education. While respondents across all levels of pre-lockdown income report a reduction in income, relatively richer respondents are slightly more likely to report a reduced income. The opposite trend is observed across employment skill classification levels, as respondents with low-skilled jobs are 36 percentage points more likely...
to report reduction in income compared to those with high-skilled jobs.

In addition to income reduction, we ask respondents about the need to borrow money and reduction in days worked. More than half (52 percent) of households report that they felt the need to borrow money during the month of May. 62 percent of households report that they did not work at all during the first week of May. 75 percent of households report a reduction in days worked during the first week of May during lockdown, while 68 percent of respondents report reducing the number of days worked by half or more.

While more than half of the households report a reduction in income during lockdown, a smaller percentage report becoming food insecure. 28 percent of households report reducing the number of meals, and 24 percent report reducing the size of meals. Overall, 20 percent of households report reducing the number and size of meals. This is similar to a Gallup poll finding that 27 percent of urban and 20 percent of rural Pakistanis report reducing the size and number of meals in April, 2020. Respondents across education levels report a reduction in meal sizes, with 13 percent of uneducated households and 8 percent of those with more than secondary education reporting reducing meal sizes for 5 or more days in the first week of May. Sindh, compared to other provinces, reports a higher proportion (30 percent) of households reducing meal sizes. 19 percent of households with income of less than Rs. 10,000 per week are reducing meal sizes for more than 3 days per week compared to 14 percent of households making above Rs. 10,000 per week. Similarly, respondents with low-skilled jobs are more likely to report reducing meal sizes. A similar pattern emerges when looking at the number of meals.

Overall, only a small percentage of households (21 percent of households) are covered by government’s Ehsaas program, 16 and 12 percent of households report receiving food rations from relief organizations. Furthermore, only a little more than one-fifth (22 percent) of households reporting a reduction in income due to lockdown are covered by the government’s Ehsaas program. This finding implies that the government must consider expanding coverage of Ehsaas program to include other needy beneficiaries to reduce the economic impacts of the crisis.

A similar picture emerges when looking at food insecure households covered by the government’s cash transfer program. Overall, 20 percent of respondents report reducing both meal sizes and number of meals. Only 26 percent of these individuals are covered by the government’s cash transfer program and 21 percent of these individuals report receiving food rations from a relief organization. Food insecurity (reduction in both meal size and number of meals) is worse for uneducated households, yet only one-third of such households are covered by the government’s Ehsaas program. Similarly, food insecurity is worse for respondents reporting no income, yet only a small minority are covered by the government’s cash transfer program.

Figure: Food insecure households covered by government’s Social Protection EHSAS program
Looking across employment skill classifications, those with low-skilled jobs are roughly two times more likely to be food insecure compared to those with high-skilled jobs, but only one-third of those with low-skilled jobs report being covered by the government’s social assistance program. Across regions, respondents from Sindh are most likely to report being food insecure, but only one-fourth are covered by the cash transfer program.

Inclusion levels of Refugees, FDPs and Host Communities

In the case of internally displaced communities there is not much friction between host communities and displaced households, as majority of the returns have taken place and the displaced communities were Pakistani nationals who sought refuge from the conflict in neighboring cities or towns – so generally there is cohesion and understanding. Getting jobs can be competitive sometimes but organizations working with these communities have adhered to processes for trust building and joint decision making.

For refugees, inclusion is a major institutional issue which need to be addressed to mainstream them into national responses and provide them access to decent work (formal job market and informal jobs). Very few organizations work with Afghan refugees and the work is strongly regulated due to security concerns. Not much funds are allocated to provide services to Afghan refugees by the government and other institutional donors also shy away from work with Afghan refugees as they do not feature as high priority of the government. With the meager funds available, investment in human capital is limited as programming has been unable to move towards development and remains primarily humanitarian despite 2 generations of Afghan refugees having lived in Pakistan. Afghan refugees are unable to report human rights violations and they live in situations where it is not possible to adhere to COVID-19 safety measures. Example if 5 households of 10 members per family need to use one washroom, there is hardly room for the luxury of social distancing or adequate sanitization.

Unregistered Afghan refugees are not accounted for anywhere and without adequate documentation or access to support and services, these communities are essentially slipping through the cracks.

Key Barriers and Constraints faced by Refugees, FDPs and Host Communities

The internally displaced communities were vulnerable but still protected as they could access government support, welfare programs and subsidies. On the other hand, refugees could neither access government facilities and services nor could they earn a wage as they lack work permits – and in many cases they may not be registered. The process of registration and acquiring work permits is both complicated and tedious. Unregistered refugees were most vulnerable as they could not access the limited support provided by organizations like UNHCR mirroring the government support for citizens. Access to the formal economy is negligible if any for refugees and informal jobs in Micro, Small and Medium Enterprise (MSMEs) were heavily cut down due to the pandemic. The MSMEs are now gradually re-opening, however this re-opening does not signify a change in vulnerability or low incidence/risk of COVID-19 but it shows that households have to take the risk and expose themselves to put food on the table. Investment in education, gender equity, skill building etc was reverted to health and COVID-19 response. The civil society organizations operating in Pakistan fear that this may reverse the progress made over years. An example is education for girls; when the schools closed down and the girls were home, they helped with unpaid work at home – now with school re-opening in Pakistan, girls’ enrollment has further dwindled. This may now take months or years of advocacy to get girls back in schools.

Most refugee and displaced communities do not have access to internet, banking services or other financial services. They also do not possess adequate digital skills to navigate the post COVID virtual world. In the case of refugees, the causes are institutional but for the internally displaced communities, the causes are security related. Even injecting cash is not allowed in many parts of Newly Merged Districts (NMDs) and organizations need to provide support in kind – which leaves households in a very passive and non-empowering role. Some organizations are procuring and delivering supplies after consultations with communities but that too is with challenges i.e. logistics, delivery costs, tax, weather conditions, organizing distributions during COVID-19 etc. Refugees and displaced communities were the first to lose jobs and more women lost employment as compared to men. Negative coping mechanisms adopted include skipping meals, cutting expenditures on education and health, increased drug use, increased family violence and increased incidence of small crime. The process of registering refugees and subsequent work permit issuance has been further delayed as systems struggle to adapt to a post COVID-19 situation.

Key Stakeholders

The government has limited fiscal levers available at present and relies heavily on international assistance to make up the shortfall. The international response to COVID-19 in Pakistan will continue to be shaped by a transitioning donor landscape. Large bilateral donors (UK and US) are sharpening their strategies. Smaller donors have recently phased out of Pakistan. Most donors have given early support, including China, which is expanding its donor presence in the region. Some local and international NGOs continue to face local registration hurdles, which prevent them from operating. As the second and third order effects of COVID-19 mount, further support from donors may be limited.

Multilateral development banks are increasingly taking a leading role in development in Pakistan.
The National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA) and the Provincial Disaster Management Authorities (PDMAs) are the main actors on the ground. Due to security situation, the military and intelligence offices on ground are also on high alert and are frequently involved in coordinating aid delivery especially for the NMDs and Balochistan. According to the 4W matrix of UNOCHA, January to June, 2020; 86 organizations were responding to community needs through 91 projects. This included 5 UN organizations, 60 NGOs, 11 INGOs and 10 Government Authorities. The UN is working with the federal and provincial governments at multiple levels to aid coordinated management of COVID-19 preparedness and response. Example supporting the Planning Commission in establishing a secretariat for multi-sectoral planning, financing, coordination and programmatic implementation. WHO has provided technical support to the development of National Action Plan for of COVID-19, leading the development of Strategic Preparedness and Response Plan for the Government and the UN along with supporting the government with provision of information for planning which includes projection and modeling of the trend of COVID-19 disease. UNHCR is supporting coordination concerning the refugee population with the Commissionerate for Afghan Refugees, the Provincial Disaster Management Authorities (PDMAs) and relevant departments. UNHCR continues to advocate for the inclusion of refugees within the Government’s COVID-19 preparedness and response plans, including the BISP/ Ehsaas social protection program.

UN is working with the federal and provincial governments at multiple levels to aid coordinated management of COVID-19 preparedness and response. More specifically:

- UNDP is supporting the Planning Commission in establishing a secretariat for multi-sectoral planning, financing, coordination and programmatic implementation.
- WHO is supporting Ministry of National Health Services, Regulation and Coordination (NHSR&C) to coordinate response to COVID-19 through provision of technical support to the development of National Action Plan for of COVID-19, leading the development of Strategic Preparedness and Response Plan for the Government and UN
- WHO is providing technical support to NDMA to coordinate COVID-19 response.
- WHO is supporting the government with provision of information for planning which includes projection and modeling of the trend of COVID-19 disease.
- UNHCR is supporting coordination concerning the refugee population with the Commissionerate for Afghan Refugees, the Provincial Disaster Management Authorities (PDMAs) and relevant departments.
- UNHCR is engaged in advocacy for the inclusion of refugees within the Government's COVID-19 preparedness and response plans, including the BISP/ Ehsaas social protection program.
- UNODC is supporting national counterparts including National and Provincial AIDS Control Programme, provincial Health Departments, Criminal Justice Actors such as Law Enforcement Agencies and Police by providing latest information and guidelines on how to respond to COVID-19 in prisons and in community with injecting Drug Users and drug users.
- UN Women is in the process of collecting evidence and analysis related to women and COVID in high-risk settings (prisons, shelter homes) and facilitating access to services.
- UN Women is supporting evidence generation for gender integration in COVID-19 preparedness and response plans, including gender analysis for UN’s rapid socio-economic impact assessment, and development of a policy brief on socio-economic impact of COVID-19 on women and girls in Pakistan, in collaboration with Ministry of Human Rights and National Commission on Status of Women. A mobile survey on changes in women’s economic status, trends in unpaid domestic and care work etc. is underway with support from Jazz.
- UN Women has carried out an analysis of VAW cases reported to police across the country in 2020 to assess the impact of COVID-19 and is providing support to national and provincial counterparts for strengthening essential GBV services.
- UNFPA is engaged in advocating for specific quarantine arrangements and services for women and girls. Moreover, UNFPA is advocating for the provision of reproductive health services to the most vulnerable population during this crisis.
- UNFPA has taken the lead to contextualize and distribute IEC messages on COVID and SRH, develop capacity of Health providers working in MCH across Pakistan (on infection prevention, universal precautionary measures, stigma and stress management) and provided PPEs in MCH facilities in KP, Balochistan and Islamabad (PPEs for Gilgit Baltistan, Sindh and Punjab in the pipeline).
- UNFPA carried out a Socio-Economic Assessment of COVID-19 on Reproductive Health and Gender-Based Violence in Pakistan to support the government to mitigate the impact caused by COVID-19 on the most vulnerable.
- UNFPA, WFP, UNHCR and other UN agencies contributed to joint Government/UN Socio-Economic Impact Assessment of COVID-19 on livelihoods, food security, agriculture supply chain, market situation and food prices and coping strategies.

Various donors (mostly institutional) i.e. European Union, Australian High Commission, USAID, the Japanese government, the Norwegian government etc continue to support communities although the calls for proposals for recovering from COVID-19 have not been very inclusive for refugees. Many funding opportunities have focused on youth and addressing the economic impact of COVID-19.
The Asian Development Bank has also committed to support a large economic development program. There is little to no recognition or involvement of communities, especially women and youth as stakeholders especially at a broader/higher level of decision making on policies, funding and programming – which remains a vacuum.

**Policy Response**

- The Govt. of Pakistan, 23 April 2020, launched an initial USD 595 million coordinated multi-sectorial Pakistan Preparedness and Response Plan (PPRP)
- Prime Minister’s COVID-19 Pandemic Relief Fund - 2020 was set up
- Ehsaas Emergency Cash Program - PKR 144 billion allocated to benefit 12 million vulnerable families through a cash transfer.
- UNHCR mirrored the Ehsaas initiative for registered Afghan refugees
- Chief Commissioner, ICT issued an order prohibiting workers to be laid off & closure to be considered paid leave. (March 2020).
- Other provinces and municipalities also issued orders to prohibit layoffs and consider closure as paid leave
- National and provincial governments encouraged businesses to avoid/limit layoffs
- $ 1.2 billion for providing relief to daily-wagers and labourers by disbursing Rs12,000 /month through the Social Protection system.
- $ 600 million for the industrialists and exporters, which would help resolve their liquidity issues.
- $ 600 million for agriculture and SMEs sectors
- $ 300 million for the Utility Stores Corporation (USC) to provide five basic edible commodities, including flour, pulses, sugar and Ghee, on subsidised rates.
- $ 1.69 billion to procure 8.2 million tons of wheat during the current season
- The prices of per litre petrol, diesel, kerosene, and light diesel oil have been reduced by Rs15 each.
- $ 90 million to be incurred on tax break on health and food supplies
- $ 600 million for residual/energy fund.

**Key Gaps and Policy Recommendations:**

MSMEs were severely impacted by the pandemic which also caused many refugees and displaced communities to lose their jobs. This is alarming because of the critical role MSMEs have in driving economic growth, revenue generation, and employment for daily wagers and especially unskilled labor. The problem MSMEs faced was the lack of capital, and their employee’s main problem was the absence of social protection nets – so the MSMEs and their employees did not have the resilience to stand the shock the pandemic brought. The government’s decision to lift some of the lockdown restrictions was determined by the need to support low-income people and small businesses. There hasn’t been any tangible support announced for MSMEs yet.

Poverty and increased level of poverty amongst refugees and displaced communities is the serious and perhaps most pertinent structural problem. Households often rely on one income as women are restricted to the domestic sphere and losing the wages for even one day may mean, there is no food on the table for dinner. Due to inflation, refugee and displaced communities reported having 2 meals or sometimes even less before COVID-19. Undoubtedly the vulnerability and insecurity has exacerbated due to COVID-19.

Refugees and displaced communities are trapped in the cycle of poverty, limited opportunities and isolation. This can in part be attributed to the disconnect between the humanitarian and development programming on ground and also to the fact that projects are sporadic and short term, so they fail to perform at scale and generate an impact which is significant and long-term. Innovative and flexible programs, at scale are required to make a difference.

The involvement of the private sector also seems limited in Pakistan. Some telecom companies like Jazz and Telenor are stepping forward as they are interested in expanding coverage and extending facilities like mobile wallets etc. to vulnerable communities – but they seldom have access to refugee and displaced communities.

Refugees and displaced communities need to be actively consulted and involved in decision making that concerns them i.e. policy level or program implementation level. Without recognizing those as a prime stakeholder and without their ownership initiatives will not sustain, and the cycle of short term projects will continue with little impact.
LAKE CHAD REGION

NIGER COUNTRY SNAPSHOT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Value</th>
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<td>Returnees from abroad</td>
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<td>Refugees</td>
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<td>Gender Inequality Index Ranking</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Extremism percentile</td>
<td>9.52</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Extremism percentile: 9.52
### CHAD COUNTRY SNAPSHOT

- Internally Displaced Population: 336,124
- Refugees: 16,127
- Returnees from abroad: 30,422
- Returnees (former IDPs): 26,937
- Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Extremism percentile: 10.48
- Human Development Index Ranking: 187
- Gender Inequality Index Ranking: 160

### CAMEROON COUNTRY SNAPSHOT

- Internally Displaced Population: 2,144,135
- Refugees: 115,921
- Returnees from abroad: 144,314
- Returnees (former IDPs): 1,592,535
- Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Extremism percentile: 5.24
- Human Development Index Ranking: 161
- Gender Inequality Index Ranking: Not Rated

### NIGERIA COUNTRY SNAPSHOT

- Internally Displaced Population: 2,144,135
- Refugees: 115,921
- Returnees from abroad: 10,934
- Returnees (former IDPs): 112,555
- Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Extremism percentile: 8.10
- Human Development Index Ranking: 161
- Gender Inequality Index Ranking: 141
Context

The Lake Chad region comprises of 4 countries i.e. Niger, Chad, Nigeria and Cameroon. Violence in the region has disproportionately affected borderlands and caused temporary border closures resulting in restricted cross border trade and migration movements. Northeastern Nigeria has been experiencing insecurity since 2009, with the violence causing a humanitarian crisis in the beginning of 2014. The violence between all parties intensified and expanded to countries including Cameroon, Chad and Niger.

Following the escalation of violence, a Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF), a coalition of forces from Benin, Cameroon, Chad, Niger and Nigeria, was activated in 2015 to fight the Non-State Armed Groups in the four affected countries. National and MNJTF military operations resulted in a significant loss of territory for the Non-State Armed Groups. However, the military operations also triggered unexpected displacements to insecure areas, mainly in Nigeria. These areas of displacement are often hard to reach for humanitarian actors. Sudden withdrawal of military forces from certain locations have resulted in increased security concerns for civilians and displaced communities. Since 2015, activities of Non-State Armed Groups and associated fatalities have decreased, but they still remain active and deadly.

In addition to the fighting between security forces, pro-government militias and armed opposition groups, conflict over natural resources between occupational groups such as farmers, pastoralists, fisher folk and hunters, has been exacerbated by reductions in arable land, grazing routes, changing rainfall patterns affecting crop yields and cattle health, military restrictions, security concerns and scarcity of water. Ethnic, religious and social tensions have increased due to the conflict and has impacted the economy. Inter-communal tensions and heightened violence regarding access to resources has led to the emergence of stigmatization and rivalry over the control of economic activities and land ownership. With time, the consequences of the conflict affected relations between IDPs and host communities as people have exhausted their own resources to host displaced populations, leaving them and their families in vulnerable economic positions – which means that the communities residing in these countries are vulnerable and require support, and refugees and displaced communities are even more vulnerable, marginalized and in critical need of relief and rehabilitation.

Boko Haram’s extremist ideology and its heavy reliance on tactics of indiscriminate terror perpetrated against a wide array of targets have significantly impacted social relations, further dividing and polarizing an already fragmented
society. The repeated but unpredictable incidences of violence have created widespread suspicion, mistrust, and apprehension, leading to fragmentation along religious, ethnic, and other cultural fault lines. The insurgency has resulted in a pervasive sense of fear among the population, especially toward anyone who may be or have been associated with Boko Haram, or who just shares a religious or ethnic identity with the group. Thus, to varying degrees, North-Eastern Muslims, people belonging to the Kanuri ethnic group, the forcibly displaced, and victims of forced recruitment and abduction can be open to suspicion. Traditional institutions and community-level conflict management mechanisms (such as local government councils, local courts, and religious institutions) have been undermined by this wider erosion of social capital and by the assassination of leaders, leaving significant gaps in the capacity of these institutions to mediate and manage conflicts.

The crisis currently affecting the Lake Chad Basin states results from a complex combination of factors, including conflict with Non-State Armed Groups, extreme poverty, underdevelopment and a changing climate, which together have triggered significant displacement of populations. According to IOM, as of 25 February 2021, Cameroon, Chad, Niger and Nigeria were hosting an estimated 5,118,035 affected individuals made up of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs), Refugees (both in- and out-of-camp), Returnees (Former IDPs and Returnees from abroad) and Third Country Nationals (TCNs). 76 per cent of the affected population (representing 3,880,984 individuals) were located in Nigeria, while 11 per cent resided in Cameroon (561,296 individuals), 8 per cent in Chad (409,610 individuals) and 5 per cent in Niger (266,145 individuals).

IOM’s report ‘Within and Beyond Borders: Tracking Displacement in The Lake Chad Basin’ notes that displacement dynamics are complex, characterized by multiple displacements, ‘pendular’ movements (such as those returning to areas of origin to check on their assets/ livelihoods, to carry out agricultural activities, etc.), forced returns, as well as the returns of refugees according to the Tripartite agreement signed in March 2017 between the governments Cameroon and Nigeria, and UNHCR. The agreement calls for safe, dignified, informed and voluntary returns from Cameroon to Nigeria.17 In addition, the absence of identity documents and strong ethnic and family links that span across borders and do not necessarily identify with a specific country, make the categorization of displacement challenging. Ongoing violence has further aggravated the weak economic development of the region. Affected regions of all four countries were already experiencing high levels of poverty prior to the conflict, as well as underdevelopment, population growth, environmental degradation, and marginalization.

As the conflict has intensified, the prevalence of sexual and gender-based violence (SGVB) in the region has escalated dramatically. Women and girls are now even more vulnerable to rape, exploitation, and forced marriage due to the conflict and resulting displacement, adding to already high rates of domestic violence and child marriage. Women and girls abducted by Boko Haram are victims of rape; forced into marriage, labor, and religious conversion; physically, sexually, and emotionally abused; and are highly vulnerable, exposed to sexually transmitted diseases and often forced impregnation by their captors. They and their children are particular subjects of stigma, often rejected by their communities and families, leaving them particularly vulnerable.

Key trends

The conflicts in the Lake Chad Basin (LCB) and Sahel regions continue to fuel forced displacement and growing insecurity hinders humanitarian access to populations of concern. UNHCR reports envision the situation to grow even more sensitive and needs to escalate as the impact of COVID-19 settles in.

According to UNHCR, in Nigeria, the Tahoua and Tillabery regions are seeing continuous influxes from neighboring Burkina Faso and Mali, while internal displacement has also increased. More than 45,000 Nigerian refugees still live in the Maradi region, which is seeing growing internal displacement caused by the spillover of the ongoing instability and violence in Northern Nigeria. In the Diffa region, refugees and IDPs continue to arrive, joining an already protracted displacement situation. Finally, Niger is a major transit country for mixed movements of migrants and asylum-seekers towards the Central Mediterranean, which are expected to continue and intensify in 2021 as the social and economic impact of the COVID-19 pandemic unfolds.

Nigeria continues to grapple with a protracted humanitarian crisis in the North-East, an ongoing conflict that will likely persist in 2021, causing further internal displacement and refugee movements. The high level of violence and insecurity prevent UNHCR from accessing important hosting areas, and with the situation showing no signs of abating, humanitarian responses will continue to be hampered in 2021. Furthermore, the South-East of the country continues hosts more than 60,000 Cameroonian refugees who have fled violence in the North-West and South-West regions of Cameroon, where the conflict also shows no sign of abating.

This regional instability and insecurity directly affect Chad’s operational environment and was exacerbated in 2020 by the COVID-19 pandemic, which severely affected the most vulnerable populations including refugees and IDPs. Despite these challenges, the protection environment in Chad remains favorable to refugees and IDPs and UNHCR works closely with the Government to ensure protection and seek solutions for over 470,000 refugees from Sudan, the Central African Republic and Nigeria, as well as 330,000 IDPs, mostly around the Lake Chad region.

Chad has adopted its first-ever asylum law, which will enhance protection for the nearly 480,000 refugees
currently hosted in the country. Adopted 23 December 2020, the law ensures refugees and asylum-seekers fundamental protections, including freedom of movement, the right to work and access to healthcare, education, and justice. The passage of this law makes Chad one of the first countries in the region to fulfill a pledge made during last year’s Global Refugee Forum in Geneva to strengthen legal, physical and material protection of refugees and asylum seekers. The law will also guide the establishment of an efficient national asylum system, which is being pursued under the Asylum Capacity Support Group. The law conforms to international standards enshrined in the 1951 Refugee Convention and its protocol and the 1969 OAU Convention on Refugees.

Cameroon continues to host some 1.96 million people of concern to UNHCR, including Nigerian refugees in the Far North and Central Africans in the Eastern border regions, with access to basic services limited, such as civil documentation, particularly for displaced populations. The country also has over 1 million IDPs concentrated in the North-West and South-West and the Far North regions where conflict and instability are likely to persist in 2021, as well as 484,036 IDPs returnees in the Far North. Gabon, also covered by UNHCR’s operation in Cameroon, hosts 484 refugees and 84 asylum-seekers in a context of prolonged displacement.

Displacement and violence continued in the region making refugees, displaced communities and host communities vulnerable and in need of support.

Sexual and gender based violence continues to affect women and girls across the region. There are serious issues around protection – this situation is linked to the conflict and stability of the region.

The prevalence of COVID in the region (Feb 2021) is as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sr</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>COVID cases #</th>
<th>cases recovered #</th>
<th>deaths #</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>4,740</td>
<td>4,250</td>
<td>172</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>4,056</td>
<td>3,542</td>
<td>140</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>157,000</td>
<td>136,000</td>
<td>1,939</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Cameroon</td>
<td>35,714</td>
<td>32,594</td>
<td>551</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**The Impact of COVID of Refugees, FDPs and Host Communities**

Across the region, the COVID-19 pandemic had a severe impact on the livelihoods of refugees and IDPs, exacerbating existing vulnerabilities and exposing them to heightened protection risks, including incidences of gender-based violence and rising poverty levels, adversely impacting the protection environment.

**Chad:**

In 2020, Chad was affected by growing insecurity within its borders and within neighboring countries, economic fragility intensified by the COVID-19 pandemic, a precarious health context, and the impact of destructive climate-related events. The pandemic’s socioeconomic impact exacerbated pre-existing vulnerabilities, including of people – many of whom are women – working in the informal sector. The context was marked by the closure of borders, a collapse of the oil price, a rise in food prices and initial paralysis of the economic fabric, including high levels of unemployment for several months.

The security situation continued to be of concern in Lac province, including clashes between non-State armed groups and the Chadian Army and the declaration of an ‘no-go zone’ for civilians. As a result, the number of IDPs in that province increased to 336,000 – a 98 per cent rise compared to 2019. In southern and eastern Chad, some 480,000 refugees from the Central African Republic (CAR) and Sudan still depend on humanitarian assistance. Nearly 20,000 new refugees arrived in eastern Chad in 2020 due to the persistence of intercommunal clashes in Darfur. Interc communal conflict between farmers and herders has also continued, particularly in the south.

The socioeconomic impact of COVID-19 affected the food and nutrition situation of the most vulnerable people. In 2020, the number of severely food insecure people remained 1 million. According to the preliminary results of the November food security assessment (Cadre Harmonisé), 2 million people now need livelihood support. The prevalence of acute malnutrition continues to rise, with 18 out of 23 provinces in an alarming nutritional situation. At the national level, GAM prevalence is 12.9 per cent, of which 2.9 per cent is in its severe form (SAM). Almost 2 million people are affected by health emergencies, the most vulnerable of whom are children under 5 years of age, pregnant and breastfeeding women, people with disabilities and the elderly. This situation is largely explained by the poor access to basic social services worsened by the pandemic, but also by the increase in endemic and epidemic diseases, notably malaria, measles and a new outbreak of chikungunya.

**Niger:**

2020 has been marked by persistent and increasing insecurity in certain border areas between Niger and neighboring Nigeria, Mali and Burkina Faso. The activities of non-State armed groups (NSAGs) in the regions of Diffa, Tillabéri and Tahoua and the recurrent incursions of NSAGs from bordering countries caused population movements, particularly in the Tillabéri and Maradi regions. As of 30 September 2020, the number of people on the move (IDPs, refugees and returnees) was estimated at more than 530,000, which is an increase of 21 per cent in comparison...
to 2019. In the regions of Diffa, Maradi, Tillabéri and Tahoua alone, the number of IDPs increased by 37 per cent. Insecurity has led to the closure of 356 schools, affecting more than 33,500 children in Maradi, Tillabéri and Tahoua. The number of human rights violations also increased. Overall, 1,758 protection incidents were recorded as of 30 September. The number of recorded GBV cases increased by 133 per cent, from 1,399 in 2019 to 3,261 in 2020.

Flooding in Niger between August and September caused extensive damage. As of 20 October, 632,000 people (three times more than forecast by the Government) in 116 communes (44 per cent) across the country were affected by the destruction of more than 50,000 houses and over 18,000 ha of farming areas, and the loss of more than 15,000 small ruminants. These losses will weaken the livelihood conditions of already vulnerable populations.

As of 31 October, the COVID-19 epidemic has also impacted the daily lives of Nigeriens. However, its effects have been felt on the economic level. The mobility restrictions introduced by the Government to limit the spread of the virus restricted the population’s access to necessary food items.

In addition to COVID-19, Niger experienced three other disease outbreaks, namely measles, vaccine-derived poliomyelitis virus type 2, and malaria. According to health authority records released in September 2020, measles affected 2,685 people, polio affected 5 people, and there were more than 2 million cases of malaria. Malnutrition and food insecurity are also major concerns, affecting more than 2 million people.

Government-imposed escorts due to insecurity have greatly contributed to restricting humanitarian access. In Tillabéri and Tahoua, more than six assessment missions were canceled between January and July for reasons linked to escort requirements, depriving several thousand affected people of much-needed humanitarian assistance. In October, more than 30,000 people were deprived of access to health-care services due to the closure of health centres in the districts of Ayorou and Banibangou in Tillabéri because of insecurity. The rehabilitation of hydraulic facilities could not take place in the Tillabéri region, depriving more than 12,000 people, living in 12 sites, of access to drinking water.

COVID-19 overturned the initial 2020 planning, leading to the revision of the Humanitarian Response Plan (HRP) 2020 in July. The People in Need (PiN) was revised from 2.9 million at the beginning of the year to 3.7 million at the mid-year review, and the target increased from 1.8 million to 2.2 million during the same period. Despite the low level of funding received (44 per cent of funds requested by 2 November 2020), the humanitarian community was able to assist 1.07 million people, or 49 per cent of targeted people. Food assistance was provided to 1,073,088 people, while 73 per cent of those targeted were able to benefit from temporary access to drinking water.

**Nigeria:**

The major crisis in Nigeria’s north-east persists unabated: the continuing conflict will still severely affect millions of people in 2021, subjecting them to displacement, impoverishment and threat of violence. The armed conflict has no clear end in sight. The Nigerian Armed Forces’ strategy (since 2019) of regrouping in ‘super camps’ has not guaranteed security and protection for nearby IDPs and other civilians. Prospects for displaced people’s safe return to their areas of origin are far from certain.
The operating environment remains extremely volatile, particularly in Borno State where all the major supply routes have become dangerous for civilians and specifically for aid workers, humanitarian cargo and assets. Humanitarian hubs and aid organizations’ offices have suffered regular attacks in 2020. Protection needs are formidable. Women and girls are under threat of violence, abduction and rape, for example when venturing outside the trenches that surround many IDP camps to collect firewood, though also within IDP camps. Gender-based violence is growing, as are forced and child marriage; women and girls still lack adequate protection and access to services. Desperation drives women to negative coping strategies such as exchanging sex for food and other necessities. The COVID-19 pandemic both deepens humanitarian needs and complicates the response. The Nigerian economy has suffered from the fall in global oil prices and from restriction measures to mitigate the pandemic, particularly intermittent border closures and the need to dedicate resources to curtailing the virus’ spread. The consequent impairment of livelihoods cascades down to loss of income and buying power, with acute effects on the already-vulnerable and food-insecure. Operationally, COVID-19 measures to keep humanitarian staff and beneficiaries safe consume time and resources. Conflict and insecurity have cut people off from their main means of livelihoods—agricultural lands. This causes major food insecurity in north-east Nigeria, which COVID-19’s effects on incomes have exacerbated: despite good crop yields, food insecurity is rising.

Nonetheless solutions are sought for people caught in this crisis, many since 2009. State governments are increasingly committed to IDP returns. Borno State Government in particular has set a target of all IDPs returning by May 2021. If most of the areas identified for return are highly insecure and inaccessible to humanitarian organizations, alternatives could be available and need further exploration—mainly resettlement in safer areas where there is enough land, or local integration alongside the cities and towns where they refuge. For the few areas that are relatively safe for IDPs who choose to return, a concerted package including timely durable-solution plans is now needed to ensure safe, voluntary, and dignified return. Essential services, firm livelihood prospects, basic infrastructure, civil administration to ensure rule of law, and humanitarian aid for the difficult first phases of return will all have to be delivered synchronously.

