

IsDB RESILIENCE REPORT

Pandemic Recovery and Preparing for Future Shocks



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FOREWORD



The COVID-19 pandemic has disrupted positive trends in many development fronts such as long-term poverty reduction and increases in life span. Nonetheless, these pre-COVID-19 positive trends have not also been extended to the most fragile of states, those caught in a vicious cycle of protracted or recurrent humanitarian crisis. Moreover, the COVID-19 pandemic experience has revealed that a reduction in fragility does not necessarily mean an increase in preparedness to face future shocks and a reduction in fragility does not automatically mean more resilience, whether at the country level or globally.

These lessons learned and the magnitude of shocks and challenges imposed by COVID-19 necessitate a new thinking of recovery, preparing for future shocks and building resilience. As one of the most significant world-changing events in recent history, the COVID-19 pandemic tested the resilience of states, systems, and communities worldwide. The pandemic revealed many weaknesses in global resilience but also showed experiences of remarkable capacities to adapt, innovate, and bounce back from crises. By studying the capacity of states and institutions to adapt to the COVID-19 pandemic, we can surely understand more about the requirements to build multidimensional and interconnected resilience.

The pandemic has provided a deep understanding of the interconnectedness of resilience and the inter-dimensional nature of preparedness for future shocks. While the pandemic started with pressure on the health dimension of resilience, it cascaded in shock waves, manifesting the interconnectedness of various dimensions of resilience (health, economic and livelihood, environment, human security and forced displacement). Pressure on one dimension cascading across each of the others. The pandemic compounded the effects of climate change, led to massive unemployment, impacted displacement, and increased domestic abuse, in addition to many other consequences. In this way, COVID-19 was a landmark experience in understanding resilience and analyzing the complex interactions between fragility and resilience providing evidence that resilience is not just the ability to suffer a shock and bounce back but also the ability to adapt and mitigate the ripple effects of pressures across multiple dimensions of resilience.

In this report, the above experiences are analyzed in various ways. Each dimension is investigated through an in-depth study with an emphasis on IsDB member countries (MCs). The case studies and global trends and the analyses led to policy directions for resilience and report recommendations based on the lessons learned and good practices throughout the pandemic experience.

The report reflects how the dimensions of resilience interact in areas with unique challenges, contexts, capacities, and opportunities and provides insights on good practices of resilience that can shape the short- and long-term strategies of IsDB and its partnership with its Member Countries.

IsDB addresses the need to build resilience in its Member Countries through IsDB's strategy focus of one of three overarching, interconnected strategic objectives (tackling poverty and building resilience) besides its strategy focus on resilience across strategy pillars and sectors. To maximize the impact of its efforts in resilience building, the Bank will focus on the needs expressed by its member countries and areas of its comparative advantage and operational expertise. IsDB will also be guided by its first-ever Fragility and Resilience Policy, which sets standards and strategic direction of IsDB to strengthen institutions, build resilience and contribute to social cohesion and sustainable development in member countries and accents a partnership approach in building resilience.

This report considers resilience as a transformational process that is fundamental for the achievement of the SDGs in Member Countries. I am confident that the recommendations and outcomes of this report will be very useful for understanding, investing in, and programming for resilience to promote recovery and sustainable development in our member countries

H.E. Dr. Muhammad Sulaiman Al Jasser

President, Islamic Development Bank

PREFACE



Recovery from the COVID-19 pandemic compounded shocks and preparedness for future shocks requires learning from the pandemic experience and understanding the interconnectedness of resilience and inter-dimensional preparedness to design relevant resilience strategies and interventions in IsDB Member Countries.

The objectives of this report are to: (i) help understand the interconnectedness of resilience and inter-dimensional preparedness for future shocks across various dimensions of resilience (health, economic and livelihood, environment, human security and forced displacement); (ii) provide policy direction and recommendations for recovery, preparedness for future shocks and (iii) recommend development interventions to help build preparedness and multidimensional resilience and approaches to implement them.

In its pursuit to understand interconnectedness of resilience and inter-dimensional preparedness for future shocks, the report studies the second and third-order effects of the COVID-19 pandemic shock and provides evidence on how pressure in one dimension of resilience cascades across each of the others. The report begins with a contextual overview of interconnectedness of resilience and provides case studies of preparedness for and recovery from Covid-19 in nine Member Countries.

The primary built on findings from the case studies and recommended policy direction for resilience building, which led to recommendations that prize adaptive, flexible, and innovative approaches for pandemic recovery and preparedness for future shocks. These policy directions have been drawn from the case studies and show the need for dynamic, contextually relevant interventions during conflict, pandemics, and shocks.

Finally, the report presents critical concrete recommendations on issues including preparedness to future shocks and building resilience, bilateral and intergovernmental, community, civil society, and private sector-based regional cooperation. The report also recommends approaches to addressing issues of rural health infrastructures, delivery systems with a focus on pandemic response, preparing education system for future shocks, leveraging civil society for social cohesion, improving social protection systems, investing strategically in digitalization and mainstreaming resilience lessons and strategies across and among diverse stakeholder networks such as those on climate change adaptation

The Outcomes of this report will help IsDB and its Member Countries, stakeholders and partners understand key elements of relevant policies, strategies, and interventions to strengthen preparedness for future shocks and build resilience.

Dr. Mansur Muhtar

Vice President, Operations
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Mr. Amer Bukvic

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ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

ACLED	The Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project	CBR	Community-Based Rehabilitation
ACF	Action Contre la Faim	CCHF	Crimean-Congo Hemorrhagic Fever
ADB	Asian Development Bank	CEDAW	Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women
ADF	African Development Fund	CENOE	National Emergency Operations Center
ADPC	Asian Disaster Preparedness Center	CEVI	Centro di Volontario Internazionale
AECID	Spanish Agency for International Development Cooperation	CFIP	Caritas Vocational Training and Professional Integration Centre
AFD	Agence Française de Développement	CIDDDH	Ivorian Coalition of Human Rights Defenders
AfDB	African Development Bank	CIIP	Competitive Industries and Innovation Program
AIDE	Support for Integration and Employment Development Programme	CIPLEV	Comité Interministériel de Prévention et de Lutte Contre l'Extrémisme Violent
AIFC	Astana International Financial Centre	CITI	Côte d'Ivoire Transition Initiative
AKF	Aga Khan Foundation	CITI2	Côte d'Ivoire Transition Initiative 2
ANAC	National Administration of Conservation Areas	CLGRCS	Local Disaster Risk Management Committees
ANPE	National Employment Agency	CLPs	Local Peace Committees
ANVT	Togo National Volunteer Agency	CNAM	National Council for the Advancement of Women
AQIM	Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb	CNTIG	Remote Sensing and Geospatial Information Committee
AU	African Union	COP21	21 st Conference of the Parties
BAP	Balochistan Awami Party	CPEC	China-Pakistan Economic Corridor
BIOFUND	Fundação para a Conservação da Biodiversidade	CPF	Country Partnership Framework
BCG	Bacille Calmette-Guérin	CSMI	Compulsory Social and Medical Insurance
BdL	Central Bank of Lebanon / Banque du Liban	CSO	Civil Society Organizations
BMBF	Bundesministerium für Bildung und Forschung	CT	Counterterrorism
B&MGF	Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation	DAG	Dyck Advisory Group
BMZ	German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development	DGP3	Disease Control Priorities 3
BoD	Burden of Disease	DDR	Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration
BOE	Barrel of Oil Equivalent	DGMM	Directorate General of Migration Management
BP	Benefit Package	DPDs	District Platforms for Dialogues
BRACED	Building Resilience and Adaptation to Climate Extremes and Disasters	DRC	Democratic Republic of the Congo
BRIDGES	Boosting Restoration, Income, Development, Generating Ecosystem Services	DRM	Disaster Risk Management
CAFE	Consortium Africain des Fonds Environnementaux	DSS	Decision Support System
CARE	Climate Adaptation and Resilience	DSS	Direct Support to Schools
CAWEP	Central Asia Water and Energy Program	EAEU	Eurasian Economic Union
		ECOWARN	ECOWAS Early Warning and Response Network

ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
EPHS	Essential Package of Health Services
EU	European Union
EWER	Early Warning Early Response
EVD	Ebola Virus Disease
FADM	Mozambique Defense Armed Forces
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization
FATA	Federally Administered Tribal Areas
FDI	Foreign Direct Investment
FFP	The Fund for Peace
FNFI	National Fund for Inclusive Finance
FPIP	Fostering Productive Innovation Project
FRELIMO	Liberation Front of Mozambique/ Portuguese Frente de Libertação de Moçambique
GBV	Gender-Based Violence
GCF	Green Climate Fund
GCG	Gender Coordination Group
GF2D	Groupe de Réflexion et d'Action, Femme, Démocratie et Développement
GFF	Global Financing Facility
GGW	Great Green Wall for the Sahel and the Sahara Initiative
GIZ	German Federal Foreign Office
GLPs	Local Guardians of Peace
GPI	Gender Parity Index
GRAISEA	Gender Transformative and Responsible Agribusiness Investments in South-East Asia
GREPOC	Cabinet of Reconstruction Post-Cyclones
HCCRN	The Office of the High Commissioner for Reconciliation and Strengthening National Unity
HDI	Human Development Index
IDA	International Development Association
IDPs	Internally Displaced Persons
IFAD	International Fund for Agricultural Development
IFRC	International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies
ILO	International Labor Organization
IMF	International Monetary Fund
INGC	National Institute for Disaster Management
INGO	International Non-Government Organization
INTERPOL	International Criminal Police Organization
IOM	International Organization for Migration
IsDB	Islamic Development Bank
ITFC	International Islamic Trade Finance Corporation

IYCF	Infant and Young Child Feeding
JERP	Joint Economic Research Program
KII	Key Informant Interview
KM	Kilometers
KRI	Kurdistan Region of Iraq
LFIP	Law on Foreigners and International Protection
LMIC	Lower-Middle-Income Country
MADER	Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development
MASEF	Ministry of Social Affairs, Childhood, and Family
MC	Member Countries
MDBs	Multinational Development Banks
MERS	Middle East Respiratory Syndrome
MITADER	Ministry of Land, Environment, and Rural Development
MOH	Ministry of Health
MoNHSR&C	Ministry of National Health Services Regulation and Coordination
NAP	National Adaptation Plan
NAPA	National Adaptation Programme of Action
NCCRM	National Center for the Coordination of Response Mechanism
ND-GAIN	Notre Dame Global Adaptation Initiative
NDRMF	National Disaster Risk Management Fund
NDS	National Development Strategy
NGO	Non-Governmental Organizations
NISP	National Immunization Support Project
NRDS	National Rice Development Strategy
NSCW	National Commission on the Status of Women
ODI	Overseas Development Institute
OECD	Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
OFACI	Organization of Active Women in Ivory Coast
OSCE- ODIHR	Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe's Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights
PAEIJ-SP	Project to Support the Employability and Integration of Young People in Growth Sectors
PAMIF	Financial Infrastructure Modernization Support Project
PARPA	Action Plan for the Reduction of Absolute Poverty
PARSACC	Enhancing the Resilience of Communities and their Food Security to Adverse Effects of Climate Change in Mauritania
PARU	Urban Sanitation and Resilience Project
PBF	Peacebuilding Fund
PCR	Post-Conflict Reconstruction

PEPFAR	U.S. President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief	UCDP	Uppsala Conflict Data Program
PERC	Partnership for Evidence-based Response to COVID-19	UHC	Universal Health Coverage
PI	Personal Initiative	UIR	Rapid Intervention Unit
PISA	Program for International Student Assessment	UN	United Nations
PL	Presidential Land	UNAMI	United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq
PMCs	Private Military Companies	UNAPROC	National Civil Protection Unit
PNCC	National Climate Change Program	UNCT	United Nations Country Team
PNDSE	Education Sector Development Plan	UNDP	United Nations Development Project
POJED	Plateforme des Organisations de Jeunesse de Duékoué	UNFPA	United Nations Population Fund
PPE	Personal Protective Equipment	UNICEF	United Nations Children's Emergency Fund
PRAPS I	Regional Sahel Pastoralism Support Project	UNEP	United Nations Environment Program
PVE	Prevention of Violent Extremism	UNHAS	United Nations Humanitarian Air Service
RDAS	Regional Resilience Data and Analytics Services	UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
REDISSE	Regional Disease Surveillance Systems Enhancement Program	UNODC	United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
RENAMO	Mozambican National Resistance	USAID	United States Agency for International Development
REWARD	Reacting to Early Warning and Response Data	USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR)
RCCE	Risk Communication and Community Engagement	WA-BICC	West African Biodiversity and Climate Change
RIMES	Regional Integrated Multi-Hazard Early Warning System for Africa and Asia	WACA	West Africa Coast Areas
RIMRAP	Institutional Strengthening Programme for Agro-Pastoral Resilience in Mauritania	WACOM	West African Coast Observation Mission
RVF	Rift Valley Fever	WAEMU	West African Economic and Monetary Union
RWS	Rural Water Supply	WANEP	West Africa Network for Peacebuilding
SAFRON	The Ministry of States and Frontier Regions	WASH	Water, Sanitation, and Hygiene
SALW	Small Arms and Light Weapons	WFP	World Food Program
SAM	Severe Acute Malnutrition	WILDAF	Women in Law and Development in Africa
SAWAP	World Bank-led Sahel and West Africa Program	WHO	World Health Organization
SDG	Sustainable Development Goal	YEMAC	Yemen Mine Executive Action Center
SGBV	Sexual and Gender-Based Violence		
SME	Small and Medium-sized Enterprises		
SPRP	Strategic Preparedness and Response Project		
SRH	Sexual and Reproductive Health		
SSR	Security Sector Reform		
STC	Southern Transitional Council		
SWAp	Sector-Wide Approach		
SWEDD	Sahel Women's Empowerment and Demographic Dividend		
TIP	Trafficking in Persons		
TTP	Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan		
UAE	United Arab Emirates		

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Pre-Covid, over the past several decades, there had been many positive worldwide trends, including long-term poverty reduction and increases in life span. While these trends may suggest a decrease in global fragility, two important caveats must be noted. First, these positive trends did not extend to the most fragile of states, those caught in a vicious cycle of protracted or recurrent humanitarian crisis. Second, as illustrated in stark relief by the experience of COVID-19, a reduction in fragility does not necessarily mean an increase in preparedness to face a major shock. Put another way, a reduction in fragility does not automatically mean more resilience, whether at the country level or globally.

The COVID-19 pandemic tested the resilience of states, systems, and communities worldwide. As one of the most significant world-changing events in recent history, the pandemic has not only revealed many weaknesses in global resilience but also showed remarkable capacities to adapt, innovate, and bounce back from crises. By studying the capacity of states and institutions to adapt to the COVID-19 pandemic, prescriptions can be made on aspects of global resilience.

In this report, the Islamic Development Bank's (IsDB) Resilience Index — launched concurrently with this report—is used as a framework to conduct a holistic scan of lessons learned and good practices over the COVID-19 pandemic across five key dimensions of resilience. These five dimensions of resilience include:

- 1) **Resilience to Environmental Pressures and Natural Disasters:** The ability of communities to cope with deteriorating environmental conditions (natural disasters, climate change, pollution, water scarcity, etc.).
- 2) **Resilience to Health Crises and Pandemics:** The capacity of a community's healthcare system to equitably respond to health situations that undermine health and livelihoods (epidemics, infectious disease, etc.).
- 3) **Resilience to Economic Challenges and Livelihoods Disruptions:** The extent of which mechanisms exist that enable communities to adjust to deteriorating and challenging economic conditions (change in commodity price, inflation, unemployment, etc.).
- 4) **Resilience to Human Security Challenges:** The capability of communities to protect vulnerable populations (women, children, displaced peoples, minorities, the disabled, etc.) in situations of conflict escalation or deterioration in human security.
- 5) **Resilience to Forced Displacement:** The ability of communities to mitigate the humanitarian impact of an influx of IDPs, refugees, or migrants displaced from neighbouring countries.

The events of 2020 can primarily be seen as pressure in the Health and Pandemics dimension of resilience. However, the second and third-order effects of the COVID-19 pandemic have shown the interconnectedness of all five dimensions, with pressure in one category cascading across each of the others. As can be seen in this report, the pandemic has compounded the effects of climate change, led to massive unemployment, increased levels of domestic abuse, and impacted displacement, among many other consequences.

Resilience is not just the ability to suffer a shock and bounce back but also the ability to adapt and mitigate the ripple effects of pressures across multiple dimensions. In this way, 2020 was a landmark year to analyze the complex interactions between fragility and resilience.

In this report, such an analysis was conducted in several ways. First, each dimension is investigated through an in-depth study of global trends in resilience, with emphasis on IsDB member countries (MCs). In each section, recommendations are made on building resilience based on lessons learned and good practices throughout 2020. Second, this report develops case studies of resilience in nine IsDB's MCs, selected to represent a range of regions, risk profiles, sizes, and demographics – Côte d'Ivoire, Togo, Mozambique, Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, Iraq, Pakistan, Mauritania and Yemen – to contextualize how these five dimensions interact in areas with unique challenges, contexts, capacities, and opportunities. Through analysis of the effectiveness of practices to respond to the problems presented by the COVID-19 pandemic in each of these MCs, further insight is gained on good practices of resilience that can shape the long and short-term strategies of the IsDB.

The analysis presented in this report is based on an evaluation of several types of evidence. First, it is based on the framework and empirical foundation of the IsDB Resilience Index that includes 200 metrics and dozens of sources. Second, a review of scholarly research, government documents, and numerous databases was used to summarize the latest research and recent trends across the five Dimensions. Third, field research, including 112 key informant interviews (KIIs) with stakeholders ranging from government officials, traditional leaders, religious leaders, security professionals, humanitarian actors, and grassroots actors in nine countries was conducted to contextualize the findings and identify specific ways in which countries demonstrated resilience to a range of humanitarian and development challenges in 2020.

Key outcomes of the report highlight the need to think about development in particular ways, such that the imperatives of scaling programs, projects, and activities at population level must not conflict with the need for a focus on localization, relationships, flexibility, context, and synergy. The nine case studies surfaced specific examples, which were then extrapolated to eight broad recommendations. The recommendations should be understood as guidance not only on what should be prioritized as areas for investment, but even more so, on how those allocations, policies, and incentives can be implemented to catalyze multiplier effects and virtuous cycles for the prevention, preparedness, and recovery from crisis, as well as long-term growth. These eight recommendations are as follows:

1. Track 1 (bilateral and intergovernmental) and 2 (civil society, private sector, and community-based) regional cooperation are key to preparedness and an effective response to pressures and shocks.
2. Mainstream key resilience lessons and findings, and strategies across and among diverse stakeholder networks, including government, the private sector, the non-profit sector, and local communities.
3. "Brain drain," or out-migration of skilled workers, should be mitigated through incentives, jobs programs, and localized resilience building.
4. Scale and localize rural health infrastructures and delivery systems with a focus on pandemic response.
5. Capitalize on public education system for resilience promotion, beyond individual learning.
6. Capitalize on civil society for social cohesion and collaboration.
7. Prepare social protection systems.
8. Invest strategically in digitalization for education and livelihoods.

Through emphasizing where current IsDB MCs lie on a continuum of stability and resilience, this report helps identify countries that, while not currently experiencing an active crisis, remain vulnerable to a future shock in one or several of the five key dimensions. Strategic intervention by the IsDB to strengthen national resiliencies inherent in certain countries and identified by the Resilience Index can further enhance their preparedness for future shocks to the international system. Yet, as reiterated throughout the report, resilience is not just the ability to bounce back from a shock; it is also the ability to manage and mitigate multi-dimensional pressures that present an ongoing and sustained source of stress. These pressures, if allowed to multiply, can degrade the capacity of countries to respond to shocks. Through strategic investment and capacity building, countries will be better able to prepare, prevent, manage and recover from shocks, whether that be a pandemic, an extreme weather event, or any other humanitarian emergency.

TERMS AND DEFINITIONS

Resilience is the ability to positively adapt and transform households, communities, and states' structures and the means to respond to risks, stresses, and shocks. Resilient states and communities are characterized by the following: Stable social and political contracts; functional, inclusive, and accountable institutions; and the provision of basic services. They can maintain political stability and prevent violent conflict.



Fragility is defined as the combination of exposure to risk and insufficient coping capacity of the state, system, and/ or communities to manage, absorb, or mitigate those risks. Fragility can lead to negative outcomes, including violence, the breakdown of institutions, displacement, humanitarian crises, or other emergencies. It encompasses the inability of states to fulfill responsibilities as a sovereign entity because of the lack of legitimacy, authority, and/or capacity.



Shocks are the onset of sudden and severe humanitarian crises emanating from any of the five dimensions: 1) Environment/Natural Disasters, 2) Health/Pandemics, 3) Economy/Livelihoods, 4) Human Security, and 5) Forced Displacement. A shock in any of these dimensions can cascade across the others in the absence of social capital, human capital, financial capital, political capital, or environmental capital necessary for resilience to a particular emergency.



Pressures are ongoing and sustained stresses on society emanating from any of the five dimensions: 1) Environment/Natural Disasters, 2) Health/Pandemics, 3) Economy/Livelihoods, 4) Human Security, and 5) Forced Displacement. A pressure in any of these dimensions can degrade capacity in the other four unless resilience is consolidated through the professionalization, legitimacy, and representativeness of key public and private institutions.



Latent Crisis is a scenario where an emergency does not currently exist, but capacities are low, creating a situation where in the advent of an eventual shock, the country may not have the resilience to cope. These situations present opportunities for investments and programs preventing crisis and saving lives.



Oscillating Crisis is a scenario where there is an elevated level of existing pressures and shocks, but there is significant capacity to manage those challenges. This creates a situation that tends structurally toward a prognosis of oscillation, whereby the severity of the humanitarian emergency is likely to be bound within a particular range (ceiling and floor) absent a major change in the dynamic for the better or worse.



Escalating Crisis is a scenario where there is an elevated level of existing pressures and shocks, and a low level of capacity to deal with those vulnerabilities. This creates a situation that tends structurally toward a prognosis of escalation, whereby the situation is likely to deteriorate, absent a major change in the dynamic.



Stability is a scenario where there is a low level of existing pressures and shocks and a high level of capacity to deal with any vulnerabilities that may occur. This is the optimal situation for sustainable development and the goal for the promotion of resilience. However, even a country that finds itself in a situation that structurally tends toward a prognosis of stability can be destabilized by inexorable increase in pressure or a sudden shock of sufficient severity. It pushes the county into a dynamic of oscillation or by the erosion of resilience capacities pushing it into a situation in which it is vulnerable to a latent crisis.



Diagnostic Tool is an index or framework that measures symptoms of vulnerability or resilience. A diagnostic tool cannot be directly employed for prognosis or response planning, in that the variables and indicators are not linked to causal loops or mitigating options.



Prognostic Tool is an index or tool that not only diagnoses vulnerability or resilience but also extrapolates the second and third order effects of what is likely to happen as a result of that baseline. The IsDB Resilience Index, planned to be launched, is primarily a diagnostic tool, but as outlined in this guidance note, can also be used to identify whether a country tends structurally toward stability, oscillation, escalation, or latency. It can also serve as a baseline for prognostic analysis through the clear articulation of a theory of change and a contextualized scenario planning with the incorporation of country knowledge in regard to stakeholder mapping and historical analysis.



Response Planning Tool is an index or tool that not only diagnoses vulnerability or resilience and provides a baseline for prognosis, but also serves as a foundation for response planning whether at the strategic or operational levels. While the IsDB Resilience Index is primarily a diagnostic tool which can be used as a baseline for prognosis, this prognosis can also serve as an entry point for response planning as detailed in this guidance note in three ways: 1) Risk Management Response Planning, 2) Resilience Promotion Response Planning, and 3) Conflict Sensitivity and Do no Harm.



Dimensions: The five dimensions operationalized in the IsDB Resilience Index were identified based on the initial IsDB Resilience Report, published in 2019, which included case studies in Somalia, Jordan, Indonesia, Palestine, Pakistan, Nigeria, Iraq, and Turkey. This field research, complemented by extensive quantitative and qualitative desktop analysis, suggested five key humanitarian vulnerabilities for which countries and communities have had to develop mechanisms to manage and overcome. These comprise 1) Environment/Natural Disasters, 2) Health/Pandemics, 3) Economy/Livelihoods, 4) Human Security, and 5) Forced Displacement. The order of these five dimensions posits a common sequence whereby crisis can cascade inter-dimensionally, such that environmental factors often precede health challenges, etc. However, it should be noted that a crisis can emanate from any direction, which is why they are conceived dimensionally rather than as phases.



INTRODUCTION

INTRODUCTION

The Coronavirus Pandemic of 2020 not only served as a stress test for resilience in countries all over the world, revealing many weaknesses, but also showed remarkable capacities to adapt, innovate, and to bounce back from crisis. Using the IsDB's Resilience Index as a framework, this report conducts a scan of resilience trends across five key dimensions: 1) Environment/Natural Disasters, 2) Health/Pandemics, 3) Economy/Livelihoods, 4) Human Security, and 5) Forced Displacement, to surface lessons learned and good practices to replicate and scale. To contextualize these findings, the majority of the report focuses on nine country case studies, selected to represent a range of regions, risk profiles, sizes, and demographics – Côte d'Ivoire, Togo, Mozambique, Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, Iraq, Pakistan, Mauritania, and Yemen – to contextualize how these five dimensions interact in areas with unique challenges, contexts, capacities, and opportunities to see how these findings play out in practice in different countries in different regions, with different challenges, and different profiles. An evaluation of what worked in the different IsDB member countries (MCs) as well as an assessment of where they are in terms of their recovery, will proffer insight that can shape IsDB's goals and strategies in the next five to ten years.

One topline finding for resilience that immediately presents itself is that preparedness must be inter-dimensional. Preparing for a pandemic, for instance, must go far beyond the health system alone. As an article in *Nature Medicine* recently put it, "... health is more than healthcare and that a whole-of-government approach to health and well-being is needed to create healthy populations able to collectively prevent and respond to crises, leaving no one behind."¹

This is true not only for resilience to a pandemic but for any crisis, because any shock of a certain magnitude can and does cascade and compound across all five dimensions, with vicious cycles and feedback loops, so that even rich countries can be as vulnerable as poor ones. In the case of the COVID-19 pandemic, what started in many countries as a health crisis very quickly turned into a threat to people's livelihoods, which in some countries increased restiveness and inflamed grievances, and even violence. Because it was a global shock, some countries which may not have been as directly impacted by the epidemiological aspect of the crisis, were nevertheless severely affected by the economic downturn, whether due to lockdowns, disrupted supply chains, reduced trade, oil and commodity prices, or other factors.


But some countries, through a combination of early action, consistent and effective enforcement of lockdowns, strong social and political capital which increased compliance, and robust social protection for those whose livelihoods were threatened, were able to manage the complex emergency that presented itself. In cases where there may have been a breakdown at the national level (whether due to a failure of information, capacity, or political will), traditional and religious leaders, civil society, charities, and opinion leaders were often able to fill the gap.

The IsDB's operational strategy for fragility and resilience seeks to invest in prevention, transition from relief to development, support recovery after a crisis, and mobilize resources for resilience. To that end, the IsDB Resilience Index, and this report emphasize several key findings. For prevention, it identifies countries not currently in an active crisis, but which might be vulnerable in the event of a future shock to highlight areas where a strategic investment could strengthen their preparedness. For transition from relief to development, it identifies opportunities to support human and social capital, value chains, and livelihoods in countries impacted by protracted or recurrent humanitarian crisis. Finally, it also emphasizes the challenges and opportunities regarding access to finance for the private sector, external capital flows, and government resource mobilization and reserves and so that the Bank can amplify and facilitate where necessary for maximum impact.

Looking ahead, development imperatives will naturally turn to recovery for those countries which were most severely impacted economically, in their health and social protection systems. It will also be vital to prioritize governance and social cohesion, since it will certainly require collective action and shared sacrifice in the recovery phase as well as to be better prepared for the next time in case of another a shock. Although the timeframe of a potential shock may not be predictable, it is assumed that eventually a shock will come.

Of course, resilience does not just mean the ability to bounce back from a shock. It also relates to the management and mitigation of pressures. As defined in the Resilience Index, a shock is the onset of a sudden and severe humanitarian crisis emanating from any of the five dimensions. Pressures, on the other hand, are ongoing and sustained stresses on society, in any dimension, which can degrade capacity in the other four unless resilience is consolidated through the professionalization, legitimacy, and representativeness of key public and private institutions. Thus, resilience is the ability to bounce back from a crisis, adjust to rising pressure, and/or make structural changes when faced with fundamental, irrevocable upheaval. It is the ability to prepare, prevent, manage, and recover from catastrophic change, including all the challenges highlighted in the Global Economic Forum Global Risk Report 2022 (technological, societal, geopolitical, environmental, and economic)².

Research Framework for Assessing Resilience to Shocks and Pressures



Source: IsDB Resilience Index

As outlined in the first IsDB Resilience Report and corroborated by the long-term trends in the Fragile States Index³, the world overall is becoming less fragile, with long term reductions in poverty, mortality, and other important metrics (except for those countries which perennially face protracted or recurrent humanitarian crisis and therefore find themselves in a "Fragility Trap"⁴). But this global reduction in fragility does not necessarily mean that the world is essentially becoming more resilient. Growing environmental and demographic pressures, consolidation of resources, polarization of societies, declining public confidence in institutions, and other imbalances make it harder to quickly bounce back from the occurring crises. And further, as evidenced by the events of 2020, countries assessed as being least fragile, can also prove, at times, to be the least resilient of all.

In this report there is reference to countries that are "most resilient" or "most vulnerable" across the five Dimensions. These scores are calculated based on a quantitative assessment 200 metrics and dozens of sources, scaled, and aggregated to measure the social, institutional, and economic capacity to manage shocks and pressures. For instance, under the Environment/Natural Disasters Dimension, quantitative measures of capacity to cope includes ecosystem health and vitality, sanitation, agriculture, water reserves, governance, livelihoods, public health, social protection, communications, and education. Countries with high capacity in this context and across these measures are considered to be more resilient. Countries with low capacity more vulnerable. However, going beyond the quantitative assessment, field research in the nine case studies provides additional context and qualification to further enrich and nuance that analysis.

The countries for the case studies were selected to ensure a representative sample across regions, risk profiles, population size, and economic factors to surface good practices and lessons learned that can be applied across all MCs. Some countries have more coping capacity in one Dimension than the others. Some countries were in West Africa, the Sahel, Southern Africa, Middle East, Central Asia, or South Asia. Population size ranged from under 10 million (in Togo, Tajikistan, and Mauritania) to an estimated 232 million in Pakistan. Some countries were low income, while others were lower middle income or upper middle income. Some countries were currently or recently conflict-affected, while others had not experienced violent conflict in many years. This broad range of country profiles ensured that the findings would be more comprehensive and generalizable, especially considering that the COVID-19 pandemic affected each and every one, albeit in different ways. In the drafting of these cases studies, 112 people were interviewed, including government officials, military, traditional, religious, and women leaders, civil society, community leaders, humanitarian, development, and private sector actors to learn what has worked and to document those lessons and good practices so that they can be scaled and replicated for better preparedness for the next shock.

Thus, a robust quantitative baseline was followed by the nine case studies carefully selected to represent a broad range of country profiles, through key informant interviews conducted with a range of experts and stakeholders. As such, this report presents a synthesis as a resource for policy makers and IsDB partners in any country of the world to review these findings through comparative analysis and find points of commonality and relevance to their own countries or sectors for the application of the conclusions and recommendations.

In the first report, Policy Implications that presented themselves in the research were 1) the need to empower youth as a force for resilience, 2) the opportunity of using the education system as a tool for resilience across all five dimensions, 3) the need to leverage the human and social capital of women, 4) water access and water management as necessary for resilience, 5) disaster preparedness, and 6) anticipating regional spillover effects. This report reinforces those six and with the added value of the Resilience Index, takes a deeper look into the complex systems in each of the nine case studies to surface the following eight recommendations:

1. **Track 1 (bilateral and intergovernmental) and 2 (community, civil society, and private sector-based) Regional Cooperation** are key to preparedness and an effective response to pressures and shocks. Given shared water basins, cross-border affinity groups, migration, power grids, infrastructure corridors, and trade, countries must have platforms and mechanisms to coordinate policies regionally and to mobilize resources to address matters of urgent concern if a crisis in one country is to be mitigated before it grows and spreads. Togo's membership in the West African Coast Observation Mission (WACOM) is an excellent example of such regional cooperation. Due to the potential regional impacts of coastal erosion

in West Africa—such as displacement, spread of disease, and disruption of trade—regional agreement on guidelines to reduce erosion promotes resilience and decreases the risk of crises. Countries should seek similar cooperation on the unique issues impacting their respective regions. In addition to formal inter-governmental partnerships, emphasis should be placed on relationships among regional and cross-border communities and grass-roots organizations. This may include exchanges or shared education or health resources or exchanges in remote villages or civil society organizations which are establishing Global South-South connections using lessons learned in similar political or environmental circumstances.

2. **Mainstream key resilience lessons and findings, and strategies across and among diverse stakeholder networks**, including government, the private sector, the non-profit sector, and local communities. This should include sensitizing critical concepts, incorporating resilience into national and local strategies, and providing appropriate budget to strengthen resilience. This mainstreaming across sectors can enhance cross-program synergies and proper accounting for, and targeting of, second- and third-order impacts for maximum resilience promotion. For example, climate adaptation programs can also be structured to empower women and stimulate the economy. Green jobs programs, such as Pakistan's nationwide tree planting initiative, are particularly well positioned to stimulate the economy, provide incomes, and build environmental resilience.
3. **"Brain drain," or out-migration of skilled workers, should be mitigated** through incentives, jobs programs, and localized resilience building. But at the same time, in cases where net migration is high, remittances should be leveraged for development and humanitarian response. Programs like the IsDB-France and IsDB-McGill Scholarship programs provide opportunities for students to attend some of the most respected colleges in the world while promoting their return to IsDB regions at the conclusion of their studies. Programs like these award high performing individuals and incentivize using their talents to improve regional development and resilience building.
4. **Scale and Localize Rural Health infrastructures and Delivery Systems with a focus on Pandemic Response**. Systems developed over the course of the COVID-19 pandemic should be maintained. Rather than being treated as ad-hoc emergency expenses, countries should solidify their pandemic response structures and incorporate them into their permanent public health systems. This will not only render them better able to handle the inevitable flare ups and new COVID variants possibly emerging over the coming years, but it will also build their capacity to deal with other endemic diseases and health pressures. Pre-existing health infrastructure in West Africa, developed over the past decade in response to the Ebola virus have proven crucial to the region's relative resilience to the COVID 19 pandemic. In the same way, structures and practices being developed now can increase preparedness for the next epidemic or pandemic. Innovations include mobile health clinics that meet people where they are to improve access. This should be scaled up as it will be crucial in increasing the uptake of vaccines and the provision of a range of basic health services to rural and marginalized populations.
5. **Leverage the public education system for resilience promotion, beyond individual learning**. The public education system may be the single most important institution at the intersection of the state and the population, for integration, social cohesion, prevention of radicalization, psychosocial support, and as a platform for deploying social protection services, in addition to the longer-term income generation potential for the most vulnerable and the economic outlook of the country. Countries with fewer natural resources often invest heavily in education as a tool for building social and human capital, which multiplies dividends in remittances and regional influence policy and attract foreign investment. Programs like the Education Sector Development Plan (PNDSE) in Mauritania have helped the country capitalize on its youthful population and prevent radicalization. Similar programs, particularly focusing on public education for rural communities and women, should be developed and promoted. Further, is essential that the schools not only exist in places reachable by student populations, but that the education system is prepared for further shocks, such as a pandemic that closes all public gathering spaces. Schools, teachers, and students in many areas were forced to put their education on hold while more developed countries shifted online. Thus, public education access includes increased internet saturation rates, digital literacy, technology adoption, and community socialization.



- 6. Leverage Civil society for social cohesion and collaboration.** Civil society networks are vital, not just for accountability and governance, but as a critical tool for bridging ethnic, communal, and religious divides and reducing group-based polarization, which otherwise could lead to conflict. In the event of a shock, a divided population tends to become even more divided. Civil society networks should be cultivated and empowered to promote social cohesion, which is a prerequisite to resilience, even before health and emergency response systems. In turn, empowered local communities are often the first line of defence in responding to shocks such as natural disasters. Early warning and rapid response systems at the local level can be crucial tools in building a bottom-up resilience structure better able to respond when disasters strike.
- 7. Prepare Social Protection Systems.** Social Protection should be well in place before a shock occurs. As natural or human-made disasters disrupt livelihoods, insurance schemes, unemployment benefits, cash and food distribution, loans, and utility assistance should all be prepositioned with clear financing and rapid deployment plans. In particular, direct digital cash transfers and micro-credit institutions geared toward women have proven to be crucial lifelines throughout the pandemic. These are essential tools that should remain in the arsenal of governments moving forward.
- 8. Invest Strategically in Digitalization for Education and Livelihoods.** Digitization proved to be a lifeline for vulnerable populations during the worst of the pandemic, facilitating much-needed cash transfers within and across borders; improving access to digital banking; improving and expanding the reach of social welfare and healthcare systems; enabling educational continuity; limiting the impacts on livelihoods; providing innovative app-based solutions to myriad challenges; providing assistance to Gender-Based Violence (GBV) victims; and contributing to the economic inclusion of women by boosting e-commerce. The COVID-19 pandemic proved to be a stress test for many countries' digital infrastructure, fostering innovation. Efforts must be made to continue on this path, while ensuring that digitization does not paper over cracks – such as education access disparity – at the expense of addressing underlying institutional and societal issues. Furthermore, disparities in internet access will only deepen inequalities as digitization takes hold, and so internet penetration should be inclusive. At the same time, consider potential issues of cyber-security, privacy, social alienation/mental health, and radicalization/hate speech that gain salience in a more online world.




OVERVIEW AND GLOBAL TRENDS

OVERVIEW AND GLOBAL TRENDS

As of March 2022, the world was emerging from a third wave of the COVID-19 pandemic, caused by the Omicron variant. Based on weekly averages of new cases, the WHO regions most impacted epidemiologically, since COVID-19 first emerged in 2020, were Europe and the Americas according to Johns Hopkins University CSSE⁵.

COVID-19 Trends Per 100,000 People




Source: Center for Systems Science and Engineering (CSSE) at Johns Hopkins University (JHU)
<https://coronavirus.jhu.edu/map.html>

Health, Security, and Economy/Livelihoods

At a global level, in retrospect, at least regarding this particular pandemic, the capacity and effectiveness of the health infrastructure seems to have had far less of an impact on the trajectory of the disease than factors such as obesity rates, age distribution, and population movement. This suggests that for pandemic preparedness, development policy should go well beyond the reinforcement of health services and infrastructure alone. Of the IsDB member countries, (based on country reporting) those most impacted in terms of number of cases per capita were the Maldives, Bahrain, Brunei, Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan, Kuwait, Suriname, Qatar, and Palestine. The top ten most impacted countries in terms of deaths per capita were: Tunisia, Suriname, Iran, Guyana, Lebanon, Jordan, Albania, Turkey, Palestine, and Malaysia.

Further, it is also clear that the pandemic was far more than just a health crisis, directly and indirectly affecting trade, supply chains, commodity prices, livelihoods, and social unrest. According to the IMF, GDP growth sharply declined⁶ during the pandemic, even more than it declined during the global financial crisis in 2008-2009. This impacted countries all over the world, even those which may not have been as directly impacted by the disease itself. At the same time, according to ACLED data⁷, there was a sharp increase in riots and protests globally in 2020 and 2021.

Global Trends in Economic Growth and Social Restiveness



Source: International Monetary Fund (IMF) - https://www.imf.org/external/datamapper/NGDP_RPCH@WEO/WEO_WORLD

Source: Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project www.acledata.com

Some IsDB member countries experienced a combination of high COVID-19 prevalence or fatalities per capita, as well as sharp economic decline in 2020 and a high number of riots and protests in 2020-2021. These included Tunisia, Suriname, Lebanon, and Palestine. Others had less COVID-19, but nevertheless, experienced a sharp economic downturn and/or a high number of riots and protests. The table below lists MCs that experienced one or more of these disruptions in 2020-2021.


	High Covid Prevalence or Deaths Per Capita	Sharp Economic Decline in 2020	High Riots and Protests in 2020-2021
Tunisia	X	X	X
Suriname	X	X	X
Iran	X		
Guyana	X		X
Lebanon	X	X	X
Jordan	X		
Albania	X		X
Turkey	X		
Malaysia	X		
Kazakhstan			X
Maldives	X	X	
Bahrain	X		X
Brunei	X		
Kuwait	X	X	
Qatar	X		
Libya		X	
Iraq		X	X
Kyrgyzstan		X	X
Yemen		X	
Palestine	X	X	X
Mauritania			X

This is not to say that in every case, COVID-19 was the main driver of economic distress or restiveness, but given these global trends, the confluence of pressures is unmistakable, with the potential for cascading effects well beyond the pandemic itself. If the financial crisis of 2008-2009 is any indication, it can take many years to recover from a shock of this magnitude, particularly as it affects public confidence in institutions and governance, unless systems and mechanism of resilience are amplified and leveraged for recovery.

Long Term Health and Economic Progress – Except for in Fragile and Conflict-Affected Situations

The COVID-19 crisis and its cascading and compounding effects occurred in the context of an impressive long-term progress in key development indicators worldwide, including literacy⁸, sanitation⁹, poverty¹⁰, and life expectancy¹¹.

Long-Term Health and Economic Development Outcomes



Notably, however, fragile and conflict affected states have found themselves trapped in a vicious cycle, where they did not experience the same degree of improvement as the rest of the world, except for life expectancy. Still, contrary to most expectations, it was not the most fragile states that were the most vulnerable to the adverse effects of the pandemic, reinforcing the idea that resilience cannot be seen as the inverse of fragility.

Security and Economy/ Livelihoods

The COVID-19 pandemic is not the only global challenge that is having cascading effects across the dimensions of fragility and resilience. The conflict in Ukraine and the resulting devastation have already had major global impacts and will have implications for resilience in IsDB member countries. Major trade disruptions, as well as ongoing food security issues, have been some of the first issues to arise. Ukraine is a major exporter of wheat, barley, and sunflower oil. The sudden and immediate reduction in those goods, and the anticipated continued reduction in their availability has triggered major price increases on staple goods. In addition, the global trade relationship with Russia has suffered as a result of political and war-related complexities, from sanctions to continuing supply chain challenges. There has been an impact on the global energy supply, especially to states who directly border Russia and remain in the economic sphere. Over both the short- and long-term, this will have implications for increased poverty levels in fragile economies who rely on tourism, remittances, or have little to no trade reserves to pull from to get them through this sudden trade slump.

Environment, Displacement, and Health

These challenges are further compounded by the increasing unpredictability and frequency of major weather events due to the changing climate. While this topic is multi-dimensional and complex, it is necessary to note in any discussion of global trends with far reaching and cascading implications on human security. In addition to the direct effects on the environment, from desertification and higher temperatures, economies and health sectors are highly susceptible to the effects of climate change, including droughts and floods effecting harvest yields, to longer mosquito seasons increasing the risks of malaria and other insect-borne diseases. As climate change alters the ways and places in which agriculture, livestock, and fishing can feed and support populations, human migration and the resulting demographic shifts have the potential to fundamentally change the economies, populations, politics, and habitability of several IsDB member countries.

This paper seeks to parse the nuances of fragility, resilience, and their relationship through a deeper look at nine case studies below.



RISK AND RESILIENCE FACTORS

RISK AND RESILIENCE FACTORS

The IsDB Resilience Index framework considers factors which are necessary to bounce back from crisis and to adapt to rising pressure as they relate to 1) Environment/Natural Disasters, 2) Health/Pandemics, 3) Economy/Livelihoods, 4) Human Security, and 5) Forced Displacement. Recognizing that a crisis can emanate from any one of these dimensions and cascade and compound across the other four, they are sequenced in this order to reflect the prototypical example of climatological pressures triggering a natural disaster, which then could lead to an outbreak of an infectious water-borne disease, which adversely affects livelihoods, rising social tensions and conflict, and ultimately driving people from their homes. As illustrated by the events of 2020, no single dimension can be prepared for in isolation, so resilience factors are often cross-cutting, such as education, inclusiveness, governance, opportunity, infrastructure, and social protection. The IsDB Resilience Index, therefore, takes more of a systems approach to measuring resilience than other indices, which are generally structured more by sector and pillars than with an explicit link to different types of disasters.




Overall Resilience				
	Resilience to Shocks		Resilience to Pressure	
	Prevalence of Shocks	Coping Capacity to Manage Shocks	Level of Pressure	Coping Capacity to Manage Pressure
Environment/ Disasters	Sharply deteriorating environmental conditions including natural disasters	Extent to which mechanisms exist that enable communities to cope with sharply deteriorating environmental conditions	Environmental pressure including climate, pollution, and water scarcity	Extent to which mechanisms exist that enable communities to cope with environmental pressures
Health/ Pandemics	Sharply deteriorating health situations due to epidemics, especially infectious disease	Extent to which the health system as well as other determinants such as infrastructure and social equity allow for effective response to shocks.	Extent to which the baseline disease burden puts pressure on communities and undermines health and livelihoods	Extent to which the health system, as well as other factors such as nutrition, and other social determinants mitigates pressure, especially for the most vulnerable.
Economy/ Livelihoods	Sharply deteriorating economic conditions including commodity prices, inflation, and unemployment	Extent to which mechanisms exist that enable communities to cope with sharply deteriorating economic conditions	Challenging economic conditions	Extent to which mechanisms exist that enable communities to cope with challenging economic conditions
Human Security	Sharply deteriorating human security conditions, including for vulnerable populations such as women, children, displaced people, minorities, and the disabled	Extent to which mechanisms exist to protect vulnerable populations in situations of conflict escalation and sharply deteriorating human insecurity conditions	Challenging human security conditions including for vulnerable populations such as women, children, displaced people, minorities, and the disabled	Extent to which mechanisms exist to protect vulnerable populations in situations of challenging human security conditions
Forced Migration	Sharply deteriorating conditions in relation to IDPs, refugees or migrants displaced from neighboring countries	Extent to which mechanisms for emergency response functions exist to mitigate the humanitarian impact of sharply deteriorating conditions in relation to forced displacement	Challenging conditions, in the face of IDPs, refugees, or migrants displaced from neighboring countries	Extent to which mechanism exist for host communities to maintain livelihoods and social cohesion in the face of situations of forced migration



Building Resilience: Environment and Natural Disasters

Map Showing Relative Levels of Capacity to Manage Environment/Natural Disasters Pressures and Shocks



Source: IsDB Resilience Index

Most Resilient	Most Vulnerable
1. Brunei Darussalam (8.3)	1. Somalia (1.3)
2. Malaysia (8.1)	2. Yemen (2.2)
3. United Arab Emirates (8.1)	3. Afghanistan (2.3)
4. Kazakhstan (8.1)	4. Chad (2.5)
5. Saudi Arabia (7.5)	5. Sudan (2.6)
6. Kuwait (7.4)	6. Comoros (2.7)
7. Qatar (7.3)	7. Niger (3.0)
8. Albania (7.2)	8. Nigeria (3.1)
9. Azerbaijan (7.2)	9. Sierra Leone (3.2)
10. Oman (7.1)	10. Guinea-Bissau (3.2)

Country Resilience Scores Based on the IsDB Resilience Index

In a context where climate change is acting as a multiplying factor for destructive weather events, resilience to environmental pressures is as much about the social and economic capacities as it is about the intensity of the hazards themselves.¹² Natural hazards are intensifying to increasingly dangerous magnitudes, growing more unpredictable and emerging where they might not have previously posed a threat.¹³ But poverty is often the most important factor determining whether an individual, community, or country will be disproportionately impacted.¹⁴ Regulation of settlement planning (for example in flood zones), building codes, and drought resistant agriculture is important, but the complexities are fraught with risk. Mitigating long term climate risk is secondary to concerns of survival for billions of people. Thus, the framework employed in this analysis, and in the analysis of the case studies considers not only the capacities directly related to conservation, water management, and agriculture, but also education, livelihoods, social protection, public health, and governance.