For IDPs from areas not conducive to returns, humanitarians will advocate (and State governments have signaled some openness to developing) the alternative solutions—durable though not necessarily permanent—of local integration or resettlement. A focused initial exercise might point the way forward by crystallizing new joint working methods among government, national and local civil society, and the international community—in particular development, humanitarian and peace-building actors. Still, as solutions will be slow to arrive for most of the 1.9 million IDPs in need, the humanitarian community must continue to improve conditions in camps, including decongestion, and host communities.

**Cameroon:**

Humanitarian needs in nine of Cameroon’s ten regions continue due to three concurrent crises affecting the country: the Lake Chad Basin (LCB) conflict, the North-West South-West crisis and the Central African refugee crisis in the eastern regions. The required assistance ranges from immediate life-saving to protracted recovery.

In 2020, violence escalated against civilians in Cameroon’s Far North. According to UNOCHA Cameroon remains the country second most-affected by the Lake Chad Basin (LCB) emergency. Ongoing hostilities have uprooted 560,000 people, an increase over 72,000 since October 2019. Armed attacks, abductions, including of children, and the looting and destruction of goods and infrastructure continue to cause physical and psychological trauma. Insecurity is exacerbating already limited access to basic social services such as education and health. Epidemics such as cholera, meningitis and measles are recurrent. Excess rainfall since July 2020 has caused widespread flooding in five regions of Cameroon. More than 170,000 people were affected in the Far North region alone. The loss of livelihoods due to the armed conflict, the socioeconomic impact of the COVID-19 pandemic, as well as the destruction of houses, goods, crops and fields to the floods have resulted in a drastic increase in food insecurity. An estimated 630,000 people will be food insecure from June to August 2021, which is a 50 per cent increase compared to the same period in 2020. What began as a political crisis in the South-West and North-West regions in 2017 has now become a significant, complex humanitarian emergency that displaced over 1 million people. People in rural and hard-to-reach areas are most affected because of limited or no access to medical, nutrition and WASH facilities and limited access to farmland due to insecurity. An estimated 700,000 children are out of school due to the crisis in the North-West and South-West regions. Students and teachers are killed, kidnapped, tortured, caught in crossfire, and subjected to arbitrary arrest and detention.

In the Adamawa, East and North regions, Cameroon hosts 284,000 refugees from CAR. This is placing significant pressure on already limited natural resources and basic social services in host communities and exacerbating pre-existing vulnerabilities. Seventy per cent of the refugees have no formal education and 46 per cent have no source of income. Girls and young women are more likely to miss out on school, and they are particularly vulnerable to forced displacement and returns. Humanitarians have signaled some openness to developing the alternative solutions—durable though not necessarily permanent—of local integration or
and early marriages and other forms of sexual exploitation. UNHCR aims to seek durable solutions in Cameroon and in IDPs countries of origin, while enhancing resettlement and complementary pathway for refugees. In light of the relative improvements seen in certain areas of Nigeria and the Central African Republic, UNHCR plans to facilitate the repatriation of 10,000 refugees from Cameroon in safety and dignity in 2021.

**Inclusion levels of Refugees, FDPs and Host Communities**

The COVID-19 response has been limited in the region because of the region being initially/economically strained, high levels of poverty, ongoing conflict and displacement and lack of institutional capacity. Refugees were expected to abide to the measures out in place for containing COVID-19 while all relief provided to refugees was through humanitarian aid, mostly by UNHCR, other UN organizations or international and national NGOs operating in the area.

**Key Barriers and Constraints faced by Refugees, FDPs and Host Communities**

According to UNDP’s report on ‘COVID-19 and Stabilization: Governance Implications for the Lake Chad Basin Region’ (2020), the inter-section of the COVID-19 pandemic (and containment measures), increased tempo of security activities and economic downturn in the LCB region (territories) since March 2020 have further complicated the delivery of social and humanitarian services to the vulnerable population in LCB territories. Emerging data point to at least four impacts of COVID-19 on access to social and humanitarian services in LCB region.

First, COVID-19 and containment measures compound the humanitarian crisis in the region by increasing the vulnerability of refugees, internally displaced persons, and local communities. The COVID-19 pandemic and rising insecurity have triggered prolonged displacement and increased the number of persons needing humanitarian services in the LCB region. For instance, an additional 50,000 persons have been displaced since the start of the year, increasing the resource requirements for humanitarian services. In June 2020, the UN released a revised 2020 HRP for Nigeria in light of the COVID-19 crisis, requesting nearly $1.1 billion—an increase of approximately 30 percent compared to the $839 million requested in the March 2020 appeal—to provide emergency assistance to 7.8 million crisis-affected people in Adamawa, Borno, and Yobe.

Furthermore, COVID-19 also restricts access to camps, and the movement and delivery of services (especially healthcare and food). It also heightens the risk of infection due to overcrowded and insecure refugee and IDP camps, and the closure of border posts (stranded travelers and returnees). Some of the over-crowded camps include those in Banki in Bama Local Government Area (LGA) and Ngala in Gamboru-Ngala LGA on the Nigerian-Cameroon border, although UNCHR is working to decongest them. The containment measures have left more than 10,000 migrants stranded at border posts or transit centres across the LCB region, and the lack of social distancing and basic hygiene facilities in these centres raises fears of COVID-19 transmissions. It is also estimated that recent military operations and COVID-19 containment displaced over 20,000 people living on the Lake Chad islands with limited access to food and basic services, and vulnerable to safety and health risks.

Second, COVID-19 has disrupted the healthcare system in LCB countries and territories through the repurposing of available human, financial, and material resources for COVID-19 at the expense of other healthcare needs, especially for women and children. The COVID-19 containment measures such as border closures have delayed the supply of sanitary materials and other basic healthcare needs, especially for landlocked LCB countries (Niger and Chad). In Chad, the COVID-19 outbreak has led to a drop in measles vaccinations, leading to a rise in measles cases. In Cameroon and Chad, COVID-19 has exposed the weaknesses and challenges of the health sector, including the lack of personal protective equipment (PPE), lack of tests, and poor screening and testing procedures (especially at entry points), ventilators, limited hospitalization capacity, and disruption of medical supply chains because of border closures. To this extent, COVID-19 has exposed and further weakened the delivery of healthcare in LCB countries and territories.

The COVID-19 pandemic has also laid bare the lack of medical personnel, support equipment, respirators, testing kits, and PPE, and the inadequate funding to match immediate needs. In Niger, 143 health workers (19% of total confirmed cases) were affected as at early May 2020, with a negative impact on treatment capacities. In Chad, 30 of the 117 confirmed COVID-19 cases at the end of April were medical personnel. In Nigeria, around 6% (113) of confirmed COVID-19 cases were medical personnel at the start of May. In fact, on 18 April, Borno witnessed the death of a healthcare worker deployed by Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) who had no history of travel outside of Borno and worked in a displacement camp in Pulka, on the border with Cameroon. This heightened fear among aid workers and raised strong suspicions of community transmission in IDP and refugee camps.

Third, COVID-19 has constrained the access to and delivery of education and vocational skills in LCB countries and territories. This compounds the pre-COVID-19 situation in which over 1,000 schools were already closed with teachers being abducted or killed due to insecurity. In May 2020, the UNCHR noted that the closure of schools was impacting 140 million children across West and Central Africa. The United Nations Support Group (UNSG) also noted the difficulties of online access to education in Sub-Saharan Africa because close to 90% lack access to household computers, 82% lack online connections, over 8.5 million teachers are unable to learn or teach from
home, and around 56 million live in areas that are not served by mobile networks. In border areas of Cameroon and Chad, especially those hosting refugee camps, UNCHR and UNICEF are working to support government education ministries to establish distance learning through radio, telephone, television and online means, and distribution of school work packages to the most vulnerable pupils. However, “only 20% of refugee-hosting areas can access a radio signal and alternative methods are in place to ensure the continuity of education.” Finally, COVID-19 has disrupted food distribution, and overall aid sector logistics and supply chains. The restrictions introduced due to the upsurge in security activities by the military and enforced lockdowns by COVID-19 combine to significantly impact aid and humanitarian operations in LCB territories, especially in Northeastern Nigeria and Hadjer Lamis and LAC in Chad.

In Nigeria for instance, aid agencies report that the movement and distribution of food are now prolonged due to the need for military clearances (permits) and escorts, and to the institution of new crowd management protocols. It is feared that this threatens the delivery of services to roughly 800,000 internally displaced people scattered in 229 congested camps throughout Borno State. The continuous spread of COVID-19 and its subsequent containment measures in LCB countries and territories will continue to impact livelihoods and economic activities. Given the large size of the informal economy across the LCB, the closure of land and sea borders, curfews, and the imposition of quarantine in key economic cities, the overall economic slowdown will impact the access of populations and local communities in LCB territories in the following ways.

The impact of COVID on the global economy caused regional economic slowdown and imposed a climate of economic hardship with implications for the critical sectors of the economy in LCB territories. Disrupted international trade, the collapse of oil and commodity prices, and reduced government revenues have major negative impacts on livelihoods and national economic growth (recession). The UN Economic Commission for Africa estimates the effects of COVID-19 to include the reduced inflow of foreign direct investments and remittances, increased capital flight, tightening of domestic financial markets, currency exchange rate depreciation, and a decline in economic growth with a 1.4%-point reduction in economic growth (from 3.2% to 1.8% based on March 2020 estimates). This could deprive 19 million people of their livelihoods and, in the context of weak social protection programmes in Africa, push up to 29 million more people into poverty. For example, Nigeria is projected to lose $14-19 billion in oil revenues and an increase in fiscal deficit to -2.6% of GDP and debts rising to 55.8% of GDP.

One clear impact of this is the reduced financial resources available to governors of LCB territories as central government allocations dwindle and the capacity to raise internally generated revenue is curtailed. This will impact their capacity to meet social service obligations, as well as reduce their scope to implement stabilization and recovery plans envisaged under the RSS. Second, the mixture of closing and/or reducing working hours for banks and offices impacts vulnerable people by limiting their access to savings, and the absence of support services for small- and medium-scale firms. Worse still, vulnerable households have limited access to online banking services thereby limiting their access to savings and other assets. This could also trigger the loss of jobs in the banking and financial service industry among locals. Cross-border movement of persons, goods, and services, which is a historical feature of the LCB, specifically as an adaptive capacity to the effects of climate change.

The closure of key border posts, especially the strategic Gamboru-Ngala crossing that connects and facilitates socio-economic exchanges between Cameroon, Chad, and Nigeria, affects the livelihoods and seasonal movement of labor and livestock. The closure of official border posts usually triggers attempts by small-scale traders to explore unofficial crossing points thereby facing exposures to illegal payment of taxes (bribes) and the risk of robberies. Expectedly, the landlocked nature of Chad and Niger and the reliance on Cameroon and Nigeria for port access means additional economic hardships and vulnerability (including food insecurity) for populations in LCB territories. Similarly, military operations and COVID related border restrictions between Nigeria and Chad around Lake Chad disrupt the all-important trade in fisheries as suppliers of the fresh and smoked fish product are unable to move their goods to markets in Maiduguri and other cities in Northern Nigeria (Kano, Kaduna, and Abuja).
It is feared that the resumption of border crossings will pose sanitary risks without pre-emptive measures such as adequate screening and testing, or isolation facilities. Fourth, COVID-19 containment strategies have disrupted informal economic activities, especially those involving the most vulnerable categories (women and girls) such as petty trading, food and drinks vendors, load carriers, hawking, and beggars in markets, border crossings, and other public centres. The extant data which points to “almost 90% of women employed in Africa work in the informal sector, with no social protections, [and] female-headed households are, particularly at risk.” Moreover, the nature of informal economic settings, such as markets, and local transportation on crowded tricycles and minibuses, is hardly adaptable to containment measures such as social distancing.

The onset of COVID-19 has also upped public discontent manifesting in demonstrations and protests over the socio-economic effects of containment measures, and broader governance issues in LCB countries. Giving pre-existing political tensions, activities of violent extremists, youth unemployment, and general dissatisfaction with the lack of democratic dividends in LCB countries, increases in COVID-19 cases over the short and medium-term could trigger new protests, including the possibility of ‘Arab Spring’-like upheavals. If confirmed COVID-19 cases and deaths increase very rapidly in the short- and medium-term, and more stringent lockdowns are implemented, public tensions and discontent will most likely rise. But if the increases in confirmed cases and deaths over the short- to medium term are low or moderate, COVID-19 may not trigger a major political upheaval in LCB countries and territories.

There is a risk of COVID-19 setting off wider instability in LCB countries and territories. Similar to how events such as police brutality triggered uprisings in Tunisia, dissatisfaction with COVID-19 measures could set off a chain of events that transcend reactions to COVID-19 measures and lead to wider unrest and instability. This could potentially reverse gains made in the stabilization agenda and further worsen the security and stability of LCB territories. Already, protests have been recorded over poor conditions at isolation centres in LC countries, though not yet in LCB territories. In Niger, on 17-19 April 2020, 108 persons were arrested in Maradi and Niamey for protesting against the COVID-19 curfew and the ban on religious gatherings. The protests included road blockages, burning of tires, and burning of private and government properties. Nigeria recorded public outcries and discontent over inadequacies in the distribution of foodstuff and perceived lopsided patterns of conditional cash payments for extremely poor people. It also recorded demonstrations against COVID-19 containment measures in early May in urban centres in Abuja, Kaduna, Gombe, and Niger states. In Gombe and Niger states, residents of isolation centres protested poor facilities, threatening to discharge themselves. Cameroon recorded a brawl in Yaoundé over the distribution of rice and other palliatives donated by charitable individuals. Increases in COVID-19 in LCB countries and territories carries the risk of mass protests over the adverse socio-economic effects of COVID-19 response strategies, with the risk of expanding to protests over wider socio-economic, governance and security deficits. Overall, COVID-19 in the context of active military operations in the LCB region is reducing humanitarian access, disrupting aid logistics and supply chains, increasing the vulnerability of at-risk population and communities, limiting human rights, and curtailing the cross-border movement of agricultural goods and services. This has major implications for stabilization. At best, it may create a lag between security and civilian initiatives envisaged under the RSS as government agencies and services are either slow or unable to deploy to areas liberated from violent extremist groups. In the worst case, it may reduce government resources and capacities for socio-economic services and recovery over the short- to medium-term.

Some in-country contexts are provided below from the UNDP's report on COVID-19 and Stabilization:

**Governance Implications for the Lake Chad Basin Region.**

**Nigeria**

In Nigeria, the COVID-19 pandemic is placing a significant strain on healthcare facilities that are already overwhelmed by lack of capacity. More than 40 percent of the health facilities in the affected states of Borno, Adamawa, and Yobe have been damaged or destroyed as a result of the protracted conflict. The capacity of the health system to address the impact of the pandemic is thus limited. COVID-19 exacerbates the situation, with heightened risks for the most vulnerable population groups, such as women, elderly and people with chronic medical conditions or children at risk of malnutrition. 887,740 IDPs are living in camps or camp-like settings in the BAY states. Four out of five IDPs are living in overcrowded conditions with makeshift and temporary shelters built in close proximity to each other. In some camps, per capita space is less than 1 square meter. Overcrowding exacerbates the risk of disease outbreaks and makes it nearly impossible to enforce physical distancing. An additional 1,259 hectares of land are required to provide more space for highly congested camps. Moreover, the COVID-19 pandemic is disrupting people’s livelihoods and deepening hunger across Nigeria’s northeast, with lockdowns and movement restrictions limiting livelihood opportunities, hindering access to farmlands and reducing the amount of food available in markets across conflict-affected Borno, Adamawa and Yobe states. Without sustained humanitarian assistance, more than 5.1 million people will struggle to meet their basic food needs in the coming June to August lean season in 2021.

**Cameroon**

In Cameroon, insecurity, population displacements, limited access to basic services (water and sanitation, health and education, etc.), gender related socio-cultural

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barriers, and poverty are the main drivers of the unfolding humanitarian crisis that has been affecting IDPs, refugees, and host communities in the Far North. In conflict-affected communities, humanitarian needs range from the immediate assistance that is required for the physical and mental well-being of the affected populations (protection) to the assistance that is needed to build the resilience and recovery of the affected communities. Against the backdrop of the COVID-19 pandemic, inter-agency coordination is paramount particularly as long as instability in the region continues to exacerbate the already limited access to basic social services, notably with regard to health and education systems. The lack of health facilities facilitates the spread of diseases such as cholera, polio, and measles which are recurrent and particularly affect the most vulnerable, children, and the elderly. 819,128 people are projected to be food insecure in the period from June to August 2021.

The 2019 SMART survey for the Far North found that 5.2 percent of under five children suffered from global acute malnutrition (GAM) while 1.4 percent were severely acutely malnourished, which represents the highest SAM prevalence reported in surveyed provinces. In order to respond to urgent needs, including those of returnees, the response capacity of humanitarian actors must be strengthened in the Far North that accounts for 25 percent (1,000,000) of the people targeted for aid and which requests 126 million (23 percent of the total appeal). In Chad, as the number of IDPs (internal and cross border population displacements) in the Lac province increases, so do their humanitarian needs, which are highly underfunded. According to the latest assessments, scaling up readiness/preparedness capacities and maintaining emergency response capacity are essential. Emergency food assistance and livelihood support, water and sanitation, shelter and NFI, as well as health and nutrition services remain the priorities. The increase in violence also leads to increased protection needs of the most vulnerable people. Longer-term needs are likely to increase sharply as many programs and projects deemed non-critical have been suspended due to the pandemic. Finally, all the schools have been closed for several weeks, depriving children of access to education.

**Niger**

In Niger, the regular occurrence of armed attacks, the State of Emergency measures as well as the COVID-19 measures keep on reducing resilience capacities of long-term displaced people and vulnerable host populations and increasing the vulnerability level of newly forced displaced population. Because of the lack of livelihood opportunities, humanitarian assistance is vital especially in food assistance, shelters and NFIs provision, access to health and nutrition services, education, protection mechanism, and WaSH services. Rapid response capacity requires high standard of coordination and logistics resources, while protracted humanitarian assistance is needed as well.

**Chad**

In Chad, as the number of IDPs (internal and cross border population displacements) in the Lac province increasing, as are their humanitarian needs, which are highly underfunded. According to the latest assessments, scaling up readiness/preparedness capacities and maintaining emergency response capacity are essential. Emergency food assistance and livelihood support, water and sanitation, shelter and NFI, as well as health and nutrition services remain the priorities. The increase in violence also leads to increased protection needs of the most vulnerable people. Longer-term needs are likely to increase sharply as many programs and projects deemed non-critical have been suspended due to the pandemic. Finally, all the schools have been closed for several weeks, depriving children of access to education.

**Key Stakeholders**

The Governments of the 4 countries, local governments and UNHCR are the main stakeholders on the ground.

There is work by IOM, World Bank other UN organizations (UNDP, UNICEF, UNCT, UNOCA etc.). The context on ground is extremely challenging and rapidly evolving. Mostly, UNHCR coordinates on refugee issues with partners across different coordination platforms, including the UN Country Team. UNHCR is also strengthening its emergency response capacity by reinforcing its leadership role in the protection, shelter and camp coordination and camp management clusters, and supporting local and national authorities to prepare for, prevent and mitigate displacement risks. Some actors engage with the governments to advocate for tangible actions on the commitments made at the Global Refugee Forum 2019.

UNHCR works with stakeholders to support the national and local authorities in their effort towards the socioeconomic inclusion of refugees and other displaced populations while broadening and strengthening its partnership with key humanitarian and development actors. Bringing multi-lateral banks to the table appears in planning documents of UNHCR, particularly the World Bank.

Private sector engagement is not adequate and remains a priority to expand opportunities for refugees and other people of concerns and mitigate the socio-economic impact of the COVID-19 pandemic.

Currently targeted approaches are being used to ensure that most vulnerable refugee households continue receiving assistance to meet their basic needs and efforts towards enhanced community-based protection to reach the most vulnerable with water, sanitation and hygiene services, livelihood opportunities, cash assistance, health care, gender-based violence prevention and response services, and child protection to ensure that basic needs are met can be sustained.
Policy Responses

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<th>CAMEROON</th>
<th>NIGER</th>
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<tr>
<td>Deferrals of utility payments for three months for vulnerable households and accelerated VAT reimbursements.</td>
<td>Temporary tax relief</td>
<td>A national health contingency plan introduced</td>
<td>of social register by 1 million households and the distribution of cash and grains to vulnerable households</td>
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<td>Expanded preparedness and response plan for health spending estimated at CAF 58.3 billion ($100 million).</td>
<td>Two-months free utilities for vulnerable households, and support for agricultural production.</td>
<td>Slash business license rates and presumptive tax by 50% for small firms</td>
<td>Continuation of the school feeding programme and reduction of fuel prices.</td>
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<td>BEAC measures such as reducing policy rate by 25 bps to 3.25 percent, reduction of Marginal Lending Facility rate by 100 bps to 5 percent, increased liquidity.</td>
<td>The building of liquidity buffers, temporary suspension of convergence criteria, including 3% of GDP fiscal deficit, under the regional monetary union (WAEMU), and the regional central bank</td>
<td>Deferral of tax payment, payment of domestic debts to suppliers worth CAF 110 billion</td>
<td>Release of contingency funds ($2.7m) to the disease control agency and $18m to contain the outbreak.</td>
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<td>Provision from CAF 240 to 500 billion, and postponement by one-year principal repayment of consolidated central bank’s credits to member states.</td>
<td>(BCEAO) introduction of fixed rate of 2.5 percent (the minimum policy rate) thereby allowing banks to satisfy their liquidity needs fully at a rate about 25 basis points lower than before the crisis</td>
<td>Temporary suspension of payments of utility bills</td>
<td>Establishment of a Youth Entrepreneurship Fund</td>
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Key Gaps and Policy Recommendations:

The challenges of instability and conflict in the region are deep and prolonged. COVID-19 has further aggravated the situation. There is a need to address both the short-term issues of the displaced through immediate humanitarian approaches. However, the longer-term prospects of development are no less urgent. The crisis poses a substantial threat to development progress, including achieving the Sustainable Development Goals, in areas from which displacement occurs as well as in the hosting countries. An adequate response requires strong partnerships between humanitarian and development actors to address preparation, response, recovery, and prevention under a shared framework that goes beyond financing support.

Advocacy, coordination, capacity-building and partnership between national and international agencies is ongoing at ground level but can be strengthened.

UNHCR will aim to reduce the risks of gender-based violence and improve the quality of the response through enhanced community-based prevention and response and survivor-centered protection. However, this is inextricably linked to stability and multi-stakeholder partnerships.

Restarting resettlement activities suspended due to COVID-19 measures is an urgent need - fast-tracking departure procedures for refugees under consideration; and advocating increased quotas of refugees benefiting from third-country resettlement programmes are options to catalyze the process.

Seeking additional opportunities for education and health integration as well as livelihoods, with a focus on securing access to land and socioeconomic opportunities is necessary and this requires all stakeholders to join head, hands and resources.

Addressing governance issues remains critical for all interventions to be impactful. Ensuring inclusive and diverse teams in all stakeholders would also be a milestone towards productive discussions and actions.

Work on peace building especially promoting a civilian approach to COVID-19 responses and de-militarise the delivery of services to vulnerable groups and promoting the integration of human rights protocols in COVID-19 containment strategies in LCB territories is required.

Ensuring a greater role for the private sector in the region is critical as is facilitation of the establishment of a cross-border trade corridor adapted to COVID-19 prevention measures to boost food security, livelihoods, and increase the capacity to withstand COVID-19 shocks in vulnerable communities and populations in LCB territories.

**Colombia’s migration policy towards Venezuelan Refugees**

In the last five years, the exodus of people from Venezuela has become the second largest displacement in the world. More than 5.4 million have fled, with 1.7 million, or 30 percent, ending up in nearby Colombia. The Government of
Colombia has been incredibly generous towards this population, enacting several rounds of work permits which granted the right to work, move, and formalize their status. They should be celebrated for these moves, while supported to overcome the remaining constraints to full economic inclusion. “Foreigners in Colombia shall enjoy the same civil rights as Colombians”. More than half of the Venezuelan population in Colombia lack regular status, affecting their ability to access essential services, protection and assistance. However, Venezuelans faced issues of informality, xenophobia, stigmatization, loss of jobs and income, education for children and youth and insufficient access to health and social protection when COVID-19 broke out.

Article 100 of Colombia’s Constitution states, “Foreigners in Colombia shall enjoy the same civil rights as Colombians.” There are many refugee-hosting countries whose constitutions include similar language, yet few that have followed through on such a promise. Within just a few years, 1.7 million Venezuelans have entered Colombia, fleeing violence and economic deprivation at home. The Government said they made an immediate decision to facilitate their full economic inclusion for three main reasons:

4. Solidarity. Venezuela and Colombia have long shared cultural and economic ties. As a stark example, for the last 50 years, armed fighting in Colombia has created waves of refugees, many of which have ended up in Venezuela. Colombia felt compelled to return the favor.

5. Vulnerability. Many Venezuelans arrived in Colombia with few resources. Facilitating their access to work, education, and health, would reduce vulnerability among this population and prevent them turning to crime, child labor, or other measures, to fend for themselves. It is also a way to address the growing humanitarian crisis across the border (e.g., through remittances).

6. Practicality. On average, those displaced are younger and more educated than the Colombian population. These waves are also unlikely to stop any time soon, even if president Maduro resigns, and closing the border is impossible. Integrating Venezuelans is therefore the more practical and most beneficial thing to do—an opportunity for Colombia to promote economic, social, and cultural growth.

The evolution of PEPs 2017-2020

To implement this approach, the president’s office created a new position:

Manager of the Colombian-Venezuelan border, with an associated office. The National Planning Department (DNP, in Spanish), with the support of this office, issued the CONPES 3950, a policy document detailing the strategy for integrating Venezuelans over the next three years. The document strongly argues that migration is not just an opportunity for the migrants, but also for receiving countries. The Challenges in Regularizing 1.7 million People Still, economically integrating such a large population has come with its challenges. In 2017, the Government of Colombia created the Permiso Especial de Permanencia (PEP), a temporary and ad hoc special permit. It granted Venezuelans two years of regular status, work authorization, and access to public services, and could be renewed once. So far, just over 700,000 PEP’s have been granted, and researchers have found little evidence that the provisions have changed labor market outcomes for Venezuelans or Colombians.

In 2019, the Border Manager’s Office created an Income Generation Strategy which identified the barriers Venezuelans face to full economic inclusion. Together with the Labor Migration Policy Management Group of the Ministry of Labor, they have begun by working on inclusion, and credentialing. For example, the government
has provided more than 5,000 professional recognition certificates through the National Learning Service. They also created a new permit in January 2020. The Permiso Especial de Permanencia para el Fomento a la Formalización (PEP-FF) allows Venezuelans in an irregular situation with a formal job offer to regularize their status. According to Migración Colombia, by December, more than 9,000 PEP-FF’s had been granted.

Nevertheless, concerns with both of these measures remain. The Income Generation Strategy has not been fully implemented and barriers remain, many of which have been exacerbated by COVID-19. And while the PEP-FF is an innovative measure, it poses several protection risks. Tying regular status to an employment contract exposes workers to potential exploitation and abuse. The permit cannot be extended to family members, and therefore does little to reduce their vulnerability. Finally, the holder can fall back into irregularity when the permit ends.

Combatting these remaining barriers is going to take a coalition of the national and local governments, private sector actors, donors, and local NGOs. For example, planned and voluntary movement would ensure Venezuelans can access existing job opportunities, and targeted matching and training programs would ensure Venezuelans can access new ones.

The private sector needs to be more involved than it has been to date, promoting the benefits of hiring Venezuelans and expanding financial service. Finally, women should be explicitly targeted with policies to support childcare and family responsibilities. It is not often you see a country state clearly, pragmatically, and early the reasons why the economic integration of a new population should be prioritized, and then for that country to take pragmatic steps to execute this vision. Barriers remain, and COVID-19 has exacerbated them, but as long as such leadership remains in place, these challenges appear surmountable.

It is a life-changing gesture for the 1.7 million displaced Venezuelans who will now benefit from added protection, security and stability while they are away from home. With the COVID-19 pandemic compounding needs throughout the region, many Venezuelan refugees and migrants, as well as local communities, struggle to survive as they face worsening poverty, job losses, evictions, hunger, and a lack of food and access to medical treatment. The Temporary Protection Status will also provide access to basic services including the national health system and COVID-19 vaccination plans. Regularization is also key to long-term solutions, including access to the job market, which in turn serves to lessen the dependency of people on humanitarian assistance while also contributing to the country’s post COVID-19 socio-economic recovery.

The regularization of Venezuelan refugees and migrants in Colombia through the provision of a generous temporary protection status is a key to facilitating their socio-economic integration and access to the national health system and COVID-19 vaccination campaigns. The implementation of such a large-scale initiative will require a significant investment in time, logistics and resources. IOM and UNHCR, as co-leaders of the Regional Inter-agency Coordination Platform for Refugees and Migrants from Venezuela (R4V), and in coordination with their 159 partners, stand ready to contribute with their technical expertise, field presence, logistical capacity and resources to support the roll-out of this important initiative. Reiterating the need for solidarity and support to Colombia and other refugee and migrant-hosting communities.

Amidst a groundbreaking initiative, under President Ivan Duque’s new government decree, probably due to backlash to his previous initiatives, those who arrived before 31 January will now be allowed to stay in the country for a decade and apply for resident status, which will allow them to legally work. All Venezuelans who enter regularly through a border crossing with the official stamp over the next two years will also be eligible under the scheme. •Those who now arrive “irregularly” – not through an official migration point – will have to return to Venezuela and re-enter to be able to apply for the 10-year temporary protection. It is believed the move – widely seen as a response to the backlash Duque received for saying he would cut Venezuelans out of the country’s COVID-19 vaccine rollout – will also afford Venezuelans migrants general healthcare, including improved access to vaccinations. The decree is still in draft for comments for civil society, so there is no clarity on the rights associated with the status. It’s also unclear how the scheme will work for the many Venezuelans who don’t have ID cards or passports and may find it hard to enter regularly.

It is believed the move would reduce the exploitation of Venezuelan workers. The reason why Venezuelans were being exploited by unscrupulous employers was because they had ‘irregular status, so when you have no rights and nobody’s looking out for you and there’s no protection, then anybody can prey on them. These people now have protection, they have some guarantees, have some rights, and they will be on an equal footing to any Colombian for employment, which means unscrupulous employers cannot hire Venezuelans for a quarter or a third of the price of a Colombian. But while it is hoped the new measures will help to integrate Venezuelans over the longer term, aid officials fear it could make things difficult right now with working-class Colombians, especially as jobs – due to the pandemic – are in such short supply. The decision may also further increase tensions between Venezuelans and Colombians, which have been on the rise.
Asian Development Bank

While ADB did not specifically program for refugees, it assisted member countries in dealing with COVID as part of their national response. For example: ADB contributed to the Humanitarian Response Plan of Afghanistan and ADB supported Pakistan’s Ehsaas program for social protection packages to poor and vulnerable families across the country.

ADB’s policies and recommendation for mainstreaming gender and promoting the role of civil society include promoting digital technology and ensuring vulnerable and marginalized groups across sectors helps advance the inclusion agenda.
Executive Summary

ADB’s policies and recommendation for mainstreaming gender and promoting the role of civil society include promoting digital technology and ensuring vulnerable and marginalized groups across sectors helps advance the inclusion agenda.