Few countries exemplify the existential threat posed by natural disasters and environmental change as well as the Maldives, both in terms of shocks and pressures. As an archipelago of low-lying islands and atolls (making it the lowest-lying country in the world), the Maldives is in the position of being vulnerable to both environmental

shocks, and pressures in the form of rising sea levels, driven by climate change. Although not located close to a geological fault, on December 26th of 2004, most of the country's constituent islands were hit by an Indian Ocean tsunami, causing an estimated \$460 million of damage – representing an estimated 62 percent loss of GDP.¹⁵ Additionally, the tsunami killed over 100 people, representing an estimated 0.3 percent of the Maldives' population at the time. For comparison, Hungary lost approximately the same percentage of its population 14 months into the pandemic – the highest official mortality rate globally.¹⁶ Beyond the loss of human life, the Indian Ocean tsunami destroyed and affected houses, tourist resorts, boats, fishing equipment, schools, health facilities, transport and communication equipment, plus the country's water, sanitation and electricity infrastructure.¹⁷ Additional environmental impacts included substantial soil erosion, thereby imperiling agriculture and home-based market gardening, the destruction of crops and perennial trees, and the salinization of farms, homestead plots and aquifers.¹⁸ All these disruptions serve to highlight the potential risks posed by acute environmental shocks, to which a number of coastal IsDB member states are vulnerable. Cyclones Kenneth and Eloise wrought considerable destruction on Mozambique in 2019, cumulatively affecting over half a million people,^{19,20} while cyclone Kenneth furthermore swept over Comoros, causing widespread flooding, displacing 20,000 people, destroying 3,800 houses and damaging a further 7,000.²¹ Amongst a population of 851,000, 41 percent or 345,000 were affected by the passage of the cyclone.²²

To contextualize the potential impact of such major extreme weather events, consider that COVID-19 slashed GDP growth for all but 28 countries worldwide in 2020;²³ the Maldives was no exception, its economy experienced a 28 percent contraction, largely due to the impact on the tourism and construction industries.²⁴ Though higher than the -13.1 percent contraction that the country suffered following the tsunami, the timeframes are diametrically opposed. In 2004, the devastation wrought by a single extreme event was massive and the consequences lasting. While each country presents a unique combination of economic, social and political factors, the Maldives' example is a cautionary tale. However, the speed with which it recovered from the 2004 tsunami is a testament to the country's resilience and has served it well in preparing for the impacts of climate change, namely rising sea levels that threaten to submerge large parts of the country. The government has explored plans to purchase land in other countries and has also begun building an artificial island in preparation for the irreversible submersion of much of its landmass.²⁵ Furthermore, crises often breed opportunity, and in 2017, the Maldives constitutionally recognized protection of the environment as a human right, while in parallel committing to low-emission, sustainable development.²⁶

The case of the Maldives is unique among IsDB member states, insofar as it is one of a handful of low-lying island states whose very existence is threatened by rising sea levels and increasing storm events. Many IsDB member countries are susceptible to different environmental pressures, which manifest themselves in less acute ways than shocks, over a longer period. By and large, climate change is the driver of many of these chronic pressures, and is behind sea level rise/coastal flooding, rising temperatures, water scarcity/drought, erratic rainfall, increasing frequency and severity of wildfires, and cyclones²⁷. Their overall impact individually, and collectively, can be massive. Water-related pressures and increasing temperatures pose risks across the thematic spectrum, namely menacing human security and livelihoods with regards to an increasing paucity of clean drinking water and poor agricultural yields, while also acting as a multiplying factor for health risks by virtue of leading to the spread of vectors such as mosquitoes, and therefore of devastating diseases such as malaria²⁸. Additionally, extreme weather events exacerbate forced displacement²⁹. Additionally, where extreme events, such as droughts and floods, occur in succession, the multiple impacts on recovering communities can be devastating.


That the Maldives, which faces acute pressures and shocks also ranks among the IsDB members' most "resilient" countries according to the Resilience Index, demonstrating that circumstances need not dictate outcome. The Maldives' resilience in the face of rising sea levels is largely predicated upon the government's



In a context where sustained climate change is acting as a multiplying factor for destructive weather events, resilience to environmental pressures is as much about the social and economic capacities as it is about the intensity of the hazards themselves.

ability to take stock of the country's predicament and plan accordingly. Such resilience is required across the IsDB member countries if the damage caused by environmental change is to be mitigated and contained so as to avoid cascading effects across the human security, forced displacement, economy & livelihoods, and health dimensions.

Key Climate-Related Vulnerabilities in Each of the IsDB Regions and Regional Hubs



Source: 2020-2025 IsDB Climate Action Plan³⁰

Using the IsDB Resilience Index to plot vulnerabilities against capacities presents four broad quadrants for an estimation of structural dynamics: Relative Stability (High Capacities/Low Vulnerability); Latent Crisis (Low Capacity/Low Vulnerabilities; Potential Oscillation (High Capacity/High Vulnerability); Potential Escalation (Low Capacity/High Vulnerability). In the 11 countries within the quadrant for Potential Escalation, four (Mauritania, Niger, Chad, and Sudan) are located in Africa's Sahel belt – the ecoclimatic and biogeographic transition zone between the Sahara Desert and the Sudanian savanna – while a further two (Djibouti and Somalia) are located in the horn of Africa, a region characterized by arid or semi-arid conditions. Across the Bab Al-Mandab Strait lies Yemen, another country whose environmental challenges result in its presence in the Escalation quadrant.³¹ Meanwhile, Mali sits close to the border between latent crisis and escalation, suggesting that it is close to tipping into the latter. Additionally, although not located within the Sahel belt, Egypt – another country presenting escalation dynamics – borders Sudan to the north, and shares a major environmental challenge with it: heavy reliance on the Nile River, compounded by geopolitical disputes over riparian rights with Ethiopia.³² As such, a pattern linking all these countries becomes clear, thereby establishing geography (and more pertinently, climate) as a key factor in countries' environmental vulnerabilities, if not the sole cause.

Consequently, these countries' vulnerabilities, and therefore their avenues for resilience, are largely predicated on their climate. However, a number of MCs with comparable levels of aridity or risk in the face of rapidly changing rainfall patterns are found by the Resilience Index as having relatively low vulnerability and high capacity, thus tending structurally toward "stability": Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Qatar, Bahrain, Oman and Saudi Arabia all constitute the arid Arabian Peninsula, and by and large, experience similar climatological pressures as Yemen. However, all of these have been able to found their economies and prosperity upon rich oil resources, whereas the aforementioned countries spanning the Sahel belt and Horn of Africa largely have agriculture-based economies, making them especially vulnerable to climate change, altered rainfall patterns, and water resource pressures.³³ While not all countries located in the "stable" quadrant can point to oil reserves as the source of their relative stability, it is an important contributing factor for Brunei Darussalam, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan (to name a few).³⁴ To suggest that there exists a direct correlation between commodity-wealth and resilience in the face of environmental pressures would be tenuous, (and certainly an overreliance on a single commodity export inevitably presents significant

long-term economic risks). However, the ability to adapt and bounce back from shocks and pressures, as well as to avoid them altogether, is aided by higher GDP/capita levels and Human Development Index (HDI) scores (in turn positively associated with a country's financial prosperity).³⁵ This is thrown into sharp focus by Saudi Arabia's dramatic change of fortunes following its oil reserves discovery in the 1930s, and its exceptionally high HDI score today.³⁶ Consider that the life expectancy improved from 52.7 years in 1970 to 70.07 years in 2015, while infant mortality decreased from 292 deaths per 1000 live births in 1960 to 13 deaths per 1000 live births today. Finally, adult literacy now stands at around 95 percent, up from 8 percent in 1970. Underscoring the role that the pivot of the Saudi economy toward oil played in this, per capita income increased from \$927 in 1970 to \$54,000 in 2016. While such good fortune is only shared by a handful of IsDB MCs, the example of Saudi Arabia highlights the importance of economic management and human development in building resilience across the five pillars, including in the face of environmental pressures and shocks. This is all the more so the case for agriculture-based economies, for whom environmental change poses a serious threat to livelihoods, food security, and to government revenue and by extension, expenditure, thereby potentially creating a feedback loop.

The fact of climate change contributing to vulnerability is also borne out when looking at the countries with low capacity and low vulnerability, thus tending structurally toward a "Latent Crisis" as if and when a shock hits, they may not have the capacity to manage, and it could cascade and compound in unpredictable ways. A number of these countries are located south of the aforementioned Sahelian belt countries, and benefit from a climate conducive to extensive rainfed agriculture (Côte d'Ivoire, Benin, Togo, Burkina Faso, Gambia, Guinea-Bissau, Cameroon, The Gambia, Sierra Leone, Guinea, Nigeria). While conditions in these countries remain favorable to extensive agriculture, rainfall patterns are becoming more erratic and less reliable, posing increasing risk with regards to sudden weather events such as torrential rain (which can in turn lead to landslides), but also to agricultural productivity. Furthermore, many are coastal, and so are also faced with rising sea levels threatening coastal communities. Resilience building strategies will be required.

The ambitious 2020-2025 Climate Action Plan is built upon the four following pillars:

- i. Mainstreaming climate action in IsDB operations
- ii. Promoting climate change resilience
- iii. Green growth and supporting the transition to a green economy
- iv. Leveraging resources

A constant and integral part of this plan is the objective, as noted in the IsDB's 2020-2025 Climate Action Plan, to dedicate 35% of the Bank's overall commitment to climate finance by 2025, reflecting both the importance it grants to adaptation and resilience, and the urgency of adequate policymaking and financing to adapt to environmental changes that are occurring too slowly to be considered acute, but nevertheless too quickly and inexorably to continue with current growth models.


Good Practices in Building Resilience to Environment and Natural Disasters

A silver lining to the threat posed by environmental change is that it is being increasingly taken seriously. The interconnectedness of environmental degradation and other thematic areas are coming into sharp focus, even if on a theoretical level: for instance, the coronavirus pandemic has underscored the risks associated with biodiversity degradation and the reliance of social and economic benefits on biodiversity and nature-based services. The urgency to integrate nature-based solutions into sustainable development pathways is now well-established.

The majority of the 57 IsDB member countries are located in areas projected to be the hardest hit by climate and environmental change. The IsDB has a long history of streamlining the SDGs into its projects, leading to what it terms a "global agenda of sustainability"³⁷ and a practice of making "do no harm" a prerequisite to its projects since the Bank's formation in 1975. This has contributed to building sustainable societies across its member countries. Furthermore, as evidenced by the contrasting fortunes of oil-producing and non-oil producing IsDB member countries, high HDI is correlated with high levels of resilience, including in the face of environmental threats: Making human development a central tenet of short- mid- and long-term development will significantly improve outcomes in countries threatened by environmental change. For those countries not blessed with commodities and resources, especially, there is a need for proactive measures for green economic growth to be introduced.



Building Resilience: Health and Pandemics



Most Resilient	Most Vulnerable
1. Kuwait (9.4)	1. Chad (1.5)
2. Qatar (9.2)	2. Somalia (1.6)
3. Maldives (8.9)	3. Yemen (2.4)
4. United Arab Emirates (8.9)	4. Nigeria (2.6)
5. Brunei Darussalam (8.8)	5. Niger (2.6)
6. Saudi Arabia (8.5)	6. Sudan (3.1)
7. Bahrain (8.5)	7. Mali (3.1)
8. Oman (8.1)	8. Mozambique (3.1)
9. Uzbekistan (8.0)	9. Togo (3.2)
10. Kazakhstan (7.9)	10. Sierra Leone (3.2)

Country Resilience Scores Based on the IsDB Resilience Index

The successes and failures of responses to the COVID-19 pandemic have underscored the importance of the resilience of health and health systems. Resilience within this sector is dependent on many interconnecting factors such as the healthcare system (including quality of care, accessibility, affordability, adequate training and retention of medical personnel, and supply chains for medical equipment and treatments/vaccines), access to clean water and food, and the adoption of sanitary practices. Education has also been linked to better health and nutrition.³⁸ In addition to these factors, organizational barriers such as administrative barriers, delays in “responsiveness” by services, and a concentration rather than dispersion of health services can also impede adequate delivery of health services.³⁹

Other variables, including social and political factors, impact a state’s health resilience as well by restricting healthcare access by certain groups. Cultural barriers that can restrict access to health services include gender, nationality, race and ethnicity, religion, and health literacy or beliefs.⁴⁰ Some geographical barriers that prevent equal access to health services include a lack of public transportation to healthcare facilities,

disparities between services offered in rural and urban areas, and regional variations.⁴¹ In order to create a resilient health system, states must address all aspects of society that can contribute to health in addition to infrastructure and training medical staff.


Over the past few decades, great strides have been made toward improved health systems throughout the world. In the Middle East and Northern Africa, noncommunicable diseases such as hypertension, cancer, and cardiovascular diseases are currently responsible for around 60 percent of the diseases recorded in the region, indicating a shift away from the prevalence of communicable diseases.⁴² While the region has overall improved its health system to reduce communicable diseases, poor diets, increased rates of obesity, and smoking are increasing rates of noncommunicable diseases within the population.⁴³ Despite these advances, shocks from the wars in Syria, Libya, Iraq, and Yemen have put pressure on health systems in the region. This pressure is especially felt in Lebanon and Jordan since these countries have accepted large numbers of refugees.⁴⁴ These conflicts can also result in the destruction of health infrastructure, hindered access to healthcare services, increased soldier and civilian injuries, the spread of communicable diseases, and loss of doctors. In addition to coping with the conflict within Syria, 70 percent of Syrian medical professionals had left the country by 2013, further straining the health system.⁴⁵

In comparison, the health systems in Southeast Asia are experiencing pressure from the prevalence of infectious diseases such as malaria, HIV, zoonotic diseases, and influenza. Food insecurity and poverty within the region have exacerbated the health crisis. At present, USAID is working in the region to implement programs that will curb the spread of drug-resistant malaria.⁴⁶ For example, funding from the U.S. President's Malaria Initiative has allowed USAID to work in Laos and Thailand to reduce malaria cases through the introduction of bed nets treated with long-lasting insecticide and provide training on how to use the malaria surveillance system in Thailand to test and treat malaria cases.⁴⁷ To create a resilient health system, nations must learn from these experiences and build upon their existing health system to guard against future stressors.

The ongoing COVID-19 pandemic is one such stressor and government responses to the pandemic have revealed the varying degrees of resilience within health systems around the world. One such example is Saudi Arabia (6th most resilient according to the IsDB Resilience Index). After experiencing the Middle East Respiratory Syndrome (MERS) in 2012, Saudi Arabia adapted its health facilities by creating separate triage units that were tailored for treating respiratory illness by incorporating custom ventilation that protects medical workers from illness. A minimum of two hospitals also added drive-thru testing.⁴⁸ Due to its experience with MERS, Saudi Arabia was more prepared for the arrival of COVID-19.




In addition to infrastructure preparedness, the Saudi Arabian government responded quickly to the COVID-19 pandemic. Seven weeks before the first COVID-19 case was identified in Saudi Arabia, the government had created guidelines to manage the pandemic, including stopping air travel, quick testing, and curfews once cases were confirmed.⁴⁹ Since the beginning of the pandemic, Saudi Arabia has experienced 15.3k infections per million people with 240.7 deaths per million people,⁵⁰ which is due to an increase in cases after restrictions were lifted on June 21, 2020,⁵¹ and the emergence of the Delta Variant in 2021. This indicates that health system resilience and quick government response are crucial to an effective mitigation strategy, but decreased vigilance can lead to increased infection rates.



In contrast, Somalia, which has the second most vulnerable health system according to the IsDB Resilience Index, struggled in its response to the pandemic. The 2019 Global Health Security Index ranked Somalia as 194th out of the 195 countries analyzed.⁵² In Somalia, only one in three people has access to clean water, and one in nine children dies before they turn one year old.⁵³ In addition, there is a high risk of contracting measles and cholera for the internally displaced people in Somalia who live in areas with reduced access to hygiene services and sanitation.⁵⁴ As of January 2020, there were more than 2.6 million internally displaced Somalis with 750,000 more residing in neighboring countries, which indicates a high risk for the spread of communicable diseases.⁵⁵ When the pandemic reached Somalia, the lack of testing and tracing strategies led to widespread infection. To address these needs, the WHO has aided Somalia through training healthcare workers, providing training on infection control, and donating medical supplies.⁵⁶ Other aspects of healthcare have suffered during the pandemic as well. Routine visits to the doctor for pregnant women and children under five decreased by about 50 percent when comparing the first seven months of 2019 to 2020.⁵⁷

Africa has fared better than many other continents during the pandemic. While it is likely that some of this can be explained by lower levels of testing, the number of deaths has not increased by a substantial amount, suggesting that a lack of testing is not the only explanation. Although experts are still evaluating why this lower level of infections is observed, there are a few likely contributing factors. On average, the African population is much younger than the rest of the world. The median age of the African continent is 18 compared to a median age of 40 in Germany. Since COVID-19 tends to have a milder effect on younger people, the demographics of

many African countries likely plays in their favor.⁵⁸ Furthermore, in many regions in Africa, people live in rural areas with fewer inhabitants and more time spent outdoors, which would result in decreased transmission rates as well. It has also been suggested that due to the greater incidence of disease such as malaria, diarrheal diseases, and measles, the population's immune systems may be better equipped to manage COVID-19.⁵⁹



In addition to demographics, some actions contributed to the low rates as well. Early in the pandemic, many of the African countries responded quickly and took measures to decrease the spread of the COVID-19 pandemic. This was especially true in countries which had fought the Ebola outbreak and were able to utilize the tools they had learned during the 2014-2016 outbreak.⁶⁰ Public compliance was also reported to be high. A Partnership for Evidence-based Response to COVID-19 (PERC) survey of 18 countries in August 2020 revealed that around 85 percent of respondents reported that they had worn masks the week before.⁶¹ The high level of compliance with public health measures by the continent has likely contributed to the low numbers of COVID-19 cases. However, despite the swift measures taken by the government at the beginning of the pandemic, the lack of health infrastructure and resources in some countries such as Guinea, Sierra Leone, and Liberia later became a problem as case numbers increased.⁶²

Interestingly, despite having resilient health systems, many developed countries around the world experienced very high numbers of confirmed cases and an overburdened healthcare system. Some factors that have contributed to this outcome include political and social influences. In times of crisis, people turn to leaders to set the tone and manage the response. A strong political message can lead to positive outcomes while a disjointed or negative message can lead to disaster, as was evidenced in countries like the United States where hyper-polarized politics contributed to a disjointed response and the behaviors and attitudes of the citizens themselves are also linked to their political party.⁶³ By the beginning of 2021, the United States' death toll of almost 373,000 was in the top 20 percent of COVID-19 deaths compared to other developed countries.⁶⁴

Potential outcomes in a health crisis are dependent on two factors: health capacity and health vulnerability. The health capacity of a country reflects the health infrastructure, including:

- Number and quality of hospitals/medical clinics
- Number of trained doctors and medical staff
- Funds and access for medical resources
- Public accessibility of healthcare

The capacity of a health system is then tested by health vulnerabilities such as communicable diseases, which can be exacerbated by limited access to clean water or people living in close quarters, such as those in refugee camps. Using the IsDB Resilience Index to plot vulnerabilities against capacities presents four broad quadrants for an estimation of structural dynamics: Relative Stability (High Capacities/Low Vulnerability); Latent Crisis (Low Capacity/Low Vulnerabilities; Potential Oscillation (High Capacity/High Vulnerability); Potential Escalation (Low Capacity/High Vulnerability). Within this framework, the UAE health system tends toward a prognosis of “stability”, as it is characterized by having a high capacity for health with relatively low health vulnerabilities. The high health capacity is unsurprising since one of the focuses of the UAE Vision 2021 strategy launched in 2010 is to achieve “world-class healthcare” by 2021, the 50th anniversary of the founding of the UAE.⁶⁵ As a result, between 2011 and 2015, the UAE’s spending on healthcare increased by 10 percent. To reflect these efforts, by 2015 maternal mortality rate was 8 per 100,000 live births compared to that of 14 in the United States.⁶⁶ The 2019 Global Health Security Index ranked the UAE as 56th out of the 195 countries analyzed for overall health and the ability to prevent, detect, and respond to health crises, indicating a relatively good health system.⁶⁷ In addition to a solid health infrastructure and a high level of accessibility to UAE citizens, the UAE also strives to incorporate the newest technology into their healthcare system that coordinates patient data amongst all hospitals and clinics, 24/7 telemedicine, and a screening program that allows the health authority to identify patterns of non-communicable diseases so health policy changes can be made.⁶⁸

The opposite is observed in Sierra Leone, which demonstrates a low health capacity and high health vulnerabilities, and structurally trends towards “Potential Escalation” unless there is a major change in the health system. The weak health sector in Sierra Leone is very susceptible to any shocks to the system, such as the Ebola outbreak from 2014-2016 or the COVID-19 pandemic. It is argued that the fragmentation of the health sector results in uncoordinated policies and disrupted financing and resources.⁶⁹ This uncoordinated system, compounded by high health vulnerabilities, has resulted in the top three causes of death in Sierra Leone to be malaria, lower respiratory infections, and neonatal disorders.⁷⁰

After learning from the Ebola outbreak, the government in Sierra Leone was quick to respond to the COVID-19 pandemic by isolating those who test positive and quarantine potentially exposed people. Despite these actions, the rate of infection is increasing. This is likely due to Sierra Leone’s lack of financial capital and insufficient resources to care for those infected or protect healthcare workers.⁷¹ In addition, although ventilators have been donated to Sierra Leone, they remain unused because health care workers have not been trained to operate them.⁷²

Bangladesh, in contrast, has both low health capacity and a relatively lower level of health vulnerability, and therefore tends structurally toward a “latent” crisis, suggesting that it should be a priority country for prevention efforts. According to the 2019 Global Health Security Index, Bangladesh was ranked 113th out of 195 countries used in the index and received a score of 23.6 out of 100 for healthcare access, compared to the average score of 38.4. Infection control practices and availability of equipment were especially low in Bangladesh. However, due to a lower risk of communicable disease (70 percent of deaths were by non-communicable diseases in 2019 according to the WHO⁷³ as compared to 23 percent deaths due to communicable diseases, maternal, prenatal, and nutritional conditions⁷⁴) the health system does not have to struggle under the burden of such cases. Despite the lack of a robust healthcare system, the absence of health crises has allowed the Bangladesh population to remain relatively safe. However, this also puts Bangladesh in a precarious situation, whereby in the event of a potential shock, Bangladesh may not have the capacity to effectively cope with the crisis, which could result in a public health disaster. It is critical that Bangladesh use this period of lower health risks to invest in its healthcare system and infrastructure to prepare for future crises.

These examples demonstrate the intersection of health capacity and vulnerability in the resilience of a country. A high capacity can make a country more resilient to the impact of a vulnerability but does not guarantee an

effective response to each shock, especially if the shock is not similar to an event experienced by the country before. Conversely, a country with a low health capacity can remain relatively stable as long as it is combined with a low health vulnerability.

The World Health Organization provides guidance for pandemic planning that states can follow as a template when preparing the country for any potential pandemics. This template consists of six categories:

- i. Policies and the management of resources
- ii. Coordination and planning
- iii. The management of knowledge and information
- iv. The preparation of safer and resilient health infrastructure
- v. Strengthened and specialized health services
- vi. The capacity of the local health workforce to respond to crises.

Such preparations will allow a country to respond quickly and efficiently to communicable health crises and mitigate the burden on the health system in the event of any crisis.

The promotion of a resilient health system relies on a variety of variables. The most critical variables include medical infrastructure, the accessibility and affordability of care, adequate training and retention of medical personnel, resources for medical equipment, access to clean water and food, and the adoption of sanitary practices. In addition, social and political determinants such as education, income, and social status within the community also have impacts on the ability to access adequate healthcare. As such, it is important that states work to increase and improve both the infrastructure of medical facilities as well as training of medical staff while simultaneously increasing the livelihoods of those undereducated, living below the poverty line, or minority groups within the state to ensure strong health resilience within the country.

A state must also have the capacity to coordinate health responses quickly and effectively to a shock to the system, such as a pandemic. States that lack the resources to improve their health systems also have the option of working with external groups such as international organizations, non-government organizations, development banks, and non-profit institutions to provide financial and personnel support. This idea is illustrated through the IsDB's initiative to upgrade the emergency preparedness of six national referral hospitals throughout Indonesia. In September 2020, the IsDB approved US\$262 million to aid this project. The goal of this project is to help Indonesia achieve Sustainable Development Goal #3, which seeks to ensure a healthy life for its citizens and their well-being regardless of age group.⁷⁵

The IsDB has also contributed to projects that will have multiple benefits to the community. Starting in 2018, the IsDB provided EUR 159 million to upgrade and convert an Okmeydani hospital in Istanbul into an earthquake proof facility. In addition to providing healthcare to 2.5 million patients each year, the hospital can be used as a shelter for the community during earthquakes.⁷⁶ As a result of the construction, Istanbul will not only gain an improved hospital, but a life-saving shelter in the event of a natural disaster.

During the COVID-19 pandemic, the IsDB has contributed to enhancing the preparation and response of IsDB Member Countries. These contributions have ranged from increasing the availability of Personal Protective Equipment and other medical supplies to case detection, containment, and response. A selection of IsDB health-focused projects, including many targeted towards the COVID-19 pandemic, are described in the table below.



The most critical variables include medical infrastructure, the accessibility and affordability of care, adequate training and retention of medical personnel, resources for medical equipment, access to clean water and food, and the adoption of sanitary practices.

Selected IsDB Health Projects^{77,78,79}

Country	Project Name	Project Description
Benin	Emergency Support for the Preparedness and Response Plan against COVID-19 (Phase I) in Benin	\$20 million granted to support Benin's Preparedness and Response Plan against COVID-19 by providing health care services and enhance the capacity to detect cases
Cameroon	Support to the COVID-19 response for essential reproductive health activities	\$1.5 million provided to the COVID-19 response to ensure access to maternal and childcare services and other reproductive health activities
Côte d'Ivoire	Emergency Support to the COVID-19 Response Plan Project in the Republic of Côte d'Ivoire	\$46.2 million dedicated to equipping 14 COVID-19 treatment centers with medical equipment
Guinea	Emergency Support to the COVID-19 Pandemic Preparedness and Response Plan in Guinea	\$20.0 million to enhance Guinea's preparedness and response to the COVID-19 pandemic through enhanced surveillance at entry points, the prevention and management of cases, coordination of interventions, strengthen human capital and health infrastructure, bolster laboratory system, and develop communication and information activities
Indonesia	Strengthening of National Referral Hospitals and Vertical Technical Units	US \$262 million approved to upgrade six National Referral Hospitals and Vertical Technical Units throughout the country
Kyrgyz Republic	Emergency Support for Building COVID-19 pandemic preparedness and response capacity in the Kyrgyz Republic	\$15 million granted to improve health system preparedness and response to the COVID-19 pandemic through improved containment measures, surveillance capacity, and project management support
Mauritania	Acquisition and deployment of medical equipment to fight against COVID-19, Islamic Republic of Mauritania	\$0.9 million to acquire and distribute Personal Protective Equipment and collection and transport kits for COVID-19 samples
Turkey		EUR 159 million contributed to the construction of an earthquake proof Okmeydani hospital in Istanbul
Uganda	Emergency Support to COVID-19 Preparedness and Response Project, Uganda	\$13.8 million approved to increase the availability of Personal Protective Equipment for health workers and staff, bolster COVID-19 laboratory testing, and increase access to supplies necessary for biohazardous waste disposal and disinfection
Uzbekistan	Equipping of the 10,000 beds Medical Facility for Treatment of COVID-19 Patients in Tashkent in Uzbekistan	\$17.2 million to provide medical supplies and equipment for a specialized medical facility for the treatment of COVID-19 patients in Tashkent

In addition to developing resilience at a national level, regional initiatives can be utilized to improve and expand upon health and pandemic resilience. In 2016, WHO Member States in South-East Asia launched an initiative that would increase information sharing and collaboration on regulatory practices across the region to ensure access to high-quality medical products.⁸⁰ Considering many health crises such as pandemics can easily cross borders, regional cooperation provides an opportunity for states to reduce the risk of a pandemic within their own borders by working to improve the resilience of neighboring states.

Another such initiative is the Regional Disease Surveillance Systems Enhancement Program (REDISSE), funded by the World Bank. This program works to strengthen both the national and regional capacity to

withstand and manage disease threats that come from the intersection of the environment, animals, and humans across Central Africa. The goal is to strengthen healthcare systems, health security, and overall preparedness for pandemics across Central Africa by increasing surveillance and the ability to effectively respond to threats to reduce the possibility of transmission across borders.⁸¹

These preparations can help a country create a sustainable and resilient health system to manage the overall health of its citizens as well as health crises. In addition, it is critical that governments learn from previous health crises within their borders as well as in other countries to adapt their health systems and infrastructure to be better prepared for the next, thereby increasing the resilience of their health system.

Good Practices in Building Resilience to Health and Pandemics


Building country-level resilience to health and pandemics is a multifaceted process that should take into account various approaches that capitalize on past good practices and leverage innovative approaches. As a basic foundation, a resilient health system that is able to cope with shocks such as a pandemic should include medical infrastructure that supports adequate training and retention of medical personnel, as well as access to basic medical equipment and resources. However, even with a strong foundation, a resilient healthcare system is also one where there is access to clean food and water, and the adoption of sanitary practices, and community access to medical facilities and treatments. This, in turn, is often dependent on social and political variables such as education levels, income, and social status. Therefore, initiatives aimed at building or strengthening resilience in the health system, and to health shocks and pressures such as a pandemic must increase and improve both the infrastructure of medical facilities as well as training of medical staff, while also working to improve the livelihoods of those who currently are unable to access healthcare due to a variety of social or political determinants.

Additionally, in terms of innovation, while states and multilateral institutions such as the IsDB and its partners invest in building basic infrastructure and improving livelihoods and access through a variety of programs, some examples from the case studies examined for this report might prove valuable for more targeted or expanded funding. For example, the use of mobile health clinics, particularly in countries that have large rural populations that may not have ready access to healthcare, have proven critical. Beyond vaccination campaigns or in response to a surge in need due to pandemics or other health-related emergencies, mobile health clinics have also been used to provide routine medical and dental care in underserved communities and regions. As noted in the section above, the WHO lays out six critical components of pandemic preparedness, one of which is the preparation of a safer and resilient health infrastructure, which includes access to basic medical services. The use of mobile health clinics, as well as teams of medical professionals including doctors, nurses and dentists, to access remote areas helps build a safer and more resilient society, where the basic medical needs of a population are being met. Other innovations include the use of cash transfer programs to ensure that during national health emergencies, like the COVID-19 pandemic, communities are able to continue to access resources, and ensuring critical investments in programs that ensure maternal and child health are bolstered and continued.

Initiatives that focus both ensuring critical healthcare infrastructure and personnel training needs are met, along with targeted investments such as mobile health clinics or expanding maternal and child healthcare access, can also help build more political and social capital for local and national governments, which is critical during health emergencies like pandemics where broader societal cooperation and collaboration is needed. As seen during the COVID-19 pandemic, even in countries with highly resilient healthcare systems, a lack of social cohesion and political will can make all the difference in how well a country is able to respond to a health emergency and be prepared for the next one.



Building Resilience: Economy/Livelihoods



Country Resilience Scores Based on the IsDB Resilience Index


Most Resilient	Most Vulnerable
1. Malaysia (7.8)	1. Chad (2.6)
2. Indonesia (7.1)	2. Somalia (2.9)
3. Morocco (7.1)	3. Guinea (3.2)
4. United Arab Emirates (7.0)	4. Yemen (3.4)
5. Brunei Darussalam (7.0)	5. Libya (3.5)
6. Turkey (6.9)	6. Afghanistan (3.5)
7. Qatar (6.8)	7. Guinea-Bissau (3.6)
8. Tunisia (6.7)	8. Sudan (3.6)
9. Bahrain (6.5)	9. Sierra Leone (3.7)
10. Albania (6.5)	10. Iraq (3.7)

While poverty has been reduced globally over the last two decades from 65 to 43 percent, as measured by the poverty headcount ratio at \$5.50 per day, the same cannot be said for countries trapped in conflict and fragile situations, who only moved from 87 percent in 1995 to 80 percent in 2014, and worryingly increased back up to 83 percent as of 2017.⁸² This recent worsening of economic outcomes for fragile countries tracks across a number of indicators, including poverty headcount at \$1.90 per day⁸³, and poverty gap at \$3.20 per day⁸⁴, suggesting that development approaches in the most fragile countries are not working. Increasing poverty rates are multifactorial, reflecting no single cause per se, but a series of compounding issues. These include urbanization and population growth, market vulnerability—especially where families, communities, or even countries rely on a single export, lack of social protection, and in a negative feedback loop, poverty itself. As noted above, the COVID-19 pandemic exacerbated many of these issues, leaving both individuals and countries with limited options for economic stability, let alone improvement. Perhaps related, literacy rates in fragile countries peaked at about 65 percent in 2006 and have remained flat since.⁸⁵

IsDB MCs run the gamut from very poor, fragile and conflict affected countries, such as Yemen and Chad, that find themselves in this trap, and wealthy countries such as Qatar and the UAE. When the COVID-19 pandemic struck, it roiled the global economy, with the sharpest downturn in decades, as measured by change in real

GDP growth⁸⁶ disrupted supply chains, slowed regional and international trade, impacting rich and poor countries alike. Libya, for example, went from 9.9 percent growth in 2019 to -66.7 percent growth in 2020. Lebanon was already struggling with -6.9 percent growth in 2019, plummeted to -25 percent in 2020. Among the ISDB countries, one outlier was Guyana, which actually increased to 26.2 percent growth in 2020 due to a massive oil discovery. But every other MC did worse in 2020 than 2019 except for Iran, which stayed at about -6 percent growth both years, suggesting an antecedent of economic stresses which were not unduly impacted or exacerbated by the economic effects of the pandemic.

Countries Affected by Conflict and Fragility Trapped in Cycles of Poverty



Source: The World Bank - <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SI.POV.UMIC>

But in general, just as the COVID-19 pandemic was not just a health crisis, it was also not just a health and economic crisis. Countries affected by sharp recessions also tended to experience more social restiveness, particularly those with deeper pre-existing social and political divisions.

Economic resilience to pressures includes the ability for the most vulnerable to maximize their income earning potential in situations of sustained macro-economic constraints. Countries that invest in infrastructure create an enabling environment for a crowding-in effect of investors and entrepreneurs, further optimized through access to finance, and a prioritization of research and development for innovation. This requires a stock of government reserves and efficient resource mobilization in order to build, maintain, and grow that infrastructure, including road networks, irrigation and water management systems, as well as electricity and communications. It also requires quality in public administration, budgeting and finance. Such investments should also dovetail with other inter-dimensional challenges, such as building resilience to climate change, natural disasters, and disease epidemics. Green job programs are particularly well placed to stimulate economies, provide much needed household income, and build environmental resilience. In turn, investments in growing and modernizing national health systems will not only enhance health resilience, but also provide the types of highly skilled jobs that can incentivize educated members of the population to stay home rather than emigrate. This dynamic will, in turn, produce knock on effects across other dimensions, as decreasing brain drain is an essential step towards preserving and increasing socio-economic cohesion and resilience.

In the event of a shock, however, when there is a sharp economic slow-down, resilience requires diversification so that the entire economy does not come to a halt if a single commodity export or value chain is disrupted. This is balanced against the need for countries to promote exports and a stock of foreign currency, so that the economy can withstand a potential shock, such as a drought or natural disaster, without destabilizing the monetary system, contributing to inflation, which disproportionately would impact the most vulnerable and lead to vicious cycles of poverty begetting poverty.

Other important resilience factors include short-term access to finance, external capital flows (such as remittances), and social protection systems, which are all necessary to help the most vulnerable to survive the emergency and bounce back when the economy eventually recovers. Indeed, countries across the world resorted to direct digital cash transfers to households which proved to be essential lifelines as economic activity ground to a halt. This represented a great leap forward in expanding the social safety net to a wider range of the population, including the poorest and those in the informal sector.⁸⁷ These programs have been deemed quite effective across Africa and Asia, with Pakistan in particular expanding support to over 15 million poor families.⁸⁸ It has also proven to be a highly effective aid target, as the World Bank and other development

partners teamed up with the government of Mozambique to create “one of the most ambitious and agile social safety net response plans in the region,” reaching over 1.5 million families as of September 2020.⁸⁹ The gathering of data and digitization of social welfare systems will be crucial tools going forward as governments will be able to expand the reach and increase the efficiency of support, as well as react quickly to deliver vital lifelines when shocks occur.

Though it is not necessarily the case that poorer countries will be more insecure or violent, to the extent that entrepreneurs have a stake in their local or national economies, and to the extent that communities are economically interdependent, they will have more of an incentive to find positive-sum, win-win solutions to disputes over land and resources. Therefore, an inclusive economy that creates broad-based opportunity for peaceable livelihoods will be most resilient to both pressures and shocks.

Different countries have different circumstances, starting at different baselines, and therefore have different short, medium, and long-term imperatives and priorities by which to establish sustainable fiscal and monetary systems conducive to an enabling environment for livelihoods. Large current account deficits, for example are risky in poorer countries, and can weaken the currency, contributing to inflation⁹⁰. In Lebanon, for example, a “sudden stop in capital inflows, coupled with a continued large current account deficit, has implied a steady depletion in foreign exchange (FX) reserves at BdL,⁹¹” contributing to inflation, which hit 84.9 percent in 2020⁹². Countries that lack natural resources may need to invest more in developing human capital. Countries with a large old-age dependency ratio may need to promote immigration. Countries with a large youth bulge may need a faster growing economy. In a context where rapid rural-urban migration is hollowing out the economies in the countryside and putting stress on infrastructure in the population centers, countries must invest in rural infrastructure so that local economies can thrive. In countries where the informal economy is large, and the banking system is weak, innovative approaches for access to finance can include the use of mobile money or hawala systems. In Somalia, for instance, mobile money is extremely widespread, even among the very poor. All countries need a decent social protection system, including insurance schemes, cash, food, and utility benefits that can be quickly and effectively deployed in the event of a disaster to minimize exposure to shocks.

Looking ahead, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) projects that the global economy will recover to pre-pandemic growth rates in 2021. Some countries, like Libya, are projected to grow rapidly due to expected oil production and demand⁹³. However, the most vulnerable who may have lost jobs or homes, will need assistance to regain lost ground. The IsDB has an important role to play in terms of capacity building, finance facilities, infrastructure development, and bilateral strategic planning with member countries to ensure alignment with government strategies and responsiveness to the specific individual circumstances.

For example, in Senegal, the IsDB is investing in energy, transport, agriculture, water and sanitation, finance, industry and mining, health, education and public administration in order to increase crop production, schools, water access, roads, and jobs.⁹⁴ In Egypt, the bank is focusing on pandemic response, food security, and



Micro, Small, and Medium Enterprises (MSMEs), especially in the energy sector, as well as urban development, industry, mining, and transport.⁹⁵ In Yemen, despite the ongoing conflict, the IsDB is focused on the health and agricultural sectors in response to the pandemic as well as reconstruction efforts. Additionally, according to the November 2020 IsDB report, "The Road from Conflict to Reconstruction, Recovery and Resilience in the MENA Region," for countries experiencing active violence like Yemen, and the collapse of the government and absence of functioning regulatory or legal oversight bodies, investments in SMEs can be a way to continue investments in sectors such as health and education to build resilience, despite the lack of a functioning state.⁹⁶ Another vitally important sector for the bank in many member countries is Islamic Finance so that investors can raise capital in accordance with Islamic law. Through such proactive strategies as well as humanitarian response efforts, livelihoods can be maintained and countries can become more resilient over time, even those who may currently be stuck in a vicious cycle of fragility and economic distress.

Economic resilience requires diversification:

- i. Build, maintain, and grow physical infrastructure, including road networks, irrigation and water x systems, electricity, and communications
- ii. Introduce and support green job programs
- iii. Maintain stock of foreign currency
- iv. Expand from a single commodity export or value chain
- v. Ensure short-term access to finance, including digital money management, as well as external capital flows (such as remittances), and social protection systems

Good Practices in Building Resilience in Economy and Livelihoods


Good practices in building resilience in the area of economy and livelihoods rests on the ability of the most vulnerable in society to maximize their earning potential in situations of sustained macro-economic constraints. This means that countries that prioritize investments in infrastructure help to create a crowding-in effect that positively incentivizes investment and entrepreneurship by granting access to finance and encouraging research, development and innovation. As noted in the above sections on Environment and Health and Pandemics, adequate national infrastructure has proven critical in shoring up a country's ability to handle shocks to the system, so that a shock in one dimension does not necessarily lead to cascading and compounding effects in others. A key message then, in building resilience in economies and livelihoods, is that investments in infrastructure, to include roads, irrigation and water management, electricity and communications, must include both a stock of government reserves as well as efficient resource mobilization.

Building resilience in the dimension of economy and livelihoods can complement other initiatives aimed at building resilience in other sectors. For example, complementing initiatives aimed at building resilience to climate change and natural disasters, as well as improving health systems and managing epidemics can help fuel the economy and provide necessary jobs, while at the same time improving the resilience of these other dimensions. As noted above, another, longer term investment, that can maximize impacts across sectors are green jobs program which can help stimulate economies, while providing much needed household income to support livelihoods, while at the same time building environmental resilience. Building economic resilience and improving livelihoods more broadly is also contingent on ensuring that local populations, particularly skilled and educate labor, does not emigrate abroad seeking better opportunities, also known as "brain drain." A key message then, in terms of good practices, is that targeted investments help decrease brain drain and is an essential step towards preserving and increasing socio-economic cohesion and resilience

Another important factor, and key message, in building resilience in economies and livelihoods is ensuring economic diversification. Countries that are mainly reliant on one commodity are extremely vulnerable when a shock comes, as it could result in the entire economy coming to a halt if single commodity export or value chain is crippled. Finally, as noted in the above section, short-term access to finance, external capital flows, including remittances, and social protection systems are all crucial to ensuring that the most vulnerable in society are able to survive and bounce back should a shock destabilize the economy. Here, the COVID-19 crisis provided a valuable lesson in that those countries where governments utilized cash transfer systems to support households proved fundamental to the ability of those households to survive and to be able to bounce back, when economies have stabilized or recovered.



Building Resilience: Human Security



Most Resilient	Most Vulnerable
1. Brunei Darussalam (8.6)	1. Yemen (2.5)
2. Jordan (8.3)	2. Somalia (3.0)
3. Saudi Arabia (7.6)	3. Cameroon (3.3)
4. United Arab Emirates (7.2)	4. Nigeria (3.6)
5. Algeria (7.1)	5. Afghanistan (3.6)
6. Bahrain (7.0)	6. Mozambique (3.6)
7. Azerbaijan (6.8)	7. Sierra Leone (3.6)
8. Malaysia (6.7)	8. Sudan (3.7)
9. Kuwait (6.7)	9. Libya (3.7)
10. Oman (6.7)	10. Côte d'Ivoire (3.7)

Country Resilience Scores Based on the IsDB Resilience Index


Resilience in this dimension is the capacity of countries and communities to bounce back from shocks and manage pressures, such as criminality, weapons proliferation, group-based conflict, and gender-based violence. Challenges to safety and security can run the full spectrum, from extreme levels of country fragmentation and a self-reinforcing war economy, on the one hand, to less extreme localized violent competition over land and resources, pockets of criminal networks and violent extremism, or elevated levels of interpersonal violence due to limited police capacity or access to justice. From a development perspective, this dimension is vital for conflict sensitivity analysis/Do No Harm, as well as risk management and peacebuilding efforts. As such, assessing resilience in the dimension of Human Security can help development actors better optimize the success of their investments and programming, whether that be a program on value chains, education, infrastructure, or any other development intervention.

In the context of the IsDB Resilience Index, Human Security is focused on those factors which contribute to individual and community peace and safety. It also takes into account the critical role that the provision of public services, infrastructure development, and institutions play in shoring up and expanding human security within a country. Countries with the highest level of resilience, therefore, tend to have highly professional security services, strong national infrastructures, functioning public services provided by state and local

institutions, as well group-based inclusiveness, and opportunities for peaceable livelihoods, so that citizens are not susceptible to recruitment into illicit or sectarian groups.

A spike in violence now receding: Two decades ago, from 2000-2010, the level of violence across the 57 IsDB MCs was much lower than it is today. At that time, it hovered around 20,000 fatalities per year, according to the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP). But after the uprisings in North Africa and the Middle East and the cascading effects of those uprisings, as well as environmental pressures such as drought and the availability of staple commodities violence sharply increased about sixfold to peak at 128,650 in 2014, mainly due to violence in Syria and Iraq, but also Nigeria and the Lake Chad Basin more broadly. Since then, the number of annual fatalities has dropped to 2012 levels (about 60,000 in 2019, according to UCDP).⁹⁷ And according to the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (ACLED⁹⁸) those numbers dropped again in 2020 by about 25 percent, which extends that positive trend but remains about twice the level of violence from before the spike.

Conflict Fatalities in IsDB Member Countries




Source – Uppsala Conflict Data Program⁹⁹

It will take a few years before it can be determined if the world has become fundamentally more violent than it was in 2000 or if the last few years represented an outlier due to a combination of temporary circumstances. But for now, the trends seem positive. During these last four years, certain regional conflict systems have been improving, most notably Syria and Iraq. Somalia and Yemen have also shown positive signs in 2020. However, during the same period, Central Africa and the Sahel have been becoming more insecure, particularly Nigeria, Mali, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, and Niger. Afghanistan had been showing signs of improvement but is now in a period of uncertainty with rapidly changing circumstances on the ground. In general, the fact that the overall levels of violence are improving across the MCs is a positive sign for human security and will create space for resilience promotion and generate peace dividends as that continues, which will allow for more successful development programming.

A quantitative analysis of the change in violence in 2020 against COVID rates per country, suggests that the pandemic does not seem to have significantly impacted the trend in violence connected insurgency and civil conflict, as these trends in large scale violence are driven by deeper antecedents and are on longer cycles and larger scales. When countries do not have the inclusive institutional mechanisms to respond, precarious structures and power centers can be destabilized by profound environmental pressures, large population movements, and geopolitical factors which enflame communal and group-based tensions or empower violent extremists. Lockdowns and recessions in 2020 may have exacerbated restiveness in many countries, but the pandemic does not seem to have been a major driver of large-scale violence in the short term.

2020 Trends and Dynamics: COVID-19, Recession, and Violent Protests^{100,101,102,103}



However, there are several notable dynamics in regard to COVID-19 and personal and community safety, particularly as related to social restiveness and violence against women. Notwithstanding a few big outliers in the data that preclude the necessary conditions for a linear regression, an analysis of dynamics in 2020 suggests a relationship in some countries between COVID -19 prevalence, economic recession, number of protests, and the number of fatalities associated with protests, particularly in those countries where protests turned violent or were violently suppressed and in countries where radical groups capitalized on popular grievance and frustrations to sow division. Additionally, many respondents and observers have cited a rise in domestic and intimate partner violence among households affected by lockdowns and a reduction in income due to job losses at the peak of the pandemic.