African Development Bank

AfDB’s COVID response and Refugees

The COVID response program funded by AfDB recognized that:

a. COVID-19 exacerbates inequalities and affects mostly the poorest and most vulnerable communities, often with devastating and life-threatening consequences. Persons and communities of particular concern include those affected by fragility, forcibly displaced (refugees and Internally Displaced Persons) and their hosting communities, stranded migrants and hosting communities, population groups exposed to particular risks (women, youth, the elderly, people with disabilities and/or other pre-existing health conditions, other marginalized groups etc.), among others.

b. African public health systems regularly face the challenge of stemming the spread of infectious diseases locally. The capacity of public health systems to screen for COVID-19, particularly in densely populated areas, including urban/semi-urban centers and areas of displaced populations (refugees, IDPs and hosting communities), is essential for the identification, quarantine and treatment of infected persons and, finally, for reducing impact on society.

c. In Central and Eastern Africa, instability within countries has also spread to neighboring regions. The number of refugees and internally displaced persons per capita in the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Somalia, Sudan and South Sudan is among the highest on the continent. The resulting pressures on resources, access to land and local economies, exacerbated by the context of the current COVID-19 crisis, can quickly become a source of conflict.

In Central Africa, Cameroon is currently the most affected by the COVID-19 pandemic, adding to the suffering from attacks by the Boko Haram group in the Far North in recent years and a separatist movement in the so-called English-speaking North West and South West (NWSW) regions. Therefore, a rapid increase in the spread of COVID-19 could increase poverty and the risk of instability in Cameroon. This has the potential to indirectly affect six neighboring countries including Central African Republic (CAR), Gabon, Equatorial Guinea, Nigeria and Chad. The latest crisis in the CAR has shaken the country’s health system, characterized by a lack of connection between first and second level health facilities (FSLHF), and suffering from a lack of human resources in terms of quantity and quality in health facilities and regulatory services in the sector. In the Horn of Africa, the effects of cross-border conflict and insecurity have also been a major source of regional vulnerability. In Djibouti, high levels of pressure from Somalia, as well as transnational crime related to piracy and illicit trade have been observed. A rapid proliferation of COVID-19 in this context could have disastrous consequences on the already alarming humanitarian situation in the region. COVID-19 could further increase the vulnerability of the populations in this region.

The AfDB, in its strategy to address Fragility and Building Resilience in Africa, notes that:

- the importance of applying a fragility lens to be more sensitive to the dynamics of political economy and conflict;
- strengthening strategic partnerships that go beyond aid coordination to address more effectively the challenges of building resilience;
- adopting a regional approach to address regional dimensions of fragility;
- reaching out to non-state actors to build resilient societies and deliver services;
- integrating a gender perspective to encourage the participation of women in peace- and state-building process; and
- adopting a longer-term perspective to building resilience by planning for scale.

The Bank’s approach to addressing fragility and building resilience is built on two objectives: inclusive growth and transition to green growth. The bank applies a fragility lens to these objectives to promote inclusion and mainstream gender and food security. As evident, the bank recognizes the intricate and direct linkage between economic development and building resilience.

European Investment Bank

Vulnerable Workers

Annex 2 of EIB’s Guidance note to EIB promoters on environmental and social performance in EIB-financed operations in response to the COVID-19 outbreak crisis focused on labor. EIB recognized that the COVID-19 crisis is having an unprecedented impact on workers and employment. The main consequences included job insecurity, health risks for workers and a lack of social protection. The note provided recommendations to focus on how to deal with vulnerable workers.
### Possible Vulnerable Workers

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<tr>
<th>Factors</th>
<th>Suggested Mitigation Measures</th>
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<tr>
<td>• Job insecurity</td>
<td>• Consider transferring employees to other parts of the business</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Lack of social protection (including paid or sick leave mechanisms)</td>
<td>• Offering minimal in-kind benefits (e.g. vouchers, accommodation)</td>
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<td>• Difficulties in applying for alternative employment</td>
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<td>• Temporary, seasonal, or informal workers</td>
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<td>• High reliance on employer, including visa and potentially worker accommodation</td>
<td>• Allow the employee to remain in their worker</td>
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<td>• Difficulties in reaching their home countries</td>
<td>• accommodation for a certain period of time</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Lack of social protection</td>
<td>• and/or receive minimal in-kind benefits (e.g. vouchers, accommodation, visa extension)</td>
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<td>• High risk of workers</td>
<td>• Offer payment allowing the worker to reach their home country</td>
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<td>• Violating immigration laws of the host country due to international travel</td>
<td>• Provide all information in an accessible and culturally appropriate manner.</td>
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<td>• Restrictions</td>
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<td>• Language barriers in accessing health and other essential information</td>
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### Migrant Workers

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<th>Factors</th>
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<tr>
<td>• Risk of developing serious health issues due to COVID-19</td>
<td>• Explore flexible working arrangements and enhance social distancing measures wherever possible</td>
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### Workers with underlying health issues, older workers, and workers with disabilities

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<tr>
<th>Factors</th>
<th>Suggested Mitigation Measures</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Limited access to social protection</td>
<td>• Assess and consider any potential differentiated impact of collective dismissals and mass retrenchments on women and men in the workforce and minimize any potential gender biases</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Disproportionate exposure to health risks due to occupational segregation and their overrepresentation in the care and health sectors</td>
<td>• Help to direct employees to needed services, including domestic violence hotlines.</td>
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<td>• Increased child or elders care responsibilities</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Pregnant women considered more at risk</td>
<td>• Request that pregnant women take all preventive measures (including flexible working arrangements) to avoid infection</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Increased risk of sexual harassment, exploitation, and abuse, including domestic and intimate partner violence due to forced-coexistence</td>
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### Women (gender considerations)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factors</th>
<th>Suggested Mitigation Measures</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Migrant status; migrant workers are amongst the populations most directly affected by COVID-19, due to the closure of economic sectors that typically employ them (for example, the garment sector), the concentration of migrants in sectors where health and safety guidelines are difficult to enforce (for example, agriculture), poor access to health information for some categories of migrants, limited access to health services including health insurance, risks of getting stranded due to border closures, and finally, reliance on remittances that have drastically decreased. While EIB did not directly intervene in work with refugee and newcomers, the partners it supported and countries and businesses it offered services to supported the inclusion and job protection agenda strongly. The Bank promotes equality of opportunity through a practical approach rooted in its private sector focus, addressing three key dimensions:</td>
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#### European Bank for Reconstruction and Development

**EBRD and Vulnerable Groups**

The EBRD prioritizes groups that experience disproportionate barriers to economic opportunity due to circumstances outside their control – women, youth, people living in remote areas, refugees and refugee hosting communities and people with disabilities. Wherever possible, the Bank will continue to explore extending its approach to other disadvantaged groups such as migrants, LGBTI people and the ageing workforce.

The Bank promotes equality of opportunity through a practical approach rooted in its private sector focus, addressing three key dimensions:

- **Promoting access to employment and skills** for disadvantaged groups through a unique private sector-focused approach.
- **Supporting access to finance and entrepreneurship** by investing directly, and through financial institutions, to provide tailored financial and non-financial services and improve access to finance to women-led SMEs, youth-led SMEs and SMEs operating in less developed regions.
- **Improving access to services** by supporting inclusive and gender sensitive design of infrastructure and safe transport for all, improving connectivity for regional areas and harnessing the advantages of technology.
EBRD Refugee Response Plan:  

EBRD Refugee Response Plan, launched in 2016 in the wake of the Syrian crisis and focused specifically on supporting host communities and refugees alike in Jordan and Turkey. The civil war in Syria has displaced millions of people in the largest refugee crisis since World War II. Many have fled to neighboring countries - including Jordan and Turkey, where the EBRD invests. The EBRD's response to the challenges posed by the sudden surge in population in these two transition economies is to help build the host-countries' economic resilience to cope with the crisis, now and in the months and years ahead.

Humanitarian relief, provided by specialized agencies, needs to be complemented by urgent development support. Here institutions like the EBRD can make a contribution - and an impact. The Bank has prepared a €900 million investment plan consisting of EBRD funds (up to €500 million) and donor contributions (up to €400 million - with €100 million pledged by the Bank through its Shareholder Special Fund). At the same time, the Bank is forging ahead with the first steps to alleviate the refugee crisis. Since 2016, the EBRD has invested €352 million in the refugee response plan.

The EBRD is engaged with investments, technical cooperation and policy dialogue to promote livelihood opportunities and inclusion as well as advancing economic development. Building on its experience, the Bank focuses on areas where it has the track record, know-how and strong networks to improve people’s lives quickly.

Turkey hosts the largest share of refugees from Syria, with numbers estimated around 2.7 million. In Jordan, the 1.4 million Syrian newcomers represent 13 per cent of the current population. In both countries, almost all refugees (90 per cent) live outside of camps and are mostly concentrated in cities close to the border.

The sharp increase in population has had an enormous impact which affects the lives of local communities and the overall economies of the two countries. Public services such as water and sanitation, solid waste management and urban transport, which in many instances were already in need of upgrade, are now extremely stretched and fail to serve the increasing number of people. Vulnerable communities of local and refugee populations struggle for livelihood opportunities - so much needed to cement social cohesion.

To deal with these issues and bolster refugee-hosting communities, the EBRD promotes a strong role for the private sector. It can help provide employment to both host-communities and refugees with work permits. In addition, increased private sector participation in municipal projects can accelerate the upgrade of infrastructure to improve urban life, preserve the environment and ultimately benefit the economy as a whole.

Many of EBRD’s projects have immediate impact. The extension of micro-loans through local financial institutions to disadvantaged segments of the population such as women boosts opportunities for refugees and local population to establish businesses. Rapid financial and institutional support to municipal companies operating in areas densely populated by refugees helps to ensure uninterrupted delivery of services, for example for collection and disposal of solid waste and availability of public transport.

In Jordan EBRD is supporting the City of Amman in modernizing the landfill which serves the capital (home to half of the Jordanian population and 30 per cent of all refugees present in the country) as well as the cities of Zarqa and Rusayfeh, home to a significant number of refugees.

In Turkey, thanks to an EBRD loan and grants from the SSF, the city of Gaziantep, which saw a sharp rise of its population due to refugee inflows, acquired 50 new buses which are increasing the service for commuters. The Bank is now working on extending another loan to continue improving urban transport.

The Bank could not face these challenges without the support of donors. Together with other actors EBRD is playing an urgent role to play to alleviate the economic and social pressures in the concerned regions. We are delivering now and, with the help of our donors, will do more in the months and years to come.

The EBRD’s inclusive response to the refugee crisis targets host communities and refugees alike and aims to help lessen pressure on social cohesion and have an
immediate impact. It delivers investments to alleviate the strain on public services. It aims to increase employment opportunities through finance and advice to small businesses. It also offers inclusion programmes to facilitate economic participation through skill mapping and training, especially for young people and women.

The bank’s plan of activities, which relies on essential donor support, covers three urgent priorities in Jordan and Turkey.

- Infrastructure development
- Small and medium-sized enterprises growth
- Economic inclusion and gender

**Economic Inclusion of Refugees**

Economic inclusion is one of the core three pillars of the EBRD’s refugee crisis response programme: infrastructure development, small and medium-sized enterprise growth, and economic inclusion and gender.

In support of refugee-hosting countries the EBRD is building on its private sector-led economic inclusion to enhance access to work-based learning opportunities and skills verification mechanisms in the most affected regions, especially as part of global effort - such as the Jordan Compact.

To foster entrepreneurship opportunities, the EBRD is furthermore supporting financial institutions as they expand services they offer to local businesses, including those owned or managed by refugees or employing refugees. A Gender Focal Point has been appointed to ensure that gender considerations are reflected across all parts of the EBRD’s refugee response programme.

In parallel, the EBRD undertakes research about its refugee inclusion activities, in Jordan and in Turkey, to enhance knowledge of the impact of the influx of refugees on host communities, identify measures to address hard and soft barriers to integrate refugees in the labor market, and to monitor and evaluate the impact to learn and apply lessons in on-going programmes.

In all these endeavors, the EBRD works in close partnership with International Labor Organization, European Training Foundation, UNHCR and relevant international and local agencies.

**Inter-American Development Bank**

**Migration Initiative**

The IDB recognized this migratory reality, which is varied and growing, and a year and a half ago created the Migration Initiative. This Initiative was endowed with US $ 100 million of Bank capital, with the commitment to obtain additional donation resources to help countries 18/4/2021

The IDB and migration: a bridge between the short term and development recipients, whose number of immigrants would have increased by 0.5% over their total population in the last 3 years: 10 countries are in that category.

With these resources, the Bank has approved new or ongoing investment operations to include migrants and host communities as beneficiaries of operations in four countries and in five sectors. Likewise, it is working with all the other countries to specify operations. For example, in Belize the Bank is supporting migrant Central American schoolchildren to integrate them into education; or in Colombia, supporting the government to include migrants in the health system through affiliation; or in Ecuador we are identifying with the authorities the communities with the highest proportion of migrants and refugees using the latest geo-reference technologies to adequately deploy social protection services for the most vulnerable, the access to health service or education.

Going even further, the Bank made the decision to create the Migration Unit as part of its Social Sector, and then approved a new Migration Action Framework that broadens the scope of intervention in countries of origin, transit and return. Additional themes are also included such as the relationship of migration with climate change, citizen security or gender, among others.

A mandate that the institution must fulfill with intersectoral work with all areas of the Bank. In addition, and as part of the strategy, is has to strengthen knowledge with evidence on the causes, effects and appropriate public policies to take advantage of the migration. This is how the Bank presented 16 studies, in 10 countries, with examples in this regard. There is also progress in analyzing public opinion on migration with artificial intelligence mechanisms, which deteriorates in a worrying way, due to stigmatization in several of the countries, especially since the start of the pandemic.

This work with governments also requires reinforcing the training exercise for their public sector officials on immigration issues. In 2020, we were able to certify nearly 500 officials public in 20 countries of the region with specialized courses in these subjects. All of this must continue on a larger scale and recipient countries and the Bank need to achieve alliances. Therefore, resources and experience are vital. The support of the United States, Canada, Korea, Finland, Japan, Switzerland, the European Union, Spain and Germany have been fundamental and will continue in that task.

As the virus spreads and borders in the region and around the world shut down indefinitely, migrants and refugees find themselves more vulnerable than ever. For this reason, the IDB stressed the need to include migrants in national COVID-19 response plans aimed at reducing risk for everyone. The Bank wants to help Latin America emerge from the crisis less unequal than what it was. It wants to keep it from getting worse, and above all do not want things to worsen for migrants. The Bank highlighted the role of digital services helping the country to address migratory needs without endangering migrants or government
employees attending them. The Creation of a Immigration
Information Registry and allowing professionals with
health sector degrees abroad to exercise their profession
during the emergency. Also access by migrants with
residency papers to healthcare services are guaranteed.

In the area of migration, SCL mobilized a total of
$46.4 million from the IDB’s migration facility and donor
funds for multisector operations in 2020. For example,
in La Guajira, one of the border areas between Colombia
and Venezuela that has been hardest hit by poverty and
migratory flows, the Bank financed programs to expand
access to safe drinking water and sanitation services.

The Migration Capacity Building Program strengthens the
institutional and technical capacity of public officials, and
specialists from public and private institutions through
Virtual Tutorized Courses, Massive and Online Open
Courses (MOOC) and Communities of Practice. The main
goal of the Program is to create and sustain a critical
mass of professionals in Latin America and the Caribbean,
capable of designing, proposing and implementing
innovative and cutting-edge interventions on the issue of
migration.

The contents of the Program arise from the applied
research developed by the IDB and its networks of
researchers, regional policy dialogues, and migration
operations. The contents are developed with the highest
academic rigor and the highest standards of technical and
pedagogical quality. The Program uses the most current
and effective methodologies to ensure participant learning
and skill development. The Migration Unit has also started
to address the new issues related to gender related
migration issues, which is a trend that started in recent
decades and insufficiently understood.

A Global Business Coalition called the Tent Partnership for
Refugees is made up of more than 140 large multinational
companies committed to including refugees. It has
members are based all over the world, and span industries
from consumer goods and technology, to financial and
professional services. With more and more refugees
placed for longer periods of time, companies have a
critical role to play in helping them integrate economically
in their new host communities. We believe that businesses
can most sustainably include refugees by leveraging
their core business operations - by engaging refugees as
potential employees, entrepreneurs and consumers. These
steps are good for refugees, good for the communities
that host them, and good for business. This coalition has
contributed to hire 39,000 refugees, leveraging supply
chains, supports 5,000 refugee entrepreneurship and
tailored goods for 144,000 refugee customers.

The IDB recently published a study called MI6n6ovation:
The opportunity of the private sector and civil society
facing the opportunity of the private sector and civil
society facing the migration challenge in Latin America
and the Caribbean. It states that migration has been a
decisive phenomenon and every day in the history of Latin
America and the Caribbean. But the region today faces
a unprecedented challenge: the largest human mobility
situation generated by a context of political and social
instability and economic, added to the vulnerability natural
disasters and the impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic.

Faced with this reality, countries have the possibility of
turning this migration challenge into a great development
tool inclusive. Achieving it is only possible with a more
active participation of the private sector and civil society,
which allows connecting the opportunity generated by
migration for economic and social growth with innovation
capacity that characterizes them. This approach has been
called MI6n6ovation, which describes the actions that
converge by unifying the challenges of migration with the
human and organizational capacity to innovate.

The social enterprise Migraflix in Brazil has managed to
value the gastronomy of Venezuelans or Syrians
migrants through entrepreneurship, generating income
and rapprochement between communities. Likewise, the
Migrant Financial Society has found a business niche in
financing the deposit for the rental of an apartment or
the validation of academic qualifications of migrants in
Chile. The private sector and civil society now have two
powerful tools: the use of technology and the construction
of alliances. Data management, on the one hand, which
allows to have reliable, updated and immediate sources
to know the profile of migrants and thus offer them better
opportunities. In turn, it helps them access to employment,
information, products or services. Technology also
facilitates alternatives distance training and job offers
in new industries that can be taken advantage of by the
migrants themselves or entrepreneurs.

Operations:
Inclusion of migrants and host communities in social
services in Ecuador. Loan amount US$ 50 million and
non-reimbursable US$ 50 million.

The IDB approved a technical cooperation (TC) for $4
million donated by the Knowledge Partnership Korea Fund
for Technology and Innovation to support management
and planning processes for the integration of migrants in
Colombian cities, with a focus on service delivery, access
to housing, and urban development scenarios for future
growth. The program will be executed by the Empresa
Nacional Promotora del Desarrollo Territorial (Territorial
Development Promotion Company, ENTerritorio).

Another TC for socio-economic and urban integration of
migrants and their host communities in Colombian five
cities financed by EU, Korea and IDB was approved for a
total of US$ 16.4 million.

Islamic Development Bank
The Bank’s Strategic Preparedness and Response Program
(SPPR) aimed at helping our member countries mitigate
the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic and implemented
under the 3Rs track - Respond, Restore, and Restart’.
Support for the Tadamon CSO Pandemic Response Accelerator Program for refugees and IDPs

The Bank developed and approved a Strategic Preparedness and Response Program (SPRP) about how to most effectively provide immediate support to MCs with the understanding that the impacts of COVID-19 will be long-lasting and recovery for many will be a difficult process. In order to expeditiously respond to the urgent needs of the MCs, that are working on different fronts to tackle the crisis, the proposed program is designed to use the Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) including International Non-Governmental Organizations (INGOs) as implementing agencies and partners for the Bank’s interventions at the “Respond” and “Restore” stages.

Furthermore, the total estimated cost of the program is US$ 55 million program is based on innovative partnership approach bringing together national and international CSOs, philanthropies, foundations, Governments and crowd-funding platforms to share all the good practice and lessons learnt so far. This will be carried out through a Pandemic Response Accelerator Platform in the existing Tadamon Platform for the IsDB/ISFD NGO Empowerment for Poverty Reduction Program. The proposed program is derived from the official requests/proposals of the MCs and socio-economic impact needs assessments carried out by the CSOs and development partners. The program will allocate an amount of US$ 1.7 million as seed money to the Accelerator to support various projects with necessary resources. It is expected that the platform will mobilize an additional resource of at least US$ 6 million in the coming 8 months.

The plight of refugee and IDPs is not only at stake in the fragile and conflict-affected member countries. As COVID-19 progresses it will put at risk the lives of many that host IDPs. The proposed program will support Afghanistan, Burkina Faso, Chad, Comoros, Djibouti, Guinea, Iraq, Libya, Mali, Niger, Palestine, Somalia, Sudan, Yemen affected by fragility/conflict; and refugees and IDPs in Jordan, Lebanon and Turkey3 (see Annex 2). These countries were selected based on the level of fragility, conflict, presence of significant number of refugees and IDPs, poverty, limited availability of basic health services and institutional capacity to prevent, mitigate and contain the COVID-19 pandemic. Additionally, most of these countries do not receive OCR financing due to their specific country situations.

SPARK, the Islamic Development Bank (IsDB) and the Islamic Solidarity Fund for Development (ISFD) have been supporting vulnerable youth in multiple ways, including offering a free COVID-19 Survival Guide for Refugee Businesses. Now, building on previous collaborations, we are launching a new COVID-19 support programme called Tadamon, which translates to “solidarity” in Arabic, supports vulnerable people dealing with COVID-19 in the long and short term.

In the short term, Tadamon supports relief efforts focused on healthcare, such as providing protective equipment, training medical staff and psycho-social support. Yet the programme importantly also addresses the inevitable long term challenges that will affect these communities, namely access to higher education and jobs. Over two years, 1,695 students will be offered higher education vocational scholarships, 843 placed in internships and 85 small and medium enterprises (SMEs) will receive important training and financial support.

A newly-opened Management Skills Centre attended business skills training by SPARK, IsDB and ISFD prior to launching his entrepreneurial project for a period of six months took practical training on the ground. There was a lot of follow up by the trainers giving classes. The project helped opening the centre which launched immediately with no problems or mistakes The Tadamon programme will allow other young people to have sustainable, long-term access to better health, education and employment opportunities.

World Bank

Forced Displaced

Forced displacement is a development challenge, not only a humanitarian concern. Around 77% of refugees are displaced for more than five years, and the vast majority of the world’s refugees and internally displaced people live in developing countries (four out of five.) As part of a global effort, the WB6 is focused on addressing longer term, social and economic challenges that will help both the displaced and their hosts.

As COVID-19 spreads across countries, the impact of the pandemic could be much greater in countries impacted by fragility conflict and violence. This pandemic especially threatens forcibly displaced people and refugees, who often live in overcrowded camps or in host communities with already overstretched local health systems.

The first Global Refugee Forum (GRF) took place in December 2019 to bring the international community together, support implementation of the Global Compact on Refugees and develop a concrete work plan towards the next forum in 2023. At the Forum, the World Bank announced $2.2 billion in support for refugees and host communities as part of the IDA19 replenishment.

The International Framework Global Compact of Refugees:

• Agreed framework for a stronger, more predictable and equitable international response to large refugee situations.
• Highlights important role of development actors alongside other stakeholders to help ease the pressure on host countries and enhance refugee self-reliance
• Focus on comprehensive, medium-term responses led by hosting countries; inclusive national policies; addressing socio-economic impacts on refugees and host communities.
• Importance of Global Refugee Forum – international cooperation, policy pledges and contributions, regional support platforms, monitoring progress.

The WBG Framework – FCV Strategy

Objective: Enhance The WBG’s effectiveness to support countries in addressing the drivers and impacts of FCV and strengthening their resilience, especially for the most vulnerable populations.

Guiding Principles:
• Preventing Violent Conflict and Interpersonal Violence
• Remaining Engaged During Conflict and Crisis Situations
• Helping Countries Transition Out Of Fragility
• Mitigating the Spillovers of FCV
• Preventing Violent Conflict and Interpersonal Violence

Focus on the medium-term, socio-economic dimension of the crisis – to help both the forcibly displaced and their host communities

The Window for Host Communities and Refugees (WHR) supports countries that host significant refugee populations to create medium- to long-term development opportunities for both the refugees and their host communities.

This funding recognizes the significant challenge that these countries face in pursuing their own development goals while accommodating refugees, often in areas where local communities themselves lack basic services and resources.

There is a mismatch between IBRD’s and IDA’s country-based financing model and the fact that refugees do not live in their country

Terms:
• GCFF: buying down interest rates for MDB-supported projects
• IDA18: RSW providing additional resources ($2bn), half in grants
• IDA19: WHR providing additional resources ($2.2bn) of which $1bn in 100% grants for COVID-19 response (Jul 2020 – Jun 2021)

Focus:
• For medium- to long-term investments that benefit refugees and host communities in refugee-hosting countries, to:
  o Mitigate shocks and create socioeconomic opportunities to facilitate sustainable solutions
  o Strengthen preparedness

Eligibility
To be eligible for support from the WHR, IDA countries must:
1. Host at least 25,000 refugees or at least 0.1% of the country’s population;
2. Adhere to an adequate framework for the protection of refugees; and
3. Have an action plan or strategy with concrete steps, including possible policy reforms for long-term solutions that benefit refugees and host communities.

IDA countries that were eligible for the Refugee Sub-Window in IDA18 do not need to re-do their eligibility process in IDA19. However, they are required to prepare a short Strategy Note along with the first IDA19 WHR-financed operation that is submitted to the Board.

The WHR is neutral as to sector and instrument—it supports all kinds of operations in eligible countries that create meaningful longer-term development opportunities for refugees and hosts. A key element of creating these development opportunities involves improving the policy and institutional environment for refugees in the host country, so all projects are expected to demonstrate policy content.

The World Bank is working with governments to prepare and implement projects that deliver sustainable solutions to best meet the often dire and complex needs of these vulnerable groups.

Refugee Policy Review Framework (RPRF)

RPRF Objectives
Based on the WBG’s commitment under IDA19, “The RPRF’s overall objective is to identify key areas for WBG policy dialogue on forced displacement and document progress in each given country over time. It will measure the progress since the WHR/RSW was established, help identify further reform opportunities and inform further WHR support.”

Purpose of the RPRF
1. Seeks to inform review required under IDA19
2. Seeks to identify key policy areas relevant to relevant to the socioeconomic development of refugees and host communities

The world transformed by the COVID Pandemic, this is the largest refugee crisis since WWII, which has caused significant disruptions to lives and livelihoods of refugees, host communities and host countries; with an estimated increase of extreme poverty that will surpass 100 million people in 2020; and challenges for Governments and their partners in a lockdown environment.
3. Seeks to provide framework for enhanced coordination on policy dialogue
4. Seeks to inform further WHR support

**Principles**
- No “one-size-fits-all” approach.
- Consistency with international normative framework.
- Selectivity.
- Operational relevance.
- Realism.

**POLICY DIMENSIONS**

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>1. Host Communities</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.1 Support for communities in refugee hosting areas</td>
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<td>1.2 Social cohesion</td>
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<td>1.3 Environmental management</td>
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<td>1.4 Preparedness for refugee inflows</td>
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<th>2. Regulatory Environment and Governance</th>
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<tr>
<td>2.1 Normative framework</td>
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<td>2.2 Security of legal status</td>
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<td>2.3 Institutional framework for refugee management and coordination and management</td>
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<td>2.4 Access to civil registration and documentation</td>
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<td>2.5 Justice and security</td>
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<th>3. Economic Opportunities</th>
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<tr>
<td>3.1 Freedom of movement</td>
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<td>3.2 Right to work and rights at work</td>
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<td>3.3 Land, housing and property rights</td>
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<td>3.4 Financial and administrative services</td>
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<th>4. Access to National Public Services</th>
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<tr>
<td>4.1 Education</td>
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<tr>
<td>4.2 Healthcare</td>
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<td>4.3 Social protection</td>
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<td>4.4 Protection for vulnerable groups</td>
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<th>5. Cross-cutting themes</th>
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<tr>
<td>5.1 Gender</td>
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<tr>
<td>5.2 Social inclusion</td>
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**The Global Cost of Inclusive Refugee Education**
- Average annual cost for all refugee students to complete K-12 years of education through national developing countries: US$ 4.85 billion
- Costs for integrating refugees into national education systems account for less than 5 percent of current education expenditure in developing host countries on average
- The top 15 developing refugee host countries account for US$3.7 billion or over 75 percent of annual financing envelope
- Prioritization of investments in low and lower-middle income countries can result in over half of all school-aged refugee children being reached

**Priorities going forward**

**Key sectors for engagement:**
- Jobs, social protection, private sector involvement
- Education.
- Health.

**Improvements on how the WB works together:**
- Partnership at the country level.
- Innovative finance.
- Technology.
- **MDB collaboration.** Support the MDB Platform for Economic Migration and Forced Displacement to develop a common framework for MDB engagement; advance knowledge, evidence and data; and strengthen coordination of key issues on the ground with better-targeted instruments and products.

**Important areas for advancement:**
- Internally displaced people.
- Regional approaches, preparedness, areas of return
- Data and evidence
- Climate displacement
- COVID response
- Advocacy for refugees and forcibly displaced communities to be mainstreamed in national responses
- Expanding inclusive access to finance to catalyze economic recovery post COVID-19 especially for vulnerable and marginalized groups.
MDB PLATFORM ON ECONOMIC MIGRATION AND FORCED DISPLACEMENT

Overview of MDB Platform on EM and FD: Established in 2017, rotating chairmanship every 6 months

Objective: maximize impact of individual MDBs' actions through enhanced coordination by working “as a system”

Approach: foster strategic alignment among MDBs, strengthen operational collaboration and promote knowledge sharing

Member MDBs: African Development Bank (AfDB), Asian Development Bank (ADB), European Bank of Development (EBRD), European Investment Bank (EIB), Interamerican Development Bank (IDB), Islamic Development Bank (IsDB) and World Bank Group (WBG).
4 priority areas of work

| Common framework for MDB engagement | Knowledge, evidence and data | Coordination of key issues on the ground | Better-targeted instruments and products |

Thematic Focus:

- **Human and Labor Mobility (incl. remittances)**
- **Social Services (access, delivery, portability)**
- **Policy Dialogue and Frameworks**

**MDB Platform Activities**

- **Facilitate Knowledge:** 3 Webinars on strategic focus topics where relevant with partner organizations (e.g., IOM, UNHCR, UN ESCAP etc.)
- **Share Experience:** connect project teams and exchange best practices on sector level facilitating coordination and potential collaboration among MDBs Regional Cooperation and Integration
- **Follow-up engagement with the UN High Level Panel on Internal Displacement - 2nd Webinar on impact of COVID-19 on forced displacement (IsDB)**
- **Exchange on final contribution to OECD Financing for Refugees Survey (e.g., discussion of way forward, lessons learned etc.)**

**Examples of joint activities and shared deliverables**

- Communications brochure on platform (EBRD)
- Enhanced principles for MDB engagement on FD launched at Global Refugee Forum Dec. 2019
- Online Community of Practice (financed by IaDB for 2yrs)
- Share operational lessons learned, research and data for enhanced policy dialogue
- Regional seminars/webinars
- Partnerships with relevant organizations, e.g., UNHCR, IOM, UN Panel on Internal Displacement, OECD, ICRC and others
- Strategic Focus for January – June 2021

**Islamic Development Bank (IsDB)**

The Islamic Development Bank was founded in 1973 by the Finance Ministers at the first Organization of the Islamic Conference (now called the Organization of Islamic Cooperation) with the support of the King of Saudi Arabia at the time (Faisal), and began its activities on 3 April 1975. In 2013, IsDB tripled its authorized capital to $150 billion to better serve Muslims in member and non-member countries. The Bank has received credit ratings of AAA from Standard & Poor’s, Moody’s, and Fitch. Saudi Arabia holds about one quarter of the bank’s paid up capital. The IDB is an observer at the United Nations General Assembly.

The present membership of the Bank consists of 57 countries MC. The basic condition for membership is that the prospective member country should be a member of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), pay its contribution to the capital of the Bank and be willing
to accept such terms and conditions as may be decided upon by the IsDB Board of Governors.

The IsDB has evolved into a group of five Entities, consisting of Islamic Development Bank (IsDB), Islamic Research & Training Institute (IRTI), Islamic Corporation for Development of the Private Sector (ICD), Islamic Corporation for Insurance of Investment and Export Credit (ICIEC) and International Islamic Trade Finance Corporation (ITFC).

**ISDB and COVID-19**

The IsDB became deeply concerned about the exponential growth in the number of cases worldwide and the human, social and economic fallout from this pandemic, especially in IsDB member countries. The global supply chain disruptions, demand compression and macroeconomic instability will have severe economic growth and poverty impacts on the member countries, if not managed appropriately. The IsDB Group fully recognized the limited ability and capacity of its member countries to cope with these adverse impacts of COVID-19 and assures them of the Group’s full and unwavering support to get through this tough period.

In order to support its member countries in this time of need, IsDB Group set up a special Strategic Preparedness and Response Facility of US$ 730 million to mitigate the negative health and socio-economic impact of the COVID-19 pandemic. This will include US$ 280 million from the Bank and Islamic Solidarity Fund for Development for sovereign projects and programs, US$300 million from International Islamic Trade finance Corporation (ITFC) for trade finance and US$150 million from Islamic Corporation for Insurance of Investment and Export Credit (ICIEC) for insurance coverage.

The facility extended financing to both the public and private sector in minimizing the spread and impact of the pandemic in IsDB member countries (MC) and to build their resilience. Financing is extended in the form of grants, concessional resources, trade finance, private sector lending and political and risk insurance coverage. The IsDB Group deployed all the available financing instruments to channel the funds in a fast track manner to support its member countries.

The SPRF funding at a level of US$ 2,279.50 million, targeted interventions that focus on emergency preparedness and response to curb and contain the spread of the COVID-19, minimize socio-economic impact of the pandemic especially on the poor, and to build resilience of Member countries in responding to outbreaks and pandemics. The facility supported strengthening of the health systems, funding of national epidemic preparedness and response plans, community awareness and education, disease surveillance, data collection and analysis, sustained provision of essential social services, provision of social safety nets, and support private sector activity.

The IsDB Group also invested in research and development and provided technical assistance support for development of innovative solutions for preventing and containing the pandemic under its Science, Technology and Innovation Program. In addition, the Bank used its Reverse Linkage program facility to share lessons, best practices and technical expertise from other member countries in addressing the response and management of the COVID-19.

The IsDB Group’s entities supported the private sector in responding to the crisis and to minimize its impact on SMEs to sustain economic development. ITFC’s trade financing support was in the form of short-term rapid response initiatives, mainly aimed at enabling the member countries to purchase emergency COVID preparedness related medical equipment and supplies and medium term support to enable MCs and SMEs to recover from the impact of the crises. The rapid response package was to the tune of US$ 300 million. ITFC’s support enabled revival of trade and sustenance of supply chains in strategically important sectors. ICIEC provided US$ 150 million for credit and political risk insurance to sustain imports of strategic commodities, investment protection, and to minimize volatility. The Islamic Corporation for Development (ICD) US$ 250 million.

The Bank strongly considered that effective coordination and interaction at global, national local level was extremely important to effectively address the current situation and therefore worked closely with and partner with the Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs) and development financing institutions to effectively coordinate and mobilize resources to support the affected member countries and to implement its interventions.

The Bank also reached key donors and development partners including Arab coordination Group to mobilize resources to support the member countries. Significant number of partners including Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank, OPEC Fund for International Development, Saudi Fund, and Kuwait Fund for Development have also expressed interest in joining the Bank’s efforts for responding to the COVID-19 Pandemic.

The Bank instantly responded to the consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic and started preparing a comprehensive $2 billion package, dedicating a significant portion of it to support and empower the MSMEs sector in member countries. The aim of the programme prepared by the Bank was to provide part of the necessary liquidity with preferential modes for member countries through their financial sectors. It was expected to be supported by a lending guaranty programme and capacity building grants for MCs in the preparation of support programmes and incentive packages for such enterprises. This was designed in order to save direct and indirect jobs, energize economic activity, and help regain the growth pace to overcome the current crisis and its potential future consequences.

This programme was worth $500 million, and was expected to make it a resource mobilizing tool from partner development institutions, in addition to local partners in
member countries, to maximize the target impact. The programme is expected to contribute to saving more than 200,000 direct jobs in addition to indirect jobs. With this the Bank will contribute to saving nearly 5% of at-risk jobs globally and a higher percentage in the Muslim world.

Sustainable support for businesses, small and medium enterprises (SMEs) and other sources of livelihoods has been key to Bank’s plan to help immediate socioeconomic recovery in member countries that have been impacted by COVID-19. The Bank’s Strategic Preparedness and Response Program (SPRP) aimed at helping our member countries mitigate the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic and implemented under the 3Rs track – Respond, Restore, and Restart’.

The Bank was one of the recipients of the Women Entrepreneurs Finance Initiative (We-Fi)’s third funding allocation comprising $49.3 million. The total investment from We-Fi is expected to benefit over 15,000 women-led businesses and mobilize about $350 million of additional public and private sector resources. These funds are provided by the International Development Finance and Policy of the U.S. Department of the Treasury and chair of We-Fi’s Governing Committee.

Support for the Tadamon CSO Pandemic Response Accelerator Program for refugees and IDPs

The Bank developed and approved a Strategic Preparedness and Response Program (SPRP) about how to most effectively provide immediate support to MCs with the understanding that the impacts of COVID-19 will be long-lasting and recovery for many will be a difficult process. In order to expeditiously respond to the urgent needs of the MCs, that are working on different fronts to tackle the crisis, the proposed program is designed to use the Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) including International Non-Governmental Organizations (INGOs) as implementing agencies and partners for the Bank’s interventions at the “Respond” and “Restore” stages.

Furthermore, the total estimated cost of the program is US$55 million program is based on innovative partnership approach bringing together national and international CSOs, philanthropies, foundations, Governments and crowd-funding platforms to share all the good practice and lessons learnt so far. This will be carried out through a Pandemic Response Accelerator Platform in the existing Tadamon Platform for the IsDB/ISFD NGO Empowerment Program. The proposed program is derived from the official requests/proposals of the MCs and socio-economic impact needs assessments carried out by the CSOs and development partners. The program will allocate an amount of US$ 1.7 million as seed money to the Accelerator to support various projects with necessary resources. It is expected that the platform will mobilize an additional resource of at least US$ 6 million in the coming 8 months.

The plight of refugee and IDPs is not only at stake in the fragile and conflict-affected member countries. As COVID-19 progresses it will put at risk the lives of many that host IDPs. The proposed program will support Afghanistan, Burkina Faso, Chad, Comoros, Djibouti, Guinea, Iraq, Libya, Mali, Niger, Palestine, Somalia, Sudan, Yemen affected by fragility/conflict; and refugees and IDPs in Jordan, Lebanon and Turkey3 (see Annex 2). These countries were selected based on the level of fragility, conflict, presence of significant number of refugees and IDPs, poverty, limited availability of basic health services and institutional capacity to prevent, mitigate and contain the COVID-19 pandemic. Additionally, most of these countries do not receive OCR financing due to their specific country situations.

SPARK, the Islamic Development Bank (IsDB) and the Islamic Solidarity Fund for Development (ISFD) have been supporting vulnerable youth in multiple ways, including offering a free COVID-19 Survival Guide for Refugee Businesses. Now, building on previous collaborations, we are launching a new COVID-19 support programme called Tadamon, which translates to “solidarity” in Arabic, supports vulnerable people dealing with COVID-19 in the long and short term.

In the short term, Tadamon supports relief efforts focused on healthcare, such as providing protective equipment, training medical staff and psycho-social support. Yet the programme importantly also addresses the inevitable long term challenges that will affect these communities, namely access to higher education and jobs. Over two years, 1,695 students will be offered higher education vocational scholarships, 843 placed in internships and 85 small and medium enterprises (SMEs) will receive important training and financial support.

A newly-opened Management Skills Centre attended business skills training by SPARK, IsDB and ISFD prior to launching his entrepreneurial project for a period of six months took practical training on the ground. There was a lot of follow up by the trainers giving classes. The project helped opening the centre which launched immediately with no problems or mistakes The Tadamon programme will allow other young people to have sustainable, long-term access to better health, education and employment opportunities.

Asian Development Bank (ADB)

The Asian Development Bank (ADB) envisions a prosperous, inclusive, resilient, and sustainable Asia and the Pacific, while sustaining its efforts to eradicate extreme poverty in the region. Despite the region’s many successes, it remains home to a large share of the world’s poor: 263 million living on less than $1.90 a day and 1.1 billion on less than $3.20 a day.

ADB assists its members, and partners, by providing loans, technical assistance, grants, and equity investments to promote social and economic development.

ADB maximizes the development impact of its assistance by facilitating policy dialogues, providing advisory services, and mobilizing financial resources through co-financing operations that tap official, commercial, and export credit sources.
ADB is committed to achieving a prosperous, inclusive, resilient, and sustainable Asia and the Pacific, while sustaining its efforts to eradicate extreme poverty. Established in 1966, it is owned by 68 members—49 from the region.

**ADB COVID-19 response**

ADB President Masatsugu Asakawa stated that COVID-19 pandemic threatens to severely set back economic, social, and development gains in Asia and the Pacific, reverse progress on poverty reduction, and throw economies into recession.

The coronavirus disease (COVID-19) pandemic has caused unprecedented and ongoing public health, social, and economic crises that have created a “new normal” defined by a larger role for the state in addressing increases in poverty and inequality, persistent low employment, widespread business bankruptcies, and increasing inequality. According to the ADB COVID-19 Policy Database, developing members committed $3.69 trillion to address the crises as of 22 February 2021. In April 2020, the Asian Development Bank (ADB) established a $20 billion COVID-19 response program to assist developing member countries (DMCs).

The Asia Pacific Vaccine Access Facility was launched in December 2020. Additional funds for COVID-19 response programs were provided by the World Bank, Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, International Monetary Fund, and bilateral donors. Governance experts point out that COVID-19 response programs face significant risks associated with inefficiency, implementation delays, poor targeting of beneficiaries, diversion of funds, and corruption. Governments of DMCs and ADB are collaborating to assess the risks relevant to COVID-19 response programs as well as implement policies and procedures to mitigate these risks. ADB and other development partners are supporting the mitigation efforts through technical assistance and knowledge sharing.

Implementing and accountability institutions in DMCs face the challenges of delivering the results promised in the COVID-19 response programs under implementation and transparently accounting for integrity in the use of money spent. These challenges are placing large demands on governments’ delivery capacity and accountability systems. The unprecedented vaccination campaigns aggravate these demands. Governments and donors should consider strategically augmenting their capacities and efforts by expanding this collaboration with civil society organizations (CSOs), particularly at the local government levels. CSOs have decades of experience in public health, immunization, social protection, livelihood programs, and social accountability. Evaluation and case studies cited in this brief provide evidence on the positive outcomes of CSO engagement and success factors. ADB policies and Strategy 2030 recognize this and call for increasing CSO collaboration in ADB-supported operations to improve quality and inclusiveness. ADB has also been supporting CSO engagement through technical assistance grants.

CSOs have begun complementing COVID-19 responses of governments. The Global Alliance for Vaccination and Immunization (Gavi) and the COVID-19 Vaccines Global Access (COVAX), the global initiative for procurement and distribution of COVID-19 vaccines, also recognize the expertise of CSOs in public health and vaccination and have included them in their governing boards and operations.

ADB recognizes that governments can create a positive environment for collaboration with CSOs by inviting them to be involved in efforts within designated areas, sharing information with them, and organizing two-way communications between local authorities and CSOs. By working constructively with government authorities, particularly at the local government levels, CSOs can help improve one or more of the following outcomes: implementation effectiveness using community engagement and feedback loops; lifesaving behavioral changes among at-risk population groups; responsiveness and integrity in public expenditures; responsiveness and accountability of public officials; detection and reporting of corruption in the delivery of services; economy and efficiency in public procurement and distribution; trust between communities and government authorities; and improved inclusion in government programs through representing the voices and needs of marginalized groups.

### Engaging Civil Society to enhance the effectiveness of COVID-19 programs

ADB’s governance brief offers a framework for expanding CSO engagement to complement government efforts for the efficient implementation of COVID-19 programs in a transparent and accountable manner. The framework includes objectives, six programmatic areas for CSO activities, and expected outcomes of CSO engagement. It emphasizes that one approach may not fit all situations. A context specific, differentiated approach and fully resourced CSO engagement plan for each country and/or COVID-19 response program must be defined based on an assessment of the local situation and specific objectives linked to results and accountability.
ADB engaged and invested in civil society to mitigate the impact of COVID-19 through community-led interventions. This $2 million grant initiative funded by the JFPR and administered by ADB was launched in November 2020. It is notable for its demand-driven approach in which the CSOs are free to propose innovative approaches to deliver one or more indicated outputs. Activities would complement government responses and could include communication campaigns; contact tracing; training and deploying volunteers; hygiene awareness; support to victims of domestic violence and those in need of food, education, and medical services; raising vaccine awareness and uptake; and alternate livelihood. This program and its process innovations could serve as a demonstration project for DMCs to consider in designing their expansion of CSO engagement.

The bank recognizes that CSOs are well suited to play significant roles in COVID-19 vaccination programs. COVAX, the global initiative to help ensure that COVID-19 vaccines are available worldwide to economies of all financial capacities, is tapping the experience of civil society representatives. Included among these are Save the Children, World Vision, Aga Khan Foundation, the International Red Cross, and the International Federation on Ageing. These CSOs participate in coordination meetings, foster the necessary support at a political and community engagement level to ensure equitable access to and delivery of COVID-19 vaccines, and provide in-depth subject matter expertise in one or more areas, including vaccine R&D, manufacturing, delivery, demand, access and allocation, policy, and governance.

On 11 December 2020, ADB launched a $9 billion vaccine initiative to support its DMCs as they procure and deliver vaccines to their populations. ADB believes that CSO engagement adds value in enhancing the development effectiveness of vaccination programs. ADB’s governance policy brief quotes GAVI: “CSOs, in partnership with governments, play a key role in implementing immunization programs. In many countries they deliver up to 65% of immunization services as well as strengthening health systems, training health workers and supporting logistics.”

The first set of risks and limitations relates to the safety and mobility of CSO personnel. Spikes and a possible second wave of COVID-19 infections might compel governments to tighten, from time to time, social distancing norms and mobility of citizens, thereby adversely affecting the ability of CSOs to operate. CSOs, affected like other organizations, have largely operated remotely and used virtual meetings, phone-based and online research, and advocacy. They also have to compete with others to secure sufficient personal protective equipment for their staff and soon will

**Expected outcome:** To increase collaboration with CSOs and community-based organizations in supporting COVID-19-affected communities. 15 communities with about 50,000 persons, of whom at least 50% are women, are expected to benefit.

**Outputs:**
1. Community-based crisis prevention, mitigation, and adaptation capacity increased;
2. Informal social protection programs stressed by the impacts of COVID-19 supported; and
3. Economic support provided to people with livelihoods affected by the COVID-19 pandemic.

**Cost and Financing:** $2 million initial funding through a grant from the Japan Fund for Poverty Reduction (JFPR) administered by the ADB. Additional financing proposed for 2021 due to high number of submittals from CSOs.

**Implementation Arrangements:** CSOs from 12 developing countries in Asia-Pacific invited to submit concept notes. Five projects will be selected by April 2021 and implemented during 2021–2023 from initial JFPR funding. Eligible countries are Armenia, Cambodia, the Cook Islands, the Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Mongolia, Niue, the Philippines, Samoa, Thailand, Timor-Leste, and Viet Nam.


**ADB outlined the following programmatic areas in which CSOs can complement government efforts:**

1. Distribution, delivery, and administration of vaccines
2. Community outreach and surveillance
3. Verifying quality and quantity of vaccine-related civil works and cold chain storage
4. Identifying gaps in vaccine service delivery and helping the service providers close them;
5. Enhancing inclusion of marginalized and vulnerable people in remote areas,
6. Working with audit and anticorruption agencies to help with their work CSOs face COVID-19-related risks and disruptions to their operations.

The first set of risks and limitations relates to the safety and mobility of CSO personnel. Spikes and a possible second wave of COVID-19 infections might compel governments to tighten, from time to time, social distancing norms and mobility of citizens, thereby adversely affecting the ability of CSOs to operate. CSOs, affected like other organizations, have largely operated remotely and used virtual meetings, phone-based and online research, and advocacy. They also have to compete with others to secure sufficient personal protective equipment for their staff and soon will
need to access vaccination before being able to scale up their operations.

Second, many CSOs report that authorities may not be able to or willing to provide access to timely and relevant information, citing overburdened staff and emergency, to implement relief and recovery. Authorities may be also reluctant to cooperate in CSO monitoring and advocacy activities. Third, sometimes, overwhelmed communities and citizens coping with COVID-19 may be reluctant to devote time for participatory and collective action activities led by CSOs. Fourth, the funding situation for the CSOs has become even more dire as donations, as well as donor funding, have become scarcer. The CSOs sector has the capacity to scale up its contributions to COVID-19 programs. The sector includes millions of CSOs around the world and has grown in size, diversity, and influence. ADB’s civil society briefs provide a good overview of the civil society sector in many of its DMCs. These briefs, as well as other publications on CSO sectors in different countries, show that while the size, capacities, and civic space for the CSOs vary by the country, there are many countries in Asia and the Pacific where CSOs can be mobilized to supplement the government capacity to implement and monitor COVID-19 programs.

An expansion of CSOs’ engagement in COVID-19 programs, in line with policies of ADB and the UN Agenda 2030, is justified by their grassroots presence, experience in development work, especially at the local government level, and evidence on results of their work. It will supplement government and donor efforts to implement COVID-19 programs effectively and ensure that funds are well spent. Scaling up CSO engagement will generate substantial benefits.

**ADB noted that:**

- a. CSOs complement but not solely substitute state responsibilities in development.
- b. Authorities’ willingness to engage constructively with civil society for public benefit and identification of potential champions for civic engagement.
- c. Access to user-friendly information and open two-way communication between the community and authorities.
- d. Citizens’ awareness of public rights and responsibilities.
- e. Presence of skilled CSOs that can mobilize the community and facilitate constructive community engagement with government authorities.
- f. Use of digital communications tools to scale up citizen engagement.
- g. Adequate funding for CSO engagement programs from government and donors (private, official, domestic, or foreign).
- h. Sensitivity to contextual factors such as size and skills of the CSO sector, space for civic engagement, trust levels and attitudes, willingness and capacity of citizens to engage, the credibility of CSOs, elite power, and access to information.
- i. The willingness of DMCs to proactively use a fraction of donor funds to engage CSOs in COVID-19 response programs. The use of donor funds to engage CSOs is permitted by most of the donors, including ADB.
- j. Use of local CSOs as a primary means. If needed, international CSOs and umbrella CSO networks may be used in secondary roles such as fund management, capacity building, and technical advice.

The bank outlined key programmatic areas for CSOs to intervene in for addressing the impact of the pandemic in member countries.

**Programmatic Area 1:** Help raise community awareness, participation, and trust in government COVID-19 programs. The Bank quoted World Health Organization in its CSO engagement brief: “Responsive, empathic, transparent, and consistent messaging in local languages through trusted channels of communication, using community-based networks and key influencers and building capacity of local entities, is essential to establish authority and trust”. In COVID-19 response programs. CSOs can be one such trusted source and can play a major role by raising awareness and preparing communities for appropriate cooperation and responses.

CSOs can raise awareness of such policies, help citizens file information requests, and share information in communities, thereby increasing citizens’ trust in public health measures, encouraging the use of government-run clinics and services, and promoting adherence to public health guidelines while dispelling misinformation and stigma. CSOs can use tools such as media, face-to-face meetings, group discussions, community forums, public hearings, and plays. These activities will be particularly important for a successful vaccination program. CSOs can work with local governments to identify marginalized and migrant households and help them participate in the COVID-19 program. CSOs can use digital tools, particularly text messages, to encourage healthy behaviors.

**Programmatic Area 2:** Assist with distribution of materials and supplies. Since the COVID-19 pandemic, there have been many examples of CSOs complementing government efforts to distribute food, hygiene supplies, personal protective equipment, and so forth to communities and frontline workers. CSOs are well suited for these roles in terms of their presence on the ground and their networks, which facilitates effective supply distribution. In India, CSOs fed the destitute, sheltered migrant workers, and helped at-risk communities with essential communications and protective materials. A review of more than 50 stories of CSO engagement in COVID-19 programs available on the United Nations website indicates that distributing relief materials and raising awareness were the predominant activities reported by CSOs.
Programmatic Area 3: Enhance inclusion and accountability, and control corruption in public services delivery by local and national governments. The massive expansion of public health services, social protection benefits, and direct income transfers compose the largest component of governments’ COVID-19 responses. The speed and scale of these response programs exacerbate the normal risks inherent in targeting beneficiaries, making timely payments, including marginalized and vulnerable groups, assuring satisfaction and grievance resolutions, and controlling corruption. Evidence and experience show that CSO engagement can improve the delivery of public services such as social protection, health, and education. They can use well-recognized tools such as community scorecards, third-party monitoring, public hearings, and citizen report cards. Monitoring implementation and effectiveness should be followed by constructive engagement with authorities in sharing results and making improvements.

Programmatic Area 4: Enhance the integrity of public procurement and distribution. Transparency International’s two-part blog series Procuring for Life has pointed out that emergency procurement of COVID-19 items such as personal protective equipment, ventilators, vaccines, and test kits constitutes the greatest cost in loans and grants. Potential CSO roles in enhancing integrity of procurement include (i) pressing for full disclosure of procurements by whom, from where, for what purpose, in what amounts, and for what locations and recipients; (ii) checking when the beneficiaries received supplies, in what quantity and condition; (iii) publicizing sole-source contracting; (iv) ensuring proper warehousing; (v) working with frontline health centers to assure transparency in distributing; and (vi) helping to identify and resolve delivery bottlenecks. The Open Contracting Partnership has a resource page on emergency procurement during COVID-19.

Programmatic Area 5: Improve public participation in creating budgets and overseeing audits at local and national levels. The International Budget Partnership recommends expanding “collaboration with civil society on monitoring and implementation of emergency and stimulus measures. Civil society can help the government conduct spot checks to ensure that funding and services are reaching the intended beneficiaries, track implementation of policies, and monitor procurement risks.” Over the years, CSOs have used a variety of methods to make spending more responsive to community and gender needs and to see how much money reaches the intended beneficiaries. These methods include participatory budgeting, social audits, community scorecards, public hearings, public expenditure tracking, open contracting, audit scorecards, participatory audits, and budget literacy campaigns. They can apply these tools to promote inclusivity and integrity in the COVID-19 programs. CSOs also have engaged the International Organization of Supreme Audit Institutions, which has documented many examples of such work. The potential citizen and CSO roles include audit plans based on complaints from CSOs, joint participatory audits, and the use of CSOs to validate audit findings.

Programmatic Area 6: Advocacy and watchdog activities. CSOs engaging in advocacy and watchdog activities avoid a conflict of interest by foregoing government funding. They differ from CSO roles providing services by engaging with the government to influence policies and programs and hold governments to account. CSO advocacy and watchdog activities also may focus on transparency and accountability measures recommended by key organizations such as ADB, the World Bank, Open Government Partnership, Transparency International, the U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Center, and the International Monetary Fund.

ADB’s investment in CSOs and guidance to member countries has enabled civil society to play an active role in addressing the negative impacts of the pandemic.
The gender strategy includes the following objectives:

Objective 1: Promote women’s access to economic opportunities. Where possible, CAREC interventions will be designed to supplement and add value to national efforts to create opportunities for women to enter paid and formal employment in relevant sectors, support women in agriculture and informal sectors, promote women’s entrepreneurship, and enable women to gain skills that prepare them for jobs and business opportunities in the CAREC countries.

Objective 2: Contribute to women’s social empowerment. CAREC interventions will include regional provisions that combine with national strategies to advance gender equality and women’s empowerment in terms of (a) enhancing women’s decision-making roles; (b) reducing women’s time poverty; (c) taking into account specific needs and concerns of women and girls through projects’ consultative processes; (d) promoting women’s safety, resilience, and security; and (e) strengthening human capital development across the CAREC countries in education by connecting women to regional institutes of higher education and centers of excellence, and in health by connecting them to region wide quality healthcare services and providing access to tertiary hospitals and specialized treatment institutions.

Objective 3: Support women’s regional networks and policy reform for women’s empowerment. CAREC will support gender-responsive policy reforms where current legislation is exacerbating gender disparities and creating barriers to women’s economic empowerment; it will also contribute to an enabling environment for fostering knowledge sharing. Regional networks of women will be supported (a) to allow exchange of information across borders on legislative and regulatory regimes for women’s empowerment in the various CAREC countries, and (b) to enhance access to information about income earning and social development opportunities across the region.

Objective 4: Enhance women’s access to information and communication technology. CAREC interventions will promote better regional digital connectivity by enhancing access of women and men to, and training in, new digital technologies and affordable information and communication technology (ICT) solutions. Such interventions will reduce the connectivity costs across borders and countries, improve competitiveness of small firms and businesses that employ women, and reduce social progress gaps between men and women in the CAREC region.

The gender strategy also sets out recommendations to mainstream gender across operational clusters. Key gender issues and potential strategic directions and entry points for gender mainstreaming through CAREC’s five operational clusters are outlined in this chapter.

Economic and Financial Stability Cluster:

Women and men often do not benefit equally from economic growth and fiscal measures designed to boost economies. This is true of the CAREC region where, in all countries, there is a clear gender pay gap, and women often face discrimination in recruitment and employment practices. Gender inequalities also often prevent existing and potential female entrepreneurs from accessing credit and the financial products, services, and information that could help them start or scale up micro, small, and medium-sized enterprises. CAREC will ensure that operations within this cluster promote equal opportunities for women, including in non-traditional jobs and management in both private and public sectors, and promote the creation of an enabling environment for female entrepreneurs so that they can take full advantage of national programs and new regional economic opportunities in the productive and services sectors. To ensure effective gender-responsive planning and implementation, CAREC will promote policy dialogue at regional and cross-country levels to enable stakeholders from across the region to learn from each other’s experiences and knowledge and put in place best practices for women’s empowerment and gender mainstreaming. CAREC initiatives will seek to work with and support the banking and private sectors at the regional levels that promote financial inclusion and economic empowerment of women.

Trade, Tourism and Economic Corridor Cluster

Trade: Informal, small-scale, cross-border trading activities across the CAREC countries are a major source of income for many women. CAREC, in alignment with the CAREC Integrated Trade Agenda 2030, will support initiatives aiming at removing supply chain barriers, particularly those that inhibit women entrepreneurs in the region. CAREC can also consider providing support to member countries for the revision of national and regional trade policies to include gender-responsive measures and will facilitate consultations with female traders across borders for this purpose. CAREC will also enhance information sharing and provide appropriate training for border officials to minimize discrimination by gender.
Tourism: Tourism also offers many potential opportunities for women, including decent work, entrepreneurship, and leadership roles. CAREC, in alignment with the CAREC Tourism Strategy 2030, will promote initiatives to ensure women have equal access to information about tourism related jobs across the region and will provide support to the countries to develop regional and cross-country guidelines to ensure non-discriminatory recruitment and equal pay and access to opportunities. CAREC will actively engage both women and men from local communities, including those in the border areas, in the planning, development, and implementation of tourist attractions and related services. Regional capacity building programs will focus on skills building of both women and men regional tourism operators and on private sector tourism businesses to ensure inclusive corporate policies.

Economic Corridors: Economic corridors in the CAREC region provide an effective tool to create business development opportunities, employment, and entrepreneurship, promoting growth through deepened regional cooperation and integration. Through existing CAREC initiatives, such as the Almaty–Bishkek Economic Corridor and the Trilateral Economic Corridor connecting Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan, the CAREC Program will promote initiatives to increase women participation in cross-border trade, tourism-related services, agricultural regional value chain, integrated urban planning, and knowledge-sharing and training events.

Infrastructure and Economic Connectivity Cluster

Transport: There are often significant gender differences in transport usage and trip patterns in CAREC countries. For example, women in CAREC countries are less likely to drive and own a vehicle than men. Constraints that include cost, lack of provision, and inconvenience prevent many women from using public transport in the CAREC countries. Another key issue is safety, sexual harassment on public transport has been reported as a growing problem in many CAREC countries. Walking is, therefore, the primary mode of travel for many women, yet roads are often not designed with pedestrians in mind. CAREC, in alignment with the CAREC Transport Strategy 2030, will ensure that regional roads and railways, and public transport services connecting countries are designed in ways that prioritize affordability, convenience, accessibility, and safety for all women and children. CAREC will provide support for collecting gender-disaggregated data for the development of inclusive regional solutions. CAREC will provide trainings to transport service providers at regional level in raising awareness on protecting women from sexual and other forms of harassment, aiming at the development of zero tolerance policies and effective reporting mechanisms, as well as facilitate the establishment of regional information and exchange networks. CAREC will support member countries in developing regional policies and guidelines to ensure the employment potential of women in the transport sector is harnessed.

Human Development

Education: The majority of CAREC countries have achieved gender parity or near parity in primary and secondary education. However, women still lag far behind in science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM) subjects. Although women account for the majority of teachers in many CAREC countries, they are not well represented in higher-level decision-making posts in educational establishments. In strengthening human capital development in education across member countries, CAREC will help to connect women of the region to institutes of higher education and technical training to boost their education status and increase their income-earning capacities. To do so, CAREC will support the development of strategies at the regional and inter country levels that could include partnering with national and regional TVET providers to offer trainings in non-traditional subjects, including STEM, and technical skills such as plumbing, carpentry, and electrical work among girls and young women. CAREC will also promote regional efforts to increase women’s representation in the management of educational institutions.

Health: There has been a steady improvement across health indicators in the CAREC countries, but there
is continued poor access to health services in some countries, particularly those with low or medium ranking in UNDP’s Human Development Index. It is also likely that several gains in health sector improvement in the CAREC countries will have been undermined by the global COVID-19 pandemic. In response, CAREC will support countries in developing a regional health strategy that will, among other things, strengthen surveillance systems and monitoring capabilities across borders for control of communicable and non-communicable diseases, and improve access of women and men to quality medicines at more affordable costs across the region. CAREC will also facilitate knowledge sharing on new technologies, such as cross-border telemedicine and access to medical support across the region. This will enhance access to quality health services, particularly for women who have limited mobility and constrained access to medical advice.

**Information and Communication Technology**

The importance of digital technology is becoming increasingly evident across the world, particularly in light of the COVID-19 pandemic. ICT is providing an invaluable resource for businesses in the form of e-commerce and virtual communications as well as for access to education, health, and other vital services. This makes it vital to address the digital divide in many CAREC countries, where women lag behind men in access to digital technology. For example, there are disparities between male and female phone ownership and mobile internet usage in the region. This means that women are unable to participate in new forms of economic activity that rely on digital platforms and ICT.

To help close this gender gap in digital access, CAREC will support capacity building in ICT for women and girls of all ages through regional trainings and workshops. CAREC will also seek engagement with private sector ICT companies to facilitate the provision of internet access, especially for women in poor households. In addition, CAREC will promote the creation of regional knowledge networks to share good, gender-sensitive practices for enhancing women’s access to ICT and increasing their opportunities in information technology-related employment.

While ADB did not specifically program for refugees, it assisted member countries in dealing with COVID as part of their national response. For example: ADB contributed to the Humanitarian Response Plan of Afghanistan and ADB supported Pakistan’s Ehsaas program for social protection packages to poor and vulnerable families across the country.

ADB’s policies and recommendation for mainstreaming gender and promoting the role of civil society include promoting digital technology and ensuring vulnerable and marginalized groups across sectors helps advance the inclusion agenda.