Human security is intimately connected to the other resilience pillars. As noted above, violence appears to be falling towards 2000 levels, but the spike from 2014 continues to have cascading effects. In countries experiencing chronic security issues, macro or micro-level economies may struggle. Insecurity may limit women's ability to freely travel to and participate in markets and trade. It may impact agricultural yields and



nutrition levels, if women cannot collect water or bio-energy materials to maintain and cook the harvest from subsistence farms and kitchen gardens. This same issue extends to children who are unable to travel to school due to security risks and localized violence, which has both short- and long-term effects on the overall resilience of the country. At the macro level, conflict in a country that exports large amounts of commodities such as grain or petroleum products can trigger a sharp increase in global prices, and a food or energy crisis, which can destabilize health and livelihoods, and create social or political tensions well downstream from the original conflict itself.

Conflict Sensitivity/Do No Harm – Any project, especially large development projects like infrastructure or mining, must take into consideration the ways in which investment may exacerbate existing tensions or create winners and losers which could upset an equilibrium and escalate violence and insecurity in a country or community. A hydroelectric project or a gold mine, for example, may require the displacement of a village, or conversely, trigger an in-migration effect, either of which will create ramifications that need to be addressed, well beyond those which can be resolved through simple transactions and compensation to those immediately affected. Even humanitarian efforts must begin with a conflict sensitivity analysis, as there have been many examples of raiding and looting of food and medical supplies whether by gangs or militias.

Risk Management – Conflict Sensitivity analysis is related to, but different from risk management, in that Conflict Sensitivity focuses primarily on indicators that an investment or project could worsen unintentionally (second and third-order effects), while Risk Management, on the other hand, focuses primarily on indicators that could undermine the success of your project. It is possible, for example, to implement a project which is highly profitable, but exacerbates conflict, or on the other hand, to implement a project which is conflict sensitive but unsuccessful.

Peacebuilding – If Conflict Sensitivity and Risk Management are looking at indicators that could jeopardize or worsen, peacebuilding programs are focused on conflict indicators that the intervention is directly targeting as a measure of its success, such as social protection for women in conflict zones, civil society-based early warning systems, community-based peace committees, or even security sector reform and human rights training

In the same way that violence can be mutually reinforcing, so too can peace be mutually reinforcing, to the extent that investors, youth, and women, have a stake in the future and communities are interdependent rather than in zero-sum competition. As such the factors which the Resilience Index measures as capacity to manage pressures include community safety for women, gender and group-based inclusiveness, as well as infrastructure and essential services.

Infrastructure: In terms of infrastructure, as noted in the preceding sections, investments in infrastructure serve as a force multiplier and can have ripple effects across multiple dimensions. Infrastructure, such as roadways and public transportation, can help link people together as well as create opportunities for employment, thereby supporting livelihoods. The extent to which people have the opportunity for peaceable livelihoods is vital to a resilient society. The extent to which civil society networks bridge communal, ethnic, and religious boundaries, groups are more likely to be integrated rather than polarized, reducing tensions which could otherwise lead to violence. In the event of a shock, of course, professional and representative law enforcement and public security forces are key. So too is ensuring that a conflict sensitivity/do no harm approach is applied to any infrastructure development investments.

Public Services: The provision of public services is also critical to ensuring not only that a society has access to essential services such as healthcare, education, and clean drinking water, but also helps shore up support for local and national governments, particularly in societies that may be polarized along group lines, or those that, based on past or present conflict, are distrustful of government. As with investments targeting infrastructure, investing in and supporting a country's ability to provide accessible and equitable public services to its population must also consider a conflict sensitive/do no harm lens, as well as potential risks that need to be managed or mitigated. For example, in several of the case studies examined for this



report, there was a wide gap between public services available in urban areas versus those available to more rural and isolated communities. While there are examples of innovation in bridging this gap, such as utilizing rail networks to provide healthcare services to rural populations, inequitable access to public services can contribute to popular perceptions that governments and institutions favor urban communities and groups residing in those areas, over rural or remote populations. In this way, both conflict sensitivity as well as risk management lenses are needed to ensure that projects do not exacerbate existing tensions, and as mentioned above, that they also fail to consider risk management while prioritizing conflict sensitivity.

In the same vein, human security is also about ensuring strong and functioning institutions, not only so they can provide public services and essential safety and security, but also to ensure that the social contract remains intact when shocks or pressures might cause societies to fragment or fray at the edges. Investing in strong institutions that are able to assess and meet the needs of populations is a critical component of resilience, and in this way, ensuring that these institutions are staffed with competent and professional bureaucrats and administrators is crucial. Again, as noted in other sections, brain drain, or the flight of the educated and professional class, is a major vulnerability that, if proactively addressed through targeted investments in education, training, professional exchanges, and general skills building in administration and governance. While multinational development and investment efforts often target national level institutions, it should be seen as equally important to ensure institutional resilience at the local level, as this is where the majority of a country's citizens interact most regularly with their institutions. As in the other areas of infrastructure and public services, applying both a conflict sensitive/do no harm, and risk management, lens is important here as well. Particularly in societies experiencing group-based or identity-based conflict, representation matters at the institutional level, from that national level to the local.

Finally, the role that peacebuilding and civil society engagement plays in shoring up human security and resilience in a country should not be overlooked while implementing programs or projects aimed at infrastructure development, the provision of public services, and institution building or assistance. Particularly when evaluating an investment or program to see whether it may jeopardize or worsen existing or latent tensions, while conflict sensitivity and risk management evaluations are looking at indicators that could jeopardize or worsen, peacebuilding programs are focused on conflict indicators that the intervention is

directly targeting as a measure of its success. These include such interventions that support a wide array of human security needs beyond infrastructure, public services and institution building, but are equally important for those types of investments to have the sustained and possible multiplier impact intended. These include social protection for women in conflict zones, civil society-based early warning systems, community-based peace committees, or even security sector reform and human rights training. Civil society has been crucial in providing capacity and support to investments by serving as both advisors and implementers, often engaging directly with local institutions and officials in the socialization and implementation of programs. Moreover, in terms of conflict sensitivity and risk management, civil society organizations have an important role to play here as well, as they are often far more aware of local dynamics, and what factors could potentially exacerbate conflict indicators or, conversely, actions that should be taken to lessen them.


Good Practices in Building Resilience in Human Security

As noted above, there are several key factors that should inform investments and programs aimed at helping to build and support human security in the IsDB member countries. These key factors include:

1. Support to infrastructure development projects, as this is one of the building blocks of resilience in human security and can serve as a force multiplier and have ripple effects across multiple dimensions. Infrastructure can help link people together as well as create opportunities for employment, thereby supporting livelihoods.
2. Support to public services is critical to ensuring not only that a society has access to essential services such as healthcare, education, and clean drinking water, but also helps shore up support for local and national governments, particularly in societies that may be polarized along group lines, or those that, based on past or present conflict, are distrustful of government. As with investments targeting infrastructure, investing in and supporting a country's ability to provide accessible and equitable public services to its population helps to build resilience in human security.
3. Support to institutions is not only essential to human security in ensuring the provision of public services and essential safety and security, but also to strengthen the social contract between governments and societies so that when shocks hit, it does not result in fragmentation or exacerbate existing pressures. Investing in strong institutions that are able to assess and meet the needs of populations is a critical component of resilience, as is ensuring that these institutions are staffed with competent and professional bureaucrats and administrators. Further, brain drain, or the flight of the educated and professional class, is a major vulnerability that, if proactively addressed through targeted investments can further shore up national and local level institutions by focusing on education, training, professional exchanges, and general skills building in administration and governance.
4. Ensuring that conflict sensitive/do no harm, risk management, and peacebuilding are all factored into any investments, whether large scale or local level, is also of fundamental importance. A conflict sensitive approach to investments targeting improved human security must be careful not to unintentionally exacerbate existing tensions or create the perception of winners and losers which could upset an equilibrium and escalate violence and insecurity in a country or community. Risk management, on the other hand, focuses mainly on indicators that could undermine the success of a project so that it is possible to have a highly successful and profitable project that nonetheless exacerbates conflict. Finally, the role of civil society and peacebuilding efforts should be factored into investments aimed at improving or shoring up human security in a given country or region. Peacebuilding initiatives, including those led by civil society and happening in parallel to conflict sensitivity and risk management evaluations, can be fundamental in garnering local support and buy-in for projects and investments, as civil society organizations have a key role to play at both the national and local levels. As noted in the preceding section, civil society organizations working on peacebuilding projects or working alongside investors and partners can play major roles in socializing initiatives, as well as being key partners in performing conflict sensitivity and risk management evaluations, as they are likely to be aware of any sensitivities or possible conflict dynamics on the ground that could be worsened or exacerbated by investment activities.



Building Resilience: Forced Displacement



Country Resilience Scores Based on the IsDB Resilience Index

Most Resilient	Most Vulnerable
1. United Arab Emirates (7.7)	1. Yemen (1.8)
2. Kuwait (7.7)	2. Somalia (1.9)
3. Oman (7.6)	3. Comoros (2.1)
4. Albania (7.3)	4. Chad (2.4)
5. Saudi Arabia (7.2)	5. Sudan (2.9)
6. Kyrgyzstan (7.2)	6. Afghanistan (3.1)
7. Maldives (7.2)	7. Mauritania (3.2)
8. Algeria (7.0)	8. Syria (3.7)
9. Brunei Darussalam (6.9)	9. Guinea (3.7)
10. Tunisia (6.9)	10. Guinea-Bissau (3.8)

In a joint paper released by multinational development banks (MDBs) in July 2017, it was stated that forced displacement has emerged as one of the most significant development challenges of the current era. Specifically, the paper notes, "Long considered a humanitarian problem to be addressed by specialized agencies, [forced displacement] has gained increased prominence on the international agenda." The publication goes on to note that short-term humanitarian interventions, if not coupled with medium and longer-term efforts to address the structural issues that drive forced migration (such as general insecurity, violence, wars, pandemics, etc.), will not be sufficient and will likely lead to a recurring crisis requiring recurring interventions. Further, the authors note that, in the short term, interventions must consider not only the immediate humanitarian needs of those displaced, but also the pressures created on the host community, including on social infrastructure. In the medium and longer-term, however, measures should seek to build the economic resilience of host communities, while also tackling those drivers of insecurity that are fueling displacement in the first place.¹⁰⁴

In June 2020, according to the UNHCR, there were an estimated 80 million people forcibly displaced in the world, with the protracted humanitarian crises in Yemen and Syria, and the global COVID-19 pandemic, contributing to rising numbers throughout the year.¹⁰⁵ At the start of 2020, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) estimated that 45.7 million were internally displaced people (IDPs), 29.6 million were refugees and others forcibly displaced outside their country, and 4.2 million people were asylum seekers. The majority of those displaced, estimated by the UNHCR to be 65 percent, came from five countries: Syria, Venezuela, Afghanistan, South Sudan and Myanmar.¹⁰⁶ The 2020 UNCHR "Midyear Trends Report," further

noted that one-fifth of newly displaced persons during the year, an estimated 574,600, were from the Sahel region, comprising Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania and Niger. Turkey remained the largest host nation for refugees, with an estimated 3.6 million by mid-year 2020.¹⁰⁷

Although conflict, climate change, persecution, and human rights abuses continued to drive forced migration flows, the impact of the global COVID-19 pandemic served to further exacerbate these pressures and expose wider vulnerabilities. According to the World Bank in 2020, the economic impacts of the pandemic have had devastating results on the already poor and vulnerable, and have served to alter the composition of global poverty by creating millions of “newly poor.” According to the World Bank report, “Poverty and Shared Prosperity 2020: Reversals of Fortune,” up to 115 million people could fall back into extreme poverty as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic, with an increase of up to 35 million in 2021. The report goes on to note that these trends are being driven by three primary factors: the COVID-19 pandemic, climate change, and armed conflicts. In regions like the Sahel, armed conflict, climate change, and the proliferation of armed groups continued to drive displacement trends in 2020, with the UNHCR estimating mid-year that 3,600 schools had either been destroyed or remained closed, and thousands of women had been victims of rape or other sexual violence.¹⁰⁸ Finally, the UNCHR mid-year report also noted the rising numbers of displaced people, mainly fleeing new or increasing violence, in Yemen, Syria, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Mozambique and Somalia.¹⁰⁹

The cascading and compounding effects of the COVID-19 pandemic on forced displacement have had far-reaching impacts, some of which have yet to play out but should be anticipated in the longer-term, particularly in regard to their impact on low- and middle-income countries. In the 2021 IsDB report, “The Impact of COVID-19 on Refugees and Displaced Communities in Fragile Contexts,” it was noted that “COVID-19 poses and will continue to pose many challenges both in the short and long-term for all low- and middle income countries.”¹¹⁰ For example, as noted by the World Bank, while the economic fallout of the global pandemic has had negative impacts worldwide, for the millions dependent on the informal economy, it has been particularly devastating.¹¹¹ According to a report from the International Organization for Migration (IOM), tracking migrant flows and the impact of COVID in the Middle East and North Africa over the eight-month time period of April to December 2020, already-vulnerable migrants who became stranded in other nations due to border closures and restrictions experienced increased insecurity. Incidents included reports of heightened levels of xenophobia, including attacks on migrants and migrant communities due to perceptions surrounding migration and disease transmission; the inability to access health services or national social protection mechanisms; becoming stranded in the host country and experiencing increased levels of violence, including sexual violence, as a result of lockdown and quarantine measures; and, finally, being unable to send or receive remittances.¹¹²

For communities playing host to large numbers of forced migrants, studies have shown that social cohesion can be impacted both negatively and positively, depending on the context and the support arrivals receive to foster better integration. For example, the formation of social networks, the development of a sense of place and trust, perceived safety, and sense of community are all impacted by the arrival of refugees or IDPs. Relationships between host communities and forced migrants are also context-specific and can develop in different ways over time. When there is active investment by governments and the participation of local civil society and businesses, studies have shown that migrants have become force multipliers for investment and growth in local communities.¹¹³ Conversely, and particularly in cases where there is a massive or sustained influx of refugees over time in communities already experiencing scarcity and resource competition, that conditions of “marginalization, exclusion, and risk are produced.”¹¹⁴ Further, and in addition to the impacts that scarcity and job competition has on social cohesion, it also has had a very real negative impact on the ability of refugee communities to find work at all. According to the 2021 IsDB report on the impacts of COVID-19 on low- and middle-income nations hosting large numbers of refugees, it was noted that the pandemic most impacted those sectors where refugees tend to find employment, beyond the informal sector. For example, according to the report, “Before COVID-19, refugees were 60 percent more likely to be working in the sectors highly impacted by COVID-19 and the economic downturn.” The report went on further to note that “60 percent of employed refugees work in highly impacted sectors, relative to 37 percent of the populations in host countries. Meanwhile only 7 percent of refugees work in the lowest impacted sectors, like education and public administration, compared to 19 percent of hosts.”¹¹⁵

High Capacity/Low Vulnerability Countries: Based on the IsDB Resilience Index, countries such as the UAE, Oman, and Qatar tend structurally toward “Stability” in this Dimension. They generally have low vulnerability to being an origin country of forced displacement, and higher capacities to deal with displaced populations. However, it should be noted that many countries in the stable quadrant, particularly those in North Africa like Tunisia and Algeria, tend to be transit countries for forced migrants in route to Europe from sub-Saharan Africa and not long-term host nations for the forcibly displaced. These countries also tend to have higher



capacities to deal with forced migration pressures in the short-term but are unlikely to remain in the stable quadrant if an unanticipated internal or external shock hits the system, such as a sudden increase in migrants or refugees, or an internal political crisis. Other countries, such as Malaysia, experience internal displacement largely as a result of weather-related emergencies but have both the resources and the institutional capacities to manage these regular shocks without wider systemic disruption.

High Capacity/High Vulnerability Countries: These countries tend structurally toward a prognosis of “Potential Oscillation.” Turkey, for instance, hosts the largest global refugee population, estimated at 3.6 million by mid-2020, according to UNHCR.¹¹⁶ Most of the forcibly displaced are from Syria, with an estimated 320,000 asylum seekers and beneficiaries of protection from other countries, mainly Iraq, Afghanistan, Iran and Somalia. Turkey also was at the center of a migration crisis in 2015, known as the Mediterranean Crisis, when the route from Turkey into Greece surpassed the route from North Africa to Italy as the main source of sea arrivals.¹¹⁷ Over the past eight years, Turkey has made significant strides in transforming its laws and practices surrounding the status and treatment of forced migrants and refugees. In 2013, for example, Turkey adopted the “Law on Foreigners and International Protection (LFIP),” which established a specific legal framework for asylum seekers, established the Directorate General of Migration Management (DGMM) as the agency responsible for migration and asylum claims, and also affirmed the country’s obligation towards all asylum seekers and those in need of international protection, regardless of country of origin. Turkey also has a temporary protection regime for Syrians, which grants beneficiaries a right of legal stay as well as some level of access to basic rights and services.¹¹⁸

Similarly, Jordan which is host to the second largest refugee population per capita in the world, estimated by the UNHCR to be 750,000 in mid-2020, has significant capacities to deal with pressures from forced displacement, but also remains highly vulnerable to shocks. While Jordan has typically been able to cope with the pressures from hosting large numbers of forced migrants and refugees, the COVID-19 pandemic, and its subsequent economic fallout, has hit the country hard. According to the UNHCR in June 2020, “Before the pandemic hit, 79 percent of refugees in Jordan were already living below the poverty line but recent surveys indicate that this proportion has now increased.” The report went on to note that 35 percent of refugees in Jordan indicated that they had a job to return to as restrictions surrounding movement have begun to ease in the country. Moreover, up to 83% of forced migrants in Jordan live in urban centers which, beyond placing additional pressure on infrastructure and resources in the main cities, also increases competition for jobs, particularly when combined with increased internal migration from rural to urban areas in search of livelihoods themselves. According to a 2017 report by the Overseas Development Institute (ODI) on building urban resilience in the face of forced migration, the authors note, “With many cities experiencing this kind of population growth, strengthening resilience to mass displacement is becoming a more pressing concern. In many cases, national and subnational governance systems are failing to respond adequately, because governments often do not anticipate or fully understand the phenomenon and do not have the required resources or capacities to manage it.” The report goes on to emphasize that many of the cities receiving large numbers of forcibly displaced are located in countries already experiencing significant levels of conflict or post-conflict political instability. In these situations, residents are already living under chronic stress, which may be further exacerbated by an influx of displaced persons.¹¹⁹ In countries like Jordan, these pressures may become even more pronounced in the aftermath of the COVID-19 pandemic, with the economy contracting by 1.5 percent during the first nine months of 2020 and levels of debt and unemployment on the rise.¹²⁰

Low Capacity/High Vulnerability Countries: These countries tend structurally towards “Potential Escalation.” Some, such as Syria, Yemen, Iraq, and Afghanistan have elevated levels of conflict and significant refugee outflows. Uganda, by contrast, is a major host nation, with the largest refugee population in Africa, estimated to reach 1,484,356 by the end of 2021. Uganda officially closed its borders to asylum seekers in March 2020 in an effort to mitigate the spread of COVID-19. Despite this measure, the UNHCR has reported that it expects new refugee arrivals will continue to cross into Uganda through unofficial crossing points, continuing to flee the violence, instability and economic decline in neighboring countries, including the DRC and South Sudan.¹²¹ Despite structurally trending towards potential escalation and consistently experiencing significant pressures from forced displacement, Uganda has also been cited by the World Bank as one of the most progressive countries in the world when it comes to refugee resettlement. The 2006 Refugee Act provides free healthcare and education to refugee populations and permits refugees to move freely in the country to seek employment.¹²² In 2017, the government also adopted the Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework, a multistakeholder initiative that includes national and local authorities, international organizations, international financial institutions, regional organizations, regional coordination and partnership mechanisms, civil society partners, the private sector, media, and refugees themselves. The model focuses on the humanitarian and development needs of both refugees and host communities and was developed by the UN and piloted in Uganda. Despite these progressive and laudable efforts, the continued and increasing instability in neighboring countries, in addition to the economic impacts of COVID-19 within Uganda may be pushing the country beyond its coping capacities in 2021 and beyond.

Another initiative, spearheaded by the IsDB, the Sheikh Abdullah Al Nouri Charity Society, and SPARK that could serve as a model when considering investments to host countries who fall in this quadrant and are experiencing significant or increased refugee pressures is the “Improving Access to Education for Syrian Refugee and IDPs in Syria Region through Providing Vocational Education for Employment in-order-to empower a workforce for the Reconstruction of Syria” program. This four-year initiative, which began in 2018, is specifically aimed at the creation of a pathways to education and sustainable employment opportunities for young Syrian refugees and IDPs in Lebanon, Jordan, Turkey, Syria and Iraq. Building upon the already successful SPARK program, which has been collaborating with communities on the ground in host nations to provide support and integration assistance to young refugees since 2015, this initiative has two objectives: 1. Access to higher and vocational education for Syrian Refugees and IDPs to gain either a two-year technical and vocational education training (TVET) diploma, or three to nine months support for TVET certificates; and, 2. Economic empowerment and entrepreneurship support for Syrian refugees, host community youth and IDPs through entrepreneurship trainings, financial support and coaching for the start-up of SMEs, soft and technical skills trainings, internships and job placements. Additionally, this initiative is well integrated and collaborative with SPARK’s existing programs that capacity building of local organizations in the host countries and inside Syria. According to an evaluation report issued in December 2021, thus far the program has enabled 1,150 refugees to gain diplomas or certificates, enabled 460 students to find jobs or internships, and enabled 115 students to start new businesses through entrepreneurship support.¹²³

Low Capacity/Low Vulnerability Countries: These countries tend structurally toward “latency.” Although they may not currently be experiencing a major crisis, they do not have the capacity to manage a shock if and when it occurs. And in some of these countries, the pressures are already beginning to rise. Several Sahelian nations, for example, are currently in this quadrant, but are experiencing increased levels of political instability and violence compounded by the impacts of climate change as well as COVID-19. According to the UNHCR’s Mid-Year Global Trends report, of the newly 2.9 internally displaced by mid-year, a fifth of those displaced, or 574,600 people, were within the Sahelian nations. Of all new refugees recorded by UNCHR by mid-year, there had been a 9 percent increase in the number of people fleeing violence across borders in West and Central Africa, mainly uprooted by the conflict and insecurity in the Sahel, and the regional spillover effects.¹²⁴ As countries that tend towards latency are most often highly vulnerable to internal pressures themselves, and have low capacities to cope, increased migration flows can have a cumulative, destabilizing influence, which very well may compound and exacerbate existing pressures and lead to long term instability or conflict.

Good Practices in Building Resilience to Forced Displacement

Forced displacement has been recognized as one of the most significant development challenges of the era and building the resilience of countries and communities requires a multistakeholder and multi-sectoral approach. A resilient system, in terms of forced migration, is one that is able to understand and enhance the ability of local communities to absorb, adapt and potentially transform in the face of increased stress and potential shocks, but also consider and plan for the needs of migrant populations. This can be difficult, particularly when examining urban resilience, as many frameworks consider the existing context and capacities, but in terms of building resilience to forced migration, frameworks and approaches must consider

the resilience and capacities of the migrants too. If this is done early and well, it can build cohesion across and within societies, making them more resilient even in the face of high levels of vulnerability.¹²⁵

During 2020, notable progress was made in the implementation of the Global Compact on Refugees, which takes a multisectoral and multi-stakeholder approach. According to the UNHCR, “In 2020, arrangements and tools to facilitate more predictable and equitable burden- and responsibility-sharing were operationalized, while progress was made towards greater inclusion of refugees in national systems and national development plans.” The Global Compact’s comprehensive and cross-sectoral model to responding to forced migration and refugee crises has advocated more innovative approaches and through facilitating access to employment, health care, education and financial services.¹²⁶

A resilient system, in terms of forced migration, is one that is able to:

- i. Understand and enhance the ability of local communities to absorb, adapt and potentially transform in the face of increased stress and potential shocks
- ii. Consider and plan for the needs of migrant populations
- iii. Integrate migrants as a resilience multiplier, not only a vulnerability
- iv. Scale and facilitate access to employment, health care, education and financial services for both host and migrant communities

Multinational development banks have also spearheaded efforts to address forced displacement, as well as economic migration. In April 2018, on the sidelines of the IMF forum, seven MDBs (African Development Bank, Asian Development Bank, World Bank Group, European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, European Investment Bank, Inter-American Development Bank, IsDB World Bank Group) formally launched a platform for improved coordination, collaboration and strategic dialogue to maximize the impact of their efforts. Following a request from the G7 in May 2017 to create the platform, the seven MDBs agreed to four main priority areas where there was the highest potential to maximize impact: refining the common framework for MDB engagement; advancing cooperation on knowledge, evidence, and data; ensuring strategic coordination on priority topics in coordination with governments, UN, and other partners; and deploying better-targeted instruments and products.¹²⁷ An example of such cooperation and innovation in this dimension is an initiative known as the Global Commissioning Finance Facility (GCFF). The GCFF was developed in 2015 and is a co-led initiative by the World Bank, Islamic Development Bank, and the UN that provides development support on a concessional basis for middle income countries experiencing the impacts of refugee crises around the world. The GCFF specifically attempts to address the humanitarian-development gap that often occurs in host nations where short-term, emergency humanitarian assistance is not often adequate to meet the more medium- and longer-term host country needs for support after the immediate humanitarian crisis has passed but refugee populations remain. The GCFF can not only provide support to host countries for adapting infrastructure to meet the needs of incoming refugee populations, but also can provide additional support for the delivery of social services to expanding populations. Some examples of supported projects including strengthening health infrastructure and services in Lebanon and supporting a water and energy sector improvement project in Jordan.¹²⁸

In 2021, the IsDB made a series of investment recommendations concerning the impact of forced displacement and refugee communities on host nations also experiencing fallout from the impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic. These included an evaluation of where a country is in the three stages of movement and displacement, and ensuring investments are being appropriately targeted towards each stage. These are called the “3 Rs” of resilience, rescue and recovery -- which has also informed the IsDB’s COVID-19 response strategy more broadly -- with each stage offering guidance on what types of investments and support are need at each phase. This is particularly useful framing because, as noted in the report, in the face of a displacement crisis, there is a tendency to get stuck in the “rescue” phase, which then becomes a strategy that endures, rather than addresses how to build resilience (which can be preventative) and how to support recovery with investments that support economic inclusion and integration.

Finally, in addition to efforts by the global community to both understand and anticipate how forced displacement can be transformed into a force multiplier for more resilient societies, there are also examples of national innovation and leadership. From Ugandan leadership in piloting the Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework to Turkish and Jordanian innovation in jobs creation and service provision, building more resilience to the continuing (and likely increasing) pressures globally from forced migration will be present both key challenges and potential opportunities for IsDB member countries into the future.



RESILIENCE IN CONTEXT: INTRODUCTION TO THE 9 CASE STUDIES

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The COVID-19 pandemic was a rare case of a global shock, hitting the entire world in the same year, allowing for quantitative and qualitative comparative analysis to derive insights, lessons learned, and good practices for the promotion of resilience. Having conducted the quantitative desktop study above, which identified overall trends in resilience (see the Resilience Index scores at the end of this report), nine case studies were selected for a deeper, field based, qualitative review of specific approaches that have worked to promote resilience in different contexts. The case studies were selected to include a representative sample of regions, risk profiles, population size, and economic factors to surface good practices and lessons learned that can be applied across all MCs.

In the drafting of these cases studies, 112 people were interviewed, including government officials, military, traditional, religious, and women leaders, civil society, humanitarian, development, and private sector actors to learn what has worked and to document those lessons and good practices so that they can be scaled and replicated for better preparedness for the next shock. One key lesson was that, to prepare for a pandemic, it is vital to not just prepare for a health crisis. Governments and development actors must also prepare for an economic, political, and security crisis. The same is true for every shock that might occur.



Côte d'Ivoire has demonstrated remarkable resilience in post conflict recovery over the last decade, showing that it is possible to get out of the "Fragility Trap. With a population of 25.72 million people, Côte d'Ivoire has West Africa's second largest economy in terms of GDP per capita, owed largely to its position as the world's pre-eminent cocoa producer and exporter, which the government successfully placed at the heart of its economic recovery efforts following the civil war. However, as a coastal country, Côte d'Ivoire's agricultural economy is vulnerable to the effects of climate change; thus, the government has exerted great effort to diversify the industry and economy as a whole. Côte d'Ivoire has demonstrated resilience in the face of the COVID-19 pandemic. By leveraging the pre-existing health infrastructure born of the Ebola virus epidemic and taking quick action to institute curfews and physical distancing, the government was able to minimize the public health impact of the pandemic. In addition, micro-credit institutions and direct cash transfers have represented key elements of economic and livelihood resilience in the face of the dramatic economic slowdown wrought by the global health crisis.



Togo has demonstrated how investing in women and youth can be a vital source of resilience, even in cases of poverty and environmental challenges. Over the last 20 years, due to high commodity prices and increased foreign investments, Togo's GDP per capita more than doubled from 292 USD in 2001 to 679 USD in 2019. With one of the most important ports in West Africa, Togo is a regional transport hub. Its main exports are cotton, phosphates, coffee, and cocoa, primarily to ECOWAS partners in the region. However, poverty remains high with over half the population living on less than 1.90 USD per day and a large informal sector. Though the economy has grown over the last two decades, the economic shocks associated with COVID-19 (global slowdown in trade and a strict three-month lockdown) led to a reduction in GDP growth from 5.3 percent in 2019 to 0 percent in 2020. Direct cash transfers and heavy government subsidies of essential resources, such as water and electricity, have mitigated the economic and livelihood impact from the pandemic. The known health impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on the population has been comparatively small thus far, though the daily average of cases rose in the first quarter of 2021.



Mozambique has demonstrated resilience in addressing endemic diseases, improving the business climate, and in peace negotiations, despite facing many obstacles. According to the World Bank, it is the fifth poorest country in the world, as measured by GDP per capita. Its economy relies heavily on natural resource extraction, rendering it highly susceptible to fluctuations in global commodity prices. In addition, its position along the Indian Ocean coast renders it highly vulnerable to extreme weather events such as cyclones, three of which have devastated in the country in recent years. An insurgency in northern Cabo Delgado province – the country's poorest – has intensified, with over half a million people displaced. Finally, the COVID-19 pandemic has put pressure on the country's already fragile health system. As of July 2021, a third wave of infections has pushed hospitals to capacity and impelled the government to take stricter curfew and lockdown measures to control the spread. Despite these challenges, Mozambique has been proactive and innovative in financing strategic and integrated approaches to development and humanitarian interventions. International donors have partnered with the government to fund direct cash transfers programs to salvage the livelihoods of those most affected by the economic shutdown, and vaccines have begun to arrive from the international COVAX program, as well as donations from China and India.



Tajikistan has demonstrated resilience through the strategic leveraging of its human capital and natural resources. The smallest country in Central Asia, its population of 9.2 million is largely homogenous, with 80 percent being of the Tajiki ethnic majority. Following independence from the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) in 1991, Tajikistan saw a brutal civil war until 1997, devastating its agricultural, infrastructural, and human capacity and making it one of the poorest countries in the world. However, a youthful population with high literacy rates, and significant hydropower, has contributed to a sharp reduction in poverty, decreasing from rates of 83 percent in 2000 to 27.4 percent in 2018. Although Tajikistan inherited a Soviet economic legacy, it is transitioning to a market economy with viable agricultural production through reforms and restructuring. The population is highly dependent on agriculture for both subsistence and employment. The COVID-19 pandemic exposed many of Tajikistan's vulnerabilities, two of which are the high dependence on imports for necessary goods and a reliance on remittances as a major GDP source. As a result, economic growth slowed from 7.2 percent in 2019 to 4.2 percent in 2020, and a growing portion of the population is facing food insecurity.



Kazakhstan has been an important success story over the last decade through investment in infrastructure, education, access to healthcare, and poverty reduction. It is the largest country in Central Asia and ninth largest in the world. It has a diverse population of over 19 million comprised of Kazakhs, Russians, Uzbeks, Ukrainians, Uighurs, Tatars, and Germans. Kazakhstan is rich in natural resources, with large amounts of gas, oil, coal, uranium, and other minerals. Its per-capita GDP increased sixfold since 2002, and the country reached upper-middle-income status in 2006. Kazakhstan is strategically positioned between China, South Asia, Russia, and Western Europe and it connects them via rails, roads, and ports, making it a major regional hub for transport. However, COVID-19 has hit the economy quite hard, which contracted by 3 percent in 2020 for the first time since the late 1990s.





Iraq has emerged from four decades of conflict and has demonstrated sharp improvements in the last several years, due to resilience efforts at the intersection of peace and economic development. Classified primarily as arid or semi-arid, the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers supply the majority of Iraq's surface water needs. The population is nearly 39 million, with a 2.3 percent growth rate and a large youth population, with roughly 59 percent of its citizens under the age of 24. After over forty years of conflict, Iraq has been especially vulnerable to the dual shocks of COVID-19 and subsequent decreased demand for petroleum-based products that led to a collapse in global oil prices in 2020. However, local, national, and international efforts have worked to mitigate the health and economic impacts of the pandemic, including mobile health units, short term job programs, and direct cash transfers.



Pakistan has successfully reduced poverty and reduced violence by significant amounts in the last 10 years. Located in South Asia, Pakistan has a population of an estimated 232 million, making it the fifth most populous country in the world as of 2020. It is culturally and linguistically diverse, with six major languages: Punjabi, Sindhi, Saraiki, Pashto, Urdu, and Balochi. According to the World Bank, as of 2019, it had the world's 43rd highest GDP and a diversified economy spanning the sectors of industry, services, and agriculture. But the country remains vulnerable to shocks such as natural disasters, security crises, and disease epidemics. The COVID-19 pandemic highlighted weaknesses, but also provided insight into Pakistan's ability to adapt and manage shocks, partnering with international and regional actors to quickly enhance their health infrastructure, initiate job stimulus programs, and expand the social safety net to the most vulnerable communities in the country.



Mauritania has developed innovative strategies for adaptive and restorative programs to address environmental and economic challenges. Located on the Atlantic coast of Africa, Mauritania is a desert nation with only 0.5 percent arable land. It has an ethnically diverse population of 4.5 million, including Moors (two thirds of the population), Wolof, Soinke, Fulani, and Tukolor. Mauritania's economy is the sixth smallest by GDP among ISDB MCs. In the Sahel region, traditional subsistence economic practices persist with a focus on agriculture, trading, and crafts. However, an export-led economy is developing in the Sahara region, focusing on fishing and mineral reserves (iron ore and copper). Mauritania is emerging as a tourist destination; however, security and public health concerns persist. Furthermore, the country struggles with low literacy rates and significant gender inequalities. Despite these challenges, Mauritania has made remarkable progress in building its resilience. Facing enormous climate pressures, Mauritania has adopted innovative strategies that prioritize adaptive and restorative programs. Moreover, the country launched development initiatives around its agricultural economy, focusing on advancing innovative agricultural activities for sustainable livelihoods and food security. Mauritania has shown continued and consolidated long-term efforts to mitigate health emergencies, as illustrated in its response to COVID-19.



In **Yemen**, where conflict and fragility are acute, key resilience mechanisms include community support systems, and the role of humanitarian agencies and the private sector, as well as context specific innovations, such as the use of solar energy for farming and household use. Yemen is located in the southwest of the Arabian Peninsula, bordered by Saudi Arabia and Oman. It has a population of 28 million, 46 percent of whom are under the age of 15. Conflict has caused a collapse of Yemen's infrastructure and a humanitarian crisis leaving 22.2 million people in need of assistance. Moreover, the COVID-19 pandemic has put further pressure on all aspects of Yemeni society. In this context, communities have mainly relied on community support systems, the strong presence of international humanitarian aid organizations, remittances from the diaspora, solar power for energy, and informal security networks. Also, the private sector plays an important role in promoting livelihoods.



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



These nine case studies were selected as representative across regions (from West Africa, the Sahel, Southern Africa, Central Asia, and Middle East), size (small, medium, and large populations), economy (low income, lower-middle income, and upper-middle income) and resilience profile, for comparison and lessons learned for the promotion of resilience across all of IsDB's MCs, and as a complement to the nine country case studies in the first Resilience Report.

Country Case Study	Geography	Population	Economy	Most Resilient Dimension	Most Vulnerable Dimension
Côte d'Ivoire	West Africa	25.7 million	Lower Middle Income	Economy/Livelihoods	Human Security
Togo	West Africa	8.3 million	Low Income	Economy/Livelihoods	Health/Pandemics
Mozambique	Southern Africa	30.4 million	Low Income	Forced Displacement	Health/Pandemics
Tajikistan	Central Asia	9.3 million	Low Income	Health/Pandemics	Human Security
Kazakhstan	Central Asia	18.5 million	Upper Middle Income	Environment/Natural Disasters	Economy/Livelihoods
Iraq	Middle East	39.3 million	Upper Middle Income	Health/Pandemics	Economy/Livelihoods
Pakistan	South Asia	232 million	Lower Middle Income	Human Security	Health/Pandemics
Mauritania	Sahel	4.5 million	Lower Middle Income	Environment/Natural Disasters	Forced Displacement
Yemen	Middle East	29.2 million	Low Income	Economy/Livelihoods	Forced Displacement



RESILIENCE IN CÔTE D'IVOIRE



Just ten years ago, Côte d'Ivoire was embroiled in its second civil war in less than a decade. Unresolved tensions – a holdover from the country's first, deadlier and significantly longer civil war – led to a relapse following contested presidential elections in October 2010. In truth, the two civil wars are equally aptly described as a protracted period of low-level conflict bookended by two periods of heightened violence. Therefore, the decade of peace that ensued is noteworthy in its stark contrast to the previous ten years of turmoil. Yet Côte d'Ivoire has gone much further than merely avoiding subsequent flare-ups of violence: it has demonstrated noteworthy resilience in recovering from damage wrought upon its economy, social fabric and political institutions.

Today, Côte d'Ivoire can boast of its status as West Africa's second largest economy in terms of GDP per capita, a mantle it largely owes to its position as the world's pre-eminent cocoa producer and exporter, which the government successfully placed at the heart of its economic recovery efforts following the civil war. Nevertheless, the threat of unrest remains visible under the surface, as evidenced by tensions in the lead-up to the presidential elections in October 2020. As its post-independence history is a testament to, Côte d'Ivoire cannot solely rely on natural resources, a vibrant agricultural sector and strong economic growth to prevent conflict, especially as new threats such as climate change emerge. Field research conducted to identify key factors of resilience revealed that understanding Côte d'Ivoire's unique societal structure first was paramount. Lamentably, a significant information gap pervades, and many communities lack knowledge of programs and projects that are in place to boost resilience. This is a significant hurdle, which if cleared, would greatly improve Ivorians' resilience stock.

Environment and Natural Disasters

The threat of climate change is cross-cutting in nature; it not only threatens lives directly through increased frequency and intensity of natural disasters (shocks), but also jeopardizes the livelihoods of the hundreds of millions who still rely on rainfed agriculture, and therefore on a semblance of predictability in rainfall regimes (pressures).¹²⁹ To underscore this point, rainfed agriculture accounts for 98 percent of farmed land in Côte

d'Ivoire.¹³⁰ Although widely known for its export of cocoa (producing an estimated 42 percent of the world's total),¹³¹ successive governments have made concerted efforts to diversify Côte d'Ivoire's agricultural sector, the better to resist shocks and long-term pressures, and spread risk.¹³² Côte d'Ivoire's recent successive governments have fruitfully exploited the country's rich climate and soils, and can now point to tubers, cashew nuts, yams, cassava, cereals, oil-crops, fruit, oil palm fruit, cotton, rubber, and sugar cane as alternatives to its traditional cocoa and coffee industries.¹³³

The impacts of environmental change that Côte d'Ivoire faces reach further than just decreased predictability in rainfall regimes, however. Although variations in total annual precipitation are minimal, a clear trend is emerging for rainfall to concentrate itself in ever-shorter windows, with increasing intensity. In a country where farming accounts for approximately 68 percent of the labor force,¹³⁴ this poses a risk to both food and economic security. Drought, but also episodes of intense rainfall, risk damaging crops, aiding the spread of diseases among plants, and reducing yields due to declines in soil fertility. Ivorian communities are addressing environmental challenges through campaigns focused on social and behavioral change, such as awareness-raising efforts. Numerous campaigns exist to support farmer organizations in promoting peri-urban agriculture, where a strong combination of traditional and scientific knowledge allows farmers a robust route to effective climate change adaptation. Such projects have, for instance, been carried out by the local NGO Chigata, with farmers in the northern region of the country (mainly Senoufo farmers)¹³⁵.

Beyond the risks posed to food security, erratic rainfall regimes can lead to severe flooding events, landslides, ever-greater economic damage, and loss of life.¹³⁶ It is in this context that Côte d'Ivoire is rolling out its Urban Sanitation and Resilience Project (PARU), a \$315 million program for improving solid waste management in major cities, building/rehabilitating drainage systems, and resettling those most at risk from flooding events.¹³⁷ Importantly, Côte d'Ivoire has been developing a National Adaptation Plan 2015; preliminary results indicate that the government has identified sea-level rise, greater rainfall variability, increased frequency and intensity of heavily rainfall events, increased temperatures, and increased duration of long-lasting heat waves as key observed and anticipated climate change impacts. Accordingly, the priority sectors for adaptation identified are agriculture, health, water, coastal zones and land use planning

While Côte d'Ivoire benefits immensely from its coastline, extreme weather events and rising sea levels threaten the livelihoods of millions of Ivorians, evidenced by the gradual submergence of Lahou-Kpanda.¹³⁸ Equally endangered are coastal ecosystems which not only provide livelihoods for Côte d'Ivoire's coastal communities, but also protect them from the erosion that menaces the country's shoreline. Feedback from field interview respondents indicates that support and solidarity actions for victims of natural disasters are directly implemented by members of the population, often before government actions. This was namely the case in Gonzagueville in 2011, when the sea level began to rise dangerously: the local population immediately set up an early warning system and sheltered the populations living in areas at risk.¹³⁹ The Côte d'Ivoire government has given the green light for several international donor-funded projects for the protection of its coastline, and perhaps most importantly, its mangroves. These come in the shape of ECOWAS climate financing, a National Climate Change Adaptation Plan, a joint FAO-Abidjan Convention project, and USAID West African Biodiversity and Climate Change (WA-BICC) program for ecosystem resilience.¹⁴⁰ In 2018, the World Bank approved the West Africa Coast Areas (WACA) Resilience Investment Project to boost the resilience of coastal communities in Côte d'Ivoire, to the tune of \$30 million.¹⁴¹

Health and Pandemics

Although health sector recovery, relative to economic recovery, has been slow, Côte d'Ivoire's experience with major regional and global health emergencies in recent years unveils several critical threads of resilience, many of which are reflective of sustained development. Côte d'Ivoire is ranked 105th out of 195 countries on the 2019 Global Health Security Index; records the second highest maternal mortality rate of its neighbors at 617 per 100,000 live births; has a higher neonatal mortality rate than all four of its neighbors at 33.0 per 1,000 live births; and allocates about 5 percent of its national budget to public health spending, 10 percent below the Abuja Declaration target.^{142,143,144}

During the 2014 – 2016 West Africa Ebola Virus Disease (EVD) epidemic, Côte d'Ivoire, a neighbor to two epicenter countries, remained relatively insulated due to its remarkable ability to adopt proactive and reactive

measures to minimize the impact of the emergency. The government instituted a coordination plan for pandemic preparedness, solicited the insights and perspectives of its partners in the development of response protocols, and grouped the various international NGOs and aid organizations operating in the country into coordination committees focusing on specific issues such as case management, social psychology, water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH), and communication. In addition to these mechanisms and platforms of resilience, the government also committed to health system strengthening by establishing an Ebola Treatment Centre in Yopougon; created regional and district-level rapid response teams; developed a community alert tool as well as epidemiological and contact tracing mechanisms; and deployed a comprehensive and evidence-based awareness-raising campaign that built upon the communications infrastructure that had been expanded during the peace process.¹⁴⁵ Furthermore, traditional structures of conflict resolution were re-purposed and leveraged as health-related resiliencies in the face of the EVD shock.

Though key elements of COVID-19's epidemiological profile differ from the EVD, the nature of the emergency allowed Côte d'Ivoire to build upon the foundation of resilience established during the EVD epidemic. As with the EVD epidemic, the government was quick in its response, instituting a nationwide curfew and closing land, air, and sea borders 11 days after the first case was confirmed.¹⁴⁶ Multi-stakeholder coordination was also at the core of Côte d'Ivoire's response strategy. This included the implementation of the World Bank's Côte d'Ivoire COVID-19 Strategic Preparedness and Response Project (SPRP), which complemented national efforts on infrastructure preparedness and case management; support by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) on government-led coordination efforts at the national and local levels; sensitization and capacity building activities by the United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund (UNICEF); and the engagement of powers of influence, such as religious leaders, women, and youth, in response actions.^{147,148,149}

In addition to leveraging the resilience strategies and mechanisms of the EVD context for the COVID-19 experience, Côte d'Ivoire and its development partners also adopted and built upon several transformative and innovative approaches to mitigate both the health and socio-economic impacts of the pandemic. Key among these strategies were technology and digitization. Regarding the tech-driven response measures to the direct health impacts of COVID-19, local companies, such as WeFly Agri, and Investiv, developed drones to take temperature, clean public areas, and disseminate messages to rural areas, which have historically been characterized by under-resourced and under-developed health systems.¹⁵⁰ On the pandemic's cascading effects on the socio-economic sphere, digitization focused on two main areas that are central determinants of health access and equity: education and livelihoods. On the former, in addition to the use of old and new media to respond to the pandemic's education disruption, mobile services were utilized. Côte d'Ivoire exhibited foundational, yet critical, resilience in its management of routine health and educational practices in the face of the pandemic.



Economy and Livelihoods

Following its recent civil wars, Côte d'Ivoire has a proven track record of rebounding from shocks. Depending on their intensity and duration, civil wars demonstrably slash GDP growth by up to 10 percentage points annually, more often than not leading to economic ruin that countries struggle to recover from.¹⁵¹ Yet Côte d'Ivoire bucked this trend, quickly making up lost ground to take up its current position as West Africa's second largest economy.¹⁵² The bearing that this has on its resiliency stock is not to be underestimated, and this was evidenced during the COVID-19 pandemic: with GDP growth of 2.3 percent, Côte d'Ivoire was one of only 28 countries worldwide to successfully avoid a recession, and growth in 2021 is projected to rebound to just shy of 2019 levels.^{153,154} This has come on the back of sustained economic growth over the past decade, characterized by a surge in foreign direct investment (FDI), as well as targeted policies such as VAT exemptions, lowered tariffs and minimum guaranteed cocoa prices for farmers. However, there are a number of other governmental, as well as institutional and individual-level factors that contribute to Côte d'Ivoire's noteworthy economic resilience.