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**African Development Bank (AfDB)**

The African Development Bank (AfDB) Group is a regional multilateral development finance institution established to contribute to the economic development and social progress of African countries that are the institution’s Regional Member Countries (RMCs). The AfDB was founded following an agreement signed by member states on August 14, 1963, in Khartoum, Sudan, which became effective on September 10, 1964. The AfDB comprises three entities: the African Development Bank (ADB), the African Development Fund (ADF) and the Nigeria Trust Fund (NTF). As the premier development finance institution on the continent, the AfDB’s mission is to help reduce poverty, improve living conditions for Africans and mobilize resources for the continent’s economic and social development. The AfDB headquarters is officially in Abidjan, Côte d’Ivoire.

The bank’s mission is to promote the investment of public and private capital in projects and programmes that are likely to contribute to the economic development of its stakeholders. The bank therefore finances projects run either by the government or the private sector. The AfDB is one of the five major multilateral development banks in the world that provides assistance to its regional member countries with a view to helping them achieve their development goals.

The overarching objective of the African Development Bank (AfDB) Group is to spur sustainable economic development and social progress in its regional member countries (RMCs), thus contributing to poverty reduction.

**The Bank Group achieves this objective by:**

- mobilizing and allocating resources for investment in RMCs; and
- providing policy advice and technical assistance to support development efforts.

The Bank has previously supported the African Union to respond to epidemics, such as the Ebola crisis that affected a number of countries in West, East and Central Africa. The Bank provided over USD 255 million, which included budget support, emergency relief, capacity building and technical assistance to the affected countries. The AU was a beneficiary of an ADF grant of UA $ 1.59 million for the Multinational Crisis Response Project implemented by Africa CDC to provide technical assistance to support countries (Guinea, Sierra Leone and Liberia) affected by Ebola epidemic. Through this project, the Africa CDC got acquainted with the Bank’s project operations and procedures, and also succeeded in establishing the African Volunteer Health Corps (AVoHC) by training health workers to serve as a reserve health force to respond to public health emergencies. The same health force is now serving...
AfDB’s COVID-19 Response

The establishment of the COVID-19 Rapid Response Facility (CRF) has augmented the Bank’s capacity to pro-actively support member countries and agencies such as the Africa CDC. Prior to the approval of the CRF, the Bank leveraged the Special Relief Fund to provide a grant of USD 2 million to WHO to support countries at high risk of uncontrolled COVID-19 pandemic, in addition to several country-specific Bank supported emergency operations. In collaboration with the Regional Economic Communities (RECs), the Bank is providing assistance using ADF resources (for RPG grants) to support COVID-19 response operations totaling about USD 70 million benefiting countries belonging to the CEMAC, EAC, ECOWAS, IGAD and SADC regions including the support to the G5 Sahel countries (Burkina Faso, Chad, Mauritania, Mali and Niger). Other COVID-19 response assistance include the Crisis Response Budget Support (CRBS) operations. Each of the operations to be implemented by RECs will have an interface with the Africa CDC with regards to the application of COVID-19 guidelines in member countries.

The shared mandate of the African Union and AfDB to support Africa’s development agenda was reinforced following the declaration of COVID-19 as a Public Health Emergency of International Concern (PHEIC) on 31 January 2020, and subsequently as a pandemic on 11 March 2020. Africa CDC3 was established by the AU to support public health initiatives of member countries as well as strengthen the capacity of public health institutions to detect, prevent, control and respond quickly and effectively to disease threats. The Bank has the responsibility of mobilizing financial resources for the implementation of continental initiatives, including Africa’s strategic framework, Agenda 2063. Furthermore, as a leading African development finance institution, the Bank’s response to COVID-19 is aptly aligned to the High 5s: “Improving the Quality of Life for the People of Africa” and “Integrate Africa.” The support is also aligned with the Bank’s Ten-Year Strategy and commitment to inclusive growth, as well as the Bank’s Strategy for Addressing Fragility and Building Resilience in Africa, among others. The project is also aligned to Pillar II of ADF 15, focusing on institutional capacity building at the national and regional levels, strengthening the Africa CDC to deal with COVID-19 and future epidemics. It will also help in coordinating in-country capacity development efforts.

AfDB approved a grant of UA 10 million and TSF-Pillar III grant of UA 10 million to the African Union to finance the Africa Centres for Disease Control and Prevention (Africa CDC) COVID-19 Response Project. The project was to be implemented in the form of a Regional Public Good (RPG) covering capacity building and technical assistance over a period of thirty-six (36) months starting in August 2020. Project design followed the Bank’s COVID-19 Rapid Response Facility (CRF) approved by the Boards of Directors in April 2020. The project complements other COVID-19 response support that the Bank is providing through Regional Economic Communities (RECs) and directly to countries as Crisis Response Budget Support (CRBS).

The project aimed to support Africa CDC’s COVID-19 Pandemic Preparedness and Response Plan (with an estimated cost of USD 643 million). AfDB supported the Africa CDC has the mandate to strengthen regional and country capacities to detect, respond to, and mitigate the health and economic impacts of COVID-19, while also building long-term capacity to manage future pandemics and outbreaks. The expected outcome from the intervention is a stronger Africa CDC that is able to coordinate the COVID-19 response and future epidemics across member countries in collaboration with the World Health Organization (WHO) and other partners.

Transition Support Facility (TSF)

The Bank Group’s support to Africa CDC through the Regional Public Good (RPG) and the Transition Support Facility (TSF) resources is substantiated by the need to increase the scale, effectiveness and responsiveness to the current pandemic at national, regional and continental levels as well as to enhance the capacity of member countries to deal with future health emergencies. Countries with weak health systems need to be supported, otherwise they pose a risk to neighboring countries if they fail to contain the pandemic. For this reason, the emergency response qualifies as a Regional Public Good (RPG) since no country can be excluded from the benefits. The intervention is critical to prevent, address and mitigate the complex, multidimensional and dynamic drivers of fragility as well as their regional spill-over risks. Such emergency situations require quick, flexible and targeted support.

The goal of this project is to reinforce the delivery capacity of the Africa CDC (including its Regional Collaborating Centers) to mitigate and contain COVID-19 pandemic, while also building long-term capacity to manage future pandemics and outbreaks, including those resulting from impacts of climate such as floods and drought. The project will support the African Union COVID-19 Response Fund and Africa CDC Pandemic Preparedness and Response Plan (PPRP) in the following areas: (i) strengthen surveillance at points of entry (air, sea and land) while easing the free flow of goods; (ii) build essential sub-regional and national capacity for COVID-19 epidemiological surveillance and case management; (iii) ensure the availability of stocks of products and equipment for the prevention, control and treatment of cases; and (iv) ensure communication and coordination at the regional level. The project aims to achieve the following outcomes:

(i) improved technical and operational capacity of national and regional institutions to respond to the COVID-19 crisis
and reduce the risks of future epidemic emergencies; and (ii) strengthened Africa CDC’s capacity to provide guidance, technical advice and oversight to continent-wide epidemic/pandemic responses.

**Project Components:**

**Component One: Technical Assistance and Capacity Building**

The proposed project will support the Africa CDC’s national measures to prevent severe illness and death from COVID-19 infection in member countries and minimize the social disruption and economic consequences of COVID-19 outbreaks. The project will support technical assistance and capacity building efforts of the Africa CDC. To ensure sustainability beyond the COVID-19 crisis, particular attention will be given to: (i) providing epidemic intelligence based on interpretation and synthesis of data reported by member countries to inform control policies and strategies; (ii) developing and implementing quality assurance programs for their laboratories; (iii) strengthening National Public Health Institutes (NPHIs) that serve as national centers of excellence by developing critical strategies and guidelines, providing needed technical expertise, advising policy makers, and providing training for public health delivery; and (iv) strengthening Infection Prevention and Control (IPC) capacity to reduce the risk of COVID-19 transmission in health facilities and high-at-risk populations, including health workers. This component also supports the development of guidelines designed to reduce the spread of the COVID-19 across borders by working with RECs and Transport Corridor Management Agencies, by providing mandatory testing and sanitization of trucks at designated points as well as awareness raising among cross-border communities at border entry and exit points.

**Component Two: Institutional Support and Project Management**

To achieve the objectives set out in components one and three, the project will reinforce the institutional capacity of Africa CDC to deliver its technical assistance to member countries with due attention to continent-wide gender-disaggregated data collection, syntheses, and communication as well as the coordination of COVID-19 response actions. This will be achieved through leveraging the best technical expertise in Africa. Africa CDC’s technical capacity will be reinforced through recruitment or renewal of contracts for a period of up to 24 months of 30 staff working in the Incident Management Structure (IMS) that serves as the emergency operations center. This support will enable the Africa CDC to effectively manage the increasing scale of its activities at the Headquarters in Addis Ababa, and in the five (5) Regional Coordination Centers (RCC). A Project Coordination Unit will be supported during the implementation of this project. It is expected that with this cumulative support, the Africa CDC will be in a strong position to manage any health crisis at continental, regional and country levels. See the Technical Annexes for the detailed overview of AFTCOR and IMS.

**Component Three: Contribution to the African Union COVID-19 Response Fund**

Part of the ADF/RPG Grant resources of the project will support activities under the AU COVID-19 Response Fund set up by the Bureau of the Assembly of the African Union Heads of State and Government in March 2020. The Fund will receive resources from diverse donors, including the private sector and will enhance the efforts of the Africa CDC to strengthen capacity of countries across Africa to respond effectively to COVID-19 and other disease threats. Specific to COVID-19, the ADF support to this Fund will facilitate testing of an additional 10 million Africans by the end of 2020.

**Support to the Sahel**

The AfDB funded a COVID response project targeting the sectors of Health, Social Protection, Community Resilience. The executing Agency was UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) for the operational component. This funded intervention in G5 SAHEL and channeled UA 16 million to the Islamic Republic of Mauritania, Republic of Mali, Burkina Faso, Republic of Niger and the Republic of Chad.

The G5 Sahel countries face multifaceted threats. In addition to the climate and security crises which have generated the humanitarian crisis, there is also the COVID-19 pandemic. The pandemic has spawned political and security challenges as well as a health emergency in this region. The region is already grappling with budget constraints, weak health systems and infrastructure, high levels of poverty and lack of insurance coverage and social safety nets for the vast majority of the population. In addition, insecurity and political instability in some of the countries could contribute to further spreading COVID-19 because of the inflow of refugees and population displacements, as well as dash any hope for a rapid return to stable economic growth in the region. This project included refugees in its response.

**AfDB’s COVID response and Refugees**

The COVID response program funded by AfDB recognized that:

1. COVID-19 exacerbates inequalities and affects mostly the poorest and most vulnerable communities, often with devastating and life-threatening consequences. Persons and communities of particular concern include those affected by fragility, forcibly displaced (refugees and Internally Displaced Persons) and their hosting communities, stranded migrants and hosting communities, population groups exposed to particular risks (women, youth, the elderly, people with disabilities and/or other pre-existing health conditions, other marginalized groups etc.), among others. COVID-19 is also coinciding with climate change related events.
such as the current floods and locust invasion in East Africa, worsening the already existing vulnerability of populations due to loss of food, livelihoods, physical displacement and loss of homes.

e. African public health systems regularly face the challenge of stemming the spread of infectious diseases locally. The capacity of public health systems to screen for COVID-19, particularly in densely populated areas, including urban/semi-urban centers and areas of displaced populations (refugees, IDPs and hosting communities), is essential for the identification, quarantine and treatment of infected persons and, finally, for reducing impact on society. The solidity of public health institutions is also essential for sharing information and disseminating best practices among health professionals, but also for better adaptation and communication with the public. In Africa, – and although this may be the case in other regions of the world – the lack of diagnostic kits prevents having an accurate knowledge of the number of people infected with COVID-19. In addition, the infrastructures and health systems on the continent are somewhat fragile and less prepared to fight the spread of the virus, carry out significant screenings or monitor the progress of the disease. All these deficiencies are vectors that facilitate the transmission of the virus and the underestimation of the cases reported. Hence, mitigation measures are included in the project’s components in support of Africa CDC and RMCs.

f. In Central and Eastern Africa, instability within countries has also spread to neighboring regions. The number of refugees and internally displaced persons per capita in the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Somalia, Sudan and South Sudan is among the highest on the continent. The resulting pressures on resources, access to land and local economies, exacerbated by the context of the current COVID-19 crisis, can quickly become a source of conflict. In Central Africa, Cameroon is currently the most affected by the COVID-19 pandemic, adding to the suffering from attacks by the Boko Haram group in the Far North in recent years and a separatist movement in the so-called English-speaking North West and South West (NWSW) regions. Therefore, a rapid increase in the spread of COVID-19 could increase poverty and the risk of instability in Cameroon. This has the potential to indirectly affect six neighboring countries including Central African Republic (CAR), Gabon, Equatorial Guinea, Nigeria and Chad. The latest crisis in the CAR has shaken the country’s health system, characterized by a lack of connection between first and second level health facilities (FSLHF), and suffering from a lack of human resources in terms of quantity and quality in health facilities and regulatory services in the sector. In the Horn of Africa, the effects of cross-border conflict and insecurity have also been a major source of regional vulnerability. In Djibouti, high levels of pressure from Somalia, as well as transnational crime related to piracy and illicit trade have been observed. A rapid proliferation of COVID-19 in this context could have disastrous consequences on the already alarming humanitarian situation in the region. COVID-19 could further increase the vulnerability of the populations in this region.

The AfDB, in its strategy to address Fragility and Building Resilience in Africa, notes that:

- the importance of applying a fragility lens to be more sensitive to the dynamics of political economy and conflict;
- strengthening strategic partnerships that go beyond aid coordination to address more challenges of building resilience;
- adopting a regional approach to address regional dimensions of fragility;
- reaching out to non-state actors to build resilient societies and deliver services;
- integrating a gender perspective to encourage the participation of women in peace- and state-building process; and
- adopting a longer-term perspective to building resilience by planning for scale

The Bank’s approach to addressing fragility and building resilience is built on two objectives: inclusive growth and transition to green growth. The bank applies a fragility lens to these objectives to promote inclusion and mainstream gender and food security. As evident, the bank recognizes the intricate and direct linkage between economic development and building resilience.
AfDB and Gender

The bank’s Gender Strategy is anchored on three pillars that support the Bank’s priorities to promote transformative gender equality and women and girl’s empowerment and accelerate economic and social development in regional member countries (RMCs). These pillars are:

- **Pillar 1 - Empowering women through access to finance and markets**

  This pillar focuses on enhancing access to finance, and technical assistance to women SMEs to transform them into productive and competitive enterprises. Leveraging all its traditional instruments and through the development of innovative financing mechanisms, the Bank will also direct efforts to increasing the confidence of African financial institutions to provide financing and technical assistance to women SMEs. Supporting women SMEs with technical assistance in areas such as business model development, financial and business planning can reduce their risk profile thereby increase Bank lending to women entrepreneurs. The Bank will also support RMCs to establish a conducive business environment for women entrepreneurs to thrive. Additionally, the Bank will dedicate efforts to creating opportunities for women in the non-financial sectors of the Bank’s Non-Sovereign Operation (NSO) offerings. This pillar will also significantly contribute to eliminating poverty (SDG 1), promoting gender equality and women and girl’s empowerment (SDG 5), peace and justice (SDG 16) and eliminating poverty (SDG 1).

- **Pillar 2- Accelerating employability and job creation for women through skills enhancement**

  This pillar focuses on increasing access to relevant skills and jobs for women by taking into account the need to introduce more women to Science, Technology, Engineering and Mathematics (STEM) fields, while leveraging technology to enhance access to skills and information. This pillar will significantly contribute to achieving access to quality education (SDG 4), securing access to decent work and economic growth (SDG 8), promoting gender equality and women and girl’s empowerment (SDG 5), peace and justice (SDG 16) and eliminating poverty (SDG 1).

- **Pillar 3- Increasing women’s access to social services through infrastructure**

  Through this third pillar, the Bank aims to influence gender-responsive quality infrastructure development to guarantee women have adequate access and positively benefit from infrastructure projects as stakeholders, workers and end-users. Through increased access to quality infrastructure for women and girls, pillar 3 will directly contribute to achieving industry, innovation and infrastructure development (SDG 9) and indirectly to achieving good health and well-being (SDG 3), quality education (SDG 4), gender equality and women and girl’s empowerment (SDG 5), peace and justice (SDG 16), clean water and sanitation (SDG 6), and affordable and clean energy (SDG 7).
AfDB recognizes that gender imbalances deepen in conflict areas. Conflict can disrupt the supply and distribution of inputs and outputs, create price shocks and cause massive displacement of labor. Girls are twice as likely to be out of school than boys in countries affected by conflict. Women risk being victims of sexual trafficking, sexual and gender-based violence (GBV) including the risk of female genital mutilation (FGM). The risk of unwanted pregnancies, HIV infection and maternal death is enhanced. Usually separated from families, adolescents have even lower access to sexual and reproductive health knowledge let alone sanitation or menstrual products and are increasingly at risk of early child marriages. With reference to the Women, Peace and Security (WPS) agenda, the Bank strategized to particularly consider specifically targeting displacement women, girls, men, and boys (as refugees or internally displaced) and their hosting communities in its interventions.

The gender strategy also explicitly noted that women are also disproportionately affected by climate change and global health shocks such as COVID-19. Women are often responsible for gathering and producing food, collecting water, meeting hygiene needs and sourcing fuel for heating and cooking. With climate change, these tasks are becoming more difficult. Extreme weather events such as droughts and floods have a more significant impact on the poor and most vulnerable – 70% of the world’s poor are women. Also, the global COVID-19 pandemic has highlighted the ever-present disparity in economic and social livelihoods as well as the overexposure of women to the virus, increased workload, the economic damage and the domestic violence they face. Women bear the brunt of the economic and social fallout from the pandemic. In Sub-Saharan Africa, 89% of employment is informal; 86% of men are employed in the informal economy, compared to 92% of women. As the pandemic strains current global economic models, those employed in the informal economy are disproportionately affected.

The Gender Strategy aims to strengthen the Bank’s commitment to do more to address challenges and push forward gender equality and women and girls’ empowerment in Africa. The Bank will do so focusing on three pillars:

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<th>The High 5s</th>
<th>The strategic pillars</th>
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<td>Light Up and Power Africa</td>
<td>Equitable participation on men and women in the energy value chain and access to energy and energy products</td>
<td>Women empowered businesses have access to financing and technical assistance</td>
<td>Women, girls, men and boys are equally empowered to participate in and benefit from the growth and potential of the sectors in focus: energy, agriculture, trade, industry and human capital development</td>
<td>Gender inequality is reduced across the High 5s</td>
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<td>Feed Africa</td>
<td>Reinforced productivity and competitiveness of women and men value chain actors</td>
<td>Women and men acquire skills to access jobs through bank’s projects</td>
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<tr>
<td>Industrialize Africa</td>
<td>Increase precipitation of women and men across value chains</td>
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<tr>
<td>Improve the Quality of Life for the People of Africa</td>
<td>Equitable access to skills, basic services and jobs</td>
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Throughout the pillars, AfDB aimed to particularly focus on the poorest and most vulnerable, marginalised communities such as minorities, those with intellectual or physical disabilities, including migrants, forcibly displaced populations (refugees and IDPs) and their hosting communities as well as other marginalized groups, following an inclusive and whole of society approach.

The gender strategy placed importance on developing partnerships for scaling up and strengthening collaboration across the different stakeholders to allow the Bank to play a leading role in the continent’s most pressing, acute, and urgent social and economic issues which disproportionately affect women, girls, and youth. Partnerships were classified in knowledge generation partnerships, technical assistance partnerships and financial and investment partnerships. Specifically, these partnerships will allow the Bank to:

- Work in synergy with institutions such as UN Women, UN agencies and other development partners that have expertise and comparative advantage in addressing issues around social and cultural constraints and women’s legal status, including addressing challenges around female genital mutilation (FGM), access to sexual and reproductive health, early child marriages and GBV.

- Increase support and advocacy towards partners who focus on the poorest, most vulnerable, and marginalized communities such as minorities, those with intellectual or physical disabilities, including migrants, forcibly displaced populations (refugees and IDPs).

- Play a leading role in the continent's post-COVID recovery process by leverage its convening power to bring key partners such as financial institutions, central banks, CSOs among others to support women, girls and youth adversely affected by the crisis.

- Step-up advocacy and awareness around women’s land rights, a critical component in unlocking women’s economic, social and political empowerment: The Bank will enhance its partnerships with institutions who are active in the space. Address socio-economic issues that result from the effects of climate change, disasters, conflict, migration, internal displacement, political instability, and emergencies, and which disproportionately affect women and girls in Africa with acute effects in the Sahel and fragile states. Given the Bank’s presence in these regions, partnerships with institutions such as ICRC and other CSOs present on the ground are critical. The Bank will leverage and support partner programs through Bank instruments such as the rapid response interventions for fragile states.

- Scale up collaboration by co-designing programs and initiatives that allow for knowledge exchange and transfer of technical expertise.

- Bridge the information gap between the Bank, RMCs, and the women on the ground - e.g. market women, women in businesses across the continent who most need financial and technical support. Through partners such as Lioness of Africa, UN agencies, Pan-African Partners Organization (PAFO), AGRA amongst others, the Bank can effectively disseminate information on their initiatives (such as AFAWA), investments and training. These partnerships would allow more women owned businesses to apply and access available opportunities.

**AfDB and Youth**

The bank’s strategy for jobs for youth in Africa recognizes that youth are Africa’s greatest asset. While Africa's economic growth is positive, there is an urgent need to promote inclusive economic transformation and jobs-induced growth to improve the quality of life for all Africans. Africa’s youth population is rapidly growing and expected to double to over 830 million by 2050. If properly harnessed, this increase in the working age population could support increased productivity and stronger, more inclusive economic growth across the continent.

AfDB’s jobs for youth strategy took stock of the lessons learnt on youth employment to innovate through the current strategy. These lessons include;

**Youth employment interventions are often fragmented, focusing on only one aspect of the situation.** Youth unemployment is driven by interlinked and mutually reinforcing causes. These include demand challenges that impede job creation, supply challenges that limit the
development of an appropriately skilled youth workforce, and challenges in linking potential employers and relevant employees together effectively. However, many interventions and policies often focus on only one specific challenge (often supply-side challenges), thus limiting their overall impact. In addition, interventions are often not integrated or linked with wider macroeconomic or sector-specific policies.

**Lack of focus on the informal sector**, where the majority of youth are currently employed. Projects are often designed based on labor market data that more accurately captures formal versus informal workers; interventions mostly focus on reducing overall unemployment and not informal employment as well; and many monitoring and evaluation frameworks do not take into account indicators such as job quality and stability, which are especially challenging for informal workers. **Implication:** Jobs for Youth in Africa will take a holistic, ecosystem approach to addressing youth unemployment in Africa, both in terms of the types of challenges it addresses as well as the types of interventions employed.

Many interventions do not fully consider the needs and desires of youth. Oftentimes, youth employment programs are not designed by youth themselves. Youth are seen as recipients of assistance rather than active actors. Often, youth involvement in the design of a policy or program is only through a short consultation and does not go further. The outcomes of the National Consultative Meetings on Youth Employment, organized by ILO in early 2012, corroborate this issue. Youth highlighted their limited engagement in policy dialogue and lack of involvement in the implementation and M&E of youth interventions. They also highlighted the lack of appropriate forums to participate in national dialogues regarding their needs. **Implication:** Jobs for Youth in Africa will substantively engage a range of youth segments throughout the design and implementation of its programs, partnerships and investments.

There is also ongoing fragmentation of efforts amongst various actors. At the government level, a variety of ministries directly and indirectly deal with youth employment. However, a lack of national action plans and defined structures to bring different ministries together leads to a lack of coordination amongst government actors, which hampers overall effectiveness of interventions. In addition, there is often insufficient consultation with and engagement of the private sector. The private sector is an essential stakeholder in addressing youth unemployment, not only as the engine of job creation but also as a potential partner to implement complex interventions alongside governments and civil society actors. **Implication:** JfYA will promote strong partnerships with RMCs, private sector actors, and CSOs based on the context of each country - with the involvement of the respective RECs.

Implementation of interventions is often ineffective. While there are a number of global and regional declarations to promote employment, and youth employment specifically, the activities to date are still fragmented and fall short of the desired transformational change that is needed. For example, The Third Biennial Report on the Follow Up of the Implementation of the Ouagadougou Declaration stated that even though more member States are incorporating employment objectives and targets in their national development plans, there is still much to be done to create effective policies. Insufficient funding and limited flexibility in funding instruments for youth employment interventions are also challenges. **Implication:** The Jobs for Youth in Africa Strategy leverages the Bank’s convening role to accelerate a collective response that builds on synergies and drives the momentum for shared accountability for action and results. Clear implementation plans and financing flexibility is built into the design of JfYA.
More data and information from both research and evaluation is needed to enhance future programs and policies. There is a lack of comprehensive, accessible and aggregate information on youth employment programs, their impacts, and lessons. Despite efforts to map activities, there is insufficient data on what various national, regional and international actors are doing to promote youth employment and how resources are being used. In addition, there is also a lack of sufficient labor market data, disaggregated by age and sex, which enables the design of sufficient interventions. Labor market information systems are often weak, fragmented, limited in scope (e.g., do not capture the informal sector) and often outdated in terms of the available data. Implication: Jobs for Youth in Africa will establish an index and innovation and information lab to address this gap.

The AfDB has detailed strategies for addressing youth and gender and its response to COVID-19 included refugees, FDPs and host communities. The bank aims to draw on innovation to promote economic development especially amongst vulnerable and marginalized groups.

European Investment Bank

The European Investment Bank Group is the lending arm of the European Union. And is the biggest multilateral financial institution in the world and the largest provider of climate finance. It finances projects of common interest to several EU Member States which are of such size or nature that they cannot be funded entirely by the various means available in the individual countries. Establishing a protection shield for the European economy to deal with the fallout of the coronavirus breakout is such a project of common interest. On 9 April 2020 the Eurogroup, recognising COVID-19 as an unprecedented challenge with very severe socio-economic consequences, welcomed the EIB’s initiative to create a guarantee fund of €25 billion, which could support up to €200 billion of financing for European companies, with a focus on SMEs.

Moreover, the EIB Group established a financing package consisting of:

- Dedicated guarantee schemes based on existing programmes for immediate deployment. Based on a €1 billion guarantee tranche, the EIF will provide guarantees worth €2.2 billion to financial intermediaries, unlocking €8 billion in available financing.
- Dedicated liquidity lines to banks to ensure additional working capital support for SMEs and mid-caps of up to €10 billion.
- Dedicated asset-backed securities (ABS) purchasing programmes to allow banks to transfer risk on portfolios of SME loans, mobilizing up to another €10 billion of support.
- In parallel, the EIB announced a €5 billion pipeline of projects in the health sector using existing financial instruments, primarily the InnovFin Infectious Disease Facility, to finance projects that work towards halting the spread of or finding a cure for the coronavirus.

The EIB Group has also proposed a financing package that will go towards bridging loans, credit holidays and other measures designed to alleviate liquidity and working capital constraints for SMEs and mid-caps. The EIB Group, including the European Investment Fund, which specialises in support for SMEs, will work through financial intermediaries in the Member States and in partnership with national promotional banks.

The EIB Group also supported emergency measures to finance urgent infrastructure improvements and equipment needs in the health sector, using existing framework loans or undisbursed amounts from existing health projects.

Outside the European Union, EIB announced €5.2 billion of accelerated financing and targeted technical assistance. This was made available for clients in 100 countries as part of the ‘Team Europe’ response to the coronavirus and will strengthen urgent health investment and help to sustain jobs and livelihoods in sectors most threatened by the economic and social impact of the coronavirus.

The European Investment Bank (EIB) Group cooperates extensively with EU institutions, national promotional banks, and international financial institutions along with working closely with UN agencies, such as UNICEF, UNDP and the World Health Organization (WHO), other organisations such as the Wellcome Trust, and many more.

EIB and COVID-19

As a contribution to the COVID-19 response EIB has:

1. Worked with WHO on a framework for collaboration in the context of the current worldwide health crisis, and to anticipate and prepare for future epidemics.
2. Worked with the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation on initiatives such as the African Health Diagnostics Platform, under the European Union’s External Investment Plan. This platform aims to significantly improve diagnostic services and health outcomes for low income populations, and its rollout has been accelerated due to COVID-19.
3. Provided a guarantee facility for GAVI, the vaccine alliance, under the Cotonou partnership agreement.
4. Entered into an InnovFin Advisory agreement with CEPI, the Coalition for Epidemic Preparedness Innovations, to advise their beneficiaries involved in vaccine development.
The impact of the coronavirus on the European economy required a rapid response. The EIB Group’s COVID crisis response documents states that EIB is well placed to assist countries through:

- A set of proven guarantee products, both funded and unfunded, that will support the companies most affected by the crisis fast and effectively. These products have worked well in times of stress in the past and EIB envisions that they will work again now.
- A Pan-European network of partner banks, venture capital firms, and direct clients that can make sure the financing reaches final beneficiaries swiftly.
- Unique expertise in the health sector that enables us to identify the most promising biotech and healthcare companies across Europe and accelerate the development of treatment and vaccines through high-risk finance. Many EIB projects already signed are proving invaluable on the front line of the fight against the coronavirus: for example, diagnostics companies like Mobidiag and Curetis have focused on testing solutions for COVID-19 and associated conditions.
- The governance structure in place to enable Member States to monitor closely the performance of the European Union’s joint measures.

Annex 2 of EIB’s Guidance note to EIB promoters on environmental and social performance in EIB-financed operations in response to the COVID-19 outbreak crisis focussed on labor. EIB recognized that the COVID-19 crisis is having an unprecedented impact on workers and employment. The main consequences included job insecurity, health risks for workers and a lack of social protection. Governments constantly updated their regulations to respond to the numerous labor-related challenges that COVID-19 entails. During these uncertain times, the guidelines required EIB promoters to continue following labor related national laws and regulations, as well as EIB Environmental and Social Standard 8 on Labor Rights. The guidance note included recommendations aimed at supporting promoters in managing labor related challenges during the COVID-19 crisis including:

1. Job protection, including alternatives to retrenchment
2. Responsible retrenchment, which should only be considered as a last resort option
3. Vulnerable workers, i.e. workers that may be disproportionally affected by the COVID-19 crisis
4. Working conditions, for those that continue working during the emergency

**Job Protection:**

Following alternatives to retrenchment were recommended:

- Considering government support, which can include grants and tax relief if workers are retained;
- Transferring employees to other parts of the business;
- Encouraging workers to take on emergency-preparedness responsibilities if they have the necessary skills;
• Consulting with workers and their representatives to understand if workers may be willing to consider alternatives such as:
• Changes to work schedule (e.g. from full time to part time);
• Temporary wage reductions;
• Job-sharing arrangements (where two or more workers share the same job for a limited period of time);
• Voluntary/unpaid leave.

**Responsible Retrenchment**

The guidelines stated that if retrenchment (or collective dismissal) is unavoidable, national laws and regulations as well as EIB standards are followed. Following conditions must be followed:

• Must be in line with the principles of non-discrimination and equality for all and recognizes that in some cases certain individuals or groups are systematically discriminated against or excluded on the basis of their socioeconomic characteristics. Such characteristics include, but are not limited to: ethnicity, race, religion, sex, sexual orientation, gender identity, caste, descent, age, disability, HIV status, migrant status, language or where they live;
• Must include consultation of all relevant stakeholders. Promoters are to give sufficient notice and to consult the workers and workers representatives when there is no other option. The way in which consultations are performed should be sensitive to the health risks posed by COVID-19 and consider alternative and innovative ways of undertaking such consultations, avoiding face-to-face meetings;
• The promoter should maintain regular and open communication so as to avoid misunderstandings, build trust and provide reassurance in these uncertain times.

**Vulnerable Workers**

The note provided recommendations to focus on how to deal with vulnerable workers.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Potentially Vulnerable Workers</th>
<th>Factors</th>
<th>Suggested Mitigation Measures</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Temporary, seasonal or informal workers | • Job insecurity  
• Lack of social protection (including paid or sick leave)  
• mechanisms)  
• Difficulties in applying for alternative employment | • Consider transferring  
employees to other parts of the business  
• Offering minimal in-kind benefits (e.g. vouchers, accommodation) |
| Migrant Workers | • High reliance on employer, including visa and potentially worker accommodation  
• Difficulties in reaching their home countries  
• Lack of social protection  
• High risk of workers  
• Violating immigration laws of the host country due to international travel  
• restrictions  
• Language barriers in accessing health and other essential information | • Allow the employee to  
remain in their worker accommodation for a certain period of time  
and/or receive minimal in-kind benefits (e.g. vouchers, accommodation, visa extension)  
• Offer payment allowing the worker to reach their home country  
• Provide all information in an accessible and culturally appropriate manner. |
| Workers with underlying health issues, older workers and workers with disabilities | • Risk of developing serious health issues due to COVID-19 | • Explore flexible working arrangements and enhance social distancing measures wherever possible |
| Women (gender considerations) | • Limited access to social Protection  
• Disproportionate exposure to health risks due to occupational segregation and their overrepresentation in the care and health sectors  
• Increased child or elders care responsibilities  
• Pregnant women considered more at risk  
• Increased risk of sexual harassment, exploitation and abuse, including domestic and intimate partner violence due to forced-coexistence | • Assess and consider any potential differentiated impact of collective dismissals and mass retrenchments on women and men in the workforce and minimise any potential gender biases  
• Help to direct employees to needed services, including domestic violence hotlines  
• Request that pregnant women take all preventive measures (including flexible working arrangements) to avoid infection |
**Working Conditions:**

Whilst avoiding collective dismissals and ensuring the health and safety of the facilities, promoters should consider if staff can continue undertaking the work in view of travel/movement restrictions (e.g. curfews, lack of public transport, stay-at-home requirements by national/regional/local authorities, etc.), family circumstances (e.g. care for children in view of closure of childcare facilities and schools, etc.). The employer should inform workers of any change to working conditions such as work time reorganisation, leave and benefits entitlements, accommodation/food subsidies, wages, unemployment entitlements, etc.

Additional supporting measures recommended include:

- Ensuring that procedures and technology is available for workers to continue to provide quality work by working from home;
- Providing temporary coverage of rents/mortgage costs for workers facing reduced salaries;
- Facilitating the provision of food for workers facing reduced salaries;
- Supporting workers facing childcare needs due to the closure of day-care and schools by allowing flexible working arrangements, facilitating paid family and emergency leave;
- Implementing the necessary measures to ensure the health and safety of its workers.

Similarly, EIB’s Guidance note on inclusion recognized that the impact of COVID-19 is not uniform across sectors, individuals or locations. Specific socio demographic characteristics affect an individual’s capacity to cope with the health, economic and social impacts associated with the pandemic. Where individuals are systematically discriminated against or excluded from access to key services and resources, their vulnerability to the effects of such a health crisis is compounded. Such characteristics include, but are not limited to: ethnicity, race, religion, sex, sexual orientation, gender identity, caste, descent, age, disability, HIV status, migrant status, language or where they live.

Indeed, COVID-19 is disproportionately affecting the more vulnerable segments of populations and workforces, such as informal, self-employed, part-time, temporary, seasonal, migrant, older workers, as well as workers with underlying health issues and/or disabilities. Furthermore, it affects men and women differently. Occupational segregation, employment type and caring/domestic responsibilities vary according to gender, affecting the respective capacities of men and women to maintain their livelihoods and generating different levels of exposure to the health risks of COVID-19. In assessing and minimising the potential health risks to the workforce, in devising business continuity strategies and in seeking to support the ability of workers and local populations to cope with, and sustain, the economic impacts of the pandemic, EIB recommended that attention be paid to the socio demographic characteristics of a workforce and surrounding communities. This is the case across the application of EIB standards and specific COVID-19 related measures. In addition to specific underlying health conditions, and to those people who are traditionally excluded or discriminated against within a given context, the following factors can constitute a risk:

1. **Gender:** gender is a clear differentiating factor when it comes to the impact of COVID-19 on individuals. Existing workforce structures resulting in occupational segregation and gender pay gaps lead to gendered impacts of a health crisis on individuals and businesses, with COVID-19 impacts affecting men and women differently. Those differences exist in terms of exposure to the virus and to job losses, and in terms of one’s capacity to cope with the side effects of the pandemic, such as the inability to travel, lack of childcare solutions or poor access to social insurance schemes. Different solutions, that recognise the differentiated gender impacts of a health pandemic, are needed to cater for the specific characteristics of men and women.

2. **Poverty:** people living on the brink of poverty with little access to savings will be particularly exposed to the economic fallout of COVID-19. They may face hard choices between adhering to social distancing measures and economic survival. Studies of previous disease outbreaks (SARS and Ebola) have suggested that poverty is an important factor in disease transmission. In particular, people who depend on a daily income from informal economic activities, those in precarious employment situations, those without paid leave or teleworking solutions, and/or in sectors where little social regulation or capacity to compensate worker exits will suffer disproportionately from restrictions imposed by COVID management and the economic fallout of the pandemic.

3. **Migrant status:** migrant workers are amongst the populations most directly affected by COVID-19, due to the closure of economic sectors that typically employ them (for example, the garment sector), the concentration of migrants in sectors where health and safety guidelines are difficult to enforce (for example, agriculture), poor access to health information for some categories of migrants, limited access to health services including health insurance, risks of getting stranded due to border closures, and finally, reliance on remittances that have drastically decreased.

4. **Location:** those in fragile and conflict-affected situations face enhanced risks, where the dangers that COVID-19 outbreaks pose will be magnified. Conflict, poor conditions in displacement sites, overpopulated refugee camps and constrained resources are likely to amplify the risks for the most vulnerable people. Furthermore, health systems and local manufacturing capacity of basic medical equipment can be extremely weak in such contexts, risking an exacerbation of existing fragilities that could lead to social unrest and a deterioration in security.
Therefore, and recognising that COVID-19 will have differential impacts based on location, sectors and the socioeconomic characteristics of individuals, and that the pandemic risks further reinforcing entrenched inequalities, EIB promoters may consider how their projects and investments can:

1. Minimise the potential impact of the pandemic’s effects on the most vulnerable and exposed segments of their workforce and the local population, whilst looking for opportunities to promote and support social inclusion.

2. Learn from the current pandemic to further build the resilience of their business and projects to sustain such future shocks, and to do so in an inclusive manner that avoids disproportionate impacts on more vulnerable segments of a population.

In practice, EIB promoters could consider taking the following actions. These are provided as a resource for promoters to draw on in considering potential options and seeking to identify good practice. They are not intended as an exhaustive list of options.

**At the level of the workforce:**
- ensuring equal representation of women on internal taskforces set up to assess and mitigate COVID-19 related risks. Ensuring that such committees are diverse and representative of the entire workforce, and in particular of those most vulnerable to the effects of COVID, including migrant workers, those with underlying health conditions, staff with disabilities and parents;
- introducing temporary, or where feasible longer-term, inclusive employment opportunities such as alternative and flexible working arrangements, part-time opportunities and/or remote working technology;
- offering the possibility to take unpaid leave, with the right to return;
- contributing to national and complementary insurance schemes that provide for paid sick leave, parental leave or caretaker leave;
- providing financial support and paid leave to caregivers, including monetary support for emergency childcare, disability, and elderly care and extending paid leave to all employees.
- communicating positive messaging around care that encourages women and men to take the time and resources available to them to care for themselves and their dependents;
- sharing resources concerning domestic violence with all employees, together with information on how to report and access domestic violence support services (such as national/local hotlines and hyperlinks to local domestic violence services) and relevant HR documentation; in consultation with experts.
- enabling employees to report domestic abuse through existing employee assistance programmes. Providing monetary or in-kind support to domestic violence services;
- assessing the differentiated impact of collective dismissals and mass retrenchments on vulnerable groups and on women and men, so that women (or indeed any other segment of the workforce) are not disproportionately exposed or left vulnerable due to their over-representation in low-skilled or low-paid job roles and that all employees understand their labor rights;
- ensuring that all protective equipment is equally suited to male and female body types;
- ensuring that information is provided in an accessible and inclusive manner to all members of the workforce (in multiple languages to reach all migrant workers, orally or through symbols for those who cannot read, among others);
- ensuring than the entire workforce gets information about how to prevent and respond to the epidemic in ways that all workers can understand, regardless of socioeconomic characteristics (including age, disability, ethnicity, minority, migrant status, language). Messaging should consider gender, social and cultural differences in hygiene/sanitation practices and required changes should be implemented in a socially, culturally and gender-sensitive manner in so far as possible.

**At the level of community engagement:**
- through corporate social responsibility programmes, supporting services in the local community that address specific risks related to COVID-19 such as the increased risk of gender-based and domestic violence during confinement periods and the limited access to sexual and reproductive health services;
- providing easily accessible information and guidance on where to find support on these more indirect risks associated with the outbreak of a pandemic, such as increased gender-based violence and poor access to non-virus related health services;
- engage remotely with local communities to provide access to information for all populations,
- avoiding convening large groups where this may increase the risk of transmission, whilst accounting for age, disability, education, gender, migration status, sexual orientation, and the existence of pre-existing health conditions in this engagement.

While EIB did not directly intervene in work with refugee and newcomers, the partners it supported and countries and businesses it offered services to supported the inclusion and job protection agenda strongly.
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD)

The EBRD was created in April 1991 to ‘foster the transition towards open market-oriented economies and to promote private and entrepreneurial initiative’. EBRD offers a wide range of financial instruments and other services, including business advice for SMEs, and takes a flexible approach to structuring its products.

EBRD medium-term strategy (SCF), launched in October 2020, affords particular importance to building back better from the pandemic along three key themes: low carbon transition, digital transformation, and equality of opportunity.

- supporting the transition to a green, low-carbon economy, with green finance comprising more than 50 percent of our business;
- Promoting equality of opportunity through access to skills and employment, finance and entrepreneurship and support for women, young people and other under-served communities
- Accelerating the digital transition, unleashing the power of technology to bring about change for the better.

The EBRD will reinforce its private sector focus, with 75 percent of its business in the private sector over the course of 2021-2025. The SCF confirms that the Bank has sufficient capital to support its proposed strategy even in the face of financial stress. Over the five years of the strategy period, the Bank can lend consistently up to €13 billion annually compared to the record level of annual lending of €10 billion in 2019.

The Bank moved swiftly in response to the COVID-19 crisis with the approval of two Solidarity Packages. These set out the ways in which clients and countries of operations will be supported in the early part of the SCF period, including exceptional and innovative measures to address short-term needs in partner banks, small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and infrastructure providers.

EBRD committed all its activity in 2020-21, worth €21 billion, to help regions counter the economic impact of the coronavirus pandemic. Its shareholders have approved response and recovery measures that will significantly enhance its Solidarity Package. EBRD is also preparing countries for the post-virus era.

Priority actions in the bank’s SCF include

- Rapid deployment and scaling up of the TFP programme and extended use of risk-sharing facilities;
- Enabling support to the real economy by strengthening the balance sheets of partner institutions through equity and quasi-equity investment; provision of higher risk junior debt and increasing participation in capital market transactions;
- Exploring the innovative use of government guarantees to enable cross-border banks to increase lending to firms.

Priority actions to accelerate transition as part of the recovery over the SCF period include:

- Increasing competition and efficiency in the sector by supporting the digitalization of incumbent financial institutions and selectively investing in challenger institutions, new business models and suppliers of technology to the banking industry;
- Supporting the development of green finance by scaling up existing activity as well as broadening the suite of products, including risk-sharing and green bonds;
- Reinforcing longer-term integration through developing the financial system’s support for trade across the region;
- Fostering the resilience of the financial sector through debt and equity financing to meet evolving regulatory requirements, competitive pressures and addressing currency mismatches;
- Expanding access to finance to underserved client segments, including women (including through the Women in Business programme), youth and refugees.

EBRD and SMEs

The Bank also has an integrated approach to working with SMEs throughout the stages of their development. The Bank has specific expertise in supporting privatisation as well as in bringing commercial approaches to state-owned enterprises, which is likely to be increasingly relevant in the wake of increased state intervention in the economy to combat the impact of the COVID-19 crisis. Priority actions to preserve transition to be undertaken specifically during the period of the crisis response include:

- Exploring innovative approaches to ensuring continued access to finance, preserving corporate bond market development and access to local currency finance;
• Supporting firms with strong long-term prospects to meet short-term liquidity needs, especially in the agribusiness, tourism and automotive sectors, through deferral and restructuring of existing loans and addressing longer-term solvency concerns through equity investment;

• Providing tailored advice to agribusiness firms to navigate the crisis and its implications

SMEs form the vast majority of the firms in EBRD’s countries of operations. Consequently, they constitute the backbone of economies by providing jobs and livelihoods. Supporting SMEs has been a key priority for the EBRD since 2014 through the implementation of a dedicated Small Business Initiative. The OECD has highlighted that SMEs are at the centre of the economic crisis brought on by COVID-19. SMEs face both a supply shock through the reduction of labor force, disruption of supply chains and shortage of goods and a demand shock given lower consumption spending and liquidity shortages. Furthermore, SMEs are heavily present in specific sectors that the measures to contain the pandemic are severely affecting, including the tourism and transport sectors.

Women owned SMEs already faced barriers to access to finance before the crisis and are expected to be disproportionately affected by the crisis, compounded by the fact that women are often primary caregivers. The Bank responded quickly to meet the needs of SMEs in the very early days of the crisis, including by:

• Supporting the flow of finance to SMEs from partner finance institutions through expanding existing programmes for risk sharing and dedicated SME credit lines;

• Stepping up support for lending in local currency to SMEs by partner financial institutions (PFIs) and

• Providing crisis response advice on financial management and business continuity to both existing advisory clients and new SMEs and accelerating the roll-out of digital delivery of advisory services.

These activities will continue to be refined and implemented during the new SCF period as the impact of the crisis unfolds. In addition, over the SCF period, the Bank will continue to strengthen its approach to SMEs, which combines indirect financing through PFIs, direct financing by the Bank alone or in partnership with PFIs, business advice and policy engagement.

Donor support plays an important part in strengthening impact. Strategic priorities include:

• Creating new products that integrate investment and new areas of advisory support, designed to address key issues such as youth employment and skills, with a strong focus on digitalization;

• Supporting SMEs to integrate supply chains by investing in aggregators via digital supply chain platforms and/or PFIs’ own supply chain solutions, including by providing advisory services to both SMEs and aggregators. Also looking to collaborate with other MDBs to support SME participating in supply chains through reverse factoring;

• Expanding the Bank’s successful ‘Blue Ribbon’ programme which supports emerging leaders in the sector;

• Strengthening the coherence and integration of the Bank’s instruments to achieve greater impact through targeted policy dialogue, expanded market coverage and lead to a better performing portfolio;

• Expanding the use of existing products, such as Women in Business, to additional countries of operations;

• Exploring the merits of creating an impact fund, possibly jointly with the African Development Bank, drawing in official and private investors, for SME development in the SEMED region. This would replicate the Bank’s success with the Enterprise Expansion Fund in the Western Balkans

EBRD and Vulnerable Groups

The EBRD prioritises groups that experience disproportionate barriers to economic opportunity due to circumstances outside their control – women, youth, people living in remote areas, refugees and refugee hosting communities and people with disabilities. Wherever possible, the Bank will continue to explore extending its approach to other disadvantaged groups such as migrants, LGBTI people and the ageing workforce.

The Bank promotes equality of opportunity through a practical approach rooted in its private sector focus, addressing three key dimensions:

• Promoting access to employment and skills for disadvantaged groups through a unique private sector-focused approach. The Bank supports firms to improve human capital development and talent management to enhance efficiency and support growth, whilst at the same time opening up access to jobs and new skills. It also draws on the power of the private sector to tackle key policy challenges, from introducing national level skills standards that reflect better employer needs, to the removal of labor market restrictions for women that affect talent acquisition and can limit opportunities for innovation and growth.

• Supporting access to finance and entrepreneurship by investing directly, and through financial institutions, to provide tailored financial and non-financial services and improve access to finance to women-led SMEs, youth-led SMEs and SMEs operating in less developed regions. The EBRD also engages in policy dialogue to develop an enabling environment for the target groups.
• Improving access to services by supporting inclusive and gender sensitive design of infrastructure and safe transport for all, improving connectivity for regional areas and harnessing the advantages of technology. This also includes a focus on ensuring gender-sensitive green investments, for example, through promoting women’s participation in renewable energy, clean technology and sustainable infrastructure. At the policy level, the Bank promotes the integration of gender-sensitive measures into national infrastructure strategies (including transport or municipal services provisions), as well as the introduction of inclusive procurement approaches.

The EBRD’s approach enables businesses to develop diverse and gender-balanced workforces and tap into better-qualified talent pools. It also provides disadvantaged groups with relevant skills, access to finance and services that open up opportunities for their participation in economic activity not previously available to them. The Bank thus offers a distinctive value proposition to private sector clients and countries across a wide range of sectors and countries of operations, fostering sustainable and inclusive economic growth.

Furthermore, the Bank is committed to continuing to mainstream gender across its operations for this purpose, the Bank integrates gender considerations as an essential component of investments and policy engagements, as well as into sectoral and country strategies. To support this work, signalling from senior management is crucial as is building the capacity of staff and developing gender toolkits

**Resilience Framework**

EBRD has enhanced established frameworks that can reach out to SMEs and corporates which are not yet its clients. The Vital Infrastructure Support Programme to finance working capital, stabilisation, and essential public investment is one such tool. EBRD continues to provide the government with high quality, straightforward and usable policy advice.

The bank has joined forces with governments and bilateral and multinational donors to address urgent needs and tackle the long-term impact of the COVID-19 pandemic. According to EBRD, it is building back better, greener economies, boosting small businesses, improving vital infrastructure and supporting policy engagement and advisory services by working with its partners. The programme is playing a major role in the EBRD’s efforts to help its partners, clients and regions respond to and recover from the impact of the coronavirus pandemic. As importers and exporters grapple with increasingly complex supply routes, there has been a rapid rise in demand for trade finance that is vital to keeping the channels of trade open. The ongoing pandemic has resulted in a surge of demand for support from the TFP. From January 2020 to September 2020, the TFP supported the financing of a record volume of new foreign trade in excess of €2 billion.

As part of its own response to the pandemic, the EBRD is also stepping up its activities in supporting trade in critical goods, including medical products and energy/food commodities through the programme. Thanks to the programme’s success at sustaining local economies through supporting international trade, the TFP could be described as the EBRD’s prime instrument for responding to the crisis. In general, the TFP strengthens the ability of local banks to provide trade financing, and through these banks gives entrepreneurs throughout our regions the support they need to increase their access to the import and export trade.

EBRD works with a large network of local banks in the EBRD regions and worldwide.

**EBRD Refugee Response Plan:**

EBRD Refugee Response Plan, launched in 2016 in the wake of the Syrian crisis and focused specifically on supporting host communities and refugees alike in Jordan and Turkey. The civil war in Syria has displaced millions of people in the largest refugee crisis since World War II. Many have fled to neighbouring countries - including Jordan and Turkey, where the EBRD invests. The EBRD’s response to the challenges posed by the sudden surge in population in these two transition economies is to help build the host-countries’ economic resilience to cope with the crisis, now and in the months and years ahead.

Humanitarian relief, provided by specialized agencies, needs to be complemented by urgent development support. Here institutions like the EBRD can make a contribution – and an impact. The Bank has prepared a €900 million investment plan consisting of EBRD funds (up to €500 million) and donor contributions (up to €400 million – with €100 million pledged by the Bank through its Shareholder Special Fund). At the same time, the Bank is forging ahead with the first steps to alleviate the refugee crisis. Since 2016, the EBRD has invested €352 million in the refugee response plan.

The EBRD is engaged with investments, technical cooperation and policy dialogue to promote livelihood opportunities and inclusion as well as advancing economic development. Building on its experience, the Bank focuses on areas where it has the track record, know-how and strong networks to improve people’s lives quickly.

Turkey hosts the largest share of refugees from Syria, with numbers estimated around 2.7 million. In Jordan, the 1.4 million Syrian newcomers represent 13 per cent of the current population. In both countries, almost all refugees (90 per cent) live outside of camps and are mostly concentrated in cities close to the border.

The sharp increase in population has had an enormous impact which affects the lives of local communities and the overall economies of the two countries. Public services such as water and sanitation, solid waste management...
and urban transport, which in many instances were already in need of upgrade, are now extremely stretched and fail to serve the increasing number of people. Vulnerable communities of local and refugee populations struggle for livelihood opportunities - so much needed to cement social cohesion.

To deal with these issues and bolster refugee-hosting communities, the EBRD promotes a strong role for the private sector. It can help provide employment to both host-communities and refugees with work permits. In addition, increased private sector participation in municipal projects can accelerate the upgrade of infrastructure to improve urban life, preserve the environment and ultimately benefit the economy as a whole.

Many of EBRD’s projects have immediate impact. The extension of micro-loans through local financial institutions to disadvantaged segments of the population such as women boosts opportunities for refugees and local population to establish businesses. Rapid financial and institutional support to municipal companies operating in areas densely populated by refugees helps to ensure uninterrupted delivery of services, for example for collection and disposal of solid waste and availability of public transport.

In Jordan EBRD is supporting the City of Amman in modernizing the landfill which serves the capital (home to half of the Jordanian population and 30 per cent of all refugees present in the country) as well as the cities of Zarqa and Rusayfah, home to a significant number of refugees.

In Turkey, thanks to an EBRD loan and grants from the SSF, the city of Gaziantep, which saw a sharp rise of its population due to refugee inflows, acquired 50 new buses which are increasing the service for commuters. The Bank is now working on extending another loan to continue improving urban transport.

The Bank could not face these challenges without the support of donors. Together with other actors EBRD is playing an urgent role to play to alleviate the economic and social pressures in the concerned regions. We are delivering now and, with the help of our donors, will do more in the months and years to come.

The EBRD’s inclusive response to the refugee crisis targets host communities and refugees alike and aims to help lessen pressure on social cohesion and have an immediate impact. It delivers investments to alleviate the strain on public services. It aims to increase employment opportunities through finance and advice to small businesses. It also offers inclusion programmes to facilitate economic participation through skill mapping and training, especially for young people and women.

The bank’s plan of activities, which relies on essential donor support, covers three urgent priorities in Jordan and Turkey.
• **Infrastructure development**—In order to alleviate the already significant strain on public services such as water and sanitation, solid waste and urban transport, the EBRD invests in municipal infrastructure to support critical improvements and to adapt the services to the increased demand in refugee-hosting communities. Substantial grant co-financing is especially important in the municipal sector.

EBRD investments also include support for project design and implementation, ensuring that accurate environmental and social impact assessments are taken into account from the outset. At the same time, the Bank involves utility companies in capacity-building training to ensure the adoption of best practice in areas such as financial management, tariff regime and corporate governance.

An important element of these projects are stakeholder engagement programmes which involve representatives of all concerned communities, in this case both host-community and refugees. The programmes provide information about the projects and a platform to voice concerns. They also roll out educational campaigns about how to use resources efficiently (e.g. how to dispose of solid waste, how to save water) as well as opportunities offered by services (e.g. public transport routes and ticket tariffs).

Finally, EBRD investments are complemented by sector reform activities, focusing on increasing the operational and financial sustainability and efficiency of the sector, including private sector involvement.

• **Small and medium-sized enterprises growth**—Promoting growth and the improved performance and competitiveness of small businesses is a key component in strengthening economic resilience in refugee-hosting communities.

Under its Small Business Initiative, the EBRD is working to improve access to finance and know-how for small businesses in underserved areas of south-eastern and central Turkey and Jordan.

The Bank is working with local financial institutions to develop credit lines for on-lending to small and medium-sized enterprises, including risk sharing, as well as providing direct financing to businesses.

The EBRD also helps small businesses to access the know-how they need to develop and grow. Our offer includes advisory projects with local consultants as well as training courses for businesses. At the same time, the Bank is working with local business support organisations, helping them to offer more support to entrepreneurs by providing information on regulations, access to finance and strengthening local professional networks and knowledge of local supply chains.

• **Economic inclusion and gender**—In support of refugee-hosting countries the EBRD is building on its private sector-led economic inclusion approach as well as its strong commitment to promote gender equality to enhance access to better skills, formal employment and entrepreneurship opportunities.

The Bank is working with its clients, governments and other key stakeholders to increase the quality of local training based on employers’ skills requirements, create opportunities for skills verification, and support the creation of better knowledge about the impact of the refugee crisis on all parts of the community.

In parallel, the Bank aims to provide pre-employment training for job seekers in partnership with prospective employers and provide job-matching and career guidance. The EBRD is furthermore exploring ways in which to enhance the financial inclusion of local communities, including refugees, through the extension of financial products to people outside the formal banking system.

The Bank is addressing the needs of women and men. Recognising that refugee women find additional barriers to their social and economic integration, the Bank aims to implement women-targeted interventions to support their access to employment, entrepreneurship and basic services.

**EBRD and ECONOMIC INCLUSION**

Economic inclusion, the opening up of economic opportunities to under-served social groups, is integral to achieving a transition towards sustainable market economies.

An inclusive market economy ensures that anyone regardless of their gender, place of birth, family background, age or other circumstances, over which they have no control, has full and fair access to labor markets, finance and entrepreneurship and, more generally, economic opportunity. Inclusion is thus an intrinsic element of a sustainable market economy.

Promoting an inclusive market-based system is about efficient (human) resource allocation rather than being a social policy choice. But there is also a political dimension to inclusion. Beyond its contribution to efficient markets, fair and equitable access to economic opportunity is essential in fostering broad support for market reforms and, ultimately, sustainable market economies.

Economic inclusion is therefore an important transition quality. If people are given a chance to succeed, they are more likely to participate in the workforce, pursue education, or engage in other activities that lead to economic growth. This, in turn, strengthens the transition process.
Through its private sector inclusion model, the EBRD builds inclusion elements directly into its investments across all sectors and regions, creating pathways into jobs and training for young people, women and rural populations whilst addressing challenges businesses face due to skills shortages, lack of workforce diversity or inadequate access to new markets.

Examples of EBRD’s economic inclusion projects include: investments in the manufacturing, retail, and infrastructure sectors that create pathways into jobs and training for young people, women and those in underdeveloped regions whilst addressing challenges businesses face due to skills shortages; credit lines and business advisory for women entrepreneurs; and investments that facilitate access to quality water supply resulting in improved economic opportunities for men and women in underserved regions.

EBRD launched its first Economic Inclusion Strategy (2017 – 2021) in May 2017. The aim of the inclusion strategy is to accelerate the transition of countries towards inclusive market economies by harnessing the power of the private sector to create economic opportunities for all.

In this context, the EBRD will strengthen its project and policy activities to enhance access to economic opportunity for women, youth and regions. It will also carefully and gradually widen its inclusion approach to other groups such as ageing populations, refugees or Roma in line with country priorities. The EBRD will work through its projects and associated policy dialogue to enhance economic inclusion across three key thematic areas:

- Access to employment and skills.
- Entrepreneurship and access to finance.
- Access to services that enhance economic opportunities.

The Economic Inclusion Strategy draws on the EBRD’s Environmental and Social Policy (ESP) and aligns with its Strategy for the Promotion of Gender Equality (SPGE).

**Economic Inclusion of Refugees**

Economic inclusion is one of the core three pillars of the EBRD’s refugee crisis response programme: infrastructure development, small and medium-sized enterprise growth, and economic inclusion and gender.

In support of refugee-hosting countries the EBRD is building on its private sector-led economic inclusion to enhance access to work-based learning opportunities and skills verification mechanisms in the most affected regions, especially as part of global effort - such as the Jordan Compact.

To foster entrepreneurship opportunities, the EBRD is furthermore supporting financial institutions as they expand services they offer to local businesses, including those owned or managed by refugees or employing refugees. A Gender Focal Point has been appointed to ensure that gender considerations are reflected across all parts of the EBRD’s refugee response programme.

In parallel, the EBRD undertakes research about its refugee inclusion activities, in Jordan and in Turkey, to enhance knowledge of the impact of the influx of refugees on host communities, identify measures to address hard and soft barriers to integrate refugees in the labor market, and to monitor and evaluate the impact to learn and apply lessons in on-going programmes.

In all these endeavors, we work in close partnership with International Labor Organisation, European Training Foundation, UNHCR and relevant international and local agencies.

**The EBRD’s just transition initiative**

Guided by its Economic Inclusion Strategy and Green Economy Transition approach, the Bank will help its countries of operations to achieve a just transition towards sustainable and inclusive market economies. This will be based on the EBRD’s experience of enhancing economic inclusion through private sector investments and associated policy engagements to achieve structural changes to support workers and communities that are at risk of being left behind due to the transition towards a green economy.

The EBRD will proactively identify investment and policy activities that can accelerate a just transition, with a focus on three priority themes:

- Green economy transition: The EBRD will work with clients with high-carbon assets in the transition to a low-carbon economy. This includes targeting the reconversion of high-carbon assets, remediation and rehabilitation of land, and a range of other green investments that create access to local employment.

- Supporting workers: The Bank will promote access to alternative livelihoods for those whose livelihoods are affected by the transition process through reskilling and enhancing entrepreneurship within the context of addressing underlying drivers of inequality.

- Regional economic development: Emphasising activities that provide access to quality employment, including tailored support for competitive SMEs and larger firms as well as the financing of projects in sustainable infrastructure.

In particular, the Bank will support green investments that can be implemented alongside investments and policy interventions to enhance green skills. It will promote access to alternative employment opportunities through active labor market policies, employment programmes and workforce upskilling, within the context of fostering digitalisation and greening of the local, regional and
national economies. The EBRD will also support regional development strategies that can mitigate regional disparities and address underlying drivers of inequality at the regional and national levels by providing equal access to skills and employment; finance and entrepreneurship; and public services that enhance economic opportunities. This will include support with: the development of inclusive regional development strategies, education and skills development policies for future of work, investments in TVET and high education PPPs and private provision; support for women and youth led SMEs and larger firms in labor intensive sectors.

To promote such efforts, we will work in close partnership with local, regional and national governments, private and public sector employers, training providers, employment agencies as well as international donors and organisations, such as the European Commission, World Bank, European Training Foundation, the International Labor Organization and other partners.

**Economic Inclusion Research**

The EBRD has a rigorous and broad research programme on inclusion issues.

At an operational level, the assessments of economic inclusion gaps continue to provide the analytical backbone of its inclusion approach. Based on the concept of equality of opportunity, the EBRD measures the extent to which economic institutions, markets and education systems extend economic opportunities to individuals regardless of their specific circumstances, such as their gender, age or place of birth. The resulting inclusion gaps reflect international best practice and are centered on the EBRD’s transition mandate.

As per the Economic Inclusion Strategy (2017 – 21) this approach is being expanded to other potential circumstances and associated groups that (i) face disproportionate barriers to economic opportunity, (ii) constitute a substantial political or economic priority in the country, and (iii) where there is a clear business case for the EBRD to foster their economic inclusion through private sector engagement and associated policy dialogue.

The EBRD’s Transition Report 2016 ‘Transition for all: equal opportunities in an unequal world’ furthermore provides a core analysis of inequality and inclusion challenges across the EBRD regions. See the 2013 Transition Report for more details on the theoretical methodology behind the conceptualization of economic inclusion for cross country research.