On a macro level, Côte d'Ivoire reaps significant benefits from its West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU) membership, creating close economic ties between itself and its seven mainly Francophone counterparts, including a shared currency. However, unlike three of these countries – Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger – Côte d'Ivoire benefits significantly from a 515-kilometer coastline. Its fisheries industry alone employs 70,000 people directly, and an additional 400,000 indirectly.¹⁵⁵ Crucially for a country with one of the highest gender inequality rates in the world, 59 percent of these are women.¹⁵⁶ Combined with Abidjan Port's status as West Africa's busiest, Côte d'Ivoire's WAEMU ties ensure that the country will remain a key shipping hub and can continue to leverage to the fullest its position as the world's pre-eminent cocoa producer. The development of Côte d'Ivoire as an integral cog in regional transport networks has been at the forefront of the government's economic policies and is underpinned by its announcement in August 2020 of a €400 million investment package to expand the port.¹⁵⁷ In 2019, the governments of Côte d'Ivoire and Burkina Faso announced a \$435m plan to upgrade 1260km of railway between Abidjan and the area of Kaya in the north-east of Burkina Faso, where manganese is heavily mined.¹⁵⁸ Furthermore, Abidjan's status as a major business and political hub in the region is reflected in a bolstered corporate standing, with FDI growing steadily since 2012.¹⁵⁹

Much of this recovery can be attributed to Côte d'Ivoire's dominant stake in global cocoa production. In a year when governments addressed the pandemic's effects reactively rather than proactively, the country's major cocoa stakes provided a significant measure of stability for individual Ivorians and government revenue alike. During a difficult year, the cocoa industry continued to provide livelihoods for a full 6 million Ivorians.¹⁶⁰ The importance of the crop to Ivorian livelihoods is reflected in the government's provision of CFA 250 billion in early 2020 to support major agricultural export crops.¹⁶¹ During the pandemic, women were able to call upon *Fonds d'appui aux femmes de Côte d'Ivoire* (FAFCI) a reduced rate credit fund for women set up in 2012 to help women overcome economic vulnerabilities. Since its set-up, the fund – spearheaded by the country's first lady, Dominique Ouattara – has benefitted over 165,000 women.¹⁶²

Digital cash transfers represent an increasingly essential economic tool in building resilience, especially among rural populations. A joint project implemented by the World Bank and the Ministry of Employment was conducted to transfer cash to social workers in hard-to-reach areas.¹⁶³ Further resilience to economic shocks is made possible through remittances from the Ivorian diaspora.¹⁶⁴ These transfers represented the equivalent of 0.5 percent of GDP in 2019, and allow the diaspora to support their native communities in accessing healthcare, but also in financing community initiatives, such as the building of schools.

Human Security

Following the end of the 2010 post-electoral crisis that left about 3,000 dead and the country territorially divided, Côte d'Ivoire embarked upon a complex post-conflict reconstruction (PCR) process to consolidate peace and security.¹⁶⁵ In view of the longstanding socio-cultural issues that had triggered multiple incidents of high-level conflicts, which had in turn contributed to the growth of extensive irregular armed networks, the multi-dimensional PCR process included a particular emphasis on Security Sector Reform (SSR) and Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR). The SSR and DDR processes produced tangible outcomes that included the "integration of former rebels and pro-Gbagbo elements within unified military units," the processing of approximately 60,000 combatants between 2012 and 2015, and the confiscation of



44,000 weapons.¹⁶⁶ However, persistent challenges and structural issues such as weak military cohesion and partisan allegiances to various political actors, which has led to recurrent episodes of mutinies, the circulation of a considerable stock of non-government weapons, as well as the continued presence of armed militias and self-defense groups in certain areas of the country have undermined the impact of these reform efforts and the effectiveness of Côte d'Ivoire's security apparatus. Despite these structural vulnerabilities that underlie the institutional fabric of Côte d'Ivoire's human security apparatus, a number of mechanisms and systems exist to safeguard the security of the state and, more critically, the security of the people and communities.

Though Côte d'Ivoire had been insulated from terrorist violence for most of the past decade, it is now highly vulnerable to the threat of terrorism due to the spillover effects of sub-regional instability and the spread of terrorist activities to coastal West Africa. In 2016, a high-profile terrorist attack carried out by Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) in Grand Bassam resulted in 19 deaths. Four years later in June 2020, a suspected terrorist attack on a security post in Kafolo, near the border with Burkina Faso, resulted in approximately 12 deaths and six injuries.¹⁶⁷

Côte d'Ivoire's response to the growing threat posed by terrorism has been characterized by both policy level and operational strategies. Prior to the 2016 attack, the country took steps to shore up its domestic counterterrorism (CT) infrastructure by passing a series of legislation to bolster its counterterrorism law and bring it in line with internationally recognized standards. In addition to strengthening its border security, Côte d'Ivoire has supported efforts by the African Union (AU) and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in Mali, serves as a maritime support base for the French-led Operation Barkhane, coordinated with INTERPOL on the use of biometric data to help identify links with attacks in the region and globally, and established an International Counter-Terrorism Academy in partnership with France.^{168,169,170,171}

Given that the terrorist threat facing Côte d'Ivoire is believed to primarily originate from external sources and is linked to its CT alliance with France, the militarized approach has been the central theme of its strategy.¹⁷² However, as the threat continues to drive regional instability, and due to the risk of radicalization of marginalized groups on Ivorian soil, a more holistic and multi-dimensional CT strategy that addresses the underlying drivers of terrorist-related activities will be key in reinforcing resilience to violence. Although the current CT infrastructure is limited on this front, there are a number of cross-sectoral initiatives, that while seemingly unrelated to CT, address its underlying drivers. For example, in response to the socio-economic marginalization of youth, a key root cause of radicalization and other notable issues of fragility, the IsDB funded a US \$31 million endeavor that focused on job creation and vocational training for youth in 2017.¹⁷³ Most recently in March 2021, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) launched a five-year multi-million-dollar project on building community resilience to violent extremism in the north of the country. As marginalized communities are highly susceptible to and victims of violent extremism, the project will provide economic and civil empowerment opportunities, as well as strengthen social cohesion, for at-risk border communities, particularly youth and women.¹⁷⁴

Côte d'Ivoire's vibrant and extensive network of civil society organizations (CSOs) have consistently been at the forefront of leading initiatives aimed at fostering social cohesion. Organizations such as the Assistance and Community Development in Ivory Coast, the Organization of Active Women in Ivory Coast (OFACI), which form part of the Ivorian Coalition of Human Rights Defenders (CIDDDH) network, have worked to spread a culture of peace through awareness-raising campaigns via radio and television, peace training seminars, and facilitating segments of the truth and reconciliations process. Traditional and religious authorities have also been key in advancing peacebuilding and strengthening community resilience to conflict drivers.¹⁷⁵ Faith-based institutions, such as the Catholic, Episcopal and Methodist churches as well as many Muslim leaders continually advocate for peace and unity.^{176,177,178,179} These groups have jointly formed the Platform of Spiritual Leaders for Peace, Reconciliation, Cohesion and Development (PLCRD) that unites leaders of different faiths and from civil society to advocate for peace.

Complementing these locally led efforts are multi-sectoral initiatives spearheaded by international partners. Activities focused on streamlining the country's land ownership system, which has been a salient driver of conflict between and within communities. The USAID Côte d'Ivoire Transition Initiative 2 (CITI2) project capitalized upon the socio-cultural role of women as conduits of peace to partner with the Coalition of Women Leaders Combatting Violence against Women and Girls to broadcast peace messages to people from different ethno-political backgrounds, and empower women as agents of change in the West and engaged youth on non-violent techniques for conflict management in Bangolo, which was one of the locations for the largest militia made up mainly of youth during the post-electoral conflict.¹⁸⁰ Other key initiatives include the African Development Bank's (AfDB) funded projects through ECOWAS' Peace and Development Initiative, which includes a focus on making "Peace Education" a part of school curricula.¹⁸¹


Approaches to safeguarding community and personal security in Côte d'Ivoire have also focused on strengthening infrastructure to anticipate and respond to conflicts, as well as manage conflicts when they arise. The West Africa Network for Peacebuilding (WANEP) has been working since the early 2000s to establish an early warning and early response (EWER) system in the country and has been aided by international partners to expand and strengthen the country's EWER ecosystem. With support from the CITI2 project, WANEP created targeted EWER systems in election violence hotspots in Abidjan to monitor, identify, and respond to drivers of conflict. In Duékoué, where ethnically tinged conflicts have been a recurrent issue of insecurity and youth have been perpetrators of conflict, CITI2 worked with WANEP and *Plateforme des Organisations de Jeunesse de Duékoué* (POJED), a local organization, to build the capacity of Duékoué's early warning committee to provide information to local authorities for preventative action.¹⁸² Furthermore, in May 2018, ECOWAS established a national early warning center with financial support from the United States.¹⁸³ The National Center for the Coordination of Response Mechanism (NCCRM) serves as a hub to coordinate and link nationwide early warning and early response to the broader, regional ecosystem and has received capacity building support from the USAID Reacting to Early Warning and Response Data (REWARD) project.

As with most countries in the sub-region, entrenched socio-cultural norms and structural factors contribute to deep-rooted societal inequalities that disproportionately expose women and girls to violence and insecurity. During the height of the various political crises in the country, women, traditionally perceived as soft targets, were victims of sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV), which was systematically employed and instrumentalized as a weapon of war to terrorize and shame perceived enemies. Though Côte d'Ivoire continues to grapple with the legacy of its conflict-related sexual violence, it has made strides towards safeguarding the security of Ivorian women and girls in the post-conflict period.

Institutional reforms and legislation centered on the protection of women and girls, which largely emerged during the post-election crisis, have focused on integrating gender-related issues in the government's national priorities. These include the 2013 law on marriage, which champions joint management of the family, the creation of a National Strategy against GBV in 2014, the establishment of a National Observatory for Equity and Gender to ensure the integration of gender for equitable development, the establishment of a Gender Directorate in the Ministry of Education in 2019, the adoption of a national strategy for child protection, and the institution of a 2016–2020 national action plan against the trafficking of persons.¹⁸⁴ In addition, a national action plan on the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 was adopted in 2007 and was under review as of 2019. These efforts have been accompanied by targeted actions meant to advance the objectives of the various regulatory frameworks and the priorities of the government. For example, trainings on GBV have been provided to judges, prosecutors, and the military, gender desks have been established in

courts and police stations to encourage the filing of GBV complaints, and donor projects like the World Bank's Sahel Women's Empowerment and Demographic Dividend (SWEDD) project is working towards creating 952 safe spaces in which women and girls can receive training on GBV and socio-economic empowerment. Improving access to justice on GBV issues has also been a key priority area in the post-conflict period and as such, the government has worked towards decentralizing legal aid and supports the provision of legal assistance throughout the country.¹⁸⁵

Spike in Reported incidents of Sexual/Gender-Based Violence during the Political Crisis of 2010-2011



Reported SGBV incidents involving at least 1 assault, Côte d'Ivoire 2010-2011 Political Crisis, Source ACLED

Source: Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project
www.acledata.com

In recent years, the rapidly evolving and dynamic landscape of human security threats, have exacerbated the risks facing women and girls in Côte d'Ivoire. Public health emergencies such as the COVID-19 pandemic have either rolled back gains or threaten to undo progress on the protection of women and girls, especially in rural areas where women have access to fewer health and social resources and may suffer from higher instances of SGBV.¹⁸⁶ Initiatives that have either continued or emerged to strengthen the resilience of women and girls in the face of the COVID-19 pandemic have ranged from logistical support to capacity building for service providers. The United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) donated about 43 million CFA francs worth of equipment to the government to combat GBV and equip hotlines. The institution also worked with the Ministry of Family, Women and Children to produce advertisements for awareness raising on GBV and platforms tackling GBV and participated in partnerships meant to continue the provision of essential services as well as develop strategies for GBV risk identification and mitigation. In addition, an Abidjan transit center for SGBV that had been shuttered for several years due to lack of funding and vandalism following the 2011 elections was reopened in 2020 with help from UNDP, which had been pivotal in creating the center.

As SGBV historically increases the susceptibility of young women to unplanned pregnancies, which in turn has long-term consequences on the gender gap in education, mechanisms have also focused on keeping girls in integrated learning.¹⁸⁷ Through the Right to Inclusive Education and Keeping Girls in School project, the Government of Canada, specifically its Global Affairs department, and the UNFPA aim to strengthen alternative distance education systems.¹⁸⁸ Given that the pandemic's disruption to GBV-related social services have resulted in the limitation of scope and geographic focus for efforts countering GBV, post-pandemic recovery will require inclusive and targeted strategies for marginalized communities.

Forced Displacement

Because Côte d'Ivoire's recent civil wars had their roots in contested elections, a consequence of this is that subsequent election periods have given rise to unrest and fears of renewed violence. This was most recently evidenced during the October 2020 presidential elections, in the lead-up to which UNHCR reported a rapid rise in the number of Ivorians fleeing to neighboring Liberia, Ghana, Guinea and Togo, rising from 3,200 to 8,000 in just a week.¹⁸⁹ In 2015, more than 20,000 Ivorian refugees were temporarily settled at the country's borders,¹⁹⁰ and each year more than 2,700 Ivorians file an asylum application in France.¹⁹¹ However, for those

who flee to neighboring countries, an apparent desire to remain close to the Ivorian border so as to return as soon as possible is a definite cause for optimism in a country that saw over a million displaced just ten years ago (a figure that has dropped dramatically since then). This bodes well for Côte d'Ivoire's ability to weather such periods of political tensions, with a view to gradually phasing them out.

Given the pervasive fear of a flare-up in the sort of unrest and violence that previously led to civil war, mechanisms for the prevention of conflict are a crucial source of resilience in the face of risks of forced displacement. In this respect, Côte d'Ivoire's civil society is a key factor of resilience. For instance, one interview respondent highlighted the creation of women's coalitions that contribute to strengthening women's capacities in matters of leadership, and of conflict management and prevention. Economic hardships and increased conflict risks go hand-in-hand, and that addressing poverty helps stem the prevalence of intra-communal conflict.

In January 2020, Côte d'Ivoire adopted a National Action Plan against statelessness, in line with the Banjul plan of action.¹⁹² This is intended to pave the way for people without recognized legal existence to receive identity documents, enroll in school, access health services, seek lawful employment, open a bank account, and buy land. According to the UNHCR, Côte d'Ivoire is home to some 1.6 million stateless people (or who are at risk of statelessness), for whom the risks posed by the COVID-19 pandemic are that much greater due to the potential of falling outside of the scope of national responses or being unable to seek medical care in the event of illness. Such trailblazing national-level plans are instrumental to creating a security net for those affected by forced displacement and who risk falling between the bureaucratic cracks.

Analysis and Good Practices

While the legacy of its various socio-political crises continues to linger and drivers of instability remain salient, as evidenced by the highly fraught electoral process of 2020, Côte d'Ivoire's multi-dimensional post-conflict recovery process has been remarkable and is reflective of several critical themes of resilience building.



Central to Côte d'Ivoire's resilience initiatives across the five dimensions has been the building upon pre-existing and proven mechanisms and platforms to leverage entry points for the maximization of efforts, and to limit their duplication. In particular, civil society organizations, which are known to command considerable influence and have laid the groundwork for long-term resilience over the years, have been key collaborators on resilience-building, as seen with WANEP and the CITI2 project. Coming on the heels of the 2014 – 2016 West Africa EVD epidemic, the COVID-19 pandemic and the Ivorian experience has highlighted how resilience built in the face of one shock can, when leveraged strategically and efficiently, reinforce and bolster coping capacities in the face of another shock. Faced with the ongoing pandemic, Côte d'Ivoire has capitalized upon and continued the robust awareness raising and messaging initiatives of the EVD context for a fairly successful response approach.

Although resilience is shown to be most long-lasting and sustainable when endogenous, bilateral partnerships are often instrumental in assisting fragile countries rebuild the foundations for a vibrant society and robust economy. Côte d'Ivoire can point to its openness to bilateral cooperation as a significant factor in its commendable turnaround since the end of its civil war, whether these are close ties with its immediate neighbors in the form of its WAEMU membership; cooperation with France on security matters, including counter-terrorism efforts; its collaboration with the agribusiness industry for the implementation of key elements of its sustainable agriculture plans; or government projects implemented jointly with regional and international organizations, such as ECOWAS, the FAO, the World Bank, INTERPOL, or the IsDB.

Côte d'Ivoire is blessed with natural resources, a vibrant civil society that has aided its recovery, and a strong agriculture industry which drives much of the country's economic growth. The past decade has provided a clear glimpse of Côte d'Ivoire's potential should its recovery translate to long-term economic development. This, in turn, has had and promises to continue to have, positive trickle-down effects for the Ivorian population. However, fault lines remain beneath the surface, as evidenced by the continued displacement of thousands of Ivorians annually, as well as the numerous threats to human security enumerated in the section. Beyond multi-stakeholder programs and projects geared towards bolstering its economic performance, Côte d'Ivoire will benefit greatly from fostering the conditions for civil society to continue growing. This section has identified its crucial role in contributing to community resilience in the face of shocks and pressures, and bilateral partnerships that recognize the importance of such resilience, and work to bolster it, will be crucial in healing the remaining divides within Ivorian society.



RESILIENCE IN TOGO



The small country of Togo has one of the most important ports in West Africa, Lomé. Over the last 20 years, Togo's GDP per capita more than doubled from 292 USD in 2001 to 679 USD in 2019. The country's main exports are cotton, phosphates, coffee, and cocoa, primarily to ECOWAS partners in the region. But poverty remains high with over half the population living on less than 1.90 USD per day and a large informal sector.¹⁹³ President Faure Gnassingbé succeeded his father Gnassingbé Eyadéma, who had ruled for 38 years until his death in 2005. Elections have tended to be controversial, with ECOWAS playing an important mediating role. In recent years, there have been incremental steps towards decentralization, including local elections in 2019 to create more space for representativeness in policy and development. Though the economy has grown over the last two decades due to high commodity prices and increased foreign investment,¹⁹⁴ the economic shocks associated with COVID-19 (global slowdown in trade and a strict three-month lockdown), led to a reduction in GDP growth from 5.3 percent in 2019 to 0 percent in 2020.¹⁹⁵ The known health impact of the COVID-19 virus on the population has been comparatively small thus far, though the daily average of cases rose in the first quarter of 2021.¹⁹⁶

Environment and Natural Disasters

According to the Notre Dame Global Adaptation Initiative (ND-GAIN) index, Togo is one of the most vulnerable to climate change (ranked at 133).¹⁹⁷ Togo's geography includes a drier northern region and more temperate, arable central and southern regions. Competition for the use of arable land not only among farmers (who often fall victim to a "double selling" scam whereby a plot is sold to two or more people simultaneously) but between herders and farmers (the former pushed ever southward in search of pasture) has resulted in conflicts, sometimes deadly, though usually small-scale. Attempts by landowners to seek legal redress often take far too long or require bribes to resolve.¹⁹⁸ Climate change has, as in many other Sahel-adjacent countries,¹⁹⁹ resulted in erratic rainfall, causing flooding and erosion in some regions, desertification in others.²⁰⁰ This has put pressure on pastoralists to find land to graze. Herders sometimes encroaching on agricultural land, or overstaying the agreed-upon grazing period, has resulted in intercommunal tensions. Several of these effects are also reportedly exacerbated by deforestation according to interview respondents, which can impoverish the fertility of arable land, aggravate local flooding, and increase the burden and risks imposed on those – typically women – who must collect firewood for cooking.

Togo's agrarian-driven economy, and the impact this has on the precarity of its population, is reflected in its National Adaptation Programme of Action (NAPA). Published in 2018, Togo's NAPA identifies agriculture, water resources, coastal zones, human settlements and health as being salient resiliencies that need addressing through adaptation. This is specifically as seen through the prism of the country's wide range of geographical regions and social groups, but also its more constrained variety of economic activity and sectors. The analysis that went into devising Togo's NAPA highlighted the impact of growing aridity on agricultural activity and yields; a growing scarcity of water resources for irrigation and drinking purposes; and a deterioration of Togo's biodiversity and pastures. Furthermore, desertification was highlighted as having devastating impacts on agriculture and natural resources, while repeated flooding impacts not only human lives (often leading to deaths) and infrastructure in an immediate and direct manner, but also through more chronic ways such as the loss of crops and arable land; and an increase in the propensity of illnesses. Finally, along Togo's seafront, coastal erosion is compelling Togolese citizens to relocate repeatedly, while leading to the systematic deterioration and destruction of coastal ecosystems – such as mangroves – but also arable land, culminating in further erosion of Togo's economic fabric and increased economic precarity. Accordingly, the NAPA identified several adaptive measures to be taken within the agricultural, herding, fishing and forestry sectors, as well as ones geared towards addressing threats posed to Togo's water resources, human settlements, health sector, and coastal zones. Of particular note is the identified need for a reinforcement of Early Warning and Early Response systems, recognizing both the need to forestall environmental shocks and pressures and to prevent the threat of increased conflict that systematic environmental degradation can exacerbate, often manifesting itself in intercommunal tensions and conflict.

Fortunately, conflict mediation services exist and have been observed as quite effective, notwithstanding an under-resourced judiciary.²⁰¹ Religious organizations routinely conduct conflict mediation, including the Presbyterian Church, the Catholic Church and village imams organized by the Togolese Muslim Union. Local, regional and international CSOs, including WANEP and ECOWAS also provide conflict prevention training for government and civil society leaders in Togo.²⁰² The government recently implemented its first rural justice houses to expand access to legal and mediation services as well (see Human Security section). The EU's Global Alliance Against Climate Change has programming in the country aimed at restoring soils,²⁰³ forest cover and protecting biodiversity, in partnership with the Ministry of the Environment and Forest Resources.²⁰⁴

Serious flooding has occurred as recently as September 2020, when the Oti river overflowed, killing 11 people, damaging 4,000 buildings and affecting around 57,000 total in the Savanes and Kara regions. Togo routinely experiences floods that displace and kill people, cause outbreaks of disease, and damage property. Benin and Togo formed an alliance, the Mono River Basin Authority,²⁰⁵ in 2014 to collaborate on water management and on developing water resources of the Mono River Basin.²⁰⁶ The Mono River Basin Authority also receives the support of the German BMBF via the CLIMAFRI project, a research project which aims to develop and put in place adaptation strategies for managing current and future flood risk along the Mono River Basin shared by Togo and Benin (BMBF).²⁰⁷ The World Bank, EU and other partners collaborate with the Ministry of the Environment and Forest Resources to implement flood early warning systems, awareness raising and land management in at-risk communities.²⁰⁸ The erosion of the coastline due to sea level rise is another major issue; two major highways (the second built as a replacement for the first) have been swallowed by the sea one after the other. Erosion has resulted in entire towns disappearing, as well as the loss of previously popular tourist beaches.²⁰⁹ Resilience factors to these threats include membership in WACA, as Togo is following WACA guidelines to reduce erosion.²¹⁰ Togo is also a member of the West African Coast Observation Mission (WACOM) which is a group of 11 coastal countries who work together to reduce risk. These organizations are managed by the World Bank. Current projects include the Lomé Cotonou Road Rehabilitation and the Coastal Protection Project, which maintains coastal structures, constructs new cobs (tidal barriers), monitors current protective structures, has created an early warning system for flooding, and has created coastal protection and management plans. The government of Togo has also made efforts to reduce erosion by passing legislation to protect the coasts, including an order prohibiting collection of sea sand on all coastline in Togo and plans to limit the exacerbation of erosion. These efforts are monitored and enforced by the coast and environmental police.²¹¹ Supporting the prevention of coastal erosion will continue to be an important effort as Togo's cargo and international exports continue to grow and require a stable coastline.

In Togo, the challenge of waste management is high. In Lomé, waste sorting is almost non-existent and the main solutions are landfills or dumping. Informal waste pickers, often unemployed youth, do a small part of



the entire work of collecting waste. Initiatives such as Africa Global Recycling have been created to capitalize on waste by buying the waste, transforming it and then selling it (e.g., for the manufacture of books, pipes, cardboard). Through this type of participatory approach, waste becomes a raw material and the community sees the financial value of sorting.

Health and Pandemics

According to the Togo government website, as of March 30, 2021, Togo has reported 9,992 cases and 107 deaths due to COVID-19 since the start of the pandemic. The vast majority of people have recovered, and infections have been limited by a strong response from the government. Regions with high risk (such as large cities and border areas) have been locked down to limit the spread, and strict curfews and social distancing regulations have been enforced. While Togo's export-driven economy has been hit hard by the COVID-19 crisis and related global economic slowdown, several strong sources of resilience have emerged during the last year.²¹² The government of Togo has taken the pandemic seriously, quickly responding to the crisis by enacting extensive curfews, closing the border temporarily, closing off more heavily affected cities, and sensitizing the population about the pandemic and about prevention efforts citizens can take.²¹³ This has meant that the health impact of the pandemic has been comparatively small, though economic disruption has been more significant. In fact, Togo was ranked second out of all countries in Africa (only after Rwanda) and fifteenth globally for its management of the pandemic by The Lowy Institute.²¹⁴

During the three-month curfew period from April to June, the Novissi ("solidarity" in the Ewe language) digital cash transfer program supported workers in the informal economy—estimated to comprise a large majority of Togo's workforce, and accounting for the majority of youth and women's economic activity.²¹⁵ Only 2.8 percent of workers in Togo were able to work remotely. This program mitigated the effects of the economic recession and was widely viewed as a success and model for other programs in other African countries.²¹⁶ The government also made water and electricity free during the curfew.

In Togo, as in many areas of the world, GBV risked a sharp increase during the pandemic year, particularly during curfews and social distancing orders.²¹⁷ To prevent this trend as much as possible, UNFPA supported 13 psychosocial support centers throughout Togo so that they could safely continue to deliver services and referrals for victims of GBV.²¹⁸ UNFPA also backed a WhatsApp platform called Akofa which provides information and help to GBV victims and is run by the Ministry of Social Action, the Promotion of Women and of Literacy. The central government took part in awareness raising campaigns with the goal of both reducing GBV and reducing the spread of COVID-19.²¹⁹ Currently, domestic violence is not a crime in Togo, and other GBV is often not reported and rarely punished.

Other major health issues affecting women include maternal and neonatal mortality and family planning. According to the Ministry of Health, the neonatal mortality rate in Togo nationally is 27 percent but it is worse in some areas, notably in Plateaux region where it reaches 34 percent. Maternal mortality is estimated to be 396/100,000 births. Togo recently proposed and is currently piloting free healthcare for all pregnant women, a policy aimed at reducing these alarmingly high rates.²²⁰ Healthcare services proposed in this initiative include

family planning, prenatal consultations, birth services and cesarian sections.²²¹ Interview respondents also cited the critical role played by local NGOs in filling current gaps in access to quality healthcare. One such example is Aimes Afrique, which specializes in the provision of both primary and specialized care to remote populations, offering more than 25,000 free consultations and 5,000 surgeries at no-cost per year.

Economy and Livelihoods

Togo is ranked 167th on the Human Development Index,²²² although poverty has been decreasing in recent years due to strategies the AfDB classifies as “pro-poor and inclusive.”²²³ To that end, the government created the National Fund for Inclusive Finance, a body designed to provide microcredit to people often left out of the formal economy and banking systems—particularly youth and women.²²⁴ This organization partners with The AfDB, The World Bank, UNDP, International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) and the Kuwait Fund for Development to provide financing to young people, women and the poor to begin activity in agriculture and to start small businesses.²²⁵ The FNFI had exceeded CFA98 billion (roughly \$181,313,592) in loans granted by the end of 2020²²⁶ and was ranked the third-best fund in financial inclusion among the WAEMU members in 2019.²²⁷ Togo’s economy is based on exports of cash crops (like cotton, palm oil and cocoa) and phosphates, but also on port and air transport services given that it has the only deep-water port on the West African coast that can handle very large cargo ships.²²⁸ Remittances in Togo account for 10 percent of the GDP as of 2018, constituting an important source of resilience for individual households as well as a stimulus for the economy as a whole.²²⁹

With nearly 60 percent of its population under the age of 25, youth unemployment, which remains high, is a serious issue. The most recent figures (2017) indicate that nearly 19 percent of male youth²³⁰ and nearly 32 percent of female youth²³¹ are not involved in education, training or employment. Absent opportunities for alternative livelihoods, young Togolese, already predominantly in the informal market, may be susceptible to drifting into more illicit markets, or even radicalization in a region where violent extremism has spread in neighboring countries. To promote resilience among the youth, the government created programs aimed at providing training and opportunity, including the Togo National Volunteer Agency (ANVT), set to take on thousands of volunteers and the Support for Integration and Employment Development Programme (AIDE).²³²

While gender parity in primary school attendance, which is tuition free and compulsory, has almost been achieved, adult male literacy is 77.3 percent²³³ while adult female literacy is 51.2 percent,²³⁴ suggesting a significant gap in outcomes. Given the current gender parity in primary school attendance, however, it is anticipated that the gap will narrow in the medium term, thus positioning the youth to be better prepared to enter the workforce than previous generations, provided there are jobs available to employ them.

The Ministry of Grassroots Development and the National Agency for Grassroots Development (ANADEB) are also active in expanding prosperity to traditionally disadvantaged groups and integrating youth in economic activity.²³⁵ The Project to Support the Employability and Integration of Young People in the Growth Sectors (PAEIJ-SP) is one of their projects, jointly financed by the AfDB and the Togolese government.²³⁶ It works to promote entrepreneurship, particularly in agriculture.²³⁷ It operates in all regions, but emphasizes activity in the poorest regions: Savanes, Centrale and Plateaux. While securing employment and opportunities for such a large proportion of youth is a challenge, having a young population is itself also a form of resilience. Young people provide innovation, a large available labor market, and potential tax base. Investing in youth education, vocational training, and employment is likely to be a strategy that yields not only economic payoff, but that secures peace, reduces crime, and empowers citizens to engage with government and civil society constructively. The National Employment Agency (ANPE) was also created at the national level to link job seekers and companies. This state agency is an advisory platform for job seekers. The ANPE draws its expertise from field studies conducted in parallel with its actions. In 2018, a sectoral study carried out in 6 cities provided precise data on informal jobs in order to provide appropriate solutions.

In Togo, political, religious and traditional representatives, as well as civil society and NGOs, agree on the need for initiatives to promote the economic inclusion of women. The issue of property rights and access to land is a source of conflict and marginalization in the country. Women are the first to be affected by this issue. Most of the interview respondents cited the Groupe de réflexion et d’action, Femme, démocratie et développement (GF2D) program, which is particularly well known in the country, as working to promote the well-being (fight against GBV via the Akofa program) and economic inclusion of Togolese women through advocacy actions

to protect women's rights to inherit land and own property. Thanks to its actions, the code of persons and the family was modified in 2012 to allow the right of inheritance to women.²³⁸

In the Togolese government, one out of three members is a woman.²³⁹ This desire to include women in public action is supported by the well-cited pan-African network of women's rights NGOs Women in Law and Development in Africa (WILDAF). This influential network is succeeding in Togo in increasing the influence and participation of women at all levels: local, regional and national.

Human Security

Political violence, particularly during or around elections (for example protests and police response in 2017), communal violence, smuggling and human trafficking are risks to human security in Togo. The Office of the High Commissioner for Reconciliation and Strengthening National Unity (HCCRUN) is an independent body dedicated to transitional justice and reparations to victims of abuses or neglect by the state.²⁴⁰ This organization has processed and delivered justice to over 10,000 people affected by the political violence. It also works to establish local peace committees (CLPs), which facilitate nonviolent conflict resolution at the community level. The HCCRUN has established 39 CLPs, one for each prefecture, of which 20 are reported to still be active. They are trained²⁴¹ and guided by the framework put in place by the Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Committee—an older body in charge of making reparations and compensating victims of government violence from 1958 onwards.²⁴²

According to interview respondents, civil society organizations (CSOs), including WANEP-Togo and the Episcopal Justice and Peace Commission, have also played a key role in establishing decentralized but coordinated network of peace actors throughout the country. A 2020 study by WANEP-Togo found that there are more than 300 local structures working on issues of conflict prevention and management, human security, and prevention of violent extremism (PVE). A key role that external actors could play is strengthening information sharing and coordination between these structures so as to enhance the effectiveness of the overall peace and security network in Togo.

Transhumance committees—which oversee nomadic herding across Sahel and sub-Sahel regions—have sought to create order in a system of livelihoods that can cause clashes across borders or among communities within Togo. The 2020 transhumance season—which ended on May 31—concluded without major incident.²⁴³ Rules for the grazing period, the definition of livestock corridors, penalties for infractions by herders and the role of Fulani and Rugga (pastoralist) chiefs in transhumance management have been established²⁴⁴ by the Operational Plan for Transhumance Management.²⁴⁵ Cross-border coordination is increasing as governments register that pastoralism usually does not occur within one border alone but concerns multiple countries and communities.²⁴⁶

Neighboring Burkina Faso has had a rise in violent extremism, including the murders of customs officials and a Spanish priest near the border with Togo in 2019.²⁴⁷ There are occasional clashes between law enforcement and weapons smugglers at the same border. The government, with support from the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC),²⁴⁸ established the Interministerial Committee for the Prevention of and Fight against Violent Extremism in 2019.²⁴⁹ The Committee is government-led but includes the participation of two civil society representatives and three religious representatives.²⁵⁰ Togo also joined the Accra Initiative — a regional security partnership among countries of the Sahel and coastal West Africa dedicated to countering terrorism by increasing regional information sharing and cooperation — in 2017.²⁵¹ Officials involved in the initiative, which is funded by member states, have reported increased trust between member state national security forces.²⁵²

Togo is a multicultural, multi-ethnic, multi-confessional society.²⁵³ Togo has a history of social cohesion and peaceful interrelations among ethnicities and religions. This is a significant source of resilience as ethnic and religious identity may be used to mobilize groups against each other politically. Traditional leaders and institutions of faith often manage and resolve conflict and run their own justice systems in a context where civil justice is overloaded and slow to resolve issues. The EU and Togolese government recently invested in four rural justice houses offering free mediation and conciliation services to underserved communities,²⁵⁴ in close partnership with the Peace Committees and Grassroots Development Committees in these communities.²⁵⁵



These new justice houses have brokered 362 conciliations and conducted nearly 800 consultations as of June 2020. Supporting rural justice houses, staffing and supplies for existing judiciary structures, and facilitating dialogues between citizens and judicial servants (and/or law enforcement) are examples of programs other funders have supported in Togo and West Africa more broadly that have met success.²⁵⁶

The Togolese Muslim Union has in recent years actively campaigned for interfaith dialogue and peace,²⁵⁷ and against terrorism and radicalism in West Africa.²⁵⁸ These campaigns have involved organizing regional and local imams as well as the leaders of koranic schools, security forces and NGOs to educate and sensitize communities about these issues. The current Catholic archbishop of Lomé, Nicodème Anani Barrigah-Bénissan, who was previously the head of the Togolese Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Committee, has also been active in advocating for peace and interfaith dialogue amid political controversy and crisis.²⁵⁹ Other Catholic officials have advocated for nonviolence as well.

Government efforts to combat child and human trafficking in the country are coordinated by several different ministries, including the Ministry of Social Affairs, which runs a no-cost helpline 16 hours per day, seven days a week with 2019 results that were “substantive, resulting in the identification of 97 child trafficking victims (12 boys and 85 girls).”²⁶⁰ Women and youth are disproportionately affected by human trafficking and labor abuses, as both groups are more likely to engage in informal and illicit work, including smuggling and cross-border trade. Children are trafficked and exploited for labor largely because of widespread poverty that makes caring for children difficult and extra income desperately sought by families, particularly in rural areas. The government has an established human trafficking awareness campaign (through the Ministry of Social Action) that has been able to reach tens of thousands of Togolese. The World Bank invests in programs which seek to fight child labor prevalence by improving social support for economically insecure families, including The Safety Nets and Basic Services Project (2017–2020), a \$29 million project put in place by both The Ministry of Social Action, of the Promotion of Women and Literacy and the Ministry of Grassroots Development.²⁶¹

Forced Displacement

Togo is not a major destination for refugees or asylum seekers and has a relatively small number of IDPs and nationals abroad. Togo hosts 11,866 refugees, primarily from Ghana and Côte d'Ivoire.²⁶² Ghana hosts approximately 3,500 Togolese refugees in turn. People internally displaced by flooding and political conflict number around 2,000.²⁶³ UNHCR is active in West Africa, providing resettlement services and COVID-19 prevention measures. They specifically provide repatriation, resettlement, and naturalization services within Togo as well.²⁶⁴

Flooding and coastal erosion have destroyed towns and roads in recent years and require management and prevention efforts to reduce displacement. Projects are underway to restore coastal integrity and to reduce riverine erosion via planting and barrier construction.²⁶⁵ Communal violence often resulting from farmer-herder conflicts has not reached the intensity of other countries in the region, with only a handful of minor incidents each year.²⁶⁶ The potential for violence persists, however, as arable land in Togo is scarce and expensive. The Ministry of Livestock has created an Operational Plan for Transhumance Management that stipulates the rules around herd movement. The government is in collaboration with Transhumance Committees, NGOs and ECOWAS for conflict prevention efforts.²⁶⁷ Interview respondents cited economic precarity and a paucity of available economic opportunities as a key driver for migration both to major Togolese cities and to neighboring countries. In addition, interview respondents cited the rural exodus of young girls and women to cities and neighboring countries (Burkina Faso, Ghana, Benin) for prostitution. Sex work has increased by more than 180 percent in 10 years; 31 percent of them are under 18 years of age.²⁶⁸ NGOs such as Plan International carry out projects to raise awareness and provide care for underage sex workers and, more generally, to combat child trafficking. The Ministry of Social Affairs has established a national child protection policy and its strategic plan, developed between 2011 and 2015, has created children's home to reintegrate more than 400 young girls and give them access to schooling.

Analysis and Good Practices

The case of Togo highlights several important challenges to resilience in the country, and in West Africa more broadly. Certain recommendations for strengthening resilience are suggested by the pattern of increasing environmental pressure causing flooding, increasing demographic pressure causing youth marginalization, potential pressure on human security from violent extremist groups and a recurring tendency for riots, protests and violence around elections. These include investing in youth and women's employment and training, focusing on the prevention of natural disasters like coastal and river flooding, and supporting local peace and transhumance groups via Togolese CSOs and government initiatives with successful track records. Inclusivity is key to minimizing risks and maximizing the considerable resilience to be found in a dynamic young country like Togo.



Investing in women and youth addresses several different sources of fragility, including economic vulnerability and poverty that lead to human trafficking and child labor, lack of employment opportunities for youth who may join terror groups and illicit smuggling chains, gender inequality and susceptibility to GBV. Addressing these interconnected issues serves to increase economic resilience as well as human security. Investing in youth and women also addresses the uncertainty of how jihadist groups will be able to recruit from the local population. Indeed, in Togo, it is important to note the significance of the family unit in mitigating the challenges. The second most important authority outside of the family circle are religious and/or traditional leaders, followed by NGOs, CSOs, and finally the courts (rarely referred to) and the state.

Supporting local leaders, peace and transhumance groups' informal conflict mediation and legal services prevents conflict escalation and group grievance (for example between farmers and pastoralists or between land buyers), while potentially decreasing community and domestic violence. Identifying local women's groups and incorporating women in peacebuilding and security sectors will certainly serve to decrease community-level and national-level violence and insecurity. Natural disaster forecasting and prevention can also yield co-benefits such as the prevention of conflict over land that is suitable for agriculture and pastoralism, disease outbreaks, forced displacement, and economic decline. Preserving Togo's coast also preserves one of its largest industries, port and cargo services for West Africa.

The World Bank, the AfDB, ECOWAS and along with key NGOs and international non-governmental organizations (INGOs) have track records of successful projects in these areas. The AfDB and the World Bank have worked successfully with the Ministry of Grassroots Development on projects aimed at improving livelihoods, preventing human trafficking and child labor and engaging youth and women in training and employment. The Ministry of Grassroots Development and the National Agency for Grassroots Development (ANADEB) are also active in expanding prosperity to traditionally disadvantaged groups and integrating youth in economic activity.²⁶⁹ The PAEIJ-SP and ANPE are key national programs for increasing employment and diverse opportunities. The IsDB has made important investments in infrastructure, but many opportunities exist for diversifying investment in Togo and supporting a truly sustainable and impactful development effort in a youthful, growing country.



RESILIENCE IN MOZAMBIQUE



Mozambique was largely spared direct harm in the first global wave of the COVID-19 pandemic. However, the country saw a major second wave that peaked at almost 1,000 new confirmed cases per day in early February 2021. Despite these pressures, and others including natural hazards and security challenges, Mozambique has made important progress in strengthening its capacities for absorptive, adaptive, and transformative resilience in key areas across all five dimensions assessed by the IsDB Resilience Index. Some of these efforts are ongoing, long-term efforts that have been worked on for decades, while others are more recent. International partners have played an important supporting role, but the Mozambican government and civil society have demonstrated critical leadership.

In the 2019 Human Development Index, Mozambique was ranked 181st out of 189 countries, and according to the World Bank, it is the fifth poorest country in the world, as measured by GDP per capita. The peace agreement signed in August 2019 between the president and the rebels-turned-opposition party, the Mozambican National Resistance (RENAMO), is the country's third since violence erupted in 1976 and an armed splinter group that calls itself the "Military Junta of RENAMO" has rejected the agreement. At the same time, an insurgency in northern Cabo Delgado province – the country's poorest and the Liberation Front of Mozambique's (FRELIMO) original home during the independence struggle against Portugal in the 1970s – has rapidly intensified, with reported fatalities escalating from 34 in 2017 to over 1,700 in 2020, including a nearly 300 percent increase between 2019 and 2020, and has displaced over half a million people. Meanwhile, devastating natural hazards have compounded an already volatile situation, with Tropical Cyclone Eloise in 2021 striking just north of Beira, causing extensive flooding throughout central Mozambique, only two years since Cyclones Idai and Kenneth, the latter of which hit Cabo Delgado province as the strongest tropical cyclone to make landfall in Mozambique since modern records began, and a devastating drought in the southern parts of the country.

Environment and Natural Disasters

The Global Climate Risk Index found that Mozambique was the country most affected by extreme weather events in 2019, and the country has seen destructive flooding at least five times between 2000 and 2013. According to the Notre Dame Global Adaptation Initiative (ND-GAIN) index, Mozambique is one of the most vulnerable countries in the world to climate change (ranked at 139).²⁷⁰ Still, Mozambique has made a great deal of progress since the height of the civil war. The restoration of Gorongosa National Park – which had been devastated by fighting and poaching due to its location near a RENAMO base – has been an exemplary case of cooperation between the Mozambican government and international partners. Though the park has not yet fully recovered its pre-war status, its great variety of habitats, which are home to one of the most diverse ecosystems in the world, are the site of increasingly national and international tourism. At the same time, the park supports the provision of healthcare, education, and agricultural assistance in the surrounding communities, an inclusive approach that helps promote the long-term sustainability of the park's recovery.

CASE STUDY: GORONGOSA NATIONAL PARK

Gorongosa National Park is located at the southern end of the Great Rift Valley in Mozambique's Sofala province. The park, which has one of the greatest variety of habitats in the world, was established when the country was still a Portuguese colony. However, the park was devastated during the civil war, during which as much as 95 percent of the large mammals residing there were killed. Beginning in 2004 and in cooperation with the US-based Carr Foundation, the government of Mozambique has worked to restore the park in a way that protects biodiversity while also fostering prosperity.

In addition to the reintroduction of diverse wildlife, from buffalo to zebras, the park employs over 600 local staff (a third of the park workforce is female) has Human Development and Sustainable Development teams to help support the surrounding communities. This includes 675 community health workers, Girls Clubs to support education in 50 villages, and 5,000 small (primarily coffee) farmers.

Visitation to the park has steadily grown, including from Mozambicans (who pay a significantly reduced entrance fee), reaching 4,800 in 2018.

In some areas, capacities to manage environmental pressures and shocks have weakened, perhaps most notably the rapid deforestation due primarily to slash and burn agriculture that,²⁷¹ in turn, have made Mozambique more vulnerable to extreme weather events like Cyclones Idai and Kenneth.²⁷² However, in other areas, Mozambique has made significant progress in strengthening its resilience capacities, including becoming a global exemplar in the management of its outstanding natural heritage through a national conservation area system.

This system covers around a quarter of Mozambique's land area²⁷³ and encompasses 14 major ecological regions from the lakes and forests of the Great Rift Valley in northern Mozambique and the wetlands of the Zambezi River delta in the middle of the country to the savannas of tri-national Great Limpopo Transfrontier Park.²⁷⁴ The parks and reserves that constitute this system are managed by the National Administration of Conservation Areas (*Administração Nacional das Áreas de Conservação*, ANAC) which is in turn supervised by the Ministry of Land, Environment, and Rural Development (MITADER).

On a higher level, Mozambique's National Adaptation Programme of Action (NAPA), published in 2007, identified four major overarching proposed actions to address the plethora of climate change-induced risks the country faces. These are strengthening of the country's natural disasters early warning system; strengthening the capacities of agricultural producers to cope with climate change; reducing climate change impacts in coastal zones; and promoting adequate management of water resources under climate change.

While Mozambique's conservation efforts do face challenges around a lack of financing due to limited resources available from tourist concessions and state support, the country has established a strong partnership with the international community that has allowed it to continue expanding the network, including the proclamation of Magoé National Park in October 2013 and of the Ilhas Primeiras e Segundas as marine protected area – Africa's largest – in November 2012.²⁷⁵ However, the dependence on external funding has meant that funding was distributed unevenly between conservation areas and even for the most well-resourced, funding could vary drastically from year to year, making it difficult to plan and implement programs.²⁷⁶

To manage these funding challenges, the country has embraced innovative financing mechanisms. In June 2015, President Nyusi officially launched BIOFUND (*Fundação para a Conservação da Biodiversidade*), the country's first trust fund dedicated to biodiversity conservation, which had begun development four years earlier in partnership with a range of stakeholders, including the World Bank, the UN, and the French, German, and American governments.²⁷⁷ BIOFUND also brings together most of the private and public organizations working on issues of conservation in Mozambique as members. The fund, which was established in accordance with international good practices enshrined in the Conservation Finance Alliance, is designed to provide a stable, sustainable, and long-term source of financing to ensure proper management of conservation areas. BIOFUND is also a founder member of CAFE (*Consortium Africain des Fonds Environnementaux*), a network of African environmental funds and conservation trust funds.²⁷⁸ The Mozambican government has also worked to create the context to foster public-private partnerships in the area of nature-based tourism, which it has identified as one of the country's largest potential growth sectors, as a way to both conserve the country's biodiversity while promoting the prosperity of its citizens. To ensure that local communities benefit from these investments, 20 percent of revenues from conservation areas are legally allocated to ANAC.

Health and Pandemics


To improve resilience around Health and Pandemics, Mozambique has made important strides in combating endemic diseases. The country has reached a rate of over 90 percent immunization with Bacille Calmette-Guérin (BCG), which protects against tuberculosis, nearly 20 years ago and has worked to steadily improve that rate since. Around the same time, in 2001, the HIV incidence curve was bent, and HIV has fallen almost uninterrupted since, to a little over half the peak levels by 2019. There have also been continued improvements in maternal health, reflected in a fall in maternal mortality by almost 60 percent in 15 years. More recently, the government introduced a successful campaign to improve coverage of vaccination against rotavirus while also committing to expand access to healthcare.

Mozambique's commitment to public health has been evident since the country gained independence from Portugal in 1975. That same year, the new government established the National Health Service, which eventually grew to encompass a primary health care system with over a thousand health units strategically located to maximize equitable access across its population,²⁷⁹ a system praised by the WHO as a model for other developing countries. Unfortunately, the escalating civil war between the government and RENAMO devastated this system. In the first five years of the 1980s, government expenditure on healthcare almost halved and by the early 1990s approximately fifty percent of the primary health care system had been destroyed or forced to close.²⁸⁰ By the mid-1990s, health spending had fallen to just 2 percent of general government expenditures.²⁸¹



Though the national healthcare system remains predominately public, the provision of public health services underwent a structural transformation in the 1990s. Due in large part to a combination of the destruction and fiscal strains caused by the civil war and austerity imposed by a structural adjustment program signed in 1987, the 1990s saw a “deluge of NGOs” with minimal oversight; by the end of the decade, dozens of donors were funding largely disconnected health projects across the country.²⁸² Much of the funding for these NGOs took the form of vertical aid focused on specific health issues instead of general support for the Mozambican health system.


Infant Mortality Rate and HIV Decreased Since 2000



Source: World Bank - <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.DYN.IMRT.IN?locations=MZ>

Together with the Rome General Peace Accords that ended the civil war in 1992, this approach did see some notable successes. Maternal and infant mortality have fallen substantially, both by almost two-thirds between 1990 to 2015.^{283,284} The percentage of 1-year-olds immunized with BCG, which protects against tuberculosis began rising in the late 1980s, increasing from 49 percent in 1988 to 90 percent in 2004, however, the incidence of TB has also continued to rise.²⁸⁵ There is some evidence that BCG possesses protective non-specific effects, which can help protect against malaria.²⁸⁶ Possibly due in part to the BCG vaccination campaign, the incidence of malaria has fallen by around 40 percent between 2001 and 2018.²⁸⁷ In 2004, the US introduced the President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) in Mozambique with a half a billion dollars in annual funding, roughly equivalent to the Ministry of Health's entire budget.²⁸⁸ Though the incidence of HIV had begun to fall two years previously, that funding helped ensure that it fell by nearly fifty percent between 2001 and 2019.²⁸⁹ Most recently, the launch of a National Immunization Program against rotavirus in September 2015 has succeeded in increasing the share of 1-year-olds immunized with the RotaC vaccine to 88 percent by 2019.²⁹⁰

Health Expenditures, Mozambique Compared to IsDB Member Country Average



Source: World Bank - <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SH.XPD.EHEX.CH.ZS>

Despite these successes, the lack of coordination between NGOs and the proliferation of one-off projects often failed to produce any significant or sustainable impact on population health. As a result, the Ministry of Health and several key donors turned to a sector-wide approach (SWAp) in 2000. The SWAp, which built on earlier common fund arrangements, was intended as a pooled fund with joint management by the Ministry of Health and donors that would improve coordination of health resources, increase funding of health system fundamentals, and make funding levels more predictable and consistent to enhance medium- and long-term planning. Since its establishment, the effectiveness of the SWAp has fluctuated; in its initial years the proportion of vertical funding to the Mozambican health sector declined, but the influx of large new aid flows from PEPFAR, GAVI, and the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, TB, and Malaria combined with continued constraints on public health spending as part of the Action Plan for the Reduction of Absolute Poverty (PARPA) agreed to with the IMF reversed that trend. The SWAp has become more useful as a coordinating mechanism, however, with the United States eventually joining the planning process and being recognized by the Ministry of Health as a “focal donor.”²⁹¹

Despite dealing with serious resource constraints, Mozambique has made major strides in improving public health, especially since the advent of relative political stability in 1992. Infant and maternal mortality have both fallen on a consistent and significant basis. Since the turn of the century, the country has achieved major progress in reducing the burden of several endemic infectious diseases, including malaria, HIV/AIDS, and, more recently, rotavirus. While the country has struggled with an explosion of outside-funded health projects with limited coordination or oversight, the Ministry of Health has seen success in using a sector-wide approach in coordination with major donors to reduce redundancy and maximize effectiveness of incoming funds. In the last few years, there has also been an improvement in fundamental health systems, with the number of physicians reaching unprecedented levels thanks to a doubling between 2015 and 2018,²⁹² helping to fulfill the promise made by President Nyusi during his last campaign to improve access to healthcare, especially in rural areas.

Economy and Livelihoods

In Economy and Livelihoods, Mozambique has undertaken a steady stream of reforms to improve its business climate which, in combination with the recent discovery of large natural gas reserves, should help attract significant foreign investment, especially once progress is made in containing the pandemic and the insurgency in Cabo Delgado. Additionally, the country has taken important steps to bolster the fight against corruption since the 2016 debt scandal. With a view to the longer-term, Mozambique has made significant progress in expanding access to primary, secondary, and tertiary education through increased investment coupled with reforms to decentralize curriculum development and monitoring. In line with Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 4, the country's current educational priorities are improving education quality and extending access to the most vulnerable children.

For two decades after the formal end of hostilities between RENAMO and the government, Mozambique's economy was roaring. Between 1995 and 2015, GDP grew by an average of more than 8 percent annually, making the country of the world's ten fastest-growing economies.²⁹³ Starting in 2010, FDI – primarily into the extractives sector with an emphasis on coal and aluminum – soared, with net inflows increasing more than five times in three years,²⁹⁴ reaching nearly 40 percent of GDP in 2013.²⁹⁵

However, Mozambique proved to be an exemplar of the fragility of an economy dependent on extractives and soaring FDI. Continued falling global prices of coal and aluminum contributed to a sharp reversal in FDI inflows, which fell by over a quarter in 2014. FDI continued its freefall for the next three years. Donors and the IMF suspended aid, Mozambique defaulted on its debt, and FDI inflows fell by nearly two-thirds from the 2013 peak by 2017. GDP growth fell below 4 percent annually, barely exceeding population growth.²⁹⁶ FDI briefly rebounded in 2018 on the back of rising commodity prices, before falling again in 2019. Cyclone Kenneth and Idai further depressed growth in 2019.


By the start of 2020, Mozambique appeared to be in a position to return to rapid growth. Inflation had spiked above 17 percent in 2016, but vigorous action by the Bank of Mozambique had brought it below 3 percent by 2019.²⁹⁷ In August 2019 the country signed a 27-point plan with the IMF to fight corruption and improve governance.²⁹⁸ Recently discovered huge natural gas reserves promised to bring in nearly \$60 billion in FDI



over the next five years.²⁹⁹ GDP growth was forecast to exceed 6 percent and Mozambique was projected to have the fifth-fastest growing economy in Africa through 2024.³⁰⁰ However, the pandemic delivered another external shock, disrupting internal economies and cratering commodity prices. Coupled with a worsening insurgency in Cabo Delgado, the site of the country's natural gas reserves, ExxonMobil announced a delay in starting work with Total potentially following suit. Growth tipped into a slight recession.³⁰¹

Mozambique nonetheless retains some key structural strengths. Work on the natural gas reserves is still expected to go forward, albeit delayed by the pandemic and the insurgency. Commodity prices rose in the latter half of 2020 and beginning of 2021. There has been some recent progress in restructuring debt, helping the government shrink its debt-to-GDP ratio while it also improves tax collection.³⁰² The country possesses abundant coastline which, especially if it established robust transportation connections to its landlocked neighbors, could offer numerous opportunities. Furthermore, the National Institute of Social Action, housed within the Ministry of Gender, Children and Social Action, provides targeted assistance to people in extreme poverty. That assistance takes the form of cash transfers, food vouchers, and in-kind transfers and households headed by women living with six or more dependents are given priority.³⁰³

GDP Growth and FDI Decreased Since 2013



Source: World Bank - <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/BX.KLT.DINV.CD.WD?locations=MZ>

Perhaps Mozambique's greatest source of promise for future economic success is the country's educational achievements. In 2000, the Ministry of Education began a process of decentralization, implementing a system

in which 20 percent of the national basic education curriculum would be developed locally.³⁰⁴ In 2004, the Ministry of Education abolished all fees for primary education which had been a major constraint to education access. At the same time, the Ministry, supported by the World Bank and other donors, began implementing the Direct Support to Schools (DSS) program. The DSS program gives small grants to schools for the purchase of materials like textbooks, which is intended to promote the dual objectives of improving educational quality and of decentralizing decision making and resource management.³⁰⁵ These efforts were also accompanied by a significant increase in public spending on education, which tripled between 1998 and 2018.³⁰⁶

These reforms were successful in increasing access to education with gross primary school enrollment nearly doubling in two decades between 1999 and 2019.³⁰⁷ Mozambique also saw impressive gains in access to secondary and tertiary education. Gross enrollment in secondary education grew from just over 5 percent in 1999 to over 35 percent in 2017 while tertiary education, increased by over 10 times over the same time period, albeit from a very low base.³⁰⁸ These gains were facilitated in large part by big increases in female access to education. By 2015, the gender parity index (GPI) for both primary and secondary education was over 0.9 while the GPI for tertiary education went from .3 to .8 between 2000 and 2018. Literacy rates have climbed as well, with adult and youth literacy rates both increasing by around twenty-five percentage points since 1997.³⁰⁹ These increased levels of education could help Mozambique transform its economy from a fragile resource-dependent one to one that enjoys diversified robust growth, but such a transformation will require support from both the government and its international partners.

Human Security

Since the signing of the Rome General Peace Accords on October 4, 1992, Mozambique has benefited from a comparatively low level of organized political violence. Though there was renewed fighting between RENAMO and the government between 2013 and 2018, the intensity of this conflict never even approached the level of the civil war. On August 6, 2019, a new peace deal was signed, hopefully putting a final end to the conflict that has plagued the country for most of its independent history. Crucially, the process that led to this agreement persisted despite the death of RENAMO's historic leader Afonso Dhlakama in 2018 shortly before the end of negotiations.³¹⁰ Despite the risk of either the government using his death as an opportunity to attempt a military solution to the conflict or of Dhlakama's potential successors taking a hard line to boost their credibility during leadership struggles, both sides were committed to the process.

However, beginning in 2017, an insurgency in northern Cabo Delgado province has rapidly worsened, with reported conflict fatalities increasing from 34 in 2017 to over 1,700 in 2020.³¹¹ The UNHCR has estimated that 530,000 people, representing over 25 percent of the province's population, have been internally displaced.³¹² Included in this figure are half a million children according to estimates from UNICEF.³¹³ Cabo Delgado is both remote – it is the country's northernmost province, located over 2,500 kilometers from the capital – and socioeconomically marginalized; even before the conflict, the poverty rate was over 50 percent and the province's resilience capacities were the weakest across a range of measures, including economic opportunity, nutrition, education, clean water, sanitation, and electricity.³¹⁴ This situation has remained unchanged despite the discovery of valuable natural resources, including rubies in 2009 and natural gas in 2010.³¹⁵ Although the province had not seen heavy fighting since independence, it remained in a persistent state of latent fragility until the outbreak of the insurgency in 2017.


In other areas, Mozambique has been more successful in improving the rights of its people to live with dignity and with equal opportunity to develop their human potential. Mozambique has made major improvements in empowering women and integrating a gender perspective throughout government programming. Female representation is especially strong in the national parliament, where the proportion of seats held by women has steadily grown from 16 percent in 1991,³¹⁶ just before the signing of the Rome General Peace Accords, to over 42 percent in 2020.³¹⁷ Within the national political system, women have also held important decision-making positions. After the 2014 elections, women were nominated to the positions of president of parliament and head of the RENAMO bench of parliamentarians,³¹⁸ and as of the beginning of 2020 women held 43 percent of ministerial positions.³¹⁹ While female representation is lower at the provincial level and lower still at local levels, these have been improving over time and there are areas with strong female representation even at the local level.

To complement the increasing representation of women within the political sphere, Mozambique has instituted several reforms over the past two and a half decades to ensure gender issues are addressed in a holistic way throughout the government. The first major such reform was the reformed Land Law of 1997, which endorsed the right of Mozambicans to have the right to land use; as a result, a quarter of Mozambican women have land title use rights.³²⁰ In 2000, the Ministry of Women and Social Action was founded. One major achievement of the ministry is the development of Eduardo Mondlane University, which provides an annual course on integrating a gender perspective into public planning and budgeting.³²¹ In 2002, the First National Plan for the Advancement of Women was developed, with the goal of reducing gender inequalities in education, health, agriculture, and institutional mechanisms for the advancement of women.³²² Two years later, the National Council for the Advancement of Women (CNAM) was founded. CNAM is responsible for mainstreaming gender in sectoral plans and women as outlined by the National Plans, and it also exists at a provincial and district level to help promote the empowerment of women at all levels of Mozambican society.³²³

In addition to the coordination role played by the Ministry of Women and Social Action, the Mozambican government has worked to institute gender focal points, coordinated by Gender Units, throughout its ministries, national and political directorates, and agencies. The role of these focal points and Units is to influence planning and budgeting processes and ensure that gender is considered within sector programming at the national and provincial levels. However, this structure still faces several constraints, particularly around limited resources and incomplete institutionalization.

In addition to work by public entities, civil society plays a critical role in strengthening female empowerment, often with support from international partners. In 1998, a joint initiative of the United Nations and bilateral donors created the Donor Gender Group, which was later transformed into the Gender Coordination Group (GCG). The GCG brings together bilateral and multilateral donors with the government and civil society, including Fórum Mulher, an umbrella group of civil society organizations in Mozambique. While the GCG has historically principally been a platform for information sharing, it has recently undertaken reforms aimed at making the group more proactive in promoting coordination between its constituent parties and in improving the effectiveness of gender policies and programming.³²⁴ With sufficiently robust support from all three pillars of the group, this shift can help ensure that women and men all live with dignity and fulfill their potential.

Female Representation in Government, Compared to IsDB Member Country Average



Source: World Bank - <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SG.GEN.PARL.ZS?>
<https://databank.worldbank.org/source/gender-statistics/Series/SG.GEN.MNST.ZS>

Forced Displacement

Faced with Forced Displacement from both extreme weather events and violent conflict, Mozambique has undertaken comprehensive reforms to build up its resilience capacities in this area, particularly its absorptive and adaptive resilience to extreme weather. With 60 percent of its population living in low-lying areas on or near the country's extensive coastline,³²⁵ Mozambique faces significant risk of population displacement from extreme weather events, especially tropical cyclones and storm surge flooding. In 2019, the year in which it was hit by Cyclones Idai and Kenneth, Mozambique was the most impacted country by extreme weather events in the world.³²⁶ The country has also had a long history of devastating flooding before 2019.



In response to these vulnerabilities, Mozambique has undertaken a series of reforms to improve their capacity to manage extreme weather events and reduce the destructiveness and loss of life that they cause. In 1999, the government adopted its first disaster management policy, which introduced proactive measures for disaster risk management (DRM) and established the National Institute for Disaster Management (INGC).³²⁷ The INGC replaced a previous disaster relief agency and its motto 'prevention is better than cure', is reflective of the shift from a focus on disaster response to disaster preparedness and risk reduction.³²⁸ While this shift was an important one, the flooding in 2000 – which killed around 800 people and affected 4.5 million – revealed gaps in INGC's preparedness and capacity to manage a major disaster and coordinate a large-scale relief operation.³²⁹

This provided a major impetus to several critical reforms. Beginning in 2005, disaster risk reduction began to be integrated into the government's 5-year plans and poverty reduction strategies, and the following year the Council of Ministers approved a Master Plan for Disaster Prevention and Mitigation.³³⁰ 2007, however, was perhaps the most critical year, as it saw the translation of previous efforts into the creation of several vital institutions to enhance the country's capacity to mitigate and respond to extreme weather events. Two of these focused on disaster response, the National Emergency Operations Center (CENOE), a coordination structure for emergency response with subservient bodies at the regional, provincial, and district levels and the National Civil Protection Unit (UNAPROC), which is responsible for the search and rescue of disaster victims.^{331,332}

Perhaps the most important creation of 2007 was the local disaster risk management committees (CLGRCs). The CLGRCs, which are staffed by volunteers, recognized the role of local communities as both the first line of response and the last mile for the dissemination of early warning information.³³³ This type of empowerment of local communities is something that has been advocated by the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) and others.³³⁴ The CLGRCs were first implemented in some of Mozambique's most highly risk-prone areas, including the country's main river basins.³³⁵ They proved instrumental in ensuring the early evacuation of people at risk during the 2007 and 2008 floods in the Zambezi river basin and have played a critical role in reducing casualties of subsequent flooding, including in 2012 and 2013.³³⁶ As of 2017, over 1,200 CLGRCs existed, with a total membership exceeding 14,000.³³⁷

Recent years have seen renewed initiative in strengthening national capacity. New resilient design standards have been established to mainstream disaster risk reduction in infrastructure provision, with the Ministry of Education and Human Development leading the way in incorporating these standards into new schools.³³⁸ In July 2017, in response to the inefficiencies and delays imposed by the time it takes to mobilize financial resources from donors in the wake of a disaster, the government established the Disaster Management Fund.³³⁹ Two years later, in April 2019, the government created the Cabinet of Reconstruction Post-Cyclones

(GREPOC) to coordinate reconstruction efforts by the government, civil society, and international partners. GREPOC encompassed a wide range of context-appropriate activities, including temporary employment, rehabilitation of community facilities, the provision of skill training, establishing resilient housing models and standards, and developing guiding principles of recovery. In 2020 GREPOC, together with international partners and local civil society groups, extended its activities to assist those displaced by the ongoing conflict in Cabo Delgado.³⁴⁰

Analysis and Good Practices

Key principles and themes that promote resilience across all five Dimensions include 1) coordination, 2) decentralization, 3) innovative finance, and 4) taking a holistic and integrated approach.

Coordination. The Mozambican government has played an important role in coordinating stakeholders, both within the government and among external partners. One area in which coordination has been very challenging yet achieved a measure of success is public health. Faced with a situation in which its financial resources were vastly exceeded by those pouring into a throng of uncoordinated NGOs of uneven quality operating largely without oversight, the Mozambican government adopted a sector-wide approach (SWAp). While the SWAp was somewhat successful in strengthening direct oversight of the Ministry of Health over public health funding in the country, it has been more successful as a coordination mechanism. For instance, the United States, one of the largest funders of public health activities in Mozambique has stepped up its cooperation with this aspect of the SWAp, leading to its recognition as a “focal donor.” Coordination has also played an important role in the success of Mozambique’s resilience in the areas of emergency response and female empowerment. The National Emergency Operations Center, created in the wake of flooding in 2000, has improved the ability of the government to respond to natural disasters by coordinating the many national and subnational government entities which have a role in such a scenario. The creation of the Cabinet of Reconstruction Post-Cyclones has helped coordinate the efforts of the Mozambican government, international partners, and civil society to assist those who have been forcibly displaced, both from natural disasters and from the conflict in Cabo Delgado. The government coordinates with international Humanitarian Country Teams, which are clusters of organizations working in different areas of disaster response, each led by a UN program.³⁴¹ In regard to female empowerment, the government participates in the Gender Coordination Group, which brings together international partners and civil society with the government, and which has recently taken steps to be more proactive.

Decentralization. Recognizing the specific contextual knowledge held by local actors along with their capacity for often faster, more effective response to changing circumstances, Mozambique has seen substantial success through decentralization, particularly in the areas of education and disaster risk reduction. In the early 2000s, the government embarked on a process of decentralizing decision making and resource management in the education sector to local school councils, a process that received important support from external partners. Twenty percent of the curriculum for basic education was shifted from a nationally standardized curriculum to a local curriculum tailored to local needs and priorities. The Direct Support to Schools program gave small grants to school councils to purchase basic materials for students and teachers, increasing transparency and accountability. These reforms, together with others that occurred around the same time, have helped drastically increase access to education, with enrollment and literacy rates both climbing rapidly, including for women and girls. Similar principles underlay the creation of the local disaster risk management committees (CLGRCs). The role played by these bodies is recognized as pivotal in both the transmission of early warning information and in the organization of response and they have been credited with being central to the improved management of riverine flooding in recent years.

Innovative Finance. Although Mozambique has taken steps to ensure that the resources it does have at its disposal have the greatest possible impact by coordinating with the country’s partners and leveraging the expertise of local actors, those resources are often still far too limited. In response, the country has sometimes turned to innovative financing schemes. One of the most prominent such examples is BIOFUND, a trust fund dedicated to the conservation of Mozambique’s biodiversity, which was launched in June 2015. While the country had previously received funding from international partners, BIOFUND, which was established in accordance with international good practices, is designed to provide a stable and long-term source of financing to ensure the proper management of all of the country’s many parks and reserves. BIOFUND is also

a founding member of CAFÉ, a network of African environmental funds and conservation trust funds to help ensure that the country stays at the cutting edge of this type of approach. The Mozambican government's adoption of the sector-wide approach (SWAp) to health is also an example of this type of innovative approach to financing. While the SWAp has become primarily a coordination mechanism, it was originally designed to move some of the funds that external funders were using for public health in Mozambique on-budget under Ministry of Health jurisdiction,³⁴² thereby boosting national ownership and domestic accountability of health sector spending and increasing the funds available for Ministry of Health priorities.



A Holistic and Integrated Approach. The final principle that runs through many of the successes Mozambique has had in building resilience is taking a holistic approach. This is best illustrated by the effort to restore and protect Gorongosa National Park. Instead of only funding those activities which directly and exclusively contributed to conservation, the park administration includes Human Development and Sustainable Development teams, which work on projects designed to improve public health, provide education, and support new livelihoods in the surrounding communities. This integrated approach has helped cultivate local buy-in and support for the conservation program, thereby contributing to the success it has achieved up to this point and to its continued sustainable success in the future. Another example is the efforts that the Mozambican government has taken to empower women and girls. The proportion of women both in Parliament and in ministerial positions has increased significantly in recent decades and is now amongst the highest in the world. The government has also reformed key laws that had restricted the economic opportunities available to women. Inside the government, the Ministry of Women and Social action has developed an annual course on integrating a gender perspective into public planning and budgeting and the National Council for the Advancement of Women facilitates mainstreaming of gender in sectoral plans and promotes the empowerment of women at the provincial and local levels of Mozambican government and society. Finally, beginning in 2005 the Mozambican government began integrated disaster risk reduction throughout the government's comprehensive 5-year plans and poverty reduction strategies. As part of this effort, the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development (MADER) uses meteorological data to forecast likely areas of droughts and flooding and preplace agricultural inputs to mitigate the impact of disasters and minimize turnaround time to a full recovery.³⁴³

Mozambique faces serious challenges across all five critical dimensions of risk and resilience, from riverine flooding to sharp economic slowdown to insurgency in Cabo Delgado. However, the country has also shown remarkable resilience in many areas. Mozambique's external partners should assist the country in bolstering these existing resilience capacities and building additional capacities that can address not only those vulnerabilities that have already reached a crisis level, but also those latent vulnerabilities which might do so in the future if insufficient attention is paid to them. Together, Mozambique and its external partners can empower the country's people to realize a future of sustainable peace and prosperity.





RESILIENCE IN TAJIKISTAN



Tajikistan is the smallest country in the central Asian region by area and is almost completely surrounded by the Pamir mountain range. The capital and largest city, Dushanbe, is located above the Kofarnihon valley. Tajikistan is home to approximately 9.2 million people, of which 50 percent are under the age of 24.³⁴⁴ This 'youth bulge' is both a challenge and potential source of resilience. Tajikistan's population is concentrated in four provinces (*viloyat*): Sughd, Khatlon, the autonomous province of Gorno-Badakhshan (GBAO), and the Region of Republican Subordination (RRP – formerly known as Karotegin Province). Each region is divided into several districts (*nohiya* or *raion*), which in turn are subdivided into village-level self-governing units (*jamoats*) and then villages (*qyshloqs*).³⁴⁵ The population is largely homogenous, with 80 percent of the population being of the Tajikistani ethnic majority, and 98 percent identifying as Muslim.

Tajikistan gained independence from the Soviet Union in 1991. From 1992 and 1997, a brutal civil war devastated agricultural, infrastructural, and human capacity. As a consequence, Tajikistan entered the new millennium as one of the poorest countries in the world. However, according to the World Bank, between 2000 and 2018, the poverty rate fell from 83 percent of the population to 27.4 percent, while the economy grew at an average rate of 7 percent per year, an impressive achievement considering the devastation wrought during the civil war. President Emomali Rahmon has ruled the country since the current constitutional presidency was initiated in 1994, having been reelected in 1999, 2006 and 2013.

Tajikistan boasts a variety of sources of resilience that, if properly fostered, could help lift citizens out of poverty and raise the country's economic standing on the global stage. These sources of resilience include a youthful population, very high literacy rates, natural resources (particularly hydropower), and a trend towards poverty reduction that should be fostered through agricultural diversification, development of natural resources, and programs and initiatives that foster innovation and create jobs. This would, in turn, help insulate the country from major shocks, such as another global pandemic, as the country currently is dependent on imports for necessary products (e.g., food) and relies heavily on remittances as a major source of income. A multifaceted approach that engages both, urban and rural communities, would be the most effective in halting brain drain and alleviating poverty.

As a Soviet Republic, Tajikistan specialized in growing cotton, which decreased their capacity to grow food crops, but reforms and restructuring have enabled the country to transition to a market economy with viable agricultural production.³⁴⁶ The population continues to be highly dependent on agriculture for both subsistence as well as employment, as 75 percent of the population lives in rural areas. Due to the mountainous climate, only about 10 percent of the country's territory is currently suitable for agricultural cultivation.³⁴⁷ As such, there is a focus both on the part of the government and international development groups on increasing the agricultural capacity of the land and the people. The government and international community have devoted particular attention to improving women's access to land and mainstreaming gender into agricultural reform policies and initiatives.

Annual GDP growth in Tajikistan remained solid, albeit sluggish, through 2019, slowing in 2020 due to the COVID-19 pandemic.³⁴⁸ While non-monetary poverty indicators in rural areas remain high, for example only 36 percent of the population in rural regions has access to safe drinking water, Tajikistan has made strong progress in reducing poverty from 83 percent of the population in 2000 to 27.4 percent in 2018.³⁴⁹ The unemployment rate for individuals aged 15-59 years is currently 50 percent, with gender disaggregated data showing women's participation in the paid labor market is even lower.³⁵⁰ Due to the scarcity of employment opportunities more than one million Tajik citizens work abroad, mostly in Russia. The remittances they send to their families make up the largest part of Tajikistan's GDP.³⁵¹ As such, Tajikistan is particularly vulnerable to monetary shocks and COVID-19 has taken its toll. Economic growth slowed to 4.2 percent during the first nine months of 2020, compared to 7.2 percent during the same period in 2019, and a growing portion of the population is facing food insecurity. The economy is expected to bounce back in 2021-22, assuming vaccination is available to migrants so they may restore remittances and international trade.³⁵²

The impact of COVID-19 in Tajikistan has been difficult to estimate due to conflicting and often unreliable or unavailable data, with some sources speculating that the situation on the ground is much worse than the official reports from the Ministry of Health and Social Protection.³⁵³ On January 26, 2021, however, President Rahmon declared that there were currently zero active cases of COVID-19 in Tajikistan.³⁵⁴ This announcement followed months of skepticism from international health experts about Tajikistan's response to the virus.³⁵⁵

Environment and Natural Disasters

According to the Notre Dame Global Adaptation Initiative (ND-GAIN) index, Tajikistan is less vulnerable to the effects of climate change than many other IsDB MCs (ranked 73rd least vulnerable).³⁵⁶ However, Tajikistan's mountainous terrain and semi-arid landscape does create susceptibility to natural disasters, which is exacerbated by the effects of climate change. Between 1992 and 2016, natural and climate-related disasters led to GDP losses of approximately US \$1.8 billion, affecting almost 7 million people.³⁵⁷ The main disaster is landslides and mudflows, which are caused by flooding and soil erosion. Tajikistan is burdened by the dual pressures of both local and global climate change. Climate scientists warn average temperatures in Central Asia could rise by up to 6 degrees Celsius, placing mountainous communities at greater risk from glacial outburst flooding.³⁵⁸ Tajikistan also faces major deforestation, soil erosion and degradation, and reduced biodiversity. These conditions are heavily determined by the high rate of rural poverty.³⁵⁹ Accordingly, Tajikistan's Ministry for Nature Protection published a National Action Plan for Climate Change Mitigation in 2003. Although aspects of the document are likely outdated in light of the wealth of scientific research conducted in the interim, many important policies and adaptive strategies laid out in Tajikistan's National Action Plan for Climate Change Mitigation include its greenhouse gas abatement strategy, its strategy for the optimization of systematic observation and promotion of research into climate change; and its strategy of enhancing the education system, including through the training of specialists and the raising of public awareness on the adverse consequences of climate change.

As much as 36 percent of Tajikistan is under threat from landslides and/or avalanches. In rural areas, this threat is exacerbated by poverty, insufficient infrastructure, and poor resources.³⁶⁰ Interview respondents noted that while disaster recovery processes at the community level are well established, there is little investment in prevention. One area of potential development is in forecasting and long-term climate information, including the creation of early warning systems, improving emergency response services, and identifying potential investments in resilient infrastructure.³⁶¹ The World Bank has invested \$50 million in the Strengthening Critical Infrastructure Against Natural Hazards program, which aims to improve both physical infrastructure (river embankments and bridges) and communication (national crisis management center and emergency communication systems).³⁶²



While forests account for just over three percent of the country's total land area, much of the population lives in or near forests. Forest coverage has been reduced by approximately 75 percent in the last century, with a significant portion of that being in the last decade. Much of this is due to illegal logging for domestic fuel, as well as to open land for farming and livestock grazing.³⁶³ Tajikistan's forests are rich in other products that fuel local economies, including fruits, nuts, berries, honey, and medicinal plants and herbs. These, in addition to timber, are the focus of several international aid and government programs for reducing rural poverty, as well as increasing nutrition.³⁶⁴ The UN Development Programme trained more than 800 farmers in the use of climate-adapted agricultural technologies and sponsored the planting of 14,000 seedlings of fruit trees.³⁶⁵ Currently, government forestry enterprises (*leskhoz*) manage almost all forest land, including forest protection and conservation programming, as well as the management of forest wildlife, including for hunting and fishing.³⁶⁶

Reviving the fishery sector is one potential area for increased economic and environmental resilience. Fish production fell from almost 4,000 tons in 1990 to just over 280 tons in 2007, and today the fishery sector accounts for less than 0.1 percent of the country's GDP.³⁶⁷ Acknowledging the potential for rehabilitating the fishing sector, in 2010, the Ministry of Agriculture formulated the Policy and Strategy for Fisheries and Aquaculture Development for Poverty Alleviation. The policy includes a goal to, "... [improve] gender equity and [generate] higher incomes and better livelihoods in rural and mountain areas".³⁶⁸

Located on the western tip of the Himalayas, Tajikistan has abundant freshwater resources in its rivers, lakes, and glaciers. Despite this access, water sanitation, security, and hygiene remain major issues. While approximately 70 percent of the population has access to safe drinking water sources, most rural populations still make use of public taps or standpipes. Flush toilets connected to a central sewage system are virtually non-existent in rural areas.³⁶⁹ More than 90 percent of agriculture production is from irrigated lands, and due to climate change and limited agricultural output, water stress is an issue for many rural areas.³⁷⁰ As touched on earlier, Tajikistan's rivers, specifically the Vakhsh and the Panj, have innate potential for hydropower dams. In addition to electricity, these dams contribute to essential agricultural irrigation. One of the World Bank's current public works programs engages rural farmers in cleaning these irrigation canals, which were mostly constructed during Soviet times, in order to increase their crop yields and earn much-needed income.³⁷¹

Despite women's traditional role in managing the home and farm, the decisions on land use, irrigation, and water management, including matters related to quantity, source, cost, and payment, are still often made in all-male family meetings, such as the traditional *mahalli*. The World Bank Group's Central Asia Knowledge Network, under the Central Asia Water and Energy Program (CAWEP), aims to promote gender equality in

water resource management and tap into the knowledge and expertise held by women in the region. Similarly, the USAID Rural Water Supply (RWS) program partners with local governments, communities, and businesses to develop and improve safe drinking water infrastructure and services. Because lack of access to clean water disproportionately affects women and youth, the project promotes their specific engagement.³⁷²

Any investments aimed at building economic resilience should simultaneously consider building environmental resilience, as Tajikistan is currently ranked as among the most vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change.³⁷³ The future of climate resilience in Central Asia is inherently cross-national and has regional implications. Supported by the World Bank, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan created a Regional Scientific and Technical Council for Emergency Situations made up of scientists and government officials focused on natural disasters, hydrometeorology, and climate change.³⁷⁴ Climate and disaster resilience are essential to protect Tajikistan's socioeconomic investments and ensure environmental sustainability.

Health and Pandemics

Prior to 2020, health data in Tajikistan was trending up due to international development interventions. The major health issues in Tajikistan are food insecurity and clean water. Nearly 33 percent of the population is considered food insecure,³⁷⁵ and an estimated 30 to 56 percent of households, depending on region, cannot afford a nutritious diet.³⁷⁶ Lowering that number will be a long-term project and will need to consider several different and interrelated approaches to resilience programming and development, the groundwork of which has already been laid. These include helping smallholder farmers increase incomes, promoting women's economic empowerment, and boosting the production and consumption of nutritious foods while also helping to diversify sources of income. There is specific focus on increasing women and youths' access to and involvement in these programs, including nutrition-sensitive agriculture production.³⁷⁷ Beginning in early 2021, the USAID "Healthy Mother, Healthy Baby" program focuses on reducing maternal and child mortality and malnutrition, building upon previous success in the region reducing stunting rates among children under five years old, from 25 percent to 18 percent, and reduce wasting from 11 percent to six percent.³⁷⁸ A major divide between the needs of rural and urban populations, as well as rural infrastructure issues and Tajikistan's mountainous geography, makes distribution and coverage of social assistance a critical issue. Successes have been seen in programs dedicated to increasing Nutrition-Sensitive Vegetable Technologies,³⁷⁹ irrigation and greenhouse technology,³⁸⁰ and water hygiene.³⁸¹

In 2010, Tajikistan had the world's worst polio outbreak since 2005. Affecting mainly children, those impacted continue to need long-term care. Under USAID and the World Health Organization, in partnership with the Ministry of Health and Social Protection, Tajikistan adopted a National Program on rehabilitation of persons with disabilities, registering 170,000 people with long-term impairments (physical, sensorial and intellectual), including 90 percent of those affected by the 2010 polio outbreak.³⁸² Based on the successful implementation of this program, the Ministry of Health has scaled up community-based rehabilitation (CBR) programs in 35 districts of Tajikistan to ensure availability of rehabilitation services in rural and remote areas. In September 2020, the U.S. PEPFAR and the USAID began a new five-year project to combat HIV/AIDS in Tajikistan.³⁸³ While HIV/AIDS rates among Tajiks are relatively low (94th in the world), there has been a recent increase due to migrant workers contracting the virus abroad and returning home to their spouses and families.³⁸⁴

There is little to no reliable data on the impact of COVID-19 on Tajikistan. According to an annual digest produced by the State Statistics Agency, 41,743 people died in Tajikistan in 2020, which is 8,649 more than in 2019 and a 26 percent increase over the average number of deaths recorded annually between 2015 and 2019.³⁸⁵ Many of these deaths have been attributed to pneumonia or other lung and cardiovascular diseases. In partnership with the government, the World Bank initiated a four-part emergency project to battle COVID-19 in Tajikistan.³⁸⁶ The government also provided a one-time COVID assistance of 500 somoni (USD \$50) to vulnerable groups in the population, but only 5 percent of households have reported receiving additional financial or in-kind support from the government since the outbreak.³⁸⁷ In July, the head of the Committee on Women and Family Affairs, Hilolby Kurbonzoda, stated that there was a significant increase of domestic violence complaints in the first three months of the pandemic and established a resource center with a 24-hour hotline.³⁸⁸ Despite very lenient restrictive measures and little PPE, Tajikistan does not officially have any current cases of COVID-19.³⁸⁹

Economy and Livelihoods

Tajikistan's economy, as measured by real GDP growth, has grown steadily over the past two decades, yet several interview respondents noted economic insecurity as a key aspect of personal vulnerability. Tajikistan benefits from a range of international aid and partnerships dedicated to furthering the country's development. With 60 completed and 25 active programs, the IsDB serves as one of the country's most critical partners. The IsDB classifies Tajikistan as one of the least developed and poorest member states; thus, they have invested to build from the country's strengths to make it more resilient.³⁹⁰ Strategic programs have focused on increasing cooperation in trade and infrastructure,³⁹¹ enhancing competency-based education,³⁹² and modernizing healthcare institutions.³⁹³ Other key partners include the Asian Development Bank (ADB), whose programs are aimed at increasing the country's stability on the micro and macro levels,³⁹⁴ and the Aga Khan Foundation (AKF). AKF programs within Tajikistan focus on four areas (civil society, education, health, and rural development) with a focus on community-based development, with emphasis on local organizations and intersecting issues like gender equality.³⁹⁵

Another main development partner is USAID, which has engaged heavily with Tajikistan's agricultural community to build business and expand exports even despite the impact of COVID-19 in 2020. Their key focus has been capitalizing on the country's wealth of water resources for expanding hydropower—a source of resilience innate to the topography of the country.³⁹⁶ Given the country's history of energy insecurity, investment into Tajikistan's energy sector has also been a major focus of the World Bank. The World Bank has a \$741 million commitment that spans across 15 projects. Some key areas of success have been in private sector development, specifically in sharpening the appeal of external business investment within the country, as well as land reforms promoting rural development.³⁹⁷

While the government is often criticized for an absence of appropriate policies and efforts to combat corruption, it has enacted some major strategies intended to improve the economic conditions within the country. The "Doing Business" Report noted that reforms put into place in 2018 have allowed Tajikistan to become one of the top ten most successful economies in which to do business.³⁹⁸ Further, the government has laid out the ambitious National Development Strategy (NDS) to 2030 that will rely heavily on the country opening for private sector investment into the economy, with the dual goals of increasing domestic incomes by up to 3.5 percent and halving the poverty rate.³⁹⁹ This national plan comes as a critical step towards continuing the previous efforts of poverty reduction that saw a drop of 52 percent in the rate of poverty between 2000 and 2015.⁴⁰⁰ Given that the country has a very high population of young people and a high level of education (as measured through literacy), there is great promise for the future of Tajikistan's economy if it is positively nurtured. The hope is that this will have a cyclical effect of drawing back and retaining talented Tajiks who will help the economy become self-sustaining.

Specific efforts have been made to enhance the standing of women within the economy. Tajikistan is unique in the prevalence of female-headed households, making female access to resources particularly vital. The government began a program of farm restructuring following its independence in 1991, however, gauging effectiveness of this program is difficult due to insufficient data.⁴⁰¹ Migration and migrant work has had a particular impact on traditional gender roles, gendered division of labor, and the gender relations of families left behind. During the post-civil war transition period, low-paid economic sectors, such as agriculture, were feminized and as a consequence have increased women's poverty levels over the long-term.⁴⁰² Women-headed households are 28.6 percent more likely to be poor than those headed by men.⁴⁰³

Over the past three decades, a variety of reforms targeted at women have been enacted by the central government. Positively, even those structural reforms not focused primarily on female empowerment tend to include provisions that highlight the importance of gender equality. Some examples of more recent legislation include The Living Standards Improvement Strategy of Tajikistan for 2013-2015 and The Programme for Reforming the Agriculture Sector of the Republic of Tajikistan for 2012-2020. Since 2004, the State Land Committee has primary responsibility for the collection of data on gender in land rights; more research should be done into how these programs benefit women within the country.⁴⁰⁴

Land ownership and reform is a major factor for both economic growth and long-term resilience. As a former Soviet republic, Tajikistan only began to privatize land in the early 1990s. Families receive a "Land Passport"

for their house and household plot (0.02-0.8 ha on average) and can use them in transactions. Allocations of Presidential Land (PL) are intended to supplement household plots (averaging from 0.15 ha to 0.25 ha.), although members of private farms, owners, or employees of cooperatives or small enterprises are ineligible for this additional land. Crops are usually sold for additional income and are considered the second most important source of income in rural areas after labor income, not including informal economic activities and remittances. Because most certificates for these agricultural plots are issued in the name of the male head of household, women often struggle to secure independent legal rights, including property rights.⁴⁰⁵ In 2007, President Rahmon decreed that uncultivated PL would be requisitioned and reallocated for cultivation by those in need, as determined by the local *jamoat*.

Specific efforts to further develop the economy and build resilience should focus on the intertwined issues of food and land security. This could include supporting the formalization and restructuring of land ownership, increasing crop diversification and agricultural technology, and implementing climate change mitigation strategies. Development programs can capitalize on the large youth population and high literacy rates. In addition, by continuing to mainstream gender and women's empowerment into economic programming, international aid and development has the opportunity to both decrease the vulnerability of the most vulnerable populations and increase the health of the economy as a whole.

Human Security

The legacy of the civil war continues to threaten the country's social cohesion and leaves Tajikistan vulnerable to violent extremism. On July 29, 2018, the first terrorist attack against foreign tourists occurred in Tajikistan's Khatlon region, for which ISIS claimed responsibility. They were also responsible for instigating major prison riots in Khujand in November 2018 and Vahdat in May 2019 that caused dozens of deaths.⁴⁰⁶ The government instituted the National Strategy of the Republic of Tajikistan on Countering Extremism and Terrorism in 2016, which resulted in a ban on 17 groups, ranging from those promoting violent extremist ideologies, as well as political Islamist groups associated with calling for profound social and political change.

Youths, migrants, and single women are the most vulnerable to radicalization, especially in the southern districts along the border with Afghanistan. Recruitment and indoctrination into violent extremist groups have been linked to migrants working in Russia, where they are exposed to radical religious beliefs and mindsets. The group targeted for this radicalization was young men aged 14-26. As such, it is key to focus development on this vulnerable demographic. Many reports cited the lack of opportunity, socio-economic freedom, and dissatisfaction with local government as risk factors, some of which can be ameliorated through dedicated youth resilience programming.



Due to the Soviet system of free education and continued investments in the sector, Tajikistan has an extremely high rate of literacy, with an estimated 99.8 percent of the population having the ability to read and write.⁴⁰⁷ However, despite high levels of overall literacy, when examining levels of literacy specific to laws and individual legal rights, disparities exist between rural and urban populations, and in particular by between men and women. For example, a national gender profile on agricultural and rural livelihoods found that women living in Tajikistan's rural areas are especially disadvantaged by a low level of legal literacy and knowledge regarding land rights.⁴⁰⁸ In addition, interaction with formal institutions is generally considered to be a male responsibility, due in part to government leaders and offices being staffed by men. These limitations on women's mobility and literacy have significant implications for women's economic and legal independence. Geographical isolation is also a factor that impedes progress toward specific development goals, such as the reduction of maternal mortality and improving access to education.⁴⁰⁹

The government of Tajikistan has been proactive in addressing youth and gender empowerment, prioritizing the promotion of balanced regional development, including support for local development and fiscal and administrative decentralization; measures to reduce unemployment among youth and women, including the promotion of entrepreneurship; and reforms geared toward reducing the tax burden, especially on micro-, small, and medium enterprises. The Ministry of Labor has focused on increasing employment opportunities for temporary and public jobs, including in rural areas, with a specific focus on returning migrants banned from re-entry in Russia. These migrants have also benefited from information and awareness-raising methods to prevent the involvement of migrant workers in extremist movements, and to reduce infectious diseases and drug addiction.⁴¹⁰

Another area under Human Security that Tajikistan has showcased promising resilience in is that of police reform. Central to the country's police reform processes is a community policing approach that recognizes the vital role played by civil society in addressing the local-level gaps in the security sector. Given that civil society organizations have well-established networks and are closely attuned to the needs and concerns of communities, they have served as a link between communities and the police and have brought these parties together to build trust. Other crucial initiatives undertaken by civil society organizations towards the fulfillment of Tajikistan's police reform goals include assuming leadership in state-led civil society platforms on policy, identifying security challenges, and facilitating access to various law enforcement entities.⁴¹¹

Forced Displacement

During the civil war between 1992-1997, there was massive internal disruption to both human and economic capacity; thousands of men were murdered or disappeared, while almost a million people were displaced.⁴¹² During this time, most non-Tajik ethnic minorities emigrated, mainly Russians and Uzbeks. Thousands of refugees fled to Afghanistan and Kyrgyzstan. UNHCR reported that by 2006 Tajikistan had no further IDPs and all refugees had been repatriated.⁴¹³

After the war, destruction of property and the resulting loss of livelihoods, in addition to lingering local conflict, forced many, especially men, to leave Tajikistan. Tajikistan has since experienced relative peace, but there continues to be acute instances of displacement, especially among rural populations. For example, economic conditions force Tajiks to migrate seasonally for work. Approximately 18 percent of the adult population leaves the country every year to seek seasonal work or to work abroad for a couple of years, the bulk of whom go to Russia.⁴¹⁴

Natural disasters are currently the main source of internal displacement. In 2015, spiking temperatures caused a massive glacial gush and mudflows damaged critical infrastructure, forcing more than 10,000 people to evacuate.⁴¹⁵ In 2019 and 2020 alone, rain flooding caused landslides that displaced almost 10,000.⁴¹⁶

Within this framework, the development focus is on reducing economic and environmental forced migration. This brain drain, noted by interview respondents as driven by a lack of opportunity and repeated disasters, can be best addressed through the current international and governmental development focus on alleviating poverty, increasing employment prospects, and supporting climate change mitigation and adaption methods.



Analysis and Good Practices


While it is undeniable that Tajikistan continues to face challenges in governance, economic development, and environmental sustainability, the groundwork for long-term resilience has been laid through years of international aid and strategic government partnerships and investments. Building upon this work, and in continued partnership with the government, international development can continue to promote the vast human and economic potential of Tajikistan.

Continued focus on land reform is one of the key factors in reducing Tajikistan's fragility to both monetary and environmental shocks. Tajikistan is exceptionally forward thinking in their approaches to youth and women's empowerment in this sector. This is especially important given the noted youth bulge and demographic composition of women-headed households. By mainstreaming women and youth into economic and environmental development programming, Tajikistan can improve both the current and future prospects of economic resilience. Tajikistan can be a leader in the region in climate change adaptation and mitigation by harnessing the innate power of their mountainous rivers in hydroelectric dams, and increase the output and quality of their agriculture yields through efficient irrigation. These programs can dovetail with climate resilience programs focused on reforestation, soil restoration, and increasing crop diversity. In turn, these programs also boost health and wellness through better nutrition, alleviation of rural poverty, and increased access to safe water. In creating a safer and more resilient Tajikistan, grievances and migration associated with employment opportunity will decrease, and reduce vulnerability to radicalization to violent extremism.

The resilience of Tajikistan is showcased in the interwoven opportunities to support the population and resume GDP growth prior to the COVID-19 pandemic. The continued promotion of good governance and transparency are key to building on existing successes to help Tajikistan further develop a vibrant, sustainable economy. In the long-term, retention of labor and increased access to education will allow Tajikistan to reduce migrant emigration and build an economy that is resilient to shocks, like future pandemics and climate disasters, and rely on international travel, investments, and trade. As Tajikistan emerges from the COVID-19 crisis, there is opportunity for increased transparency at every level of government, as well as renewed investment in diverse livelihoods. It is vital for Tajikistan to remain a leader in not only international development partnerships, but in its role as an emerging space for international business investment. Building upon their successful programs with the IsDB, ADB, USAID, and World Bank, Tajikistan is a strategic partner in promoting environmental security and economic stability the Central Asian region.



RESILIENCE IN KAZAKHSTAN



Kazakhstan is the largest country in Central Asia and ninth largest in the world, in terms of area.⁴¹⁷ It has a diverse population of over 19 million people, comprised of 68 percent Kazakh, 19.3 percent Russian, 3.2 percent Uzbek, 1.5 percent Ukrainian, 1.5 percent Uighur, 1.1 percent Tatar, 1 percent German, and 4.4 percent other.⁴¹⁸ Within this population, 70.2 percent are Muslim while 26.2 percent are Christian.⁴¹⁹ The population is relatively young with a median age of 31.6 years, although the population growth rate is only 0.81 percent. This population growth rate places Kazakhstan at 122nd place compared to the rest of the world. In addition, 57.7 percent of the population lived in Kazakhstan's cities in 2020.⁴²⁰ Kazakhstan is strategically positioned between China, South Asia, Russia, and Western Europe and connects these countries and regions via rail, road, and a port located on the Caspian Sea.⁴²¹ This has allowed Kazakhstan to become a major hub in the region for transport and is a gateway for a market of 50 million consumers within Central Asia, 300 million in China, and 150 million in countries bordering the Caspian Sea.⁴²² China has taken great interest in investing in infrastructure projects in Kazakhstan, such as the construction of highways and railroads due to Kazakhstan's strategic positioning for China's Belt and Road Initiative.⁴²³

Kazakhstan is also rich in natural resources, with significant deposits of gas, oil, coal, uranium, and other minerals.⁴²⁴ Although Kazakhstan has benefitted greatly from its oil and natural gas resources, its economy is highly dependent on this sector and it has been recommended that the country needs to diversify its economy.⁴²⁵ Despite this, Kazakhstan's GDP per capita has increased sixfold since 2002, and the country reached upper-middle-income status in 2006.⁴²⁶

Kazakhstan is a unitary republic with a bicameral legislature comprised of the Senate and an Assembly, known as the "Mazhilis." Together, the two chambers have the authority to amend the constitution, approve the budget, ratify treaties, and declare war, in addition to each chamber having exclusive, proscribed powers. Legislators serve four-year term, with two members of the Senate elected from each oblast and major urban area by all legislative members of an administrative unit, although several are directly appointed by the president. In addition, 98 members of the Mazhilis are popularly elected, while nine members are elected by the "Assembly of the People of Kazakhstan," a president-appointed body tasked with ensuring that the

interests of several of the country's ethnic groups are represented. The president is the head of state and is directly elected for a maximum of two consecutive five-year terms and is responsible for appointing the prime minister and other ministers of the cabinet, as well as the chairperson of the National Security Committee, most of whom are then confirmed by the legislature. The foreign minister, minister of defense, and minister of internal affairs are appointed without requiring legislative consent. The president serves as commander in chief of the armed forces and is responsible for the country's foreign relations. Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union and independence, Kazakhstan's first constitution was adopted in 1993, replacing the 1978 Soviet-era constitution. A new constitution approved in 1995, with 2017 amendments that reduced executive authority and granted the legislature additional checks on executive power.⁴²⁷

Environment and Natural Disasters


Environmental issues in Kazakhstan have received substantial attention in both domestic and international contexts. While the country has shown both innovation and resilience in meeting many of these pressures, challenges remain, including ramifications from nuclear testing, the Aral Sea crisis, and threatened biodiversity. A recent environmental assessment by the Asian Development Bank cited poor agricultural practices, as well as pollution from heavy industry, as key drivers of land and water resource degradation.⁴²⁸ Prior mismanagement of irrigation projects has decreased the size of the Aral Sea by 50 percent, which has culminated in land erosion and localized climate change in the area. Kazakhstan is also one of the largest emitters of greenhouse gas in Europe and Central Asia.⁴²⁹

According to UNICEF, in addition to environmental pressures, 75 percent of the country is at risk of natural disasters such as landslides, mudflows, floods, extreme temperatures, earthquakes, forest and steppe fires, epidemics, and in the southern part of the country even hurricanes.⁴³⁰ Kazakhstan is in the process of developing a National Adaptation Plan financed by the Green Climate Fund, recognizing these threats posed to the country and proposing national- and sub-national-level adaptation strategies and measures. According to a UNICEF-sponsored disaster resilience program, between three to four thousand emergency situations occur annually in Kazakhstan, affecting between 3,000-5,000 people, which have resulted in dozens of deaths, and billions of dollars in damage.⁴³¹ For example, in May 2020, unexpected floods affected over 1,000 households and damaged over seven thousand hectares of agricultural crop and pasture fields. More recently, Semirechye, a region with seven rivers, was hit by a severe drought in 2020, resulting in a loss of access to irrigation water for farmers and others residing in the region. According to the Kazakh Secretary Bigarova, the first secretary of the People's Party of Almaty district branch, these pressures will cause emigration from the region, especially that of young people.⁴³²

To manage some of these pressures and promote greater resilience, Kazakhstan has spearheaded a number of government-led initiatives, some in partnership with civil society organizations and the NGO sector. In 2007, the Environmental Code of the Republic of Kazakhstan was passed, providing a basic legislative framework for activities that require environmental protection. A system of permits and licenses for air pollution, water pollution and greenhouse gas emissions were also developed and implemented as part of this legislation.⁴³³ In early 2018, Kazakhstan's Ministry of Energy launched an online platform for monitoring, reporting, and verifying emission sources and greenhouse gases.⁴³⁴ The platform is a key element of the country's National Emissions Trading System, which was launched in 2013 to regulate domestic CO2 emissions and encourage the development of low-carbon technologies. Multiple measures have also been undertaken to regenerate the ecosystem and economic infrastructure that was lost when the Aral Sea dried in the 1970s and 80s.⁴³⁵

Additionally, with \$86 million in support from the World Bank, a new, 12km-long dyke was built across the narrow channel that connects the North Aral Sea with the South Aral Sea, reducing the amount of water spilling out into the South Aral Sea. The project also implemented improvements to existing channels of the Syr Darya river, which flows northwards from Kazakhstan's Tian Shan Mountains, which helped to boost the flow of water into the North Aral Sea. This project has been considered a resounding, and somewhat surprising success, with a report from the BBC in 2015 noting, "The return of the North Aral Sea has fueled a revival of the fishing industry in Aralsk. In 2006, the annual fish catch totaled 1,360 tons, which comprised a majority of flounder...but by 2016, the Aralsk Fish Inspection Unit recorded 7,106 tons of fish as freshwater species have returned, including pike-perch – which bring in a hefty price for local fishermen – breams, asp, and catfish." The article went on to cite the World Bank team leader and appraiser for the project, Masood Ahmad, as saying, "At that time, we were not expecting this much flow, the success has been astounding."⁴³⁶

Number of Deaths and People Affected by Disasters in Kazakhstan



Source: EM-DAT, CRED / UCLouvain, Brussels, Belgium – www.emdat.be

Figure 3. Number Affected and Deaths Resulting from Disasters

Kazakhstan natural disaster incidents from 2000 to 2020. The figures describe the total number of people affected by disasters (A) and the total number of deaths resulting from disasters (B). The color-coding of the bars refers to the disaster type indicated in the figure legend. Data retrieved on April 5, 2021 from <https://www.emdat.be>.

In terms of reducing disaster risk, the Government of Kazakhstan has adhered to the UN's Hyogo Framework for Action and the more recent Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction. The country has placed emphasis on education and awareness raising of disaster risk in order to build its capacity to manage potential environmental shocks. UNICEF provides support to the Emergency Committee of Kazakhstan's Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Ministry of Education and Science as a part of the Emergency Disaster Risk Reduction Support to Organizations and Vulnerable Communities program.⁴³⁷ By increasing focus on education, the program aims to integrate disaster risk reduction into country-wide education standards and curricula and advanced teacher daily risk management training in schools. Alongside education efforts, the country has invested in development of preparedness for disasters. This includes investment in mudflow dams on the Ausai and Aksai, the resettlement of families living in hazardous areas, and the allocation of funds towards activities on prevention and elimination of emergency situations.⁴³⁸

In August 2020, an agreement between Kazakhstan and the UN was signed, known as "Cooperation for Sustainable Development for 2021-2025," which serves as a mechanism to advance the achievement of the 2030 Agenda in Kazakhstan. As Kazakhstan moves towards achieving these goals, it is important that the country continue to invest in educational tools and good governance to remain resilient to environmental pressures and shocks.

Health and Pandemics

On March 13, 2020, Kazakhstan reported its first cases of COVID-19. The country was placed under a State of Emergency starting March 16th and a country-wide lockdown was put in place until May 11th.⁴³⁹ On July 5th, Kazakhstan reinstated its lockdown after its phased reopening plan resulted in an increase in cases. During this time, hospitals were overcrowded, and access to COVID-19 tests was limited.⁴⁴⁰ During Spring 2020, the WHO distributed \$4 million to train health care workers to respond to the pandemic and obtain medical supplies.⁴⁴¹ In addition, the United States government provided assistance worth \$6.2 million through laboratory equipment and supplies.⁴⁴² Since the beginning of the pandemic in March 2020, Kazakhstan has reported 280,576 confirmed COVID-19 cases with 3,511 deaths, as of March 15, 2021,⁴⁴³ with almost 88,000 vaccination doses administered.⁴⁴⁴

Gender-based violence, which was already a concern in Kazakhstan, is reported to have worsened during the COVID-19 pandemic. In 2019, according to a May 2020 report from the Institute of War and Peace Reporting quoting Kazakhstan's Union of Crisis Centres, it was estimated that more than two million women experienced some form of domestic violence in Kazakhstan.⁴⁴⁵ In 2020, according to a June article in *The Diplomat*, the national victim assistance fund, known as "Don't Keep Silent KZ," would receive 10-15 calls each day, but those increased to an average of 25 per day during the pandemic. Furthermore, the organization received 42,000 calls during a four-month period during quarantine.⁴⁴⁶ In an effort to tackle issues of GBV in the country, in April 2020, a parliamentary working group began drafting a law on domestic violence that advocates for streamlined guidelines, better data collection, and increased coordination between state agencies. However, the bill stops short of criminalizing family abuse as an offense. In September 2020, the draft law passed the first parliamentary reading, with the Assembly expected to adopt the draft bill in May 2021.⁴⁴⁷

Improving healthcare and medical access is a priority for Kazakhstan, with an increased emphasis on improving the general resilience of this sector by both the government and international development organizations. UNICEF estimates that 96 percent of Kazakhstanis have access to minimum basic services for drinking water, while 90 percent have access to drinking water services that are safely managed.⁴⁴⁸ Multi-drug resistant tuberculosis is another health pressure in Kazakhstan, with an estimated 26 percent of new tuberculosis cases resistant to two of the most effective tuberculosis drugs. In order to increase government capacity to combat drug-resistant tuberculosis, in 2019, USAID launched three projects aimed at assisting the government obtain diagnostic equipment and medicines for tuberculosis, as well as to implement WHO recommendations and protocols regarding tuberculosis diagnosis and treatment.⁴⁴⁹

Additionally, the Kazakh government has taken steps to digitize its health system to increase information sharing and improve patient care. In 2019, Kazakhstan's Ministry of Health joined SNOMED International, a nonprofit international organization that specializes in codifying the organization and access of health data across information systems. This membership will allow Kazakhstan to monitor health issues within the population, enable early detection, adjust to changes in medical practice, and reduce data errors.⁴⁵⁰ This builds off previous work done by the government to digitize its healthcare system and make medical records and prescriptions electronic for easier access and coordination to improve overall treatment.⁴⁵¹ In order to maximize the innovative approach and accessibility of this program, further partnerships and investment should look more broadly at addressing disparities in internet penetration between urban and rural areas to ensure this, and other programs that seek to improve access to health information and health data, continue to succeed.



Broad access to healthcare continues to be a challenge, especially in rural areas. Compared to the country-wide average of 388 doctors per 100,000 people in 2010, in the rural region of Kostanay, there are only 266 doctors per 100,000 people.⁴⁵² To address this disparity utilizing an innovative approach that might serve as an example for potential replication in other contexts, Kazakhstan's existing railways were used to transport medicine and health services to populations living in rural settings.⁴⁵³ Three trains were established to serve north, south, and east-west regions of Kazakhstan. Each train is comprised of eight wagons and manned by 80 staff members, about 40 of whom are health providers. In addition, the trains are supplied with diagnostic, clinical, and radiology equipment. Dental care and minor outpatient surgery are offered through these trains as well. For more serious cases, video communication with health providers in hospitals is available from the train.⁴⁵⁴ From 2010 to 2014, these trains treated 56,851 people living in rural locations, and the program is still in effect today.⁴⁵⁵ By utilizing existing infrastructure, combined with an innovative approach, Kazakhstan found a unique solution to limited healthcare access within its borders.

More broadly, Kazakhstan has also continued to focus on building greater resilience across the healthcare sector through other initiatives aimed at improving citizen access and reducing out-of-pocket costs. For example, in January 2020, the Compulsory Social and Medical Insurance (CSMI) program went into effect. This program is designed to create a single payer healthcare system to reduce costs. This program is especially necessary since out-of-pocket expenses comprised 45.14 percent of total health spending in Kazakhstan in 2014.⁴⁵⁶ Contributions to this program will come from both citizens and companies.⁴⁵⁷ The CSMI will decrease the costs of healthcare in Kazakhstan and increase its access as well. The government further claims that this program will increase the competition between public and private healthcare clinics.⁴⁵⁸ Additionally, Kazakhstan has also worked to improve nutrition in the country. According to the Global Nutrition Report, Kazakhstan is 'on course' to meet the targets set for infant, young child, and maternal nutrition.⁴⁵⁹ The WHO has implemented various programs in Kazakhstan over the years to increase nutrition in the country such as the "Large-scale Food Fortification Program" to increase wheat flour fortification in 2004 and the School Health and Nutrition program for school age children in 2015.⁴⁶⁰

Economy and Livelihoods

Kazakhstan is Central Asia's largest economy and is ranked 25th out of 190 countries in the World Bank's Ease of Doing Business Report.⁴⁶¹ Kazakhstan's economy relies heavily on exports, especially of natural resources. Kazakhstan's oil reserves rank in the top 15 in the world,⁴⁶² and the export of oil and petroleum-related products account for 73 percent of the country's total exports.⁴⁶³ Other main exports are copper, ferrous metals, zinc, aluminum, and uranium.⁴⁶⁴ Kazakhstan's top export destinations are China, Italy, Russia, the Netherlands, and France.⁴⁶⁵ The country's economy relies heavily on its extractives sector. As of 2020, the mining sector produces around 14 percent of Kazakhstan's GDP.⁴⁶⁶ Despite the abundant level of resources and economic dependence on this sector, many of the management practices and technology used in the sector is outdated, which has slowed the development of the extractives industry in Kazakhstan. In 2018, the Kazakh government introduced sub-soil legislation that is designed to promote investment into the mining sector.⁴⁶⁷

Due to Kazakhstan's heavy reliance on the extractives sector, it has been recommended that it expand its agricultural sector to help diversify its economy.⁴⁶⁸ In 2014, the World Bank has reported that only 10% percent of Kazakhstan's land area is considered arable.⁴⁶⁹ As of 2017, 4.8 percent of GDP came from the agricultural sector, which employs about 18 percent of the country.⁴⁷⁰ Farmers produce a variety of crops including rice, barley, cotton, and grapes. From 2015-2020, the IsDB provided \$143 million to the Rehabilitation of Irrigated Land and Drainage Project.⁴⁷¹ This project aims to increase agricultural production and productivity by improving the efficiency of water delivery, reducing the salinity of water, maintaining the ground water table, and improving soil fertility.⁴⁷² However, this industry remains at risk due to climate change. According to the UNDP's Climate Change Adaptation division, almost 75 percent of the land in Kazakhstan is at high-risk of ecological destabilization.⁴⁷³ As a result, further investment is needed to create initiatives and policies that will protect the agricultural sector as climate change advances.

In terms of building resilience in this sector, the Kazakh government has invested in multiple partnerships and initiatives to advance economic growth in the country. From 2015-2017, for example, the IsDB provided \$2 billion to support sustainable development in Kazakhstan in all sectors. This agreement framework builds off a similar partnership between Kazakhstan and the IsDB from 2012-2014.⁴⁷⁴ In addition to the agreement with the IsDB, the World Bank's Joint Economic Research Program (JERP) is a cost-sharing agreement that gives Kazakhstan an analysis of its current policies, advice on strategic planning, and "good practice"

options for the government to improve upon and further develop its social and economic development goals and policies. The topics evaluated have ranged from national tax policy to the most effective ways to spend resources on the country's health sector.⁴⁷⁵ In addition to the JERP, the Country Partnership Framework (CPF) for 2020-2025 is a partnership between the World Bank and Kazakhstan to outline an investment program and provide technical assistance to the Kazakh government. The CPF places an emphasis on three priority areas: encouraging inclusive growth, improving human capital by decreasing gaps in service between rural-urban divides and regions, and achieving sustainable carbon growth.⁴⁷⁶ These programs will help Kazakhstan further sustainably expand its economy while emphasizing investment in services that will be the most beneficial to its people.

Infrastructure projects aimed to increase Kazakhstan's highways and roads will help to cement Kazakhstan's centrality as a hub for transporting goods. Due to Kazakhstan's strategic positioning within Central Asia, China has been particularly interested in incorporating Kazakhstan into its Belt and Road Initiative and has funded infrastructure projects to improve Kazakhstan's highways and railways.⁴⁷⁷ In addition, in 2020 the IsDB approved a project worth US\$585 million to decrease congestion in Almaty and provide a route for commercial vehicles between Western China and Europe.⁴⁷⁸ These critical infrastructure projects will allow the integration of markets across Europe, Central Asia, and Asia, and solidify Kazakhstan's economic importance in the region.

Kazakhstan has also sought to encourage entrepreneurship within the country through the introduction of projects focused on the fields of science, technology, engineering, and mathematics. The World Bank and Kazakhstan's Ministry of Education and Science have started the Fostering Productive Innovation Project (FPIP), which awards grants to entrepreneurs and start-ups that aim to increase the quality of life in Kazakhstan.⁴⁷⁹ This initiative will both promote economic growth within Kazakhstan as well as encourage its highly educated youth to stay in the country after graduation.

Despite Kazakhstan's high levels of education, the quality of education is not uniform across the country. Although Kazakhstan has been able to achieve high rates of educational attainment with around 79 percent for both men and women over 25-years-old completing at least post-secondary education in 2018, education in schools varies from region to region.⁴⁸⁰ When comparing Program for International Student Assessment (PISA) scores for 15-year-olds in science, math, and reading, students in low-performing regions are on average four years behind compared to students living in high-performing regions. In addition, those who live in rural areas tend to have lower educational attainment than their urban counterparts.⁴⁸¹ The active World Bank project, Education Modernization Project for Kazakhstan, works to ensure that future generations have economic opportunities through the improvement of the curriculum, increased access to materials and equipment for instruction, enhanced teacher training, and support for students with special needs.⁴⁸²

Table 1. Selected IsDB Projects in Kazakhstan^{483,484,485,486,487}

Project Name	Sector	Project Description
Big Almaty Ring Road Project	Transportation	Provided joint funding of US\$585 million towards a project to create and operate a 66km Ring Road north of Almaty to reduce congestion and create a transnational highway that will play a role in integrating Central Asian economies.
Transformers Roadshow	Economy	A \$3000 prize is provided during a science, technology, and innovation competition that challenges innovators to pitch concepts that support at least one of the UN's Sustainable Development Goals. Over 150 entrepreneurs from Central Asia participated in the competition.
All Sectors	Economy	US\$ 2 billion framework agreement to increase cooperation between Kazakhstan and the IsDB from 2015 to 2017
Rehabilitation of Irrigated Land and Drainage Project	Agriculture	\$143 million provided from 2015-2020 to increase agriculture productivity through the improvement of water use efficiency, improved soil fertility, maintenance of the ground water table, and decreased water salinity.



Reflective of efforts to confront pressures and build resilience in both the economy and education sectors, the unemployment rate in Kazakhstan has been dropping since 1999, and it has remained around 5 percent since 2011. However, the effect of the COVID-19 pandemic on the economy caused the unemployment rate to jump to 7.8 percent in 2020.⁴⁸⁸ Women were more likely to become unemployed compared to men, and 26 percent of women lost their jobs while 21 percent of men did.⁴⁸⁹ The economic impact was felt on a larger scale as well. According to the International Monetary Fund, from 2019 to 2020, the real GDP growth of Kazakhstan dropped from 4.5 percent to -2.7 percent.⁴⁹⁰ Different industries and types of businesses were affected disproportionately. The pandemic has especially impacted the transport, hospitality, retail, and wholesale sectors, which make up about 30 percent of jobs in Kazakhstan's cities.⁴⁹¹ In addition, Micro, Small, and Medium-sized Enterprises (SMEs) were highly affected. As reported by the Statistics Committee of the MoNE of Kazakhstan in 2019, 3.3 million people were employed by SMEs. However, the quarantine measures have resulted in 69.6 percent of surveyed SME entrepreneurs suspending their business and another 2.2 percent stopping their business.⁴⁹² Furthermore, women entrepreneurs were more likely to have their businesses affected than men entrepreneurs, with 69 percent of women pausing their business activities, compared to 59 percent of men.⁴⁹³

The Kazakh government has taken proactive measures to mitigate the damage from the pandemic. On March 24, 2020, less than two weeks after the first reported case of COVID-19 in Kazakhstan, the President revealed an anti-crisis package which provides USD \$10 billion to support businesses and citizens that are struggling financially due to the quarantine measures.⁴⁹⁴ Zaur Kurumbaeva, who runs a small business in Almaty, noted that the state has introduced a three-year moratorium on sales tax for small and medium-sized enterprises in order to relieve some of the economic burden caused by decreasing sales and activity from the pandemic.⁴⁹⁵ The UNCT Socio-Economic Response & Recovery Plan released in August 2020 consists of an analysis of the current state of various aspects of society in Kazakhstan, ranging from education to healthcare and an investment of US\$ 1,140,000 into 35 projects. These projects span five pillars to address the widespread effects of the pandemic: ensuring protection for health systems and services, providing basic services and social protection, protecting businesses and jobs, macroeconomic response, and social cohesion.⁴⁹⁶

Human Security

Kazakhstan is a stable country with low levels of conflict and violence, with the 2020 Global Peace Index ranking Kazakhstan as the most peaceful country in Central Asia.⁴⁹⁷ According to the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED), most of the security events within Kazakhstan in 2020 were peaceful protests,

followed by incidences of mob violence near the southern border (Figure 4). Within Kazakhstan, there remain human security challenges, including human trafficking, the proliferation of small arms, sporadic reports of violence against civilians by security forces, and gender-based violence. In recent years, Kazakhstan has shown resilience to these challenging issues by making notable strides in protecting human rights, combatting trafficking, and supporting vulnerable populations. In this regard, resilience in human security has also been bolstered through engagement with civil society and with international NGOs and partner governments. Domestically, Kazakhstan has made strides in Security Sector Reform (SSR), and it remains one of the most active Central Asian countries regarding international cooperation with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Russian-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), according to a May 2013 study authored by EUCAM, which monitors implementation of the EU Strategy for Central Asia. The report further goes on to note progress and Kazakh government cooperation in fighting corruption, upholding human rights, and working closely with partner countries and organizations on these initiatives.⁴⁹⁸ While some important steps have been undertaken in addressing challenges to human security, a January 2021 report from *Human Rights Watch* notes that bolstering police effectiveness and capacity is paramount. Namely, the report notes that issues of inadequate training, insufficient accountability mechanisms, and a climate of politicization can lead to human rights abuses if not adequately addressed and should be an area for further international cooperation and investment.⁴⁹⁹

Economic decline due to the COVID-19 pandemic has prompted an increase in human trafficking around the world.⁵⁰⁰ Many efforts to address human trafficking have improved recently, and the government continues to demonstrate a willingness to combat this problem. In addition, police systems for referring victims to NGOs for help were judged effective and cooperative. Awareness-raising via newspaper, radio and TV among vulnerable groups has been increasing. In addition to government efforts to fight human trafficking, there is considerable support from USAID, local NGOs (the most prominent being Rodnik), the IOM, and several universities in Kazakhstan.⁵⁰¹ These organizations run shelters, raise awareness, and, in the case of the IOM, run the victim hotline using government funding. USAID has a regional anti-trafficking initiative called Safe Migration in Central Asia, implemented by Winrock, that provides strategic support to cooperating governments. Through these initiatives, the government is demonstrating a serious commitment to fighting human trafficking and leveraging partnerships with civil society and international actors in a strategic and increasingly effective way.

In terms of the human security challenges facing women, women's activists and civil society organizations form an important source of resilience, being numerous and influential across the country. These groups are active in advocating for women's rights and lead awareness-raising campaigns for victims of domestic violence, as well as the organization of hotlines and women's shelters. Prominent organizations active in the country include Podrugi, KazFem, Feminita, Femagora, Femsreda, Ne Molchi, Feminist League, the Women's Information Center, and SVET. These organizations also have a track record of partnering with international NGOs like UN Women and UNFPA to create plans for combatting GBV and for increasing funding for services to aid survivors. They also work directly with Kazakh government ministries to craft plans to combat GBV and strengthen women's rights. For example, training for police units by organizations like Podrugi (the first women's shelter in Kazakhstan) have achieved positive results. More recent police training by the OSCE also used the expertise of local women's organizations to enhance and inform the trainings.⁵⁰² Expanded investment in these women's CSOs will increase resilience to threats to human security in Kazakhstan by strengthening not only direct services to victims of GBV and domestic violence, but also in supporting the government in undertaking the necessary institutional and legal reforms to increase civilian protection.

In terms of access to justice, there have been some efforts to improve the accessibility and efficiency of the judicial system in Kazakhstan. USAID has been working with Kazakhstan since 2012 through the Kazakhstan Judicial Program, which aims to improve the knowledge of judges and their capacity to apply international good practices in the courtroom and judicial decisions as well as enhance the accessibility and efficiency of the judicial system overall.⁵⁰³ Furthermore, there have been positive regulatory and legislative changes.⁵⁰⁴ In October 2020, USAID launched the Kazakhstan Rule of Law program, which is designed to improve the legal environment for both civil society and businesses and increase judicial professionalism and independence.⁵⁰⁵ These improvements have also been leveraged to increase investor confidence, through an open forum for investors and courts to hold a dialogue about ideas and experience, as well as exchange information.

Forced Displacement

Environmental change is the most significant cause of forced displacement in Kazakhstan. In the southern provinces of Kazakhstan, communities are regularly displaced by natural disasters.⁵⁰⁶ For example, in April 2017, over 7,100 people were displaced as a result of the Zhabay, Jembarak, and Ilel River floods, while in March 2018, an additional 400 people were displaced by floods caused by heavy rains and snowmelt in eastern Kazakhstan (Figure 2). The Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre places the risk of future displacement at over 21,000 persons per year as a result of exposure to sudden shocks such as earthquakes and flooding.⁵⁰⁷ In response, the government has placed a focus on its disaster management plans and has worked with many international bodies and other countries to improve upon its preparedness.




Figure 2. New Displacements in Kazakhstan

Annual new displacements resulting from conflict and disasters in Kazakhstan. Data retrieved on April 13, 2021 from <https://www.internal-displacement.org/countries/kazakhstan>.

For example, in 2000, the government worked with the UNDP to prepare the “National Disaster Preparedness Action Plan,” which outlines a systematic approach to managing natural disaster preparedness and problems associated with natural disasters.⁵⁰⁸ UNDP has conducted numerous projects in Kazakhstan to help strengthen the capacities of communities within Kazakhstan to prepare and respond to natural disasters. These projects have ranged from risk management in earthquake zones to support for flood recovery.⁵⁰⁹ In 2019, data management, geographic information systems, and mapping trainings were provided to Kazakhstani government employees in the Department for Emergency Situations of Almaty, the East Kazakhstan and Pavlodar regions.⁵¹⁰

Other key components of forced displacement management are resettlement and the management of asylum-seekers. In 2010, Kazakhstan adopted a refugee law that refers all recognized refugees and asylum-seekers to the government. To aid this law, in 2011 the UNHCR worked with the Kazakh government to identify and document stateless persons and help locally integrate refugees. Furthermore, the UNHCR provided resources to facilitate the creation of a data system that identifies, registers, and refers asylum-seekers that arrive at Kazakhstan's border.⁵¹¹ Once recognized, refugees have the right to stay within the country and are free to move throughout Kazakhstan or abroad after they have been provided with their travel document that was issued by the government of Kazakhstan.

Analysis and Good Practices

As the largest economy in Central Asia, Kazakhstan has made great strides in investing in national resilience by building on existing infrastructure, maximizing strategic partnerships and investments, placing a greater emphasis on public education, and developing initiatives that will lead to multi-sector growth. In addition to continuing to use innovation and partnerships to build resilience, which have been critical to the overall economic progress in Kazakhstan, it is necessary to continue building upon and diversifying the economy. Both the Fostering Productive Innovation Project and the Transformers Roadshow competition open the door for entrepreneurs to get their innovative ideas noticed by investors. These entrepreneurial initiatives will provide an incentive for the highly educated youth in Kazakhstan to stay within the country rather than seek employment abroad, which will benefit Kazakhstan's long-term economic security as well.

In this regard Astana International Financial Centre (AIFC) can become a platform Kazakhstani entrepreneurs could take advantage of. The Astana International Financial Centre is a new financial hub for Central Asia, the Caucasus, the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), the Middle East, West China, Mongolia, and Europe. Officially launched on July 5, 2018, AIFC is actively involved in the country's investment attractiveness programs as a key platform, including a tax relief regime and an AIFC common law court system based on the norms and principles of English law – the first in Central Asia. The AIFC Court conforms to the highest international standards to resolve civil and commercial disputes in the AIFC. The AIFC focuses on enhancing growth through its strategic pillars – asset management, capital markets, financial technology, and Islamic finance, while also paying significant attention to green finance as well. All new investors' household activities can be arranged through the AIFC Expat Centre, which makes it easier for investors to adapt to Kazakhstan. AIFC is the youngest financial center in the world and may become the country's main platform for attracting investments and providing opportunities for entrepreneurs to realize their ideas and plans, further boosting Kazakhstan's economy. More than 1200 companies have already chosen the AIFC as their jurisdiction, including from such countries as China, Great Britain, the USA, Singapore, and the Russian Federation, among others.


To increase its management of forced displacement, which is often caused by environmental disasters, Kazakhstan has placed a large emphasis on disaster management planning through its partnerships and dialogue with national governments and international financial and human rights organizations. In addition, citizens in vulnerable areas have undergone trainings to spread knowledge about disaster preparedness and response methods.⁵¹² Regional approaches to disaster preparedness have been utilized as well, including participation and leadership in initiatives such as the 2007 Asian Conference on Disaster Reduction, which allow for discussions on good practices and identifying gaps in existing approaches.⁵¹³ By establishing a solid foundation for natural disaster management and response through education and international partnerships, Kazakhstan has increased its resilience in this sector, with the government also continuing to pass legislation and implementing programs that will combat climate change and prevent natural disasters from increasing in severity. These initiatives and investments in resilience have allowed Kazakhstan to become a country that is better prepared for the shocks and pressures it will encounter across sectors.



As the largest economy in Central Asia, Kazakhstan has made great strides in investing in national resilience by building on existing infrastructure, maximizing strategic partnerships and investments, placing a greater emphasis on public education, and developing initiatives that will lead to multi-sector growth. In addition to continuing to use innovation and partnerships to build resilience, which have been critical to the overall economic progress in Kazakhstan, it is necessary to continue building upon and diversifying the economy.



RESILIENCE IN IRAQ



The Republic of Iraq is located along the eastern slope of the Fertile Crescent on an alluvial plain that bore some of the world's first civilizations. The word 'Iraq' itself loosely translates to 'well-rooted' or 'well-watered' from Arabic, and in the ancient world the region was called 'Mesopotamia,' meaning 'the land between the rivers.' Even today, despite the rapid deterioration of these resources, the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers supply the majority of Iraq's surface water needs.⁵¹⁴ Aside from the Zagros Mountains (and their subrange Hamrin) that crown the north-eastern portion of the country, the majority of Iraq's climate can be classified as arid or semi-arid.⁵¹⁵ The population is nearly 39 million, with a 2.3 percent population growth rate,⁵¹⁶ and, as is typical of many developing countries, it has a large youth population, with roughly 59 percent of its citizens under the age of 24.⁵¹⁷ While Iraq is an Arab-majority country, it has a significant Kurdish population, comprising roughly 15-20 percent. Additionally, there are representations of Turkmen, Assyrian, Shabak, Yazidi, and other minority communities present in Iraq.⁵¹⁸

The Iraqi Government is composed of three branches: a unicameral legislature, an executive branch led by newly elected Prime Minister Mustafa al-Kadhimi, and a judicial branch. In addition to this, there is the semi-autonomous Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) of Iraq, led by President Nechirvan Barzani, who presides over the Kurdish-majority north and northeast of the country. The KRG hosted its first elections in 1992 and predates Iraq's current constitution, which was adopted in 2005.

After over forty years of conflict, Iraq has been especially vulnerable to the dual shocks of COVID-19 and subsequent decreased demand for petroleum-based products that led to a collapse in global oil prices in 2020. Finding ways to continue progress toward stability and reconstruction has posed challenges for the government and citizens, but initiatives from the local to the national and international levels have heavily informed trends in Iraqi stability and resiliency in the face of these new challenges. Continuing this positive trajectory will rely on the strengthening and diversification of Iraq's economy, investment in its infrastructure, responsibly expanding its agricultural and production sectors, and focusing on consolidating security into the hands of the central government. Continued peace is at the center of this intersectoral foundation of resilience — where continued security provides an environment for safe investment, economic expansion, and stability.

Environment and Natural Disasters

Iraq has had a Ministry of the Environment since 2003, and the right to “sound environmental conditions” for all Iraqi citizens is written into the country’s constitution.⁵¹⁹ In September 2020, in conjunction with the United Nations Environmental Program (UNEP) and the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), the government released a new National Adaptation Plan (NAP), which is a process to help the country adapt to and mitigate climate change. These top-down developments are in response to the country’s history of vulnerability to fluctuations in climatological pressures and an increasing heat index, which make environmental adaptation strategies profoundly necessary. The NAP begins by identifying key areas of vulnerability as well as gaps in the existing knowledge of the climate situation in Iraq and uses these as the foundation for a national long-term plan to address key environmental issues. Climate risk assessments target specific livelihoods and sectors most likely to be adversely affected by climate change in order to prioritize them moving forward.⁵²⁰ Specific areas identified include reductions in air pollution, pollution of scarce water resources, land degradation and desertification, deterioration of biodiversity, and pollution of marine waters.⁵²¹ The NAP is intended to be multi-tier, including participation from local populations, intermediate institutions like activist groups and non-government environmental organizations, and formal participation from the state.⁵²² Iraq’s NAP is the first such plan developed in the region, leading the way for similarly climate vulnerable states like Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait. Increased institutional capacity is also key to Iraq’s bargaining power with upstream riparian states on issues of flow rates of the Tigris and Euphrates, which support approximately 32 million Iraqis.⁵²³

Diversifying the economy through expansion of agriculture is a major facet of Iraq’s economic strategy. Agricultural development is heavily integrated with the NAP with the dual goals of providing food security while also adapting to future environmental challenges. According to a report by the World Bank, the country’s agri-food sector has seen less regulation and government interference compared to other sectors, which provides flexibility for the industry to adapt, improve, and grow.⁵²⁴ Adopting new technologies more in line with environmentally responsible agricultural practices will build resilience by reducing water consumption and limiting further environmental degradation.

The mitigation and adaptation strategy that Iraq has adopted is still in its early days and will benefit from a flexible approach, to increase its adaptability as new issues surface and novel approaches are developed. Through the NAP, the country will substantially benefit from collaboration with, and the support of, international organizations and donors. Successful adaptation in Iraq has the potential to set a positive trend in motion across the country where high aridity and vulnerability to climate change make having a NAP the gold standard in combating the negative effects of shifts in the environment.

Health and Pandemics

While work on improvement of Iraq’s healthcare sector is on-going, the sector would substantially benefit from more attention and funding. Building stronger health institutions and enticing local doctors, nurses, and other medical personnel to remain in the country will significantly shore up current gaps in the healthcare sector and contribute to broader strengthening of resilience within the country. National and subnational authorities have both implemented health messaging efforts in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. In and around Baghdad, a 250-person volunteer initiative led by the World Health Organization (WHO) disseminated information on protection measures to approximately 6 million Iraqi citizens in one month, and implemented a major drive to distribute masks.⁵²⁵ The following month there was a significant reduction in COVID-related illnesses in the country’s hardest hit areas.⁵²⁶ Another WHO initiative in the KRG was led by 300 volunteers and targeted roughly 4 million people, including particularly vulnerable IDPs and refugees.⁵²⁷ IDP camps are especially important due to their close quarters and limited access to medical services, so the information about wearing masks at all times, washing hands frequently and thoroughly, and social distancing if and where possible were essential for the protection of these populations.

The Iraqi government and non-government institutions have worked collectively to reduce the impact of the global wave of increased domestic violence resulting from lockdown protocols in response to COVID-19. Institutions already on the ground have shown flexibility and ability to adapt by expanding their programs to offer victims of violence targeted assistance and broader support. Humanitarian organizations like Cordaid



have deployed psychosocial workers, psychiatrists, and health workers to offer direct relief to victims of domestic violence and gender-based violence (GBV). They also have a 24/7 hotline that offers counseling and assistance to those who report incidences of GBV.⁵²⁸ Hala Sabah Jameel of Cordaid said the institution has seen a major increase in calls for assistance throughout the pandemic. Since its founding in 2015, Cordaid has offered a broad spectrum of support and has an established networks across the country to offer service delivery 'in the field of health care, security and justice, agriculture, WASH and shelter'. They also have a special mission in addressing gender based and domestic violence issues in Ninawa and Dohuk Governorates in northern Iraq and target the internally displaced and returnees for aid.⁵²⁹ Cordaid has expanded its mission throughout the pandemic by deploying mobile medical units to address medical concerns and promote good hygiene while also raising awareness about mental health issues resulting from lockdown. This is just one of numerous examples of aid organizations adapting to the new situation to mitigate and respond to emerging issues. The courts in the north of the country have also been proactive in addressing domestic and GBV cases. Kajhal Nayef Rahman, a judge in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI), has been on the frontlines of this issue, where she says her office has been prosecuting domestic violence cases to prove justice to the victims. In light of the negative, disproportionate impact the lockdown has had on women, Judge Rahman asserted that domestic abuse hot lines are essential to connect survivors with necessary support.⁵³⁰

App-based deployment of mobile medical units during the pandemic has substantially improved Iraqis' access to treatment and preventative medicine. These services have also facilitated the distribution of vital medications and essential food stuffs, which directly support homebound and quarantined citizens. Despite the increase in mobile deliveries, businesses have suffered due to COVID-related restrictions, and the job market has contracted significantly. To help combat unemployment and food insecurity, the World Food Program (WFP) has launched the Urban Livelihoods project, an initiative to support 68,000 people by targeting them for short-term jobs that will provide a source of income and food during the pandemic.⁵³¹ This is being done in conjunction with the WFP's other projects, which include the development of approximately 70,000 long-term, sustainable jobs focused on climate resilience and adaptation in Iraq's agricultural sector.⁵³² The future of food security in Iraq is intimately related with the economy's resilience during times of shocks and stress like the pandemic, and illustrates the inter-connected nature of Iraq's economy, security, and healthcare sectors.

Economy and Livelihoods

Positive trends in security and stability are leading to a resurgence in vitality of the state's energy and agricultural sectors. In 2013, Iraq set out a 5-year plan that would diversify the economy away from oil dependence and develop the industrial sector. It targeted underdeveloped sectors in the country, like building and services, agriculture, education, transport and communications, and energy. While these initiatives were interrupted by largescale conflict in 2014, now that the country has begun to stabilize again, the prioritized

initiatives laid out in the original plan are finding fertile ground in which to expand and begin the process of benefiting a wide spectrum of the country's citizens.

The Iraqi Dinar was overvalued by roughly 20 percent throughout 2020, but at the end of the year, the government made the decision to deflate the currency in order to stimulate interest in the country's exports and demand for factory production.⁵³³ While the devaluation of the currency was unpopular within Iraq, it has helped to diversify the economy, and as Iraqi Ambassador to the US Fareed Yasseen said, "[I]t has worked and has achieved quite a bit of progress in terms of integrating Iraq within the region... and also a better integration with the world."⁵³⁴

A reduction in petroleum-based exports in 2020, along with improved stability and a reduction in sanctions have increased the need and opportunity to diversify Iraq's market through the sale of agricultural and manufactured goods and to amplify its geostrategic importance as a center of trade and logistics for the region and internationally. Reduction in violence across the country, but especially in its fertile north, has made room for the expansion of the agricultural sector. By containing ISIS and centralizing security in the hands of the Iraqi military, the return of farmers who have been displaced by violent conflict since 2014 has dramatically increased the country's agricultural production and helped reclaim the state's arable land. Just this past season, the total area cultivated for growing wheat expanded by nearly 30 percent compared to last year.⁵³⁵ As a product of this rapid expansion and consecutive years of adequate rainfall, for the first time in decades Iraq has been wheat-self-sufficient for three years in a row.⁵³⁶ Iraq had previously been the second-largest importer of wheat in the Middle East, making it highly dependent on market rates for the high-demand product. Expanding the agricultural sector is of multi-sectoral benefit to Iraq, providing jobs domestically, expanding access to food staples, and decreasing the expenditure burden on the country's government, which provides food to the country's most vulnerable through its subsidized national food program. Growing wheat locally has greatly reduced the import expense the government has been covering for decades and could help the government cope with the increased pressures from COVID and the oil market collapse.

In an effort to draw investment to Iraq for economic diversification and the reconstruction of its infrastructure, Iraq became the 168th state to ratify the 1958 New York Convention in March 2021. The New York Convention offers legal protections to external investors by upholding foreign arbitral awards which creates a legal environment conducive to safer investment.⁵³⁷ Even before its official ratification, external investment grew when the Iraqi cabinet endorsed the convention in 2018 immediately preceding the Kuwait Reconstruction Conference. That conference generated some \$30 billion in investment promises and donations to the country's post-ISIS reconstruction efforts.⁵³⁸ The largest individual donors were the UAE and the Islamic Development Bank.⁵³⁹


Iraq is turning a new corner in its battle for energy security and wider access to electricity across the state. Historically, a heavily disrupted energy sector from years of conflict has posed challenges to development, but internal initiatives and new investments from large US companies are now underway to revitalize the industry. External investments in 2020 alone amounted to \$8 billion.⁵⁴⁰ The agreements include a contract with Honeywell to develop ar-Ratawi oil field, a deal with Baker Hughes for a gas consumption efficiency scheme, and with General Electric for the improvement of Iraq's power plants and power grid, including connecting the country with Jordan's grid.⁵⁴¹



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To further support its energy sector improvement, Iraq is also in the process of expanding its large natural gas deposits. Deals signed in August 2020 with US companies to develop ar-Ratawi will also mark investment in the largest natural gas project in the country, estimated to be able to produce as much as 1.2 gigawatts of electricity per day once fully cultivated.⁵⁴² Iraq is now steadily on-track to reach its goal of becoming gas self-sufficient by 2025.⁵⁴³ As much as three quarters of the projects needed for the whole country to become natural gas independent are already underway.⁵⁴⁴

Consistent access to electricity is key to Iraq's continued economic development and will directly contribute to women's participation in business as they are disproportionately impacted by limited and unreliable access to electricity.⁵⁴⁵ Inadequate electricity to support even basic infrastructure like streetlights limits the safety and security of women, restricting their ability to operate, manage, or participate in income-generating ventures outside of their homes, while inadequate electricity at home limits their ability to work productively and consistently. These impediments are compounded during Iraq's hot summer months. Without electricity and air conditioning, women are subject to increased incidence of heat stroke and skin disease when they need to cook indoors in already dangerously hot conditions. The work by the state to increase stable electricity provision across the country will substantially support women's security and ability to participate in the workforce.



Increased demand for internet access is directly related to Iraqi citizens' access to electricity. Network demand had exponentially expanded with internet usage growing by 55 percent between 2019 and 2020.⁵⁴⁶ In addition to this growth, the development of app-based delivery services has expanded during the pandemic. Restrictions and curfews implemented as mitigating measures to address the pandemic substantially restricted Iraqis' access to restaurants, groceries, and medications, but a surge in apps-based delivery services have helped offset the negative impact of these restrictions. Apps of this nature have drawn major domestic and international investment. One of the most successful, Lezzoo, an Erbil-based delivery app, was the first start-up in Iraqi history to generate a seven figure (USD) investment from its initial seed round,⁵⁴⁷ dually illustrating the adaptive capacity of the country and the way businesses in Iraq are becoming more attractive investment opportunities. Lezzoo offers access to over 100,000 deliverable items and distributes necessary goods from hundreds of vendors in Iraq as well as a feature that connects the population to a mobile nursing unit that can do home visits to improve healthcare access.⁵⁴⁸ This model both supports local businesses and widens access for people following responsible guidelines in response to the pandemic. This dual support of people's safety while stimulating the economy is not localized to just the north of the country. Other app-based mobile delivery businesses have sprung up or expanded across the country.

With increased access to electricity and the internet, the changes brought by COVID could be an opportunity for women to bridge the workforce participation gap due to increased flexibility in hours and the advantages of being able to work from home.⁵⁴⁹ Women have already begun to innovate and adapt in Iraq's rapidly changing

market. For example, in Mosul, some women have begun making masks,⁵⁵⁰ working in food preparation, utilizing new technology for food delivery services,⁵⁵¹ and pursuing job training services that specifically target women, like sewing and hairdressing.⁵⁵² Additionally, working from home might reduce some of the stigma associated with women in the workforce that has historically had a negative impact on their participation⁵⁵³. There is currently little representation of women at higher levels in the public or private sector.

In order to secure wider access to the internet, in August of 2020, Iraq's Parliamentary Services Committee suggested a state-owned mobile network operator would best serve Iraq's growing demand for mobile telephone service to avoid monetary losses from unpaid taxes private companies owed the state.⁵⁵⁴ The move worked as an effective bargaining chip, and Iraq's four largest mobile network providers came to the negotiation table with the state. The providers agreed to pay half the back-taxes owed, expand their coverage, and upgrade much of their pre-existing coverage to 4G in order to further support phone and internet access across the country.⁵⁵⁵

Human Security

According to UN reports, 2020 saw a continued 'drastic' reduction in violence across the country, including a major reduction in terror-related events associated with ISIS.⁵⁵⁶ Despite the group's continued presence in the country, the Iraqi Army continues to improve its counter-terrorism strategies with the help of internationally led training at bases across the country,⁵⁵⁷ and a concerted effort aimed at weeding out ISIS sleeper cells.⁵⁵⁸ ACLED data supports this finding, illustrating a major drop in 'Explosions and Remote Violence,' falling from 2,741 events in 2017 to 1,761 in 2020. In the same timeframe, battles have also been nearly halved in the country with 1,604 taking place in 2017 and just 869 in 2020.⁵⁵⁹

This reduction in violence has been in part due to the consolidation of security into the hands of the central government. Throughout the nearly two decades since the US invasion of Iraq, looting of abandoned police stations and military outposts led to the open trafficking of both small arms and light weapons (SALW) and heavier weaponry throughout the country. In response, Iraqi security forces launched Operation 'Real Promise' in September 2020. The operation, which is initially targeting heavy weaponry before shifting to SALW, has led to the surrender of stores of heavy and medium unauthorized weapons in Basra and Baghdad and the apprehension and arrest of dozens of offenders. This has both reduced conflict between warring factions and reinforced the authority of the state by centralizing security in the hands of the government.


In a sign of international endorsement of Iraq's growing stability, and confidence in Iraq's security forces, the International Coalition operating in Iraq returned control of numerous military bases to the Iraqi government in late 2020, including al-Qaim in Anbar,⁵⁶⁰ Taji in north Baghdad,⁵⁶¹ and Besmayah (Pasmaya) in south Baghdad.⁵⁶²



Strengthening Kurdish-Arab relations and ongoing joint operations between the national army and the KRG's Peshmerga forces have helped to promote security.⁵⁶³ This collaboration has gone beyond combating ISIS and extended into stabilization operations in areas like Sinjar.⁵⁶⁴ Sinjar was once home to much of the country's Yazidi population targeted by ISIS beginning in 2014. Facilitating the minority group's safe return to Sinjar required a concerted effort for restoration, collaborative security provision, and joint management in the region. United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI) chief Jeanine Hennis-Plasschaert stated that the coalition force would "help displaced people return to their homes, accelerate construction, and improve public service delivery."⁵⁶⁵

Cooperation between the Peshmerga and Iraqi Army has had a positive impact on dialogue between the KRG and the central government as well, including reopening discussions over contested territories⁵⁶⁶ and back payment owed to Peshmerga forces.⁵⁶⁷ Retired Brigadier General Adnan al-Kanani, formerly an official in the Iraqi Counter-Terrorism Service, has stated that one of ISIS's key tactics was to exploit tensions between the two factions, so continued solidarity and cooperation between the KRG and the central government is essential to repelling the ISIS threat and promoting security in the country.⁵⁶⁸

Reduced Conflict Fatalities in Iraq Since 2016



As regards Women, Peace, and Security, significant developments include a growing movement for women's rights and good governance. This is a major development for women in the region, who previously have had low participation in the workforce as well as in most social and political spaces.⁵⁶⁹ Women-led protests have had the impact of raising awareness of women's rights and unifying their voices to contest systemic inequalities.⁵⁷⁰ Regarding peacebuilding, civil society organizations have been pivotal in expanding the capacity of women on social cohesion. In the Kirkuk province, IDP women were trained by local CSOs on conflict resolution and mediation.⁵⁷¹ Iraq has a rich history of women's rights movements, especially throughout the 1970s and 1980s when Iraqi women were some of the most educated women in the region.⁵⁷²


Forced Displacement

As the state finished reclaiming formerly ISIS-occupied territories, including major cities like Mosul, they have also been able to facilitate the return of internally displaced persons who have been living in camps across the country. By the end of 2019, nearly 4.5 million people displaced by conflict had been able to return to their place of origin. While there are still approximately 1.5 million IDPs in the country in over 3,000 locations, this is the lowest number of IDPs the country has seen since 2014.⁵⁷³

Despite economic constraints that have slowed government-funded projects aimed at the reconstruction of war-torn cities across the country's north, stories of individuals and volunteer groups taking rebuilding into their own hands sprang up across the country, especially in Mosul, Iraq's third-largest city. While many IDPs

have begun to return to their place of origin, especially with the closure of IDP and refugee camps across the country, a major issue faced by those hoping to reintegrate is the continued lack of public services in areas devastated by ISIS occupation. A report from UNHCR indicates more than 825,000 of Iraq's IDPs came from Mosul alone, and 10,000 sites (mostly housing) throughout the city were severely damaged or destroyed.⁵⁷⁴ Repairs of just the basic infrastructure are expected to cost more than \$1 billion, and long-term repairs are expected to cost many billions more.⁵⁷⁵ There are also major issues with the presence of IEDs on the agricultural lands where armed groups were previously stationed, creating a situation where many residents fear to farm at the risk of potentially unearthing explosive devices.

Reduced Displacement in Iraq Since 2014



While there is still no significant, coordinated approach to the reconstruction of Mosul, local volunteers and individual projects have begun the process of restoring the city. After reviewing satellite imagery and conducting field analysis, Discovery Waste Recovery and the Urban Resilience Platform estimated there is as much as eight million tons of debris that needs to be removed from Mosul before serious reconstruction efforts can be undertaken.⁵⁷⁶ Mosul was dubbed the 'the Capital of Volunteerism' over the past three years as some 240 volunteer teams have worked in concert with the central government to complete ongoing reconstruction and clean-up efforts, especially in the hardest hit western side of the city.⁵⁷⁷ Specifically, volunteers target IDPs and returnees in order to help them with their reconstruction efforts to make the city habitable once again. Other volunteer groups, like Fazaa, bring food baskets and medicines to IDPs and returnees in and around Mosul to further support their transition back to the city.⁵⁷⁸ A major \$50 million investment by the United Arab Emirates will specifically fund the reconstruction of Al-Nouri Mosque – the jewel of Mosul's old town.⁵⁷⁹ Elsewhere, in Erbil, GIZ has done trainings with the government municipality officers on rapid response to crisis, and Barzani Charity Foundation is providing food packages for families across the region. Despite these efforts, the majority of the displaced participants interviewed noted ongoing difficulties with finding employment.

In the country's north, Tal Afar is another example of resilience and recovery at the local level in Iraq. The city was one of the last ISIS strongholds in Iraq, and it had been plagued by division and radicalization fostered by a long history of local disagreements.⁵⁸⁰ In August 2020, a pact orchestrated by the Iraqi Government and tribal leaders of the region (negotiated, in-part, by women) moved to stabilize the region and assist internally displaced persons' return and resettlement to the city. Promoting the security and stabilization of Tal Afar is integral to guarding the country against a resurgence of ISIS, not least because ISIS's newly confirmed leader was born in the small city.⁵⁸¹

Analysis and Good Practices

As illustrated throughout this report, there is an intrinsic link between peace and economic stability in Iraq. Security and an absence of conflict promote an environment conducive to investment and economic expansion, while an expanding economy, growing employment opportunities, and tax revenue generation

improve living standards and enhance institutional flexibility and resilience. These mutually reinforcing aspects of recovery require careful, multi-sector support to maximize the ongoing trend of recovery in Iraq. The two main areas that would most significantly benefit from further attention and investment are Iraq's agricultural sector and infrastructure reconstruction and rehabilitation projects.

A report from the Expert Working Group on Climate-related Security Risks found Iraq is one of the most climate-vulnerable countries in the Middle East.⁵⁸² One of the most efficient ways of mitigating the effects of climate change is by addressing Iraq's growing water problem. Water is already a scarce resource in the country. Balancing food and production demands of the country with scarce, fixed water resources is a difficult task, but greening the agricultural sector is a promising way to address both issues. Currently, over 80 percent of the country's freshwater resources go to the agricultural sector.⁵⁸³ Inefficient flood irrigation, which is commonly practiced in Iraq, can result in as much as a 60 percent loss in water due to evaporation alone.⁵⁸⁴

There are several steps that can be taken to address growing water insecurity and promoting sustainable agricultural expansion in the country, including:

- updating irrigation methods to more efficient drip irrigation systems;
- rehabilitating failing water infrastructure like leaking pipes;
- prohibiting unsanctioned well drilling, which depletes the water table and makes water resources more susceptible to saline intrusion;
- reducing pollution (especially agricultural runoff);
- incentivising the planting of less water intensive crops like wheat and barley.

In addition to these measures, the expansion and funding of Iraq's horticulture and sustainable development programs at research institutes and universities would also be beneficial by providing the detailed, on-the-ground research needed to support new policies and practices. The expansion of the agricultural sector has the potential to be a dual boon for the country's food security strategies and its economic diversification plans. More efficient water usage will also build flexibility into Iraq's available water resources, helping mitigate the impact of drought years, which are growing in frequency due to climate change.

Infrastructure rehabilitation and expansion in Iraq also requires significant attention, especially the development of the energy sector, the expansion and rehabilitation of medical and education facilities, and reconstruction projects in formerly ISIS-held territories.



The World Bank estimates that Iraq loses some \$40 billion annually to inadequate electricity supply; diversifying and expanding Iraq's electricity sector would substantially benefit the economy and the day-to-day lives of the country's citizens.⁵⁸⁵ Iraq has very high solar energy potential. Prioritizing renewable energy in a country endowed with high solar power potential will help increase resilience in a country that was devastated by the recent collapse of oil markets. According to a German Aerospace report, Iraqi deserts annually generate a mean power density of 3140–3373 MJ/m².⁵⁸⁶ Iraqi deserts cover approximately 220,000 km².⁵⁸⁷ The barrel of oil equivalent (BOE) per every 100 km² of solar cells operating at just 24 percent capacity has the potential to save as much as 6 million barrels of oil annually, meaning Iraq has enough solar energy to supply all of its own domestic energy needs and have enough left over to export.⁵⁸⁸

Reconstruction projects, especially in formerly ISIS-occupied regions like the Nineveh Governorate that saw some of the most widespread destruction from the group, are a major task that would substantially increase the quality of life for millions of Iraqis. Targeting infrastructure projects that employ locals who are already working to reconstruct the city would have the dual effect of creating jobs and making the region habitable and hospitable for the return of IDPs. It would also create an opportunity for continued joint Peshmerga-Iraqi Army forces collaboration on security provision in the country's north.

Two areas that could use targeted investment and expansion are Iraq's medical sector and educational facilities. Both of these have shown themselves to be extremely vulnerable to pressures and shocks during 2020. The closures of schools throughout 2020, without the institutional capacity to provide alternative forms of engagement, left some 11 million Iraqis without access to teaching.⁵⁸⁹ Both of these sectors could benefit from continued expansion of the electrical grid and more consistent access to electricity.



RESILIENCE IN PAKISTAN



Pakistan has a rich and dynamic history and is in many ways a very different country than it was in previous decades. In the last ten years, poverty, though still high, has been cut in half,⁵⁹⁰ and the level of violence has steadily declined, from over 8,000 conflict fatalities in 2010 to a tenth of that figure in 2020.⁵⁹¹ Consistent with this positive trend, there has also been a reduction in the number of newly displaced people since 2009. Also, as of 2008, there has been an unbroken string of three consecutive peaceful transfers of power from one elected civilian government to another, suggesting a trend towards greater resilience and space for the potential growth of social cohesion, strengthening of democratic processes and their continuity, and reflection of and inclusive leadership. However, challenges remain across all five dimensions, as illustrated by the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic and the long-term environmental pressures which could undermine progress unless key capacities are strategically leveraged. Successful programs that have had a positive effect on promoting resilience in Pakistan have focused on promoting opportunities, empowerment, and social protection for women, youth, and the displaced.

Located in South Asia, Pakistan has an estimated population of 232 million, making it the fifth most populous country in the world.⁵⁹² Its large population is culturally and linguistically diverse, with six major languages: Punjabi, Sindhi, Saraiki, Pashto, Urdu, and Balochi.

According to the World Bank, as of 2019, it had the world's 43rd highest GDP,⁵⁹³ but lags in education with an adult literacy rate of 59 percent in 2020 (compared to a world average of 86 percent).⁵⁹⁴ As with many other countries, Pakistan's economy has experienced significant swings over the past decade. GDP growth decelerated from 5.5 percent in 2018 to 0.4 percent in 2020 – the lowest rate since growth picked up after the 2009 global financial crisis.⁵⁹⁵ Perhaps illustrating Pakistan's complexity, while most of the population (63 percent) is rural, compared to a world average of 44 percent,⁵⁹⁶ it also contains two megacities (Karachi and Lahore) with over 10 million people each. Karachi, in fact, was the 11th largest city in the world as of 2021.⁵⁹⁷ Pakistan is geopolitically vital as an economic and military powerhouse in the region, yet it still has ongoing challenges with communal, separatist, and ideological stresses. Other challenges include outdated health infrastructure, unequal access to resources, and gender inequities. A critical vulnerability is its

susceptibility to natural disasters, including earthquakes, floods, and long-term water scarcity issues, which can adversely affect the other dimensions.

Despite these challenges, significant progress has been made across many dimensions in recent years, including disaster preparedness, community empowerment through decentralization, and an overall reduction in violence. The pandemic highlighted weaknesses but also provided insight into Pakistan's ability to adapt and counter shocks. Further development efforts can build upon this progress to promote resilience over the longer term.

Environment and Natural Disasters

Pakistan remains highly vulnerable to environmental threats, including both climatological and geophysical factors. According to the Notre Dame Global Adaptation Initiative (ND-GAIN) index, Pakistan is ranked as one of the most vulnerable to climate change⁵⁹⁸. Over the past two decades, there have been a variety of high-profile disasters within the country: an earthquake in 2005 that killed nearly 74,000 people and affected more than 5 million;⁵⁹⁹ floods in 2010 that killed over 1,600 and affected at least 14 million;⁶⁰⁰ and a heatwave in 2015 that killed over 1,000.⁶⁰¹ In 2019, an earthquake injured 300 people and killed 19.⁶⁰² In 2020, a heavy monsoon season destroyed over 200,000 homes and resulted in over 400 deaths.⁶⁰³ These disasters have been major drivers of forced displacement within the country.⁶⁰⁴ Therefore, various programs have been put in place over the past year to manage and mitigate these risks. Despite these vulnerabilities, Pakistan lacks an established National Adaptation Programme of Action (NAPA), though announced in 2021 that it has officially begun creating its NAPA, supported by the UN Environment Programme and funded by the Green Climate Fund.

In the event of a disaster like the 2005 earthquake, key agencies and institutions at the forefront of humanitarian response include the National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA), the armed forces, and non-profits such as the Red Crescent and local charities.

For longer-term prevention and preparedness, Pakistan's Ministry of Climate Change coordinates the national strategy and the implementation of programs such as the Ten Billion Trees Tsunami program. The Adaptation Fund has introduced a program to combat water scarcity on the community, district/city, and national/provincial levels. This program takes a three-pronged approach: 1) enhancing existing flood resilient water harvesting facilities and 2) replicating the strongest models in local communities and urban public spaces while 3) building national and provincial leadership to support more environmentally conscious policies.⁶⁰⁵

Second, the World Bank approved the Climate Adaptation and Resilience (CARE) for South Asia Project, jointly sponsored with the Asian Disaster Preparedness Center (ADPC) and the Regional Integrated Multi-Hazard Early Warning System for Africa and Asia (RIMES), in May 2020.⁶⁰⁶ The project includes a focus on expanding training programs and climate data collection, particularly through the Regional Resilience Data and Analytics Services (RDAS) and Decision Support Systems (DSS) and using these resources to adapt to challenges posed by climate change on resources and agriculture. Ultimately, CARE will further the government's goal of taking an "evidence-based" and "climate-smart" approach to policymaking to environmental decision making.⁶⁰⁷

Third, in conjunction with the Pakistani government, the World Wildlife Fund (Pakistan) introduced Recharge Pakistan: Building Pakistan's Resilience to Climate Change through Ecosystem-Based Adaptation for Integrated Flood Risk Management. With a 30-year outlook, the program focuses on building resilience to flood risks across the country. It focuses on the livelihood and safety of vulnerable communities as it works to increase water storage and recharge capacity through vast collaboration throughout the government, the WWF, and other stakeholders. The program is expected to improve water and food security, enhance climate resilience, and support the economic livelihoods and needs of local communities.⁶⁰⁸

Finally, as of June 2020, the World Bank is supporting the Pakistan Hydromet and Ecosystem Restoration Services project by offering \$188 million in aid. Implementation will be conducted through a government-owned company, the National Disaster Risk Management Fund (NDRMF), which is managed by the climate change ministry. The project focuses on disaster resilience through risk management and advanced weather forecasting.⁶⁰⁹



Other initiatives from previous years have provided a foundation of resilience that enabled vulnerable communities to be more resilient in the face of the COVID-19 pandemic. For example, the Gender Transformative and Responsible Agribusiness Investments in South-East Asia (GRAISEA) program, which was established in 2015 to benefit small-scale producers and particularly women by investing in and introducing new and sustainable technologies, provided food and livelihoods to some beneficiaries during the COVID-induced economic slowdown.⁶¹⁰ The support provided by the program during the pandemic presents a model which could be replicated and scaled to increase resilience to other potential shocks and pressures through ecosystem vitality and fighting food insecurity.

Throughout 2020, the Pakistani government has made efforts to mitigate the effects of climate change and illegal logging, and to bring relief to those affected by COVID-19. In 2019, Prime Minister Imran Khan introduced the “Billion Tree Tsunami” that seeks to plant 10 billion trees throughout the country over the next half-decade.⁶¹¹ In light of the global pandemic, the government has mobilized to introduce the “green stimulus,” a program that pays unemployed individuals to plant saplings, set up nurseries, and protect forest firefighters. Special attention is given to hiring women and young people who migrated to rural areas during the lockdown.⁶¹²

Health and Pandemics

Although COVID-19 was a social crisis, not just a health crisis, it certainly highlighted the challenges and capacities of Pakistan's health system and has refocused priorities. Key resiliencies include 1) demographics, 2) joint civil-military governance forum for effective and timely decision making, 3) international partnerships, 4) role of civil society, 4) philanthropic work of religious institutions and non-profit organizations, and 5) innovative repurposing of polio health programs to respond.

Over the past decade, only between 0.3 to 0.8 percent of Pakistan's yearly GDP has been dedicated to health.⁶¹³ Pakistan ranked below average on all but one of the Global Health Security Index's indicators in 2019, with particularly low scores in “prevention” and “health system.”⁶¹⁴ Some major social determinants of health include access to resources, literacy rates, population below the international poverty line, and individual residence within conflict-prone or environmentally unstable areas.⁶¹⁵ While there has been growth in areas such as literacy and improvement in safe water access, further efforts must be initiated to build Pakistan's resilience to major health concerns.⁶¹⁶

While Pakistani leadership appears to have succeeded to some extent in flattening the COVID-19 curve by instituting proactive lockdowns and active test-trace-quarantine activities around virus hotspots through rapid response teams,⁶¹⁷ still testing and data are limited.⁶¹⁸ The second wave hit the country particularly hard, with hospitals nearing capacity in November 2020.⁶¹⁹ Increasing tolls from the second strain have been associated with overburdened and inadequate infrastructure as well as inconsistent messaging from the government.⁶²⁰

However, Pakistan has demonstrated several resiliencies in light of the COVID-19 pandemic. First, demographics play a vital role in the apparent success of containment efforts, as the majority of citizens are under 30 years of age and better equipped to survive an infection.⁶²¹ Second, the country received a wide array of support from partners such as the Islamic Development Bank,⁶²² Asian Development Bank,⁶²³ World Bank,⁶²⁴ and the United Arab Emirates.⁶²⁵ This widespread support is an indication of Pakistan's ability to forge strong bilateral relationships with neighbors and key international and multilateral organizations. IsDB, for example, is working with Pakistan to spend \$50 million to increase the quality of regional health infrastructure through a digitization project to establish "smart cities" in Pakistan.⁶²⁶ The country's ability to garner support is itself a promising source of resilience by establishing the country as a reliable partner.

In addition to the philanthropic efforts of religious institutions, Islamic charities, and religious parties such as Jama'at-e-Islami, who conduct outreach and education among vulnerable populations, non-profit organizations such as Alkhidmat also conduct crucial humanitarian work and encourage handwashing and social distancing. Madrasas and mosques closed down during the height of the pandemic to restrict indoor gatherings and prevent people from being infected by the disease. Umeed-e-Nau focused on the mental health aspect of the crisis, and the Women Islamic Lawyers Forum was recognized by the Karachi Bar Association for its efforts during the crisis.

COVID-19 has deepened gender inequalities within Pakistan, adversely impacting economic empowerment, economic participation, health, and violence against women.⁶²⁷ Lockdowns within the country have decreased female access to healthcare products, such as sanitary napkins, and exacerbated the vulnerability of women to intimate partner violence. From March to May 2020, officials reported a 25 percent increase in domestic violence in Punjab.⁶²⁸ Further, there has been a surge in digital harassment⁶²⁹ and femicides⁶³⁰ over the past year. While the Pakistani government has made efforts to fight gender-based violence, such as developing the Women Safety smartphone app, there is more work to be done in terms of prosecuting domestic abusers and building the capacity of law enforcement on the issue.⁶³¹ Grassroots movements have emerged to advocate for women's safety within Pakistan. In the fall of 2020, a 16-day advocacy campaign was led by the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization. By focusing on its Farmer Field Schools in rural areas, the program intends to bring to light the reality of gender violence within Pakistan in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic.⁶³²

One innovation that helped with the COVID-19 response was the repurposing of anti-polio programming to respond to the crisis. Alongside Nigeria and Afghanistan, Pakistan is one of three countries where polio persists.⁶³³ The government has received support from international organizations such as the IsDB and the World Health Organization (WHO) to mitigate the effects of polio and lay the groundwork for its eradication.⁶³⁴ Gender has also been mainstreamed in this effort as thousands of Pakistani women have been hired and trained as vaccinators, scientists, and social mobilizers.⁶³⁵ But with the emergence of COVID-19, polio immunization staff was effectively mobilized to train healthcare workers to combat the pandemic. Indeed, the standing polio infrastructure, especially communication channels, was shifted to focus on COVID-19.⁶³⁶



Pakistan has demonstrated several resiliencies in light of the COVID-19 pandemic. First, demographics play a vital role in the apparent success of containment efforts, as the majority of citizens are under 30 years of age and better equipped to survive an infection

Other health concerns include food insecurity, malnutrition, high mortality rates for infants and children under 5, and a relatively high incidence of Hepatitis B, HIV, Tuberculosis, and Malaria.⁶³⁷ Although the health system remains under strain due to COVID-19, the Pakistani government continues to work with the WHO to strengthen its general health services capabilities, particularly in terms of bolstering primary care and access to resources and services across the country. Some of these initiatives, such as the Family Practice Programme, take a community-focused approach to achieve the aforementioned goals. By developing services within communities through healthcare professionals personally exposed to the regional health contexts, WHO hopes to better ensure that the support and preventative measures put into place will effectively improve Pakistan's health outcomes.⁶³⁸

Having committed to the achievement of SDGs, the Government of Pakistan set an aspirational direction for the country by endorsing the National Health Vision of Pakistan in 2016, that aims: "*...to improve the health of all Pakistanis, particularly women and children by providing **universal access** to affordable, quality **essential health services**, delivered through a resilient and responsive health system*"

In this vision the delivery of a package of essential health services was made an integral part of the Government's approach that takes the country towards Universal Health Coverage.

The development of an Essential Package of Health Services (EPHS) is an important step towards meeting the condition for UHC reforms in Pakistan. The provision of essential health services geared towards achieving UHC and health-related SDGs has been underscored in the 12th Five-Year Plan (health chapter), and the National Action Plan (2019-23). The E established a formal collaboration with the DCP3 Secretariat (London) and WHO, under a memorandum of understanding in 2019, to develop an EPHS/ UHC - Benefit Package (BP) for Pakistan to translate the government's commitment into action.

The EPHS/ UHC - BP for Pakistan has been developed with broad consensus of in-country and international experts. This has been achieved using scientific evidence based on Burden of Disease (BoD), cost of each intervention, expected health gains and health system capacity in Pakistan's context making it the first country in the world to develop its EPHS based on DCP3 recommendations. The final generic National EPHS/ UHC - BP for Pakistan was presented at and endorsed by the Inter-Ministerial Health & Population Council on October 22, 2020. The finalized UHC - BP is an integration of key sexual and reproductive health (SRH) interventions including initiatives for reproductive, maternal, neonatal, child and adolescent health, communicable and non-communicable diseases, mental health as well as intersectoral interventions.

In order to support the UHC reforms in Pakistan and strengthen the equitable delivery and quality of essential health services the Government of Pakistan and World Bank agreed on a 'National Health Support Program' amounting to US\$ 300 million IDA and US\$ +130 million of Multi-Donor Trust Fund (from GFF, GAVI, B&MGF and others). The program is envisaged on the pattern of National Immunization Support Project (NISP) – with an emphasis on provision of essential health services at community and PHC center level.

Economy and Livelihoods

According to the World Bank, the poverty level in Pakistan, though still relatively high (24.3 percent), has been cut in half in the last ten years.⁶³⁹ During the same period, GDP per capita has almost doubled.⁶⁴⁰ However, the economic outlook has turned downward in the last few years, even before COVID-19, with low exports and significant deficits.

Then, with COVID-19 and the associated economic slowdown, as many as 50 percent of the working population experienced income loss, especially low-skilled workers.⁶⁴¹ The impact was particularly acute in urban areas, with 58 percent of the working population experiencing job loss or decreased income due to COVID-19 compared with 43 percent in the rural areas. According to the Pakistan Bureau of Statistics, agribusiness makes up 24 percent of the GDP and half of the labor force.⁶⁴²

The government's poverty reduction strategy is spearheaded by the Ehsaas Program, which is an umbrella of 134 initiatives dedicated to providing a safety net and opportunities for the most vulnerable, including "the

extreme poor, orphans, widows, the homeless, the disabled, the jobless, poor farmers, laborers, the sick who risk medical impoverishment, the undernourished; students from low-income backgrounds and poor women and elderly citizens.”⁶⁴³ Despite the challenges posed by the shock of COVID-19, resilience factors included investment in agriculture and e-commerce.

While food insecurity has been a pervasive issue in various geographic regions in recent decades, COVID-19 massively compounded its negative impact on vulnerable communities.⁶⁴⁴ Pakistan responded to this global food crisis by altering its economic policies to capitalize on its role as a net food exporter. Major changes include “addressing structural issues such as improving poor crop management skills of farmers; [providing] affordable inputs such as quality seeds; [improving] agriculture infrastructure; reducing post-harvest losses; developing value chains; narrowing [the] gap between research and its practical applications; and [providing] adequate funding for research and development activities.”⁶⁴⁵ Beyond mitigating the immediate economic effects of the COVID-19 pandemic, these policy shifts are formulated to ensure stability within the agricultural sector in the long term.

Further, given the limited educational and economic opportunities for women, e-commerce has been growing as a critical platform for female economic participation. A 2019 study from the Consultative Group to Assist the Poor found that informal e-commerce enhances women’s economic livelihoods and fosters independence and inclusion for women within the economy.⁶⁴⁶ E-commerce has proven to be a powerful tool for women by minimizing risk through offering low-cost business models built around convenience and low levels of institutional interaction. These models also rely on connections with other women and allow for the formation of female value chains. The COVID-19 pandemic highlights how conducting business through a digital platform helps these micro-entrepreneurs absorb the impact of shocks, as many were able to provide their goods despite the economic downturn.⁶⁴⁷

Another source of resilience is Pakistan’s youth dividend, suggesting education and innovation should be a major priority moving forward.⁶⁴⁸ The IsDB has adopted social advancement as a key goal by supporting various programs targeted at promoting sustainable development. The IsDB supported the Transform Fund Call for Innovation, a program that allows innovators the opportunity to grow their business through the provision of seed money.⁶⁴⁹ One of the projects funded by the Transform Fund, a remote education provider for female doctors called Educast, has also benefitted Pakistan’s outlook on healthcare.⁶⁵⁰ Another way the IsDB furthers development is by offering scholarships for Pakistani students to study at elite colleges outside the country.⁶⁵¹



Finally, by providing crucial aid and investment into the economy, the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) has the potential to play a role in furthering Pakistan's economic development through major infrastructure projects such as rail and hydroelectricity.⁶⁵²

Human Security

Pakistan has been experiencing a decline in terrorist-related incidents across the country over the past decade. Though several armed groups remain in different regions of the country, yearly numbers of attacks have dropped from thousands to hundreds, with a total of 319 attacks in 2020. Conflict fatalities have also reduced considerably in the last ten years, with around 800 killed in 2020 compared to over 8,000 in 2010, according to ACLED.⁶⁵³ This progress in the promotion of security in Pakistan is due to a combination of security operations against Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), conflict-sensitive development practices, and the promotion of livelihoods and integration among refugees and host communities. Civil society organizations, along with community and religious leaders, have also been key to improving the state of security in the country by spearheading initiatives on social cohesion. In particular, CSOs have been known to organize anti-terror rallies, craft innovative campaigns around peace messaging, and build capacity around mediation and conflict transformation.⁶⁵⁴

Despite this positive long-term trend, one of the deadliest suicide bombings in the country's history occurred as recently as 2018, during an election rally of the Balochistan Awami Party (BAP) in the Mastung district, Balochistan.⁶⁵⁵ In March of 2021, there was an escalation in threats from the Taliban in response to an International Women's Day march, suggesting ongoing vulnerabilities and risks to personal and communal safety.⁶⁵⁶

Apart from violent extremism, other challenges to personal safety in the context of COVID-19 include incidents of violence directed towards healthcare workers, such as the vandalization of healthcare infrastructure, verbal and physical abuse against healthcare professionals, and at least one reported incident of hardline police action against protestors who were raising concerns regarding the need for personal protective equipment (PPE) on April 6, 2020.⁶⁵⁷ Given these continued challenges, risk management and conflict sensitivity are vital for effective and sustainable development efforts.

There are several examples of programs and projects that are addressing issues of women's rights and safety. These projects often capitalize upon civil society organizations in advancing and maximizing efforts towards address gender-based violence. Every year a major demonstration occurs in major cities called the Aurat March, which calls attention to issues relating to violence against women and girls. UN Women Pakistan and the National Commission on Status of Women-Pakistan, with the support of the Center of Gender and Policy Studies and the Royal Norwegian Embassy in Pakistan, launched their 2020 Young Women in Pakistan Status Report, which focused on identifying areas where strategic investment and action can be undertaken to open opportunities and expedite social advancement.⁶⁵⁸ Additionally, the United States Congress allocated 25 million USD to democracy and gender programs in Pakistan in December 2020.⁶⁵⁹ Canada continues to be a vital partner in promoting gender equality within the country.⁶⁶⁰

The National Endowment for Democracy (NED) published a variety of programs in early 2021 related to supporting human security within Pakistan. Initiatives touch on several topics such as education reform, promotion of leadership capacities for young activists, youth civic engagement, minority political participation, protecting religious minority rights, countering religious extremism, enhancing electoral legitimacy, and promoting open and free media.⁶⁶¹

Forced Displacement

As with violence and poverty, though still elevated, Pakistan has a long-term trend of improvement in reducing forced displacement. In 2019, about 111,000 people were displaced.⁶⁶² However, this follows a downward trend in new displacements from disasters and violent conflict per year since 2009.⁶⁶³

The two most significant drivers of displacement are terrorism and insurgency/counter-insurgency operations,⁶⁶⁴ including separatist movements and ideologically motivated militant groups such as Tehrik-e-Taliban.⁶⁶⁵ Although the Internal Displacement Index 2020 Report ranked the severity of internal displacement within Pakistan as “medium,”⁶⁶⁶ the country has consistently been ranking highly in the Early Warning Project’s list of countries at risk of mass killings.⁶⁶⁷

Currently, the National Disaster Management Authority plays the biggest role in assisting internally displaced persons (IDPs).⁶⁶⁸ The country also benefits from its bilateral partnerships in terms of funding to meet the needs of displaced persons, as seen in 2009 with Saudi Arabia’s \$100 million pledge through the United Nations to benefit the IDPs in northern Pakistan.⁶⁶⁹

In early 2020, Pakistan was praised alongside Iran by the UN Secretary-General António Guterres for their generosity in accepting 1.4 million Afghan refugees over forty years, as other countries were called upon to mirror their efforts.⁶⁷⁰

From a development perspective, emphasis on conflict-sensitive and resilience programming highlights social cohesion and the integration between refugees and host communities. In partnership with the UNHCR, the government committed to providing better health facilities and access in 2019.⁶⁷¹ In June 2020, Pakistan supported the launch of “a portfolio of projects in education, health, and livelihoods, as well as energy, water, and community infrastructure” focused on youth empowerment in conjunction with UNHCR, Afghanistan, and Iran.⁶⁷² This project comes at a critical time when Afghan refugees are experiencing increased risk due to the COVID-19 pandemic, both in terms of their vulnerability to illness and economic dependency on positions that cannot be done virtually or in isolation (e.g., daily laborers). As a result, lockdown measures have had a major negative effect on these individuals’ abilities to provide for themselves. In response, steps have been taken, such as the UNHCR suspending voluntary returns and increasing aid to improve resource provisions and sanitation and counteract the strain caused by COVID-19.⁶⁷³

Promoting social cohesion within Pakistan continues to be a national priority to avoid communal tension and potential radicalization.⁶⁷⁴ A report from the World Bank Group in 2018 noted that, in general, there is a relatively high level of inclusion and positive perception toward refugees, due in part to affinity and kinship ties, which in itself is an important source of resilience.⁶⁷⁵ The Ministry of States and Frontier Regions (SAFRON) is strategically leveraging these resiliencies to further enhance social cohesion through projects such as that with the German Federal Foreign Office (GIZ), which focuses on recreational activities, improving livelihoods, providing professional experience and skills, offering education for special needs students, and addressing the issue of water scarcity through a resource management program.⁶⁷⁶

Finally, Pakistan has continued to look ahead through the development of another major project: the Pakistan Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) Temporarily Displaced Persons Emergency Recovery Project. With assistance from the World Bank, this project was most recently updated in November of 2020 and is set to run until Summer 2022. The project will grant two unconditional loans to over 100,000 displaced families. Further assistance from this program will “support the early recovery of families affected by the militancy crisis, promote child health, and strengthen emergency response safety net delivery systems in the affected areas of FATA.”⁶⁷⁷

Analysis and Good Practices

While there are many serious challenges in Pakistan, there is a long-term positive trend in many key indicators such as poverty, violence, and displacement, which should be built upon and extended, expanding the work being done by government ministries, local charities, religious institutions, and community leaders. Underpinning these positive trends include resiliencies such as a stock of social cohesion at the community level, bilateral partnerships with international donors, and environmental resilience programs in the agriculture sector with a focus on women, youth, and the displaced.



A major strength that benefits development in all five dimensions is Pakistan's ability to forge strong and productive relationships with multilateral organizations and donor partners, such as the IsDB, ADB, World Bank, Germany, UAE, Saudi Arabia, and the United States, becoming a primary target of investment and recipient of aid.

The COVID-19 pandemic has highlighted the need to update Pakistan's healthcare infrastructure to deal with persistent health concerns and prepare for future crises. In the meantime, the government has been relatively proactive in instating adaptive policies to mitigate the COVID-19 crisis. It put in place economic policies focused on exploiting its strength as a food exporter to offset the immediate economic strains and promote long-term economic stability. Integrated programs such as climate initiatives have also been used to increase employment while combating climate change in strategic and innovative ways.



As a vital complement to security and defense operations, for a sustained and sustainable reduction in extremism and violence, an emphasis on social cohesion is foundational, including programs promoting livelihoods and integration among refugees and host communities, as well as the critical role of religious leaders in promoting peace and philanthropy.

While youth bulges are often seen as a source of pressure, Pakistan has found its young population as a source of resilience in the context of a disease like COVID-19 that targets older populations. Additionally, efforts have been made to increase education and opportunity for the youth. Programs such as the Transform Fund for Innovation have already been successful in empowering agents for change.

In the long term, climate change is a latent crisis that must be mitigated through combining disaster prevention, environmental resilience programming, and economic relief efforts, an exemplar being Prime Minister Khan's green stimulus. Pakistan remains highly affected by climate change while simultaneously struggling with the social implications of a sluggish economy. Promoting livelihoods and opportunity while at the same time addressing short- and long-term environmental challenges will further stabilize the country and put it on a path to greater resilience in the future. A focus on women, youth, and the displaced is not only a humanitarian imperative, but is also strategically significant as a means of promoting security and economic stability.



RESILIENCE IN MAURITANIA



Located on the Atlantic coast of Africa, Mauritania is a desert nation with only 0.5 percent arable land⁶⁷⁸. It has an ethnically diverse population of 4.5 million⁶⁷⁹, including Bidhan (two thirds of the population), Wolof, Soinke, and Fulani. Sunni Islam is the state religion and Arabic is the official language, although Wolof, Pulaar, and Soninke are additionally regarded as national languages.

Mauritania's economy is the sixth smallest by GDP among ISDB's MCs⁶⁸⁰. In the Sahel region, traditional subsistence economic practices persist with a focus on agriculture, trading, and crafts⁶⁸¹. Nevertheless, the economy, which is based on the export of raw materials, is witnessing a notable development in the region, especially the export of fish and mineral reserves (iron, gold and copper). Mauritania has also emerged as a tourist destination, although the tourism sector faces security challenges, as well as hurdles related to the poor level of infrastructure in addition to the poor level of health care. Furthermore, the country struggles with low literacy rates and significant gender inequalities⁶⁸².

Despite these challenges, Mauritania has made remarkable progress in building its resilience. Facing enormous climate pressures, Mauritania has adopted innovative strategies that prioritize adaptive and restorative programs. Moreover, the country launched development initiatives around its agricultural economy, focusing on advancing innovative agricultural activities for sustainable livelihoods and food security. Mauritania has shown continued and consolidated long-term efforts to mitigate health emergencies, as seen with its COVID-19 experience.

Environment and Natural Disasters

Due to its partial location within the Sahel ecoclimatic transition belt, Mauritania is particularly susceptible to the effects of climate change, ranking 133rd out of 181 countries on the Notre Dame Global Adaptation Initiative (ND-GAIN) Country Index.⁶⁸³ While an estimated three quarters of the country is located within the Sahara and therefore sparsely inhabited, the remaining quarter falls within the semi-arid Sahel, which has

faced rising temperatures, heatwaves, and increasingly erratic rainfall over the past few decades.⁶⁸⁴ Moreover, activities such as poor farming techniques and deforestation have accelerated environmental degradation.⁶⁸⁵ These conditions have left Mauritania highly vulnerable to desertification, reducing livestock and agricultural production.⁶⁸⁶

Despite these challenges and pressures, a variety of restorative and adaptive programs have been implemented to manage risks and lay the foundation for continued resilience in the face of environmental degradation. In 2007, Mauritania, through its membership in the African Union, committed to the Great Green Wall for the Sahel and the Sahara Initiative (GGW). The Africa-led initiative aims to restore 100 million hectares of degraded landscapes by planting 8,000 kilometers of trees across the entire width of the African continent, creating 10 million green jobs, and building resilience to food insecurity in the region.⁶⁸⁷ As one of the core intervention countries for the GGW, Mauritania's implementation approach to the initiative has been twofold: core reforestation activities and building institutional structures and mechanisms for the operation's sustainability. With over USD 9 million of its 2014 budget allocated to GGW activities, Mauritania established four regional offices in its intervention corridor, founded a National GGW Agency in 2013, and has thus far planted over 2 billion trees, produced over 2 million plants/seedlings, and fenced off 550 hectares for conservation.⁶⁸⁸

Complementary efforts by development partners, which are critical in creating sustainable and resilient ecosystems, have been vital in shoring up Mauritania's restorative measures and resilience to climate insecurity. From 2017 to 2020, the Republic of Turkey's Boosting Restoration, Income, Development, Generating Ecosystem Services (BRIDGES) project worked to prevent land degradation and desertification by promoting the sustainable management of natural resources, restoring degraded forests and landscapes, and contributing to the GGW in Mauritania.⁶⁸⁹ Working in synergy with programs focused on the other GGW intervention countries, BRIDGES aimed to promote knowledge sharing between Mauritania, Eritrea, and Sudan; worked towards the establishment of GGW information and monitoring systems; fostered local ownership on restorative measures by establishing networks of village-level technicians; and built capacity on sustainable management of restored landscapes.⁶⁹⁰ Other complementary projects include the World Bank-led Sahel and West Africa Program (SAWAP), which supported the advancement of GGW goals through the strengthening of landscape resilience and livelihoods in nine GGW states, including Mauritania.⁶⁹¹

In addition to these multi-stakeholder restorative activities, Mauritania, in collaboration with its development partners, has also spearheaded numerous mechanisms to foster adaptive pathways to climate security. In 2019, Mauritania launched its National Adaptation Plan (NAP), a project funded by the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) seeking to "strengthen technical and institutional capacities to manage climate change adaptation planning, improve quality and access to climate change data, support the acquisition of adaptation finance, and enhance the monitoring and evaluation of adaptation planning impacts at both the national and local level."⁶⁹² Over the course of three years, USD 2.67 million in funds from the Green Climate Fund (GCF) will be employed to combat the effects of desertification and loss of biodiversity. Furthermore, in 2020, the African Development Fund (ADF), the concessional financing window of the AfDB, pledged USD 2.1 million to finance a climate resilience program in Mauritania. The financing will "allow for the creation of an insurance policy indexed to drought risk and enable the development of climate change risk management solutions; support for access to disaster risk transfer mechanisms; and program management and coordination."⁶⁹³

As in most Sahelian countries, climate insecurity in Mauritania has had consequential impacts on human security. Drought-induced movements and increased resource competition stemming from the shrinking availability of arable land and the depletion of traditional grazing areas have historically been drivers of farmer-herder violence and tensions among pastoralist groups.⁶⁹⁴ Livestock farmers face a combination of violence, drought, and limited pasture, fueling both migration and violent extremism. However, the existence of multi-dimensional resilience approaches that emphasize institutional frameworks, community-based approaches, and cooperation have been critical in mitigating the effects of such shocks and contributed to generally low levels of violent conflict between farmers and herders, and pastoralists.⁶⁹⁵

The principal institutional framework is Mauritania's Pastoral Code, (drafted in 2000, but effective from 2004), drafted in consultation with pastoralist groups, which codifies the rights of herders, outlines the common use



of rangelands, and includes measures on conflict management.⁶⁹⁶ Community-based pastoral cooperative organizations have been active in Mauritania for decades and serve as another important tool for conflict-mitigation in the face of land and resource competition. Additionally, non-governmental initiatives have sought to foster cooperation and resilience among pastoralists. In particular, the Overseas Development Institute's (ODI) Building Resilience and Adaptation to Climate Extremes and Disasters (BRACED) project endeavored to strengthen the resilience of pastoralists and agropastoralists by securing, supporting, and promoting transborder livestock mobility between Mauritania and neighboring countries.⁶⁹⁷ Specifically, the initiative set up pastoralist corridors to ensure herders can safely take livestock across national boundaries in Africa's Sahel.

Additional initiatives have addressed the nexus between food insecurity and climate change, such as the Adaptation Fund-World Food Program-sponsored Enhancing the Resilience of Communities and their Food Security to Adverse Effects of Climate Change in Mauritania (PARSACC) project between 2014 and 2018.⁶⁹⁸ By promoting the diversification of income sources, the project improved the income and food security of nearly 12,000 households.

While past and ongoing projects reflect meaningful efforts to combat environmental degradation in Mauritania resulting from climate change, there remains a continued need for investments and innovations to improve readiness and an urgency for resilience-building in this sector.

Health and Pandemics

Mauritania's public health vulnerabilities are driven by complex, interrelated factors that limit equitable healthcare access and development. Desert terrain presents challenges for healthcare services distribution to rural areas. As of 2014, over 66 percent of the population live more than 5 kilometers, or over an hour, away from a functioning health center.⁶⁹⁹ As outlined in the Environment/Natural Disasters dimension, climate-induced pressures exacerbate geographic and environmental influences on health. As one of the most water-deficient countries, droughts and other effects of climate change have further reduced the availability of water sources and contributed to the healthcare system's fragility. According to the WHO, of the country's 2,150 yearly deaths from diarrheal diseases,⁷⁰⁰ 90 percent stem from limited access to clean water and poor sanitation.⁷⁰¹ Furthermore, Mauritania's political context adds to the vulnerabilities present in the health structure. The traditional centralization of health infrastructure projects in the capital region and urban areas reinforces poor health outcomes for rural, marginalized, and nomadic communities.⁷⁰²

Still, Mauritania exhibits vital capacities in addressing several challenges in its healthcare infrastructure. With help from international aid, the country has advanced health security in recent years. The WHO has worked to provide a water control laboratory to track water quality in isolated rural areas and serve as a timely intervention resource in a crisis.⁷⁰³ It also established eight regional laboratories and trained staff from the Ministries of Health, Sanitation, and Water on water quality monitoring.⁷⁰⁴ Further, the Decentralization and Productive Intermediate Cities Support project was launched to improve access to local health services in southern regions. This was achieved by building local governments' capacity to direct public services, financially supporting decentralized services in intermediary cities, and implementing strategies to benefit refugees and host communities.⁷⁰⁵ On water, sanitation, and hygiene (WASH), an IDA grant is set to improve water access for 473,000 rural inhabitants by establishing and rebuilding water supply systems and conducting WASH sensitization campaigns.⁷⁰⁶ For maternal and neonatal health, the World Bank financed the Mauritania Health System Support project to support expanding essential maternal, reproductive, neonatal, and child health. Given that economic factors shape and inform access to healthcare, the project will also offer targeted support to host communities and the 55,000 Malian refugees hosted at M'bera camp.⁷⁰⁷ The Islamic Development Bank (IsDB), another major partner of cross-sectoral projects, has also financed a project to expand Nouakchott's water supply network by constructing 900 kilometers of pipe to increase water distribution and improve access to drinking water.⁷⁰⁸

While public health emergencies are not new to Mauritania, the epidemiological profile of the COVID-19 pandemic presented challenges to the country's limited health infrastructure. However, Mauritania's health system demonstrated flexibility in coping, owing to its consolidation of resilience strategies from previous health-related emergencies. Over the last 18 years, Mauritania has faced several health emergencies: an outbreak of Crimean-Congo Hemorrhagic Fever (CCHF) in 2003, two cholera outbreaks in 2005, and an outbreak of Rift Valley Fever (RVF) in 2012.⁷⁰⁹ Consolidated responses to these shocks included contact tracing, establishing a multi-sector task force, collaborative initiatives with international partners, epidemiological surveillance, and health system support.⁷¹⁰ In response to the rapid regional spread of contagious diseases due to porous borders, Mauritania and its partners have demonstrated a commitment to regional cooperation on disease preparedness: in 2018, the Regional Project for the Strengthening of Disease Surveillance Systems in West Africa (REDISSE) began implementation in Mauritania.⁷¹¹

Mauritania's response to the COVID-19 pandemic has illustrated an adaptation of proven mechanisms to shore up its resilience to the pandemic's effects. These generally focused on three interconnected themes: multi-sectoral approaches, collaborative efforts, and operationalizing national-level response measures at the local level. In the first area, the country and its development partners worked on socio-economic recovery, health system strengthening, and improving resilience in the social dimensions of quality and equitable healthcare.⁷¹² For example, UNICEF designed a distance learning strategy for rural, urban, marginalized communities through financing from the Global Partnership for Education. Interventions throughout 2020 included joint efforts with regional education authorities to retain and reintegrate approximately 2,000 children into the school system; contributed to the recording of over 100 courses for final exams and education continuity initiatives for 26,700 students; provided capacity building and psychosocial support to instructors; and supported the organization of final exams for Malian refugees.⁷¹³

As with its past strategies on public health emergencies, collaborative efforts have been instrumental.⁷¹⁴ Before the first cases were detected in the country, the government established an inter-ministerial committee for information sharing and coordination.⁷¹⁵ The harmonization of multi-stakeholder efforts also extended to the donor community, with entities and CSOs partaking in the government's overall strategy and designing complementary processes. UNICEF provided financial support to the national COVID-19 helpline, which fielded 1,521,017 calls before its suspension. As geographic barriers have historically inhibited quality healthcare, the response strategy has leveraged local governance, communities, and CSOs. Elected officials and local authorities have been instrumental in disseminating messaging on the pandemic at the community level. Additionally, influential religious leaders have been at the forefront of mitigation efforts. Through trainings by organizations like World Vision, Ulemas and Imams have created critical information channels.⁷¹⁶ The country's culture of collectivism has also been a source of resilience during the emergency, with volunteers supporting various COVID-19 management activities. International partners have also coordinated and harmonized strategies between the national and sub-national levels: World Vision consulted with local and national civil associations and engaged with village cooperatives, including women's, to distribute hygiene products.⁷¹⁷

Economy and Livelihoods

Mauritania has experienced significant volatility in its economy over the past 30 years, with annual real GDP growth fluctuating between 18.3 percent and -4 percent. In line with most other countries, Mauritania experienced a sharp economic contraction last year, tied to the impact of COVID-19. With GDP activity largely driven by exports of raw materials, Mauritania benefits from considerable foreign investment, making it vulnerable to global price swings and economic trends. Particularly in rural communities, the country struggles with extreme poverty that natural disasters and gaps in governance have exacerbated. According to the Mauritania National Agency for Statistics and Demographic and Economic Analysis, an estimated 12.8 percent of the population lives in extreme poverty,⁷¹⁸ often lacking accessible resources.

Despite these challenges, Mauritania has successfully attracted foreign finance, especially in agriculture and infrastructure. One current partner is the African Development Bank (AfDB). The AfDB's PAHABO Project, administered in collaboration with the Nigeria Trust Fund and the Islamic Development Bank, focuses on agriculture and rural development through the lens of gender, aiming to break the cycle of drought-driven poverty while empowering women. The project has achieved impressive results, including establishing almost 100 feminine vegetable cooperatives, increasing crop yields, promoting new markets, and reversing rural-to-urban migration.⁷¹⁹ Women have testified that the project's training has led to a "huge change."⁷²⁰ Additional efforts to enhance Mauritania's agricultural resilience include the Agropastoralism Actors Support Project for Resilience Building in Assaba, led by World Vision Mauritania and funded by the EU. Since 2016, the program has focused on sustainable development in the Assaba region, including using biological pest control techniques for the organic production of key crops, which command higher export prices.⁷²¹ Bilateral partners also play a key role in building agricultural resilience. The German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) funded the 2018-2020 Institutional Strengthening Programme for Agro-Pastoral Resilience in Mauritania (RIMRAP) focused on research and training efforts.⁷²² Projects of this nature benefit the country by isolating issues hindering rural communities. In light of the global pandemic, the Regional Joint Programme Sahel in Response to the Challenges of COVID-19, Conflict and Climate Change was announced in early 2021 to bring relief to rural communities in the Sahel region.⁷²³ Areas for future investment and cooperation beyond agriculture include building infrastructure to capitalize on offshore hydrocarbons⁷²⁴ and fully take advantage of Mauritania's wealth of mineral resources.⁷²⁵

The country has also witnessed investment into human capital and livelihoods to fight poverty and strengthen its economy. In addition to providing aid for health and agricultural productivity, the IsDB's Lives and Livelihoods Fund for Mauritania invested in infrastructure that allows for greater financial inclusion, such as digital banking.⁷²⁶ The World Bank also approved a total of \$52 million in mid-March to increase the country's social safety net system. This initiative focuses particularly on vulnerable households, such as refugees and hosts.⁷²⁷ The AfDB's North Africa Regional Integration Strategy Paper for 2020-2026 focuses on six regional member countries, emphasizing the private sector and regional integration.⁷²⁸ This builds on work undertaken in recent years by the AfDB to foster economic diversification within the country.⁷²⁹ By focusing directly on supporting individual economic livelihoods and integrating Mauritania's financial system with global networks, foreign investment initiatives are taking a two-pronged approach towards strengthening the country's economic resilience.

Another source of resilience for the future of Mauritania's economic development is its youthful population, which has a median age of 19 years old.⁷³⁰ Proper support through education could foster a demographic dividend; the working-age population is sufficiently large and productive to support dependents and grow the economy.⁷³¹ However, barriers such as a shortage of qualified teachers, limited community involvement, and Mauritania's national civil registration process hinder access to quality education.⁷³² Mauritanian students came together in 2018 to present a report, *National Higher Education and the Harvest of the Unilateral Pathways*, on the challenges facing higher education in the country.⁷³³ Organizations like USAID help address these gaps by supporting technical and vocational skills training for vulnerable populations to promote their integration into labor markets.⁷³⁴ Similar programs are supported by the Agence Française de Développement (AFD), including one which provides resources to vocational training centers and the Education Sector Development Plan (PNDSE), which focuses on improving primary school conditions and enhancing secondary education access for girls.⁷³⁵ The latter is critical, as the country suffers from a gender disparity in education, reflected in the 14-point difference in literacy among student-aged individuals, a gap which widens with age.⁷³⁶ The IsDB

helps increase access to higher education for promising students by funding scholarship programs, including the IsDB-France Scholarship Program and the IsDB-McGill Scholarships. The recipients of these scholarships often return to their home country and use their education to better their community. The IsDB has also been active in allocating funds to Mauritania to support education throughout the COVID-19 pandemic. Emphasis was placed on utilizing ICT technology, developing new programs in light of school closures, and preparing for reopening. Their \$3.5 million COVID-19 grant places particular interest in protecting and providing for girls in vulnerable areas. Other organizations like UNICEF have been proactive in supporting education during the pandemic.⁷³⁷

Finally, a variety of barriers beyond education constrain the full participation of women in the labor force. Mauritania is ranked 46 out of 47 countries in Sub-Saharan Africa for women's workplace inequality by the Council on Foreign Relations, primarily due to inequalities in the legal system.⁷³⁸ Initiatives have already been taken to help women enter male-dominated industries; a key example is the fishing industry supported by the World Bank and the Competitiveness Industries and Innovation Program (CIIP). Their 2016 Nouadhibou Eco-Seafood Cluster Project strengthened onshore fishing through the development of a seafood cluster while their targeted training programs, like the Personal Initiative (PI) Training, simultaneously build women's entrepreneurial skills in the industry.⁷³⁹ Similar programs should be considered that take advantage of the country's abundant natural resources.

Human Security

Reduction of violence has been a significant focus of the Mauritanian government, which has avoided the level of violent extremism that has affected some of its neighbors.⁷⁴⁰ Since 2011, there have been no terrorist attacks on Mauritanian soil.⁷⁴¹ The country targets the drivers of radicalization by implementing policies that target poverty, lack of education, and unemployment. It couples these with programs and policies that focus on rehabilitation, reintegration, and deradicalization. Organizations like the Safire program provide youth with job training and placement programs while supporting entrepreneurship and addressing food insecurity. During the COVID-19 pandemic, Safire partnered with the Caritas Vocational Training and Professional Integration Centre (CFIP) in Mauritania to employ vulnerable youth populations to produce thousands of face masks and handwashing kits, giving them access to much-needed income and employment during the pandemic, which has disrupted previous ways of accessing both.⁷⁴² In addition, major efforts have been undertaken by the government and community members, such as Muslim clerical leaders, to halt violent extremism at its source and reintegrate formerly radicalized individuals into Mauritanian society. Under former President



Aziz, a national deradicalization program that focused on rehabilitating members of radical groups was started. One element of this includes converting madrasas into spaces that intentionally identify and preach ways in which radical ideological beliefs (e.g., calls for the use of terrorism and indiscriminate violence) are incongruent with Islam to positively influence youth while discrediting the appeals of violent extremism.⁷⁴³ Collaboration between Muslim religious leaders and imprisoned jihadists has aided in societal reintegration.⁷⁴⁴ Other efforts to increase security, such as developing harsher anti-terrorism laws and increasing border control, have been implemented.⁷⁴⁵ Fieldwork respondents furthermore confirmed underlying drivers of joining violent extremist groups and cited the instability of rural incomes due to droughts and flooding. These conditions also often cause displacement, another driver of recruitment into radical groups.

Further efforts to increase opportunity include boosting educational programs in rural communities. Non-profits, like the Global Partnership for Education, have funded projects like the Mauritania Basic Education Sector and Support Project, which offers teaching certificates, conducts staff training, constructs middle schools in rural areas, and provides teaching supplies.⁷⁴⁶ Efforts in Mauritania to provide better education and more socio-economic mobility to youth also include the new University of Tidjikja. The university is located some 600km from the country's capital, providing access to higher education for underserved, rural communities and bringing "local employment, a center for research and local community engagement."⁷⁴⁷ In addition, efforts have been undertaken by community leaders to halt violent extremism and reintegrate formerly radicalized individuals into Mauritanian society. Muslim religious leaders have aided in the reintegration of imprisoned jihadists after their jail term.⁷⁴⁸ Other efforts to increase security, such as developing harsher anti-terrorism laws and increasing border control, have been implemented.⁷⁴⁹

Another area of focus in recent years has been efforts to limit forced labor. Slavery was outlawed in Mauritania in 1981, and legal provisions to prosecute slave owners were passed in 2007.⁷⁵⁰ In 2015 new legislation criminalized hereditary slavery and made it punishable for public officials not to prosecute allegations of slavery reported to them.⁷⁵¹ Due to these new provisions, the effectiveness of the judicial system in combating forced labor has improved.⁷⁵² Additionally, in July 2020, Mauritania passed pioneering legislation against human-trafficking and endorsed a law against the smuggling of migrants, which builds upon the existing legal framework of the Palermo Protocol to penalize perpetrators of human trafficking and provide support for its victims.⁷⁵³ The Mauritanian government has also increased funding for the Ministry of Social Affairs, Childhood, and Family (MASEF) to provide goods and services for the victims of slavery and trafficking.⁷⁵⁴ Further regional security collaboration between Algeria and Mauritania to reduce arms smuggling, cross-border terrorism, and human trafficking is expected, increasing information sharing and bilateral military engagement between the countries.⁷⁵⁵

Mauritania has also ratified the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), though high rates of gender-based violence persist. Much of the work to combat this violence is grassroots in origin, led by organizations founded by women, for women. Aminetou Mint Ely founded the Association of Women Heads of Family, which "offers financial help for medical support, mental health counseling, and legal aid" as well as helping rape survivors by supporting their reintegration into society through a work placement initiative.⁷⁵⁶ In response to COVID-19-associated lockdown orders disproportionately affecting women, the Women Heads of Family association joined in with the Women's Learning Partnership to provide transportation for victims of increased violence.

In addition, a police commissioner in West Nouakchott, Hendou Mint Cheikhna and her colleagues, have put together an initiative to combat gender-based violence through improvements in the Mauritanian Police Force.⁷⁵⁷ This program works to remove obstacles between institutions that keep perpetrators from being held accountable and drafts training manuals to instruct police on responding to reports of SGBV. It has also had the added benefit of opening pathways of communication and collaboration between the police force and the Mother and Child Hospital in Nouakchott to best serve SGBV victims, especially of sexual assault.⁷⁵⁸



Finally, Muhammad Asif and Nalia Saleh's work on the nexus of human security and energy security illustrates how consistent access to electricity improves physical safety.⁷⁵⁹ They argue energy security is directly and indirectly linked to the majority of the UNDP Human Development Report's six essential dimensions of security: income, food, health, environmental, personal, community, and political. In response, Mauritania has expanded its energy sector in the past five years,⁷⁶⁰ especially renewable energy, which is expected to contribute 41 percent of the country's energy by 2030.⁷⁶¹ However, access to electricity remains limited: just 2.3 percent of rural communities and 39 percent of the population has consistent access.

Forced Displacement

As a result of ongoing conflict and instability in Mali, Mauritania hosts thousands of Malian refugees within its borders. As of late 2020, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) provides protection and assistance to some 62,000 Malian refugees in the southeast region of Mauritania where the primary refugee camp, M'bera camp, is located.⁷⁶² Despite the signing of the 2015 Algiers Accord, large-scale returns of Malian refugees are not expected due to continued violence in Mali's northern and central regions.⁷⁶³ Humanitarian support is also extended to some 4,200 urban refugees and asylum-seekers in the cities of Nouakchott and Nouadhibou, who are mainly from the Central African Republic, Syria, and Cote d'Ivoire.⁷⁶⁴ In addition to regional conflicts, climate pressures have also driven displacement in of Mauritania. While flooding is common during the country's rainy season, it is further exacerbated by climate change and environmental degradation.

Despite these ongoing challenges, Mauritania has remained committed to securing refugee protection while encouraging refugee self-reliance and the resilience of host communities. Mauritania is party to several international conventions pertaining to refugees, including the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, the 1967 Protocol and the 1969 OAU Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa.⁷⁶⁵ In late 2019 government officials pledged to adopt additional draft asylum legislation the following year.⁷⁶⁶ In 2021, with support from UNHCR and the WFP, the Government of Mauritania will begin to include refugee households in the national Social Registry of Mauritania, which will allow for eligible refugees to benefit from national social protection programs.⁷⁶⁷ In addition, mediation by village elders and local prefects drawing upon a culture of hospitality and shared religious values has been credited with strengthening social cohesion,⁷⁶⁸ limiting tensions between refugees and host communities.⁷⁶⁹

Recent efforts to support refugees include food assistance, sanitation, and livelihoods programming by humanitarian and development partners. In 2018, a UNHCR partnership with the World Food Program (WFP) distributed food and cash with electronic cards to over 50,000 refugees in order to bolster food security.⁷⁷⁰ Aiming to ensure clean water and sanitation facilities, the UNHCR and its development partner *Action contre la Faim* (ACF) organized hygiene sensitizations activities and awareness building exercises that effectively reached over 15,000 refugee men, women, and children in the M'bera camp.⁷⁷¹ In 2018, the International Labor Organization (ILO) and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) joined efforts to improve the livelihoods of Malian refugees and host communities living in and near the M'bera camp.⁷⁷² The project provided young refugees with access to training in several trades of the building and public works sector and in sectors that support local economic development. Currently, UNHCR is supporting over 1,000 income-generating activities related to butchery, dairy products, leathers and hides and sewing, in addition to over 1,800 participants in market gardens, inside and outside the M'bera refugee camp.⁷⁷³

Recently, the impact of COVID-19 on Mauritania's refugee population has prompted an emergency response by humanitarian actors given the higher degree of extreme poverty, shortages of public services, and limited income sources resulting from this health crisis.⁷⁷⁴ The densely populated M'bera camp lacks sufficient hygiene materials and possibilities for social distancing. In order to communicate the risks posed by COVID-19 and available prevention measures to refugees living in the M'bera camp and urban centers, humanitarian actors have drawn upon community-based networks to build awareness of the pandemic. Since March 2020, a crisis committee comprised of UNHCR and its partners, refugee leaders, teachers, and outreach community workers have engaged in an awareness campaign and mobile messaging initiative.⁷⁷⁵

As conflict continues to affect its neighbors and with extreme weather events set to worsen, support for forcibly displaced people in Mauritania is essential: this can and should strengthen the country's resilience by building on current and past successes, both in providing direct assistance to displaced persons and supporting structural reform efforts that help integrate good practices.


Analysis and Good Practices

Though the symptoms of fragility that exist across the five dimensions in Mauritania are pervasive, the country retains noteworthy structural strengths that prove these vulnerabilities are not insurmountable. First, the country's strategy of building upon the foundational threads of resilience established during previous shocks have allowed for the successful consolidation of its resilience strategies. As evidenced by the COVID-19 pandemic, the commitment to response and health system strengthening (albeit largely reactive) in the face of past disease outbreaks allowed the country to continue and replicate proven processes for COVID mitigation in 2020. Coupled with this, bilateral partnerships have been key to Mauritania's resilience as it pertains to the interlinked drivers of vulnerability. In recent years, the country has become a major recipient of aid from entities and allies such as the ISDB, the World Bank, the European Union, and the United States. The government has also shown a strong commitment to its partners and managing the vulnerabilities and shocks it faces by successfully utilizing its convening power to harmonize efforts of various stakeholder groups. Another channel of resilience lies in a fundamental socio-cultural norm of Mauritanian society that can be harnessed for the future. Over the course of the COVID-19 pandemic, the spirit of collectivism has been central to response strategies as communities and individuals have donated resources and voluntarily partaken in capacity building workshops on COVID-19 mitigation.

To achieve substantive and transformational resilience in Mauritania, these efforts need to be continued and concerted efforts on the empowerment and resilience of marginalized and rural communities need to be expanded. Additionally, the country's reliance on agriculture limits its potential to adequately respond to shocks. As climate insecurity is inextricably linked with agriculture, and also cuts across a number of the dimensions, it is imperative that development strategies moving forward look to diversify the economic profile of the country. Finally, while the influx of international aid has been crucial for building resilience in the country, funding shortfalls, as seen with the suspension of the national COVID-19 call center, are inevitable and as such, the government will need to develop sustainable strategies to funding development projects.



RESILIENCE IN YEMEN



According to the Fund for Peace's Fragile States Index, fragility in Yemen has been rising for the last decade.⁷⁷⁶ In this context, communities have coped and survived mainly by relying on community support systems and the strong presence of international humanitarian aid organizations. Many Yemenis rely on remittances from the diaspora to support their livelihoods, solar power for energy in the absence of government-provided electricity, and informal security networks to ensure their safety. Further, healthcare workers have adapted medical care to the specific needs of communities by leveraging available resources to check on previous patients and provide transportation to hospitals for those who cannot access it on their own. The private sector also plays a vital role in providing financial assistance to organizations like the Aden Bakery, which provides food for families in need.

The COVID-19 pandemic has placed further pressure on all aspects of Yemeni society, making it paramount that international organizations double down on their response. Due to the length of the conflict in Yemen, Yemeni communities, along with international humanitarian aid organizations, have partnered to create frameworks for tackling the country's most daunting issues. These and other resilience factors should be reinforced for humanitarian concerns as well as to assist with post-conflict recovery. However, it is crucial to consider the constraints under which any assistance effort must operate. For example, deliveries of food or medicine face a lack of proper storage that can result in spoilage and waste. Intermittent funding has also constrained the ability of even successful programs to sustainably continue their operations. As such, funders must ensure that potential partners are properly vetted while also being mindful of how the operating environment may limit the appropriateness of otherwise standard operating procedures.

Yemen is located in the southwest of the Arabian Peninsula, bordered by Saudi Arabia and Oman. An estimated 53 percent of Yemen's population is Sunni, while 45 percent is Zaydi Shia. Yemen's population is remarkably youthful, with 46 percent of its 28 million being under the age of 15.⁷⁷⁷ Yemen's population is also heavily tribalized, including the Houthi tribe from which the Houthi political movement is derived. The Houthi rebel movement took advantage of a power vacuum following the Arab Spring uprisings and seized control of areas of northern Yemen, forcing the new president Abdrabbuh Mansour Hadi into exile abroad. In 2015,

Saudi Arabia and eight other Arab countries backed by the US, France, and the UK initiated airstrikes against the Houthis. The ongoing conflict has caused a collapse of Yemen's infrastructure and a humanitarian crisis leaving 22.2 million people in need of assistance.⁷⁷⁸ The country is currently controlled by three main powers: the "legitimate" government, internationally recognized and led by President Hadi; the Houthi-run government; and the Southern Transitional Council (STC).

Environment and Natural Disasters

Climate change has taken a disproportionate toll on Yemen, which aligns with the global trend of poorer countries feeling the strongest effects of richer countries' CO₂ emissions. Yemen has long been plagued by flash flooding, locusts, cyclones, and water scarcity, all exacerbated by local and global climatic changes, which are identified in Yemen's National Adaptation Programme of Action (NAPA), published in 2009, six years before the ongoing war broke out, compounding these challenges. Notwithstanding the devastation wrought on Yemen by a war now in its seventh year, the NAPA identifies the following major vulnerabilities: water; agriculture and food security; biological diversity; coastal areas communities; coastal environment/infrastructure; health; and tourism. Plans laid out by the NAPA to shore up these vulnerabilities have unfortunately been overshadowed by the conflict, though nevertheless, the publishing of the NAPA was an important stage in creating a roadmap for tackling some of Yemen's more pressing environmental threats. Central to Yemen's NAPA strategy is the clear need for education, preparation and sensitization, reflected through such adaptation strategies as incorporating climate change and adaptation into school education. Mismanagement of resources, like overfishing and inland hydrocarbon extraction, has exacerbated Yemen's environmental problems, causing the depletion of fish species, high levels of water and air pollution, and high cancer rates in areas surrounding extraction sites. The World Bank predicted in 2010 that Yemen would continue to get warmer and experience more intense rainfall and floods, while the high population growth rate will contribute to the inevitable depletion of groundwater. In the last year, Yemen has experienced flash floods⁷⁷⁹ and locust infestations⁷⁸⁰ that affected agriculture and contributed to food insecurity. As such, without a grassroots sensitization strategy, as proposed in the country's NAPA, Yemen's environmental woes run the risk of persisting unimpeded. As things stand, the war in Yemen has set back adaptation efforts and compounded pressures on the environment, such as through landmines, unexploded munitions, war debris, and the destruction of physical infrastructure.

The Yemeni government has outlined some national strategies to address the country's environmental issues, but their successful implementation requires outside support. In the late 1990s and early 2000s, the Yemeni government, with help from foreign development agencies, created policy documents and issued water laws. However, due to internal conflict over power-sharing, steps to implement them were delayed by decades.⁷⁸¹



Thus, there are two primary sources of resilience in Yemen's environmental situation. The first is the wide use of solar power, which developed as a response to the collapse of the public energy grid in 2015, although Yemen had previously struggled to provide electricity to all its inhabitants. Since 2015, the use of solar energy for households and farming has increased significantly. Currently, around 75 percent of urban areas and 50 percent of rural areas in Yemen are powered by solar energy.⁷⁸² Solar power systems are generally more financially viable than the principal alternative, diesel generators, especially for farming irrigation systems. One success story is the rural Dhamar area, where water production had fallen to around 30 percent of pre-war levels but is now at 70-80 percent due to solar energy projects supported by international organizations.⁷⁸³ Further, solar irrigation pumps cannot reach the deepest fossil aquifers, and therefore have a limited impact on the environment and provide a more sustainable alternative to diesel pumps. The second source of resilience is the strong presence of international organizations in Yemen. These organizations have the capacity to address environmental issues by mitigating the effects of flash flooding and other disasters with aid, supporting the Yemeni government in developing adequate policies, and funding and implementing programs that will increase the accessibility of solar power for Yemeni households and farmers. These programs could train technicians to correctly install, maintain, and repair solar panels and provide small loans for farmers to buy solar power systems. The Yemeni private sector also plays a role in mitigating the effects of environmental crises – one interviewee mentioned that in floods and landslides in 2020, the private sector responded quickly and helped clear roads.

Health and Pandemics

Yemen is recognized as one of the worst contemporary humanitarian crises, due in part to the widespread famine and malnutrition, alongside the outbreaks of communicable diseases. Yemenis also suffer from a lack of access to healthcare services.⁷⁸⁴ Even when primary healthcare is within reach, specific health services may not be; clinics themselves may be only partially functional, and private health services can be too costly.⁷⁸⁵ The country has suffered from sizable outbreaks of malaria, cholera, and polio, and issues with sanitation and hygiene lead to and exacerbate these outbreaks. The COVID-19 pandemic further complicated the situation. Official COVID numbers from Yemen amount to about 7,100 total cases as of August 5, 2021,⁷⁸⁶ although actual numbers are probably much higher due to attempts to downplay the severity of the pandemic.⁷⁸⁷ People, especially children, suffering from malnutrition often have compromised immune systems, and hospitals do not have enough staff, equipment, or space to provide adequate care.⁷⁸⁸

The resilience of the healthcare system lies in its health workers who have survived war and disease but continue to provide services to citizens, sometimes without pay. Even when hospitals are not accessible, hospital workers go out of their way to ensure people can be treated. In several hospitals, doctors provide patients with their personal mobile numbers in case they have questions, so doctors can give instructions over the phone. In cases when patients need to return to the hospital but do not have access to transportation, health care workers have sent transportation to pick them up. Two such hospitals, the Sadaqa hospital in southern Yemen and the Aslam clinic in northern Yemen have gained international attention for these extraordinary efforts.⁷⁸⁹

Another of Yemen's greatest assets is the robust presence of international governments and NGOs investing in health-related programs. USAID has sponsored mobile medical services that travel to areas lacking proper care, increasing access to family planning, strengthening maternal and child healthcare, and combatting diseases like polio and cholera.⁷⁹⁰ The UNDP is tackling the spread of communicable diseases with initiatives like building household and public toilets to improve waste management and providing personal hygiene kits to communities.⁷⁹¹ The World Food Programme provides food assistance to 13 million people, runs nutrition programs for pregnant and nursing women and children under the age of five to battle child malnutrition, and manages the UN Humanitarian Air Service (UNHAS), which transports aid workers and facilitates the transport of humanitarian cargo.⁷⁹² The continuation of these programs is paramount to the health of Yemenis, especially since the government lacks the resources and infrastructure to provide even a fraction of what aid organizations are offering. Perhaps one of the most well-respected organizations tackling the health crisis in Yemen is Doctors Without Borders. One interviewee, a Consultative Council member, mentioned that Doctors Without Borders, which has been present in Yemen from the beginning of the conflict, remained when other organizations left conflict zones to provide high levels of service to injured people.

Finally, Yemeni CSOs, which are always adapting to the challenges posed by the conflict, have been instrumental in filling some gaps in the country's healthcare system. With the COVID-19 pandemic, CSOs repurposed and/or leveraged existing projects, as well as capitalized upon already established networks to plan their response. For example, the Center for International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights in Taiz retooled its work in schools to include trainings on the pandemic for educators and students. Another organization, the National Organization for Community, worked towards harmonizing and streamlining efforts of various community groups, leaders, and representatives to establish a network for cohesive response.⁷⁹³

Economy and Livelihoods

One of the effects of the ongoing conflict in Yemen has been the devastation of the country's economy and infrastructure. Before the conflict, Yemen already had a weak economy, characterized by corruption and mismanagement, and an overdependence on declining oil and gas reserves.⁷⁹⁴ According to the World Bank, around 71-78 percent of Yemenis currently live in poverty.⁷⁹⁵ As the COVID-19 pandemic has led to worsening economic conditions worldwide, Yemen has been disproportionately affected. Yemenis increasingly struggle to afford food, and the *rial* has decreased in value. In the past, the Yemeni government has tried to diversify the economy by investing in non-oil sectors, but the violent conflict has interrupted these endeavors.⁷⁹⁶

Yemeni women and girls are disproportionately affected in many ways by the conflict, and one of those is their ability to find jobs and provide for their families. Job opportunities in Yemen are already scarce, and businesses prefer to hire men over women because the former are seen as more capable of spending long hours at work, whereas women may have to take care of families and children. Girls are frequently forced into marriages at a young age, and both girls and women have to provide for their families when their spouses have died in the conflict.

Fortunately, two of the Yemeni economy's greatest factors of resilience remain: remittances from Yemeni expatriates and donations and investment from the international community. Approximately one in ten Yemenis rely on remittances only to survive, and in 2019 remittances amounted to 13 percent of the country's GDP.⁷⁹⁷ Although remittances and donations from international governments to Yemen have decreased due to COVID-19's effect on the global economy, it is reasonable to expect that they will increase again as the world recovers from the pandemic. They are a vital part of Yemen's economy and the well-being of its inhabitants.

International donors fund important projects such as the UNDP's "Strengthening Institutional and Economic Resilience in Yemen" and "Supporting Resilient Livelihoods and Food Security in Yemen Joint Programme," which have sponsored numerous projects to help improve Yemeni livelihoods. One of the main focuses of these programs is empowering farmers. Yemen has a long history of a rich agricultural sector, which has survived conflicts and natural disasters over decades. Yemeni farmers are not new to finding creative ways to adapt to new circumstances because they have had no other choice. Yemen's agricultural sector accounts for about 15 percent of the country's GDP and employs more than 50 percent of the workforce.⁷⁹⁸ The UNDP has invested in training Yemeni farmers in modern farming practices and empowering farmers to rehabilitate and build irrigation systems; initiatives which have been very successful in improving livelihoods. It is important to note that the inclusion of women in the workforce is paramount because not doing so is a missed opportunity. USAID has implemented programs to strengthen Yemen's central bank and its Ministry of Finance to assist them in creating a better macroeconomic environment. They also fund programs that provide financial and marketing advice for small and medium-sized businesses to generate more employment opportunities.

The field research involved an interview with an IT professional who worked on several projects that aimed to improve Yemeni livelihoods. In one of those, he worked with the Ministry of Planning to establish an online portal that allows for international organizations and their partners to submit their requests for approvals to operate in Yemen. In another project, funded by the World Bank, he established a system to vet beneficiaries and manage cases so that experts and case managers could study families in need and provide them with assistance relevant to their unique situation. The interviewee noted that using technology/social media and looking at families' needs beyond just food items are crucial to the success of a program. Another successful program is run by Aden Bakery, which is funded by the private sector and distributes food to families. Another interviewee, the head of a local tribe, emphasized that the main reason for the lack of success of NGO projects is the interference of political factions in their work. Parties may intend to use the NGOs and their programs for their own agendas, which frequently leads to corruption and unethical practices.

Human Security

The war in Yemen has been ongoing for over six years. Common security threats to Yemeni citizens include airstrikes, bombs, landmines, unexploded munition, abuse at the hand of local armed groups, arbitrary detention, and the recruitment of children as soldiers, guards, spies, and recruiters. The Houthi movement has been criticized for indoctrinating young children to join its forces and spending significant amounts of money on promoting martyrdom culture and perpetuating future recruitment cycles.⁷⁹⁹ Fighting increased in 2020 in northern Yemen as the Houthi movement seized new areas previously held by the government. Landmines killed 498 people in 2020, a 23 percent increase from 2019.⁸⁰⁰ In terms of personal and community safety, Yemenis tend to mistrust formal security forces in areas where they exist and rely more on informal security providers, such as tribal and religious figures and neighborhood chiefs.⁸⁰¹ In some regions, people accept the presence of armed groups as long as they provide basic needs and some security. Women and girls are particularly affected by Yemen's security situation, as they fear leaving their homes, especially at night, due to high instances of harassment, rape, and theft. This limits their mobility and their ability to participate in the economy.

The improvement of Yemen's security situation largely depends on the interventions of internal and international political actors. However, some aspects of resilience remain that can be built upon to improve security for Yemeni citizens. Informal security networks may be leveraged to improve cooperation among themselves to ensure adequate security for citizens. The presence of international organizations and their funds is another source of resilience. Organizations like the Halo Trust and the Saudi-funded project for landmine clearance, called "Masam," have already begun clearing thousands of landmines,⁸⁰² allowing large numbers of civilians to return to their homes and preventing countless deaths. The Yemeni government has a Yemen Mine Executive Action Center (YEMAC) that works with outside organizations to clear mines.⁸⁰³

Another key area that can be built upon in terms of shoring up resilience is the role played by civil society organizations. Since the onset of the conflict, local CSOs and NGOs have contended with a multitude of challenges, from violence to food shortages, to airstrikes. Despite this, these organizations have showcased a capacity to adapt and respond, working on the reintegration of fighters, including child soldiers, into society and countering the recruitment of children into violent groups.⁸⁰⁴ Women-led organizations are also central to the conflict response efforts, providing a range of services that include service delivery, psychosocial support, child protection, and peacebuilding.⁸⁰⁵



Forced Displacement

Yemen has a displacement problem, which increased significantly following the 2015 international intervention in the conflict. According to the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, there were approximately 398,000 new displaced persons in 2019 due to the conflict and 89,000 more in the first half of 2020.⁸⁰⁶ Even more people were displaced by factors other than the conflict, such as flooding and other natural disasters. Although new displacement is much lower than 2015 levels, the total number of internally displaced people (IDPs) in Yemen remains in the hundreds of thousands. Adding to this issue is the unique predicament that Yemen is surrounded by the closed borders of Saudi Arabia and Oman, making it more likely for Yemenis to continue constant cycles of internal displacement rather than seek asylum in neighboring countries. The dangerous journey to nearby Djibouti is met with few economic opportunities and difficult living conditions for refugees. As such, relocating within Yemen is usually the only option for those fleeing the conflict.

The Yemeni government has a specific unit, called the Executive Unit of IDPs, responsible for registering IDPs and coordinating food and shelter assistance. The unit's policy documents from 2014 indicate that it intended to work toward preventing displacement by monitoring areas at risk of armed conflict, taking measures to prevent armed conflict, enhancing early warning systems and emergency preparedness regarding displacement due to natural disasters, and ensuring that an adequate supply of humanitarian assistance is stockpiled for emergencies. It also contains plans for protecting existing IDPs and ensuring their health and well-being.⁸⁰⁷ This government unit and its policies provide an essential foundation for future work, although this alone is not enough to mitigate the current crisis.

The COVID-19 pandemic has compounded issues for IDPs. Lack of access to proper healthcare, living conditions incompatible with social distancing and quarantine, pre-existing health and economic vulnerabilities, poor sanitation and hygiene, and the loss of employment, income, and remittances due to COVID-19 lockdowns all contributed to this crisis.

International organizations such as the International Organization for Migration (IOM) provide frontline humanitarian assistance and have programming that focuses on pre-existing drivers of fragility and displacement. According to their 2021 report, the IOM plans to provide camp coordination and management, protection, movement assistance, health support, provision of water, sanitation and hygiene, shelter, displacement tracking, and more during the year.⁸⁰⁸ The IsDB can rely on such organizations with years of experience in the region as partners to expand their reach and assist as many displaced people as possible.

Analysis and Good Practices

Throughout Yemen's volatile conflict, it has been a challenge for the international community to ascertain how to best support Yemenis to mitigate environmental deterioration, tackle the unprecedented health crisis, boost the economy, improve security and help the displaced. The IsDB can build on and invest in points of resilience that are most likely to yield positive results. To focus on climate change and the environment, the IsDB can invest in solar energy initiatives that help Yemenis improve existing frameworks, especially by providing loans to farmers so that they can use solar energy to power their irrigation systems and investing in training technicians to install, maintain, and repair existing solar power systems. The Bank will also support other humanitarian aid organizations in responding to disasters, such as flash floods, to ensure that those affected have emergency access to basic needs.

Regarding the health crisis, Yemeni medical personnel has shown outstanding resilience in dealing with a global pandemic and a war on top of extreme rates of malnutrition and other diseases. They could be supported with training and funding and provided with additional supplies. The IsDB could leverage these existing resilience networks and partner with the organizations that support them like Doctors Without Borders to improve the capacities of hospitals and healthcare networks. To contribute to economic development, there is scope for the IsDB to partner with organizations conducting sustainable livelihood improvement programs, such as the UNDP. Furthermore, programs focusing on improving infrastructure will enable mobility and transportation, access to healthcare, education, and employment, and the implementation of programs that support small and medium enterprises, which can then provide more employment opportunities. Finally, to address Yemen's problem with IDPs, the IsDB can support organizations such as the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR) and the International Organization for Migration (IOM) with their programs that help IDPs receive healthcare, education, and economic opportunities, as well as return to their homes when possible.

CASE STUDIES OVERVIEW – ADAPTIVE/FLEXIBLE/INNOVATIVE APPROACHES TO CRISIS MANAGEMENT

As a global shock, the global COVID-19 Pandemic presents a rare possibility of conducting comparative analysis to derive insights and good practices for the promotion of resilience in different countries around the world. Going beyond quantitative analysis, nine case studies were identified for a deeper, field-based, qualitative review of specific approaches that have worked to promote resilience in different contexts. Selected to be representative across regions (from West Africa, the Sahel, Southern Africa, Central Asia, and the Middle East), size (small, medium, and large populations), economy (low income, lower-middle class, and upper-middle class) and resilience/risk profile, these nine case studies derive key lessons learned for the promotion of resilience across all of IsDB's MCs and complement the previous country case studies conducted as part of the first IsDB Resilience Report.

In examining the nine case studies above and their potential implications, several key themes arise that should serve as a basis for further consideration in terms of investing in and promoting resilience more broadly, for pandemic recovery as well as preparedness for future shocks.

1. Pandemic preparedness must go beyond health systems:

In some countries, the pandemic expressed itself mainly as an economic crisis or a social crisis. Some countries with weak health systems did better than those with stronger health systems. These complexities suggest that resilience across all five Dimensions is necessary for pandemic preparedness, not the Health Dimension alone. The role of religious institutions, private sector, and civil society is key to advocating for and implementing of social distancing guidelines, mask-wearing, and handwashing. Government-led social protection systems are necessary to support vulnerable people in lockdown, jobless, and displaced populations, and to prevention of community spread. These and other measures steps are key priorities even before targeted investments in the health system if the compounding destabilizing effects of a pandemic are to be managed effectively.

2. Investing in women and youth:

Investing in women and youth addresses multiple sources of fragility, including economic vulnerability and poverty. The Togo case study illustrated the significance of the family unit in mitigating these economic challenges, as well as how close-knit communities, including religious and/or traditional leaders of all genders, can serve as examples of inclusive, bottom-up sources of resilience. Supporting local leaders, especially women and youth organizations, in informal conflict mediation and reconciliation prevents conflict escalation and builds social cohesion, while potentially decreasing community and domestic violence. Identifying local women's groups and incorporating women in peacebuilding and security sectors can serve to decrease community-level and national-level violence and insecurity. Empowering women and youth in certain sectors, such as land reform initiatives, has also proven beneficial to increasing their resilience and helping to address both environmental pressures generally, and building grassroots investment and local ownership specifically. Tajikistan is remarkably forward thinking in its approaches to youth and women's empowerment in this regard, which has been especially important given the noted youth bulge and demographic composition of women-headed households. By mainstreaming women and youth into economic and environmental development programming, Tajikistan is improving both the current and future prospects of economic resilience, while empowering women and youth.



The Togo case study illustrated the significance of the family unit in mitigating these economic challenges, as well as how close-knit communities, including religious and/or traditional leaders of all genders, can serve as examples of inclusive, bottom-up sources of resilience.



3. Investing in Access to Education for Longer-term Resilience Building:

Another common theme across the case studies is the importance of investing in broad access to education, which is vital across all five Dimensions. In the event of a pandemic, or other major shocks, the education system is a lynchpin to an effective, coordinated response. Mozambique stands out as one country that has embraced this approach to resilience promotion. In 2000, the Ministry of Education began a process of decentralization, implementing a system in which 20 percent of the national basic education curriculum would be developed locally, followed by a program that eliminated all fees for primary education, which had been a major constraint to education access. At the same time, the Ministry, supported by the World Bank and other donors, began implementing the Direct Support to Schools (DSS) program for the purchase of materials like textbooks, which is intended to promote the dual objectives of improving educational quality and of decentralizing decision making and resource management. These efforts were also accompanied by a significant increase in public spending on education and were successful in increasing access to education, with gross primary school enrollment nearly doubling in two decades between 1999 and 2019, and big increases in female access to education. Literacy rates have climbed as well, with adult and youth literacy rates both increasing by around twenty-five percentage points since 1997.

In Pakistan, with a high youth population, the IsDB has adopted social advancement as a key goal by supporting various programs targeted at promoting sustainable development, including access to education. The IsDB supported the Transform Fund Call for Innovation, a program that allows innovators an opportunity to grow their business through the provision of seed money, with one of the resultant projects funding a remote education provider for female doctors, which not only has opened pathways to higher education but also improved access specifically for women. Additionally, the IsDB also has worked with the Pakistani government in fostering the resilience of future generations by offering scholarships to Pakistani students to study at elite colleges outside the country.

Similarly, in Mauritania, students came together in 2018 to present a report, *National Higher Education and the Harvest of the Unilateral Pathways*, on the challenges facing higher education in the country, which, in part, assisted bilateral and multilateral organizations like USAID to target these gaps by supporting technical and vocational skills training for vulnerable populations to promote their integration into labor markets. Comparable programs are supported by the IsDB, which helps to increase access to higher education for promising students by funding scholarship programs. The recipients of these scholarships often return to their home country and use their education to better their community, demonstrating how these investments promote longer-term resilience.

4. Leveraging Strategic Partnerships to Build Resilience

A country's ability to leverage strategic partnerships was key to resilience, specifically regarding the pandemic and more broadly. Partnerships within regional and multilateral organizations, as well as with bilateral donor partners were key to capacity building, humanitarian response, and development. These partnerships, when well-coordinated with local institutions, agencies, and organizations, and in alignment with national strategies, were able to fill critical gaps and scale up the impact of response efforts. Strategic partnerships increased cooperation in trade and infrastructure, attracted foreign direct investment, enhanced competency-based education, empowered the participation of women and youth in agricultural and land reform initiatives, and modernized healthcare institutions. For example, Tajikistan has partnered with its neighbors across Central Asia to participate in financial and climate disaster resilience programming funded through the World Bank and USAID. The objective of these trans-national programs is to improve risk informed investment planning around critical infrastructure, with a focus on cross-border issues. These included, for example, farmers in the Zeravshan Valley who receive specialized training aimed at expanding the use of climate-adapted agricultural technologies and the reconstruction and reinforcement of river embankments and essential bridges in the Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Oblast. These programs, and the others like them, leverage cross-border relationships to build more effective and efficient partnerships with multilateral donors, increasing climate and financial resilience regionally as well as locally.

5. Build Upon Proven Mechanisms and Platforms and Harnessing Innovation

The importance of building upon existing mechanisms and platforms to leverage entry points for the maximization of efforts, and to limit their duplication, was a theme that cut across multiple case studies. For example, in Cote d'Ivoire, civil society organizations have laid the groundwork for long-term resilience over the years and have been key collaborators, both with the national government as well as with international organizations, on resilience-building, as demonstrated during the COVID-19 pandemic. The nature of the emergency allowed Côte d'Ivoire to build upon the foundation of resilience established during the EVD epidemic from the preceding three years, including successful partnerships between and among government, civil society, and international donors. Similarly, in Togo, a WhatsApp platform called Akofa which was established by UNFPA and run by the government, provides information and help to GBV victims. During the pandemic, this platform was mobilized and used as part of awareness-raising campaigns and public health messaging to reduce the spread of COVID-19.

In Yemen, where an ongoing civil war and humanitarian emergency has devastated nearly every sector, the existence of ongoing international and bilateral programs have been built upon to maximize impacts in a highly insecure environment. International organizations such as the International Organization for Migration (IOM), which for years has provided frontline humanitarian assistance, plan to provide camp coordination and management, protection, movement assistance, health support, provision of water, sanitation and hygiene, shelter, displacement tracking, and more amid the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic. Organizations like Doctors Without Borders, who have been active in the country for years, also train and equip local health care providers who, in turn, have managed to show remarkable resilience in the face of mounting health and humanitarian crises.

Several countries demonstrated remarkable innovation to build resilience. The health crisis engulfed countries even at the cutting edge of 'modern' medicine, forcing other countries who have long struggled with healthcare access to innovate out of necessity. Faced with a significant disparity between healthcare access in urban and rural areas, Kazakhstan used the railroad system to transport emergency services to rural areas. Three trains were fully staffed with medical personnel, diagnostic and radiology equipment, and also able to provide dental and minor outpatient surgery services. Established to serve regions in the north, south, and east-west regions of Kazakhstan, from 2010 to 2014, these trains treated tens of thousands of people living in rural locations, and the program is still in effect today. By utilizing existing infrastructure, combined with an innovative approach, Kazakhstan found a unique solution to limited healthcare access within its borders. This program should stand as role model as the world continues to face unprecedented needs for healthcare innovation and resilience.

POLICY DIRECTION FOR RESILIENCE

The findings from the case studies suggest the need for a general orientation that prizes adaptive, flexible, and innovative approaches for pandemic recovery and preparedness. Examples that surfaced in the countries of Côte d'Ivoire, Togo, Mozambique, Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, Iraq, Pakistan, Mauritania, and Yemen specifically included appropriate technology, community-based structures, social cohesion, investing in vulnerable groups and populations, education, and partnerships. Extrapolating from these examples, several overarching areas of policy direction include a strategic focus on localization, relationships, flexibility, context, and synergy. To the extent that global and international development requires scalability, efficiency, and standardization, this focus on context and flexibility can be seen as in tension with conventional practices. However, as will be further sharpened in the conclusions and recommendation below, there are practical and concrete ways in which governments, development partners, and the private sector can prioritize and structure the allocation of resources, regulations, and incentives in a way that is catalytic to development such that communities are better positioned for prevention, preparedness, and recovery.

These five principles are key to all five dimensions of resilience, whether in response to a crisis of Environment/Natural Disaster, Health/Pandemics, Economy/Livelihoods, Human Security, or Forced Displacement. These were highlighted in the case studies, showing the need for dynamic, contextually relevant, interventions during conflict, pandemics, and shocks to livelihoods. For concrete, operational guidance on how these principles can be implemented in practice, see the conclusions and recommendations below.

Localization	Relationships
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Localization is critical for rapid delivery of resources to areas of highest need. To this end, many governments have decentralized to ensure representative leadership at subnational and local levels so that the needs of the local population are addressed by decision makers even in areas remote from the main population centers or the seat of federal government. Beyond the formal decentralization of governance structures, there is need for capacity building for local governments and agencies so that in the event of a health crisis or a natural disaster, resources can be quickly mobilized. At the project level, hiring and procurement should seek to source locally to increase social license to operate, as well as to benefit the local economy. Through localization, there are fewer bottlenecks and more efficiency, in the delivery of services, product, and capital. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Relationships are necessary for buy-in and social capital. This includes all strategic partnerships at the country, sector, program, and project level, such as with implementing partners, decision makers, clients, and beneficiaries. Some national assets, such as a hydropower plant or other major infrastructure, may be under the jurisdiction of the federal government, but still require a proactive approach to community engagement taking into consideration the social impact of the project at the local level. In conflict-affected environments, it is especially important to have a good understanding of who the formal and informal power brokers and influencers might be. Scoping can be done through a Strategic Partnership Rapid Appraisal and/or a social network mapping/analysis process.
Flexibility	Context Synergy
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Flexibility is necessary for programs and projects to adapt in a rapidly changing risk environment. This is important in projects with both long and short project cycles. At the design phase, a results chain logic model can be more dynamic, for instance, than a more traditional logical framework, which tends to be more static and linear. After Action Reviews (AAR) should be regularly undertaken as well as regularly updating Security Risk Assessments (SRA) and Security Management Plans (SMP) rather than updating them every several years as is often the case. Where possible, interventions should start with pilot projects and then adapt and scale. Early Warning systems should be integrated into the project cycle to ensure that adjustments and course correction is taking place as needed. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Context must be considered as an approach in one location may not work in another, whether due to absorptive capacity or socio-cultural considerations. Projects must conduct a contextual risk assessment for Do No Harm and conflict sensitivity. Consider the impact of a major project on the local economy, including the potential for in-migration and rising prices. Appropriate technology must be used to ensure uptake by clients and beneficiaries, as well as capacity building in how to use that technology. • Synergy, when optimized, can create multiplier effects and virtuous cycles well beyond the immediate outputs of the program, project, or activity. After taking into account localization, relationships, flexibility, and context, development efforts should be implemented in such a way as to create mutual buy-in and benefit, creating a crowding-in effect of businesses, trade, and investment. Development strategies should seek to strengthening value chains so that Micro, Small, and Medium Enterprises (MSMEs) can access finance, inputs, and organize in such a way as to compete and take their product to market. Another example of synergy is a cluster approach to humanitarian response, which coordinates response actors and minimizes gaps in the delivery of assistance.

CONCLUSIONS/RECOMMENDATIONS

Building sustainable resilience requires synthesized investment across all five dimensions. Just as shocks and pressures on one dimension bleed into the others, so too must the projects and programs meant to build resilience.

If development strategies are designed to key into existing structures, forge cross-cutting partnerships, and reward innovation, then countries and communities will be more resilient in the face of shocks and pressures, and recover more quickly when disasters occur.

Over the past year, the COVID-19 pandemic has served as a global stress test of resilience over the past year, with cascading and compounding impacts across all five of the IsDB dimensions of resilience. Some countries, presumed to be resilient, turned out to be less so. Others withstood the interdimensional impacts of the pandemic far better than their wealthier counterparts, showing remarkable resilience. Therefore, in preparing for a pandemic, countries must go beyond focusing on health systems alone, as what may start as a health crisis can quickly become a broader crisis with social, economic, and political dimensions. The health-related restrictions on movement and lockdowns, massive job losses in formal and informal sectors, supply chain interruptions, fluctuations in commodity prices, and economic downturns had broad impacts on businesses and livelihoods. However, as profiled throughout this report, countries where there were early and consistent action and enforcement of lockdowns, combined with social protection and support for those whose lives were affected, could weather the COVID-19 pandemic and its cascading effects far better than anticipated.

A recurrent and pervasive finding in the literature and the case studies, is that there is an important distinction to be made between scale on the one hand, and resilience on the other. While any health system, infrastructure project, or education program does require the budget, staffing, property, and other resources to meet the needs of the population, reaching the requisite scale should not be achieved at the expense of the resilience of those systems. If scale is achieved through centralized, replicable, turnkey approaches that prize efficiency above all else, resilience tends toward scope, decentralization, redundancy, and linkages because an overdependence on any single grid or commodity, or structure can be vulnerable no matter how large. Scale is about standardization. Resilience is highly contextual.

In West Africa, for example, countries were able to apply valuable lessons and structures from the response to the Ebola Virus Disease from 2014-2016. Côte d'Ivoire, a neighbor to two epicenter countries, quickly adopted both proactive and reactive measures in response to the COVID-19 emergency. These measures included multi-stakeholder coordination across sectors and among national and international actors, including the implementation of the World Bank's Côte d'Ivoire COVID-19 SPRP, which complemented national efforts on infrastructure preparedness and case management. Sensitization and information dissemination campaigns were also well-coordinated and engaged stakeholders at all levels, including religious leaders, women, and youth. In Togo, one of West Africa's poorest nations