The EBRD also manages a growing portfolio of project-related inclusion research. Examples include studies in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Mongolia and Morocco that use randomised control trials to detect the impact of access to microcredit on a host of outcomes, such as consumption, savings and entrepreneurship. Economic experiments are being used to analyse supply side barriers for women’s access to finance in Turkey. Other research work investigates the relationship between levels of infrastructure development and inclusion in Central Asia.

Lastly, the EBRD is interested in the relationship between economic opportunity, migration and entrepreneurship. Ongoing research looks at these links, using the Western Balkans as a case study.

**EBRD and Gender Equality**

EBRD values gender equality as an integral part of the bank’s commitment to promoting sustainable and environmentally sound development across our investment and donor-funded activities. Gender equality is a principal element in the promotion of sound business management and the advancement of sustainable growth in the countries where the EBRD invests.

Building on the experience gained under our Gender Action Plan 2009 and the Strategic Gender Initiative, the EBRD has approved its Strategy for the Promotion of Gender Equality 2016-2020 which identifies the specific gender areas where the EBRD can best add value given its business model and mandate. The Strategy sets out our approach to mainstream gender equality into EBRD operations by 2020, and comes at a critical time in the continuous development of the Bank’s operations in the southern and east Mediterranean region.

The Strategy for the Promotion of Gender Equality 2016-2020 provides for a more formal expression of engagement of the EBRD’s commitment to promoting gender equality and equality of opportunities.

It aims to increase gender equality and equality of opportunities in the countries where the EBRD invests, as an important contributor to well-functioning market economies and inclusive societies – a core component of sustainable and equitable transition.

Under the Strategy for the Promotion of Gender Equality, and building on our experience under the GAP2009 and the Strategic Gender Initiative, we will continue to

- apply a degree of prioritisation on a sub-set of countries, following on from the gender gap analysis undertaken in 2015;
- provide a targeted product offer focused on promoting access to finance, access to skills and employment; and access to services;
- Systematically monitor and evaluate our performance.

In addition, under the EBRD’s Women in Business Programmes, which provide for a combination of financing and technical cooperation, the Small Business Support team provides grant-based support for extensive training for women starting their own businesses.
Identifying, designing and assessing projects that promote equal opportunities in a specific country require a good understanding of:

• the areas in which gender gaps are greatest;

• what explains these gaps, i.e. what institutional, economic, social, or political characteristics of the economy they might depend on;

• the channels through which EBRD projects might be able to influence the conditions affecting gender gaps; and finally,

• how to find projects that might deliver gender-related systemic impact and measuring that impact.

EBRD has explicit focus on inclusion, diversity and emergency response in a building back better context. Programs on refugees are linked to economic inclusion and are therefore more likely to sustain.

Inter-American Development Bank (IaDB)

Established in 1959, the IDB supports Latin American and Caribbean economic development, social development and regional integration by lending to governments and government agencies, including State corporations. The IDB Group, composed of the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), IDB Invest and the IDB Lab, offers flexible financing solutions to its member countries to finance economic and social development through lending and grants to public and private entities in Latin America and the Caribbean.

It is the leading source of development finance for Latin America and the Caribbean. It helps to improve lives by providing financial solutions and development knowhow to public and private sector clients. The group comprises the IDB, which has worked with governments for 60 years; IDB Invest, which serves the private sector; and IDB Lab, which tests innovative ways to enable more inclusive growth.

The Bank is owned by 48 sovereign states, which are its shareholders and members. Only the 26 borrowing countries are able to receive loans. The five largest members by shareholdings (with their share of total voting power) are the United States (30.0%), Argentina (11.4%), Brazil (11.4%), Mexico (7.3%) and Japan (5.0%).

The resources of the IADB consist of the Ordinary Capital, the Fund for Special Operations (FSO, inactive) as defined in the Agreement, the Intermediate Financing Facility Account (IFF) and the IDB Grant Facility (GRF). In 2010 the IDB’s Board of Governors approved the 9th General Capital Increase (IDB-9), adding $70 billion in paid in and callable capital to IDB’s existing $100 billion capital base. The March 2021 Assembly approved a resolution authorizing the work necessary to consider a potential capital increase of around US $ 80 billion.

The Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) Group mounted a historic effort in 2020 to assist its 26 member countries in Latin America and the Caribbean to manage the economic and social impacts of the coronavirus pandemic and lay the groundwork for recovery and sustainable
growth, approving a record loans for almost $21.6 billion in new financing. In response to unprecedented need in the region – the world’s hardest-hit by COVID-19 – the Bank rapidly reformulated tools and fast-tracked operations that led to increases of 11% in sovereign guaranteed approvals and 55% in disbursements, compared to 2019.

It’s financial products include loans, grants, guarantees and equity investments (the latter available from the IDB Invest and IDB Lab). The Bank also provides financing for national and regional technical cooperation programs in areas ranging from institutional strengthening to transfer of knowledge. The Bank’s lending and its grants to member countries are funded from four sources: member countries’ subscriptions and contributions, borrowings from capital markets, equity accumulated since the Bank’s inception, and co-financing ventures.

These resources are available to borrowers via the Bank’s Ordinary Capital (OC), the Fund for Special Operations (FSO), the IDB Grant Facility (GRF), the Intermediary Financing Facility (IFF) and various trust funds, established by individual countries or groups of countries.

**IDB and COVID-19**

Like the rest of the world, Latin America and the Caribbean faced an unprecedented set of challenges in 2020. In addition to the human tragedy caused by the coronavirus pandemic, the region suffered a historic economic contraction of more than 8% of GDP. An estimated 34 million people lost their jobs, and at least 40 million fell into poverty. Unless we reverse these setbacks, the region could lose much of the economic and social ground gained in the 21st century.

Some governments have mounted public-health outreach campaigns that have succeeded in mitigating the virus’s impact. Others have deployed subsidies and cash transfers to ensure that millions of families do not lose their homes and can meet basic needs. We have also seen good policies to support small and medium-sized enterprises, and stimulus programs in key productive sectors.

The Bank has increased its financing, adjusted lending instruments and accelerated procedures to help the countries of the region cope with the pandemic, and its socioeconomic impacts. The IDB Group approved a record $21.6 billion in financing in 2020 in response to COVID-19, capped by the mobilization of $1 billion for vaccine acquisition and distribution.

Approvals increased by 10% and our disbursements by 38%, compared to 2019. Among sovereign guaranteed approvals, 36 projects, totaling $6.63 billion, directly addressed the emergency. A proposal was approved to expand the use of contingent credit facilities for natural-disaster emergencies to include public-health risks. The Board of Executive Directors authorized the reformulation of active projects to redirect a further $1.31 billion to the contingency. The IDB’s response to the pandemic reached $7.94 billion, and total approvals with sovereign guarantees for 2020 set a record of $12.64 billion. IDB Invest also had a stand-out year, as commitments reached $6.2 billion and mobilization reached $2.3 billion. For its part, IDB Lab increased its number of operations by 40%, from 90 projects to 126, of which 20 were directly related to the pandemic.

In Bolivia, the Bank approved a loan that enabled the government to guarantee a minimum income for 750,000 vulnerable older adults. And in Colombia, IDB Lab helped finance InspiraMED, an initiative that designed and manufactured low-cost respirators using local talent.

To expeditiously address both the public-health and socioeconomic impacts, the Bank designed operational tools described in the proposal for the IDB Response to the COVID-19 Pandemic Outbreak. Prepared early in the second quarter of the year, the proposal included fast-track procedures for processing sovereign guaranteed operations and substantial changes to loans in execution. The Bank also worked closely with the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank and other multilateral institutions to ensure a coordinated and complementary operational response. To enable the rapid approval of operations during the crisis, the IDB developed a prototype project in each of following response areas: the social sector, vulnerable populations, productive fabric and employment, and public policy and fiscal management. Accordingly, the IDB’s support focused on the following four priority areas:

- immediate response to the public-health emergency;
- safety nets for vulnerable populations;
- economic productivity and employment;
- fiscal policies to cushion economic impacts.

**Migration Initiative**

Throughout its history, Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) has not been immune to migration as part of their developmental realities; and, therefore, the Inter-American Bank of Development (IDB) has to play a role in the matter. Historically, LAC has been characterized by be a region of origin, transit and destination of migration, where factors of expulsion and attraction at the same time. According to the United Nations, in the last two decades there has been, at a global level, a growth in migration of about 32%, going from 153 million, in 1990, to 272 million migrants, in 2019 and LAC is no stranger to it.

In South America, for example, 80% of immigrants are intraregional, associated among others factors, to the exodus of Venezuelans in recent years. This phenomenon is, today, the second largest in the world -after the Syrian crisis- with 5.4 million Venezuelans, 17% of its population,
who have had to leave their country in the last 4 years. Most migrants, refugees, and returnees in the region are of working age, and when given the opportunity, make positive contributions to their host societies with new skills, networks, business models and entrepreneurship.

The IDB recognized this migratory reality, which is varied and growing, and a year and a half ago created the Migration Initiative. This Initiative was endowed with US $100 million of Bank capital, with the commitment to obtain additional donation resources to help countries 18/4/2021. The IDB and migration: a bridge between the short term and development recipients, whose number of immigrants would have increased by 0.5% over their total population in the last 3 years: 10 countries are in that category.

With these resources, the Bank has approved new or ongoing investment operations to include migrants and host communities as beneficiaries of operations in four countries and in five sectors. Likewise, it is working with all the other countries to specify operations. For example, in Belize the Bank is supporting migrant Central American schoolchildren to integrate them into education; or in Colombia, supporting the government to include migrants in the health system through affiliation; or in Ecuador we are identifying with the authorities the communities with the highest proportion of migrants and refugees using the latest geo-reference technologies to adequately deploy social protection services for the most vulnerable, the access to health service or education.

Going even further, the Bank made the decision to create the Migration Unit as part of its Social Sector, and then approved a new Migration Action Framework that broadens the scope of intervention in countries of origin, transit and return. Additional themes are also included such as the relationship of migration with climate change, citizen security or gender, among others.

A mandate that the institution must fulfill with intersectoral work with all areas of the Bank. In addition, and as part of the strategy, is has to strengthen knowledge with evidence on the causes, effects and appropriate public policies to take advantage of the migration. This is how the Bank presented 16 studies, in 10 countries, with examples in this regard. There is also progress in analyzing public opinion on migration with artificial intelligence mechanisms, which deteriorates in a worrying way, due to stigmatization in several of the countries, especially since the start of the pandemic.

This work with governments also requires reinforcing the training exercise for their public sector officials on immigration issues. In 2020, we were able to certify nearly 500 officials public in 20 countries of the region with specialized courses in these subjects. All of this must continue on a larger scale and recipient countries and the Bank need to achieve alliances. Therefore, resources and experience are vital. The support of the United States, Canada, Korea, Finland, Japan, Switzerland, the European Union, Spain and Germany have been fundamental and will continue in that task.

As the virus spreads and borders in the region and around the world shut down indefinitely, migrants and refugees find themselves more vulnerable than ever. For this reason, the IDB stressed the need to include migrants in national COVID-19 response plans aimed at reducing risk for everyone. The Bank wants to help Latin America emerge from the crisis less unequal than what it was. It wants to keep it from getting worse, and above all do not want things to worsen for migrants. The Bank highlighted the role of digital services helping the country to address migratory needs without endangering migrants or government employees attending them. The Creation of an Immigration Information Registry and allowing professionals with health sector degrees abroad to exercise their profession during the emergency. Also access by migrants with residency papers to healthcare services are guaranteed.

In the area of migration, SCL mobilized a total of $46.4 million from the IDB’s migration facility and donor funds for multisector operations in 2020. For example, in La Guajira, one of the border areas between Colombia and Venezuela that has been hardest hit by poverty and migratory flows, the Bank financed programs to expand access to safe drinking water and sanitation services.

The Migration Capacity Building Program strengthens the institutional and technical capacity of public officials, and specialists from public and private institutions through Virtual Tutorized Courses, Massive and Online Open Courses (MOOC) and Communities of Practice. The main goal of the Program is to create and sustain a critical mass of professionals in Latin America and the Caribbean, capable of designing, proposing and implementing innovative and cutting-edge interventions on the issue of migration.

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The contents of the Program arise from the applied research developed by the IDB and its networks of researchers, regional policy dialogues, and migration operations. The contents are developed with the highest academic rigor and the highest standards of technical and pedagogical quality. The Program uses the most current and effective methodologies to ensure participant learning and skill development. The Migration Unit has also started to address the new issues related to gender related migration issues, which is a trend that started in recent decades and insufficiently understood.

A Global Business Coalition called the Tent Partnership for Refugees is made up of more than 140 large multinational companies committed to including refugees. It spans industries from consumer goods and technology, to financial and professional services. With more and more refugees displaced for longer periods of time, companies have a critical role to play in helping them integrate economically in their new host communities. We believe that businesses can most sustainably include refugees by leveraging their core business operations - by engaging refugees as potential employees, entrepreneurs and consumers. These steps are good for refugees, good for the communities that host them, and good for business. This coalition has contributed to hire 39,000 refugees, leveraging supply chains, supports 5,000 refugee entrepreneurship and tailored goods for 144,000 refugee customers.

The IDB recently published a study called MiGnnovation: The opportunity of the private sector and civil society facing the migration challenge in Latin America and the Caribbean. It states that migration has been a decisive phenomenon and every day in the history of Latin America and the Caribbean. But the region today faces an unprecedented challenge: the largest human mobility situation generated by a context of political and social instability and economic, added to the vulnerability natural disasters and the impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic.

Faced with this reality, countries have the possibility of turning this migration challenge into a great development tool inclusive. Achieving it is only possible with a more active participation of the private sector and civil society, which allows connecting the opportunity generated by migration for economic and social growth with innovation capacity that characterizes them. This approach has been called MiGnnovation, which describes the actions that converge by uniting the challenges of migration with the human and organizational capacity to innovate.

About 43 million of migrants come from Latin America and the Caribbean. However, in recent years there has been an increase of migration within the region itself, where there are already 14.8 million migrants, with increasingly complex and sudden movements that change long-established trends.
These new flows can be disruptive to some countries and generate certain pressures if they are not handled properly, which could impact the way communities perceive migration. However, numerous studies confirm how migration can be a positive force for economic growth and competitiveness, especially for the private sector and civil society in host nations. Migrants—both with high and low qualification—bring a variety of skills and talents in demand in receiving destinations. They also represent a boost vital for the growth of economies of the region, by contributing each year more than 100 billion dollars in remittances. People in a situation of mobility are, also a key asset for development from the technology and innovation sectors, because many choose entrepreneurship as a form of establishment in their host country.

The social enterprise Migraflix in Brazil has managed to value the gastronomy of Venezuelans or Syrians through entrepreneurship, generating income and rapprochement between communities. Likewise, the Migrant Financial Society has found a business niche in financing the deposit for the rental of an apartment or the validation of academic qualifications of migrants in Chile. The private sector and civil society now have two powerful tools: the use of technology and the construction of alliances. Data management, on the one hand, which allows to have reliable, updated and immediate sources to know the profile of migrants and thus offer them better opportunities. In turn, it helps them access to employment, information, products or services. Technology also facilitates alternatives distance training and job offers in new industries that can be taken advantage of by the migrants themselves or entrepreneurs.

**Operations:**

Inclusion of migrants and host communities in social services in Ecuador. Loan amount US$ 50 million and non-reimbursable US$ 50 million.

The IDB approved a technical cooperation (TC) for $4 million donated by the Knowledge Partnership Korea Fund for Technology and Innovation to support management and planning processes for the integration of migrants in Colombian cities, with a focus on service delivery, access to housing, and urban development scenarios for future growth. The program will be executed by the Empresa Nacional Promotora del Desarrollo Territorial (Territorial Development Promotion Company, ENTerritorio).

Another TC for socio-economic and urban integration of migrants and their host communities in Colombian five cities financed by EU, Korea and IDB was approved for a total of US$ 16.4 million.

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**World Bank**

Founded in 1944, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development—called the **World Bank (WB)**—has expanded to a closely associated group of five development institutions. Originally, its loans helped rebuild countries devastated by World War II. In time, the focus shifted from reconstruction to development. With the founding of the **International Finance Corporation** in 1956, the institution became able to lend to private companies and financial institutions in developing countries. The founding of the **International Development Association** in 1960 put greater emphasis on the poorest countries, part of a steady shift toward the eradication of poverty becoming the Bank Group’s primary goal. The subsequent launch of the **International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes** and the **Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency** further rounded out the Bank Group’s ability to connect global financial resources to the needs of developing countries.

The World Bank Group has developed a new Strategy focusing on the ambitious goals of **ending extreme poverty**, by reducing the share of world population that lives in extreme poverty to 3 percent by 2030 and **promoting shared prosperity**, by increasing the incomes of the poorest 40 percent of people in each country, in a sustainable manner. It is committed to helping countries reach these goals with proven solutions that integrate the WBG’s development knowledge and financial services.

With 189 member countries, staff in more than 170 countries and offices in over 130 locations, the WBG is a unique global partnership working for sustainable solutions and it taps these to address development challenges that are increasingly global. On critical issues like climate change, pandemics, and forced migration, the Bank Group plays a leading role because it is able to convene discussion among its country members and a wide array of partners. It can help address crises while building the foundations for longer-term, sustainable development. The WB provides US$ 45.9 B in financial assistance in loans and grants to more than 12,000 projects for development relief in its 189 Member Countries (MC).

**WBG and COVID-19**

**Poverty and Shared Prosperity 2020: Reversals of Fortune.**

Poverty reduction has suffered its worst setback in decades, after nearly a quarter century of steady global declines in extreme poverty. The report presents new estimates of the impacts of COVID-19 (coronavirus) on global poverty and shared prosperity. Harnessing fresh data from frontline surveys and economic simulations, it shows that pandemic-related job losses and deprivation are hitting already-poor and vulnerable people hard, while also partly changing the profile of global poverty by creating millions of “new poor.”
This report shows that the new poor are more urban, better educated, and less likely to work in agriculture than those living in extreme poverty before COVID-19. These results are important for targeting policies to safeguard lives and livelihoods. The early evidence shows that the pandemic is deepening income inequality, threatening inclusive economic recovery and future growth. It shows how some countries are deploying agile, adaptive policies to reverse the crisis, protect the most vulnerable, and promote a resilient recovery. The 2020 Poverty and Shared Prosperity report jointly analyzes three factors whose convergence is driving the current crisis and will extend its impact into the future: (i) a pandemic (COVID-19 and the associated global economic recession, which are reversing poverty abatement trends rapidly), (ii) armed conflict (whose effects have been steadily building in recent years), and (iii) climate change (a slowly accelerating risk that will potentially drive millions into poverty).

COVID-19 is expected to push some 100 million people into extreme poverty during 2020 alone. Armed conflict is also driving increases in poverty in some countries and regions. In the Middle East and North Africa, for example, extreme poverty rates nearly doubled between 2015 and 2018, from 3.8 percent to 7.2 percent, spurred by the conflicts in the Syrian Arab Republic and the Republic of Yemen. This report presents new research that helps explain the prolonged impoverishing impact of conflict and suggests priorities for prevention and mitigation.

New estimates commissioned for this report indicate that up to 132 million people may fall into poverty by 2030 due to the manifold effects of climate change. Although the worst economic and welfare effects lie further in the future, in some settings, poverty is already intertwined with vulnerability to climate-related threats such as flooding and vector-borne diseases. New analysis featured in the report focuses on the convergence of poverty and flood risks, especially in Sub-Saharan Africa. Along with its direct cost in human lives, COVID-19 has unleashed a worldwide economic disaster whose shock waves continue to spread, putting still more lives at risk.

Without an adequate global response, the cumulative effects of the pandemic and its economic fallout, armed conflict, and climate change will exact high human and economic costs well into the future. Poverty now casts commissioned for this report suggest that the effects of the current crisis will almost certainly be felt in most countries through 2030.

Under these conditions, the goal of bringing the global absolute poverty rate to less than 3 percent by 2030, which was already at risk before the crisis, is now harder than ever to reach. Advancing shared prosperity—by boosting the incomes of the poorest 40 percent of people in every country—will also be much more difficult now. Current projections indicate that shared prosperity will drop sharply in nearly all economies in 2020–21, as the pandemic’s economic burden is felt across the entire income distribution, and will drop even more if impacts are disproportionately felt by people whose incomes were already relatively low. This uneven impact means the crisis is likely to increase inequality within countries in the longer term, which, without preemptive action, may trigger large human capital losses among disadvantaged groups and make it more difficult for countries to generate inclusive growth in the future.

There is a need more powerful response from countries and the global community. Some countries are taking bold action, learning as they go, and sharing results as they emerge. Acting urgently, in concert, and at the scale of the crisis itself, the pandemic may be stopped and counter its economic damage, which will save lives and livelihoods today; create conditions for a resilient, equitable recovery; and help draw lessons to better manage future emergencies.

**COVID-19 Response**

As countries around the world work to contain the spread and impact of COVID-19, the WBG mounted the fastest and largest crisis response in its history to help developing countries strengthen their pandemic response and health care systems.

With the pandemic’s rapid spread into developing countries, the World Bank is working hard to deliver support to clients by making available up to $160 billion in financing capacity through June 2021. In 2020, the WBG financial support totaled more than $100 billion for the first time ever, with World Bank commitments increasing 65 percent over 2019. The support is tailored to the health, economic, and social shocks that countries are facing, and includes over $50 billion of IDA resources on grant and highly concessional terms.

The Bank Group’s emergency support operations are helping over 100 developing countries save lives and detect, prevent, and respond to the pandemic. It is also helping countries access critically needed medical supplies by reaching out to suppliers on behalf of governments.
The World Bank is making $12 billion available to help developing countries finance the purchase and distribution of COVID-19 vaccines.

The IFC is providing $4 billion through its Global Health Platform to increase the supply and local production of vaccines and personal protective equipment in developing countries, as well as unlock medical supply bottlenecks.

In addition to ongoing health support, operations emphasize social protection, especially through cash transfers, as well as poverty alleviation and policy-based financing. The World Bank is also working to restructure, redeploys, and reallocate existing resources in projects it finances.

The World Bank Group’s crisis response comprises three stages – relief, restructuring, and resilient recovery. It focuses on four main areas:

- **Saving lives** – Helping countries stop transmission, deliver health services, ensure vulnerable households’ access to medical care, and build readiness for future pandemics. Low- and middle-income countries need fair and equitable access to vaccines, and the Bank Group is helping make sure they don’t get left behind. We will have vaccination programs amounting to $2 billion approved for about 20 countries by the end of April, with more in the pipeline.

  In Haiti, the Bank is providing financing for more early-detection testing, rapid response teams to help contain outbreaks, additional health staff, and medical equipment.

- **Protecting poor and vulnerable people** – Supporting income and food supplies for the most vulnerable as well as employment for poorer households, informal businesses, and microenterprises. Helping communities and local governments cope with crisis impacts, improve and expand services, and build resilience for future shocks.

  The WB is helping countries expand the reach of social protection, both through new programs in response to the pandemic and a massive scale-up of existing programs, many of which have served far too few people to be sufficient for the current crisis. In Africa, for example, 80% of workers are in the informal sector, meaning not just that their jobs are at risk but that they’re outside the reach of most traditional cash transfers and other social protection programs. Africa also has well over 100 million people who are chronically on the verge of hunger; globally, the number of people facing acute food insecurity is likely to double by the end of the year. In many places, the pandemic compounds existing risks from climate change, conflict and violence, and weak governments—and even locust swarms, which are destroying crops and threatening food security across parts of Africa, the Arabian Peninsula, and South Asia.

  The Bank is helping India scale-up cash transfers and food benefits, using a set of existing national platforms and programs, to provide social protection for essential workers involved in COVID relief efforts. This is benefiting vulnerable groups, particularly migrants and informal workers, who face high risks of exclusion.

- **Ensuring sustainable business growth and job creation** – Providing policy advice and financial assistance to businesses and financial institutions, to help preserve jobs and ensure that companies, especially small and medium enterprises, can weather the crisis and return to growth.
Due to the impacts of the COVID-19 crisis, four out of five people in the global workforce of 3.3 billion are currently affected by full or partial workplace closures. Nearly 80 percent of the world’s informal economy workers – 1.6 billion people – have faced severe constraints to earning a living as a result of COVID-19 lockdowns and their involvement in hard-hit industries. As the informal sector accounts for up to 90 percent of workers in some emerging economies, the implications of lost wages will cascade from households to communities to whole societies. Without appropriate policy measures, these workers – many of whom are women – face higher risk of falling into poverty and greater challenges in regaining their livelihoods during the recovery.

In Nigeria, IFC has used its fast-track COVID-19 facility to help small and medium enterprises in several sectors that face working-capital or trade-finance challenges through a combined $200 million loan to FCMB, Access and Zenith banks.

- **Strengthening policies, institutions, and investments** – With an emphasis on governance and institutions, the WB is helping countries prepare for a resilient recovery. Working closely with the IMF, its helping countries manage public debt better, make key reforms in financial management, and identify opportunities for green growth and low-carbon development as they rebuild.

In Mongolia, the Bank and the European Union are helping the country take targeted just-in-time measures to mitigate the effects of COVID-19. This includes assessing the impact on the economy, planning and monitoring of fiscal resources, and better tracking of allocation and expenditure on response measures.

The IFC is also deploying $8 billion in fast-track financing, with the goal of sustaining businesses and preserving jobs. Much of this funding has helped micro, small, and medium businesses, which are major sources of job creation in developing countries. IFC is helping the private sector contribute to an inclusive, sustainable, resilient recovery.

While MIGA has launched a $6.5 billion facility to support private sector investors and lenders in tackling the pandemic. It redirects MIGA’s capacity toward the purchase of urgent medical equipment, providing working capital for small and medium enterprises, and supporting governments’ short-term funding needs.

**Forced Displaced**

Forced displacement is a development challenge, not only a humanitarian concern. Around 77% of refugees are displaced for more than five years, and the vast majority of the world’s refugees and internally displaced people live in developing countries (four out of five.) As part of a global effort, the WBG is focused on addressing longer term, social and economic challenges that will help both the displaced and their hosts.

As COVID-19 spreads across countries, the impact of the pandemic could be much greater in countries impacted by fragility conflict and violence. This pandemic especially threatens forcibly displaced people and refugees, who often live in overcrowded camps or in host communities with already overstretched local health systems.

A surge in violent conflict since 2010 has led to historically high levels of forced displacement. Globally, there are about 79.5 million forcibly displaced people including refugees, internally displaced persons and asylum seekers who have fled their homes to escape violence, conflict and persecution (UNHCR, Global Trends: Forced Displacement in 2019). The hardships they endured through their displacement have made these people vulnerable. They have lost assets and livelihoods, and they are unable to plan their future. Many suffer from trauma, and women and girls are at high risk of gender-based violence. They need help to regain their agency and begin rebuilding their lives.

Host communities need support, too. The forcibly displaced often live in poor areas in developing countries that are struggling to meet their own development goals. Accommodating the sudden arrival of masses of newcomers presents a challenge for host governments, putting further pressure on their ability to deliver basic services and infrastructure.

Today, displacement situations are becoming increasingly protracted, and close to 16 million people are now in exile for over 5 years—the highest since the end of the Cold War—underscoring the need for a more sustainable and efficient way to support both the displaced and their hosts with a longer term perspective.

Many host countries in the developing world are taking the lead to better manage these crises, by including refugees in their country’s development plans and in their health and education systems, for example. The global community is also working to improve the transition between humanitarian and development assistance, aligning these efforts under the Global Compact on Refugees led by UNHCR.

The first Global Refugee Forum (GRF) took place in December 2019 to bring the international community together, support implementation of the Global Compact on Refugees and develop a concrete work plan towards the next forum in 2023. At the Forum, the World Bank announced $2.2 billion in support for refugees and host communities as part of the IDA19 replenishment.
The International Framework Global Compact of Refugees:

- Agreed framework for a stronger, more predictable and equitable international response to large refugee situations.
- Highlights important role of development actors alongside other stakeholders to help ease the pressure on host countries and enhance refugee self-reliance.
- Focus on comprehensive, medium-term responses led by hosting countries; inclusive national policies; addressing socio-economic impacts on refugees and host communities.
- Importance of Global Refugee Forum – international cooperation, policy pledges and contributions, regional support platforms, monitoring progress.

The WBG Framework – FCV Strategy

**Objective:** Enhance The WBG’s effectiveness to support countries in addressing the drivers and impacts of FCV and strengthening their resilience, especially for the most vulnerable populations.

**Guiding Principles:**

- Preventing Violent Conflict and Interpersonal Violence
- Remaining Engaged During Conflict and Crisis Situations
- Helping Countries Transition Out Of Fragility
- Mitigating the Spillovers of FCV
- Preventing Violent Conflict and Interpersonal Violence

**Focus** on the medium-term, socio-economic dimension of the crisis – to help both the forcibly displaced and their host communities.

The Window for Host Communities and Refugees (WHR) supports countries that host significant refugee populations to create medium- to long-term development opportunities for both the refugees and their host communities.

This funding recognizes the significant challenge that these countries face in pursuing their own development goals while accommodating refugees, often in areas where local communities themselves lack basic services and resources.

There is a mismatch between IBRD’s and IDA’s country-based financing model and the fact that refugees do not live in their country.

**Terms:**

- GCFF: buying down interest rates for MDB-supported projects
- IDA18: RSW providing additional resources ($2bn), half in grants
Focus:
- For medium- to long-term investments that benefit refugees and host communities in refugee-hosting countries, to:
  - Mitigate shocks and create socioeconomic opportunities to facilitate sustainable solutions
  - Strengthen preparedness

Eligibility
To be eligible for support from the WHR, IDA countries must:
4. Host at least 25,000 refugees or at least 0.1% of the country’s population;
5. Adhere to an adequate framework for the protection of refugees; and
6. Have an action plan or strategy with concrete steps, including possible policy reforms for long-term solutions that benefit refugees and host communities.

IDA countries that were eligible for the Refugee Sub-Window in IDA18 do not need to re-do their eligibility process in IDA19. However, they are required to prepare a short Strategy Note along with the first IDA19 WHR-financed operation that is submitted to the Board.

Programming
The WHR is neutral as to sector and instrument—it supports all kinds of operations in eligible countries that create meaningful longer-term development opportunities for refugees and hosts. A key element of creating these development opportunities involves improving the policy and institutional environment for refugees in the host country, so all projects are expected to demonstrate policy content.

The World Bank is working with governments to prepare and implement projects that deliver sustainable solutions to best meet the often dire and complex needs of these vulnerable groups.

The world transformed by the COVID Pandemic, this is the largest refugee crisis since WWII, which has caused significant disruptions to lives and livelihoods of refugees, host communities and host countries; with an estimated increase of extreme poverty that will surpass 100 million people in 2020; and challenges for Governments and their partners in a lockdown environment.

The evolution of PEPs 2017-2020

18 country dialogues, 58 projects under implementation...

[Map showing various projects and countries with financial details]

- Lebanon: 4 projects ($745m, of which $149m grant)
- Pakistan: 4 projects ($225m)
- Bangladesh: 6 projects ($491m)
- Jordan: 8 projects ($2.05b, of which $367m grant)
- Chad: 2 projects ($117m)
- Djibouti: 5 projects ($45m)
- Ethiopia: 2 projects ($216m)
- Uganda: 7 projects ($500m)
- Republic of Congo: 1 project ($8m)
- Democratic Republic of Congo: 1 project ($220m)
- Burundi: 1 project ($15m)
- Rwanda: 1 project ($50m)
- Colombia: 3 projects ($1.05b, of which $91m grant)
- Ecuador: 2 projects ($1.02b, of which $20m grant)
- Mauritania: 4 projects ($67m)
- Niger: 2 projects ($90m)
- Cameroon: 4 projects ($130m)
- Burkina Faso: 1 project ($14m)
- Republic of Congo: 1 project ($8m)
- Jordan: 8 projects ($2.05b, of which $367m grant)
Refugee Policy Review Framework (RPRF)

RPRF Objectives
Based on the WBG’s commitment under IDA19, “The RPRF’s overall objective is to identify key areas for WB policy dialogue on forced displacement and document progress in each given country over time. It will measure the progress since the WHR/RSW was established, help identify further reform opportunities and inform further WHR support.”

Purpose of the RPRF
1. Seeks to inform review required under IDA19
2. Seeks to identify key policy areas relevant to the socioeconomic development of refugees and host communities
3. Seeks to provide framework for enhanced coordination on policy dialogue
4. Seeks to inform further WHR support

Principles
• No “one-size-fits-all” approach.
• Consistency with international normative framework.
• Selectivity.
• Operational relevance.
• Realism.

The Global Cost of Inclusive Refugee Education

• Average annual cost for all refugee students to complete K-12 years of education through national developing countries: US$ 4.85 billion
• Costs for integrating refugees into national education systems account for less than 5 percent of current education expenditure in developing host countries on average.
• The top 15 developing refugee host countries account for US$3.7 billion or over 75 percent of annual financing envelope
• Prioritization of investments in low and lower-middle income countries can result in over half of all school-aged refugee children being reached

Priorities going forward

Key sectors for engagement:
• Jobs, social protection, private sector involvement. Build a shared understanding of what constitutes effective and proven approaches to support refugees and host communities’ transition from aid to “dignity and self-reliance.” This may include investigations into the evidence and experience with cash transfers, social protection schemes, graduation approaches and jobs programs in forced displacement situations, as well as the policy changes necessary to enable this transition. The private sector, both in its role as employer and consumer for refugee/host-produced goods and services, is an important part of this effort.
• Education. Move decisively toward the inclusion of refugees in national education systems of host countries. Increase their access to learning by designing a framework for responsibility sharing on education financing and financing country-specific cost estimations of refugee education programs and implications for inclusion. Both could feed into country-level operations financed by the World Bank or others.
• Health. Advance inclusion of refugees in national healthcare systems, including in relation to COVID-19 responses and vaccination programs, through policy reforms and investments to expand the reach of these services in refugee hosting areas and raise the quality of services for both refugees and host communities.

Improvements on how the WB works together:
• Partnership at the country level. Identify opportunities for development and humanitarian actors to align their policy dialogue on development-related issues and messages at the country level, using entry points such as the Refugee Policy Review Framework and operational and financing complementarities.

Policy Dimensions

1. Host Communities
1.1 Support for communities in refugee hosting areas
1.2 Social cohesion
1.3 Environmental management
1.4 Preparedness for refugee inflows

2. Regulatory Environment and Governance
2.1 Normative framework
2.2 Security of legal status
2.3 Institutional framework for refugee management and coordination and management
2.4 Access to civil registration and documentation
2.5 Justice and security

3. Economic Opportunities
3.1 Freedom of movement
3.2 Right to work and rights at work
3.3 Land, housing and property rights
3.4 Financial and administrative services

4. Access to National Public Services
4.1 Education
4.2 Healthcare
4.3 Social protection
4.4 Protection for vulnerable groups

5. Cross-cutting themes
5.1 Gender
5.2 Social inclusion
• Innovative finance. Explore models to fund forced displacement engagement, identifying what works and might be scaled up to strengthen humanitarian assistance and longer-term development efforts.

• Technology. Further use new technologies to improve the effectiveness of our response.

• MDB collaboration. Support the MDB Platform for Economic Migration and Forced Displacement to develop a common framework for MDB engagement; advance knowledge, evidence and data; and strengthen coordination of key issues on the ground with better-targeted instruments and products.

Poll results – Top 5 issues that partners should focus on in the next period

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issue</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Partnership at the local level</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COVID</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Data and Evidence</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preparedness</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDPs</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jobs and social protection</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Climate displacement</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country of Origin, areas of return</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Broader Health</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technology</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Private Sector (may overlap with other options)</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Prevention (may combine with Preparedness)</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EADB collaboration</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Innovative Finance</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Important areas for advancement:

• Internally displaced people. Support dissemination and discussion building on the newly released paper, “World Bank Approach to Conflict-Induced Internal Displacement,” and engage with the High-Level Panel on Internal Displacement as they shape their recommendations. Adjust operations to reflect the messages of the approach paper and HLP’s findings.

• Regional approaches, preparedness, areas of return. Develop analytical and operational support to regional initiatives on solutions/support platforms, strengthen country preparedness for increased or potential new refugee flows and enable the transition out of fragility in countries of origin to facilitate safe and lasting return.

• Data and evidence. Intensify efforts to strengthen data systems, promote responsible open data and enhance the coherence of socio-economic data collection efforts (shared methodologies across partners.) Work to ensure analytical work and evidence is relevant, timely and digestible for policy dialogue and operations.

• Climate displacement. Develop an analytical and operational framework for supporting those people who fall between the current structures for economic migration and forced displacement, propelled by a mixture of economic desperation due to increased drought, desertification, sea level rise and the conflict that frequently accompanies these occurrences.

• COVID response. Ensure inclusion of forcibly displaced populations in all COVID recovery responses, including vaccination campaigns, safety net operations and operations focused on building back better.

Conclusion and Recommendations

COVID-19 was an unprecedented crisis and the MDBs swiftly responded to the crisis in various ways including:

• Introducing recovery and response granting programs
• Approving loans for member countries to respond to COVID-19
• Support health system and evidence generation strengthening
• Provide lines of credits to member countries to help national responses to COVID-19

MDBs have strategies and/or policies to respond to the COVID crisis which outline responses so far and approaches moving forward. Economic recovery is amongst the sectors in focus. However, each MDB has its own approach to including refugees, forcibly displaced populations and host communities.

The MDBs priorities and strategies have evolved over the years and the incline towards socially inclusive, innovative and sustainable interventions is apparent in the policies and documents reviewed for this assignment. All MDB
representatives consulted to inform this report shared that
gender, and inclusion are cross-cutting themes across the
banks’ programs.

There exist policies on youth employment and harnessing
the potential of digital technologies for fueling economic
and social development.

There are opportunities for the MDBs to deepen their
programming and outreach by:

• Diversifying and intensifying their partnership base
to include civil society, private sector and other
stakeholders.
• Sharing best practices of the Global Compact for
Refugees across host countries that contribute to
reduce vulnerability, contribute to formalization of jobs
and MSEMEs and therefore shared growth
• Actively promote and create opportunities for best
use of remittances and Diaspora for development
purposes
• Implementing programs explicitly aimed at youth,
women and other vulnerable groups
• Including refugees, forcibly displaced populations and
host communities in projects and programmes
• Investing in linking relief and rehabilitation to
development and resource projects building human
capital, promoting education and facilitating
peacebuilding and social cohesion.
• Advocating with member country governments to
mainstream and integrate refugees and forcibly
displaced populations and their host communities in
national responses
• Using the opportunity for green growth and digital
innovation and financing in the development initiatives
• Enhance the data and information production and
sharing, such as the JDC as well as research for policy
and implementation purposes

While ADB did not specifically program for refugees, it
assisted member countries in dealing with COVID as
part of their national response. The AfDB’s approach
to addressing fragility and building resilience is built on
two objectives: inclusive growth and transition to green
growth. The bank applies a fragility lens to these objectives
to promote inclusion and mainstream gender and food
security. As evident, the bank recognizes the intricate and
direct linkage between economic development and building
resilience. While EIB did not directly intervene in work with
refugee and newcomers, the partners it supported and
countries and businesses it offered services to supported
the inclusion and job protection agenda strongly.

To deal with these issues and bolster refugee-hosting
communities, the EBRD promotes a strong role for the
private sector. It can help provide employment to both host-
communities and refugees with work permits. In addition,
increased private sector participation in municipal projects
can accelerate the upgrade of infrastructure to improve
urban life, preserve the environment and ultimately benefit
the economy as a whole. EBRD Refugee Response Plan,
lunched in 2016 in the wake of the Syrian crisis and
focused specifically on supporting host communities and
refugees alike in Jordan and Turkey. Economic inclusion
is one of the core three pillars of the EBRD’s refugee crisis
response programme: infrastructure development, small
and medium-sized enterprise growth, and economic
inclusion and gender.

The IDB recognized this migratory reality, which is varied
and growing, and a year and a half ago created the
Migration Initiative. This Initiative was endowed with US
$ 100 million of Bank capital, with the commitment to
obtain additional donation resources to help countries
18/4/2021. With these resources, the Bank has approved
new or ongoing investment operations to include migrants
and host communities as beneficiaries of operations in
countries and in five sectors. The Migration Capacity
Building Program strengthens the institutional and
technical capacity of public officials, and specialists from
public and private institutions through Virtual Tutorized
Courses, Massive and Online Open Courses (MOOC) and
Communities of Practice.

The IsDB developed and approved a Strategic Preparedness
and Response Program (SPRP) about how to most
effectively provide immediate support to MCs with the
understanding that the impacts of COVID-19 will be long-
lasting and recovery for many will be a difficult process.
In order to expeditiously respond to the urgent needs of
the MCs, that are working on different fronts to tackle the
crisis, the proposed program is designed to use the Civil
Society Organizations (CSOs) including International Non-
Governmental Organizations (INGOs) as implementing
agencies and partners for the Bank’s interventions at the
“Respond” and “Restore” stages.

The WBG Window for Host Communities and Refugees
(WHR) supports countries that host significant refugee
populations to create medium- to long-term development
opportunities for both the refugees and their host
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(RPRF) overall objective is to identify key areas for WBG
policy dialogue on forced displacement and document
progress in each given country over time. It will measure
the progress since the WHR/RSW was established, help
identify further reform opportunities and inform further
WHR support.”
KEY TRENDS AND RESPONSE ANALYSIS

Refugees have been disproportionately impacted by the socio-economic consequences of the pandemic and have been among the first to lose their livelihoods. This is not surprising considering that even before the pandemic, 70% of refugees had no or limited right to work, 66% had restricted freedom of movement and 47% restricted access to bank accounts. With lockdowns and more restrictive freedom of movement measures in place, income-generating opportunities disappear, and what little savings people had have dried up.
Globally, hundreds of thousands of refugees are in need of urgent financial assistance to cover their daily subsistence since lockdowns and other public health measures came into force. Many refugees and displaced communities have been forced to return to life threatening situations due to economic considerations. The loss of wages, increase in poverty, increased hunger and food security, de-prioritization of education, increased discrimination against women and girls and engagement in negative coping mechanisms are the key impacts of COVID-19 on refugee and displaced communities around the globe.

Despite some communities having been displaced for generations; the humanitarian and development paradigms continue to work in silos – which means that refugees and displaced communities are often unable to access supports which can set them up for the long haul. Instead, these communities experience continued reliance on short term assistance which disables them from sustainably resettling.

Financial inclusion and access to financial services remains a largely untapped mechanism for supporting livelihood regeneration for refugees and displaced communities. Opportunities for refugee and host communities to work side by side also remain rare due to legal issues.

32. From low-skilled to key workers: the implications of emergencies for immigration policy Marína Fernández-Reino,* Madeleine Sumption,** and Carlos Vargas-Silva*. May 2020
Several challenges are currently inhibiting investment in refugee-founded and refugee-supporting enterprises and funds. On the supply-side, investors and financiers often face challenges with identifying, assessing, and structuring deals in new and frontier markets, including identifying appropriate risk mitigation strategies. On the demand-side, refugee entrepreneurs often face barriers such as perceived higher risks, negative biases from financial and lending institutions, language and cultural hurdles, and lack of trust from host communities. Despite a significant pipeline of early stage ventures as well as nearly $300 billion in development projects, many opportunities struggle to attract the right financing due to challenges with investment readiness. Development and humanitarian actors are more focused on short-term needs than generating deal flow or attracting investors. Lastly, all of these actors—investors, investees, and supporting partners—rarely speak the same figurative language or fully understand each other’s interests or motives.

The economic impact of COVID-19 on refugees and host communities has been astounding. As low and low-middle income countries host most refugees, these countries have suffered the impact disproportionally. This is because of major losses to the informal sector due to market closures and suspension of life par usual. The importance of having safety nets and social protection measures has resonated across the globe. Based on the literature this study has reviewed and consultations with various stakeholders, effective response has to be faced with resilience building to offer sustainability. As various stakeholders strategize responding to COVID-19’s medium and long term impacts, multi-sectoral partnerships drawing on the comparative advantages of each sector, with strong community participation, has never been more important.

Preliminary thoughts and insights based on the initial literature review

In principle, when refugees flee a crisis they receive initial emergency assistance and are offered a pathway towards reintegration into normal life. However, in practice, that rarely takes place since a reform designed just for emergency all too often endures.

Overcoming the encampment approach has allowed refugees the right to work and a significant degree of freedom of movement giving refugees socio-economic autonomy and empowerment. This has been the case, for instance with the Uganda Self-Reliance Strategy, which is a relatively unique experiment formalized in 2006 with the Uganda’s Refugee Act. Skills transfers and entrepreneurship capacity in urban areas has benefited the host country, community as well as refugees transitioning from humanitarian assistance to development.

The failure to enable durable solutions and adequately implement the Global Compact for Refugees (GCR) has left 75 percent of refugees in situations of protracted displacement.

An Oxford study, conducted by the Refugee Study Center reveals six main variables that determine variations in refugees’ income levels:

1. **Regulation:** It has been shown that whether someone is in a urban area, a protracted camp or an emergency camp (incomes may vary from $120, $39 and $17)
2. **Nationality:** Culture makes a difference according to background and skills
3. **Education:** Additional years, levels and gender make a difference
4. **Occupation:** Self-employed non-farmers make the most and farmers the least.
5. **Gender often face inequality
6. **Networks:** The greater refugee HH access to wider national or international networks the greater income levels.

There are policy implications given that refugee barriers to participation have to be lowered, while culture of self-help and mutual support encouraged.

Therefore international organizations should move beyond the humanitarian approach towards a development on that prioritizes jobs, education, and economic empowerment of refugees. This in turn needs new forms of partnership that creates the incentive structures for host countries to allow refugees greater autonomy and the right to work. The different host country refugee policies are shaped by their politics and history and thus context specific. Understanding this might allow to shape the levers of policy change.

When pushed to offer greater economic participation to refugees the main concerns are related to development and security. The former relates to competition for economic resources: competition for jobs, downward pressure on wages, upward pressure on housing and depletion of scarce natural resources such as water. However, the key concern relates to national security.

The international recognition of the refugee crisis creates a potential opportunity for the Governments to appeal for the Multinational Corporations (MNC) relocation, through FDI, for reasons related to CSR and core business interests, which is a necessary condition. This also offers the basis on which host countries could appeal to regions and countries to provide trade concessions that allow market access, which is a sufficient condition. Therefore, the challenge for host countries and worldwide is how they can address the development and security concerns in host countries, while empowering refugees. This is a...
win-win proposition for all stakeholders, especially host countries, their communities and refugees.

It should also be noted that the jobs created by foreign firms, those that establish new production units and those that buy from established ones have a multiplier effect in terms of new jobs and income and its consumption of goods and services.

The pace at which the risks come down is undoubtedly associated with the speed at which the economy recovers. Therefore, helping the economy recover is a reasonable working premise to guide post-conflict policy, both that of post-conflict governments and international support.

**Concluding initial remarks:**
Rescue requires primarily a humanitarian response. Autonomy requires mainly a development response. A route out of uncertainty requires inputs from post-conflict reconstruction and state-building. Investments should be made to address structural causes and to develop human capital. Investments should have scale and scope to be effective.
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

COVID-19 has highlighted vulnerabilities of refugees and displaced communities emphasizing the need for consistent and well thought out assistance. However, it is pertinent to understand that the ‘rebuilding back better’ requires recognition and understanding of the structural causes of conflict and displacement. Conflict prevention and management, inclusive peace keeping efforts, promoting tolerance and diversity, resilience building, inclusive economic development, multi-sectoral and multi-stakeholder partnerships, understanding and addressing people’s attitude towards migration, and fostering trust are some areas which need consideration.
Conflict and violence have contributed to a large number of displacements around the world. UNHCR worked with 6.6 million IDPs in 2005, a number that grew to about 15 million by 2010 and stood at more than 43.5 million at the end of 2019 – representing an almost 7-fold increase in only 15 years. The figured from mid-2020 estimate the number to be 45.7 million. The rise in the number of refugees and displaced communities is steep and the projections even steeper. we account for projections based on climate change, over 1.2 billion will be displaced by 2050.

COVID-19 has highlighted vulnerabilities of refugees and displaced communities emphasizing the need for consistent and well thought out assistance. However, it is pertinent to understand that the ‘rebuilding back better’ requires recognition and understanding of the structural causes of conflict and displacement. Conflict prevention and management, inclusive peace keeping efforts, promoting tolerance and diversity, resilience building, inclusive economic development, multi-sectoral and multi-stakeholder partnerships, understanding and addressing people's attitude towards migration, and fostering trust are some areas which need consideration.

To create the conditions necessary for economic inclusion, a wide range of barriers that refugees typically face— including legal, administrative, practical, discriminatory, and social barriers—must be removed and/or lowered.

Turkey’s refugee response is based on a comprehensive legal framework, in particular the Law on Foreigners and International Protection (2013) and the Temporary Protection Regulation (2014). According to Turkish legislation, refugees with temporary protection have the right to health insurance, however, they can only access free health services in the same city where they registered for temporary protection. Syrians living under temporary protection have engaged in informal jobs with substandard payments. According to the in-country study, the process of acquiring residence papers is practical and affordable; refugees and forced displaced people can get work permits; they are included in social protection mechanisms and safety nets; they have the capacity to report on human right violations; and have access to decent work conditions.

The informal economy seems to have played an important role in enabling Syrians to live in Turkey in a relatively problem-free manner. More importantly, it has also played an important role in enabling Syrian refugees to work without creating unemployment among local Turks. Syrian entrepreneurs, of course, have made significant contributions to the economic cohesion of the Syrians in Turkey. Syrians can open up businesses in Turkey in accordance with the Turkish Code of Commerce. In businesses that are formally registered in Turkey, the owner of the business can officially apply for work permits. Although some are comprised only of self-financing micro-level businesses, the number of businesses established by Syrians in Turkey has been increasing. Syrian businesses comprise the highest number of foreign companies established in Turkey in 2017 and 2018.

Turkey’s proven ability to embrace and accommodate more refugees than any other country constitutes the foundation of what can be seen as a best practice in migration management. The role of Turkish civil society should not be understated throughout this process as myriad CSOs have repeatedly exhibited a remarkable degree of adaptability in the face of adversity and a strong commitment to sustaining and improving communal harmony, even amid the COVID-19 pandemic.

The Jordan Compact has run up against three main underlying dynamics that have shaped Jordan’s political economy for decades: (a) zonal development strategies with Special Enterprise Zones (SEZ), which have been a central but highly problematic feature of growth strategies in the country, (b) a nationally-segmented labor market that builds on specialized, precarious migrant labor, and (c) the relevance of informal labor and the political creation of informality. Success often has been bought at the expense of harsh working conditions and low wages, which have deterred Syrian refugees from taking up employment there. Expanded access to work permits alongside the expansion of social security coverage to informal microenterprises and self-employed workers will help longer-term self-sufficiency of workers.

Ethiopia is facing an acute refugee crisis and the conflict in Tigray has made the situation on ground further sensitive. Considering the number of refugees needing support and the fact that 80% are reliant on aid for livelihoods. Involving refugees in the local economy is not only critical but also a missed opportunity which can benefit Ethiopia, and the region. While Ethiopia has a welcoming stance to giving refugees access to jobs but tangible implementation of the legislation should be catalyzed. This will support Ethiopia in dealing with the COVID-19 crisis and bouncing back from it.

Not much funds are allocated to provide services to Afghan refugees by the government and other institutional donors also shy away from work with Afghan refugees as they do not feature as high priority of the government. With the meager funds available, investment in human capital is limited as programming has been unable to move towards development and remains primarily humanitarian despite 2 generations of Afghan refugees having lived in Pakistan.

Ensuring a greater role for the private sector in the region is critical as is facilitation of the establishment of a cross-border trade corridor adapted to COVID-19 prevention measures to boost food security, livelihoods, and increase the capacity to withstand COVID-19 shocks in vulnerable communities and populations in Lake Chad Basin territories.

Access to finance remains a key concern on the ground as many MSME’s have access to very little credit.

UNHCR promotes and prepares for durable solutions for refugees. This entails working with public institutions, particularly IŞKUR, the Turkish Employment Agency, private
companies and development actors to improve refugees’ access to self-reliance opportunities. To enhance the self-reliance of refugees, UNHCR provides financial and administrative support to refugees through its partners to obtain work permits and open businesses. Refugees continue to benefit from soft skills and entrepreneurship training, vocational courses, and Turkish language courses, most of which have transferred to online platforms.

Durable solutions to the current refugee crisis are needed that catalyze investment. Despite negative perceptions surrounding migration, data show that forcibly displaced people are hard-working, entrepreneurial, employable, and creditworthy. For example, in the US, refugees have the highest rate of entrepreneurship as a percentage of their population (13%) and immigrant-owned businesses employ 8 million Americans. Indeed, forty-five percent of Fortune 500 companies, as of 2019, were founded by immigrants, refugees, or their children. Investing in refugees can therefore generate returns that extend far beyond social and economic benefits to refugees themselves. Refugees and migrants are incredible contributors and partners to their new host communities if given the opportunity to engage in their new economies.

Several challenges are currently inhibiting investment in refugee-founded and refugee-supporting enterprises and funds. On the supply-side, investors and financiers often face challenges with identifying, assessing, and structuring deals in new and frontier markets, including identifying appropriate risk mitigation strategies. On the demand-side, refugee entrepreneurs often face barriers such as perceived higher risks, negative biases from financial and lending institutions, language and cultural hurdles, and lack of trust from host communities. Despite a significant pipeline of early-stage ventures as well as nearly $300 billion in development projects, many opportunities struggle to attract the right financing due to challenges with investment readiness. Development and humanitarian actors are more focused on short-term needs than generating deal flow or attracting investors. Lastly, all of these actors—investors, investees, and supporting partners—rarely speak the same figurative language or fully understand each other’s interests or motives.

These investments can be deployed at three different stages of displacement and movement:

1. **Resilience**: “preventive” investments that reduce the risk of displacement or address root causes;
2. **Response**: investments that improve humanitarian response capacity and innovation during emergencies and crisis;
3. **Recovery**: investments that support economic inclusion and integration.

### A Frame for Qualifying "Refugee Investments"

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>An investment must meet the criteria of at least one of the following categories to be included as a Refugee Investment:</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Refugee-OWNED:</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Enterprise is at least:</td>
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<tr>
<td>A. 51% Refugee-Owned; OR</td>
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<tr>
<td>B. 20% Refugee-Owned and have at least one refugee listed as a “key person” in operating documents</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Refugee-LED:</strong></td>
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<td>Enterprise has:</td>
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<tr>
<td>A. At least refugee in senior management (e.g., CEO, CFO or COO); OR</td>
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<tr>
<td>B. A board with at least 33% refugee representation.</td>
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<td><strong>Refugee-SUPPORTING:</strong></td>
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<td>A project that provides or has the potential to provide a good or service that supports humanitarian efforts; or, an enterprise or investment that intentionally supports refugees through the development of infrastructure and services that buttress stability in disproportionately large displacement hosting cities/communities by providing infrastructure, jobs (a commitment of at least 20% of workforce), skills, products, or services to refugees that demonstrably improve the quality of refugee self-reliance, resiliency, health education, or inclusion in financial markets.</td>
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<td><strong>Projects can also qualify as...</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Refugee-SUPPORTING:</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Host-weighted:</td>
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<tr>
<td>If they support host community business and the sponsor commits to adopt a policy to source at least 10% of all sub-contracting for the project from refugee-owned businesses. Deals must demonstrate either a minimum current percentage of refugee jobs or a commitment to increase their hiring within a reasonable timeframe to that level.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>A Refugee LENDING FACILITY:</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>A debt instrument will be considered a Refugee Investment if refugee-owned/-led enterprises, refugee-supporting enterprises, or refugee borrowers will be the recipients of at least 25% of the loan proceeds.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Refugee FUNDS:</strong></td>
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<td>Private, alternative investment vehicles (e.g., private quality, venture capital, or portfolio structures deploying debt and/or equity) with investment strategies such as late-stage venture, growth equity, or expansion financing that have;</td>
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<tr>
<td>A. A fund manager or general partner that is at least 20% Refugee-Owned or controlled; or</td>
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<tr>
<td>B. Portfolio companies that a Refugee-Owned, Refugee-Led, or Refugee-Supporting (each term as described above) making up at least 33% of the vehicles portfolio.</td>
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</table>

All Refugee investments must take refugee protection into account including across the supply chain, identity protection, and other exploitative practices including working conditions. The above thresholds should not be absolute, and should not exclude Refugee Investments that have the potential to create sustainable or catalytic opportunities.
There are a range of more focused investment theses that interested investors can pursue, including:

1. Deploying a combination of agricultural crop insurance, direct investment in value-add agricultural exports, infrastructure (like water and sanitation) for smallholder farmers, and support of micro and SME diversification in emerging markets to improve community resilience and reduce risk of community displacement (The US DFC, Catholic Relief Services, Acumen have all participated in deals that fit under this model);

2. Investing in sustainable fisheries and eco-tourism to support host country economic development while creating pathways for refugee labor integration (currently being assessed by several Mexico and Central American focused investors);

3. Financing the social determinants of work in emerging markets: By providing investment and non-predatory financing to existing small and growing businesses (SGBs) within the housing, financial services, transportation, and childcare sectors, investors can help local SGBs expand the targeting of their products and services to displaced communities (a RIN suggested thesis) radically improving the feasibility of pursuing formal employment and/or entrepreneurship.

4. Investing in early-stage ventures that have high potential to improve humanitarian capacity or innovation. Examples include Needs list, a virtual marketplace software designed to match relief organizations responding to crisis and disaster with resources which closed on a $1M seed round in 2019; Swedish social enterprise Better Shelter, which spun out of a partnership incubated by IKEA and UNHCR and to date has provided >30,000 modular emergency and transitional shelters to more than 40 countries, and software developer training and outsourcing company Andela, which closed a $100M Series D round last year led by Generation Investment Management.

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**The multiple dimensions of vulnerability**

Loss

Trauma

Right location, Ability to Plan

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**INCLUSIVE MARKET SYSTEM**

**AT A GLANCE | 2017**

Improving livelihoods of people of concern and host communities through economic and financial inclusion.

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Figure from Financial Inclusion of Forcibly Displaced Persons and Host Communities (UNHCR, UNCDF, 2017)
Some country specific lessons learnt include:

**Turkey**
- Promoting joint economic ventures for refugees and Turkish citizens
- Developing and implementing internship and apprenticeship programs for refugees and host communities, while matching supply with demand
- Communities that increase individual employability and marketability
- Designing and instating capacity building programs for Turkey-based CSOs that empower the creation of opportunities for the most vulnerable of refugees, such as women, children, and unemployed youth
- Creating gender-friendly employment contexts wherein women are provided access to language training courses and affordable day care for children and the elderly
- Establishing entrepreneurship and micro-business trainings depending on the needs of the labor market, particularly in the digital sphere
- Promote investments and incentives for enterprises and businesses from countries of origin of FDP, MNC together with appropriate trade policies for production of goods and services to attend the needs of domestic and international markets with active participation of FDP and their host communities
- Explore and provide an enabling environment for active participation of the Diaspora in the livelihoods and wellbeing of FDP
- Contribute to close the digital gap and introduce digitalization for institutional, employment and innovation in MSMEs
- Enhance the strategies, policies and operations of MDBs and IFIs in the growth and development space for FDP
- Creating platforms for coordination between government representatives, international nongovernmental organizations, and smaller CSOs rooted in the local communities to facilitate exchange of information and best practices.
- Despite the outbreak of COVID-19 and the restrictions imposed on interpersonal contact, social cohesion should be at the front and center of all livelihoods interventions in order to ensure a smooth transition from the humanitarian assistance perspective to the medium and long-term development perspective.

**Jordan**
- Underlying structural challenges in the economy, including informality and lack of decent work, affect all vulnerable workers in Jordan.
- Refugees face distinct vulnerabilities because of their legal status, which makes them more fearful of seeking justice and can limit their access work opportunities.
- Legal awareness sessions and legal assistance has proven critical for the achievement of positive decent work outcomes.
- Focused messaging to the most vulnerable persons on the benefits versus potential risks of formalization is critical, especially for HHBs.
- A community-based and collaborative approach at the local level, enabling relevant stakeholders to act collectively, can lead to positive decent work outcomes.
- Further coordination and stronger linkages among operational actors is needed to support livelihoods outcomes, avoid duplication of programs and improve coherence when dealing with the private sector.
- Increasingly tailored approaches towards job placement increase positive retention outcomes, while mentorship and coaching motivate workers to stay active in the labor market.

**Ethiopia**
- Providing tax exemptions for registered companies who commit to keeping their employees.
- Carry out contextualized assessments of the root causes of informality in Somali and Tigray
- Support MoLSA in raising awareness on how to register companies.
- Reduce inequalities by promoting refugees’ integration
- Promote freedom of movement for refugees to avoid a sudden decrease in demand.
- Target inclusive and youth led measures for skills building and remote learning opportunities.
Overall Recommendations

Empower refugees, migrants, IDPs and host communities in planning, designing, implementation and monitoring of interventions for them.

Protect health of refugees, displaced communities from COVID-19 – ensure access to PPE, testing and health services for treatment - encourage awareness raising in both men and women.

Build bridges between humanitarian and development program. Invest in linking relief to development. Refugees are supported by emergency assistance and in most cases, it is not linked to medium to long term support – this is a barrier for sustaining results and impacts of intervention.

Create protection for workers in the informal sector (laws against xenophobia, discourage discrimination on the base of sex, race, religion and ensure access to decent work and social justice)

Deliver jobs and sustainable income for refugees, migrants, IDPs and host communities by providing skills, apprenticeship and MSEs entrepreneurial capacities through the promotion of rural and urban value chains and clusters that provide goods and services, while achieving scale, coverage, sustainability and competitiveness in domestic and international markets.

Invest in addressing structural issues and in human capital for sustainable development

Create/Expand social protection and safety nets

Innovation for inclusion and building back better (role of digitization and new models for economic recovery)

Multi-stakeholder partnerships (government, private sector, CSO, and CBOs that join hands and play to their strengths)

Financial literacy, non-financial support services and access to affordable financing

Create feedback systems for agility in the approach to economic recovery

Combat misinformation and increase anti-xenophobia efforts

Support multi-year, flexible livelihoods programming

Collect better data and evaluate interventions

Support policies that enhance freedom of movement and the right to work.

Help create economic opportunities with scope and scale - where there are large numbers of forcibly displaced persons.

Invest in skills and education that are in demand in the labor market.

Annexes

I. References

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<td>Refugee camp in Malawi gets banking services – A local bank has</td>
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<td>Malawi bringing much needed services to its residents</td>
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<td>Creativity amid Crisis - Legal Pathways for Venezuelan Migrants in Latin America</td>
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<td>An Early Readout on the Economic Effects of the COVID-19 Crisis Immigrant Women Have the Highest Unemployment - Factsheet</td>
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**Resources Reviewed for MDBs Responses to COVID-19**

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<td>EBRD Good Practices from Jordan GAM Solid Waste Crisis Response Framework Microfund for Women: Lending to refugees Abdali Mall Recruitment and Training Centre</td>
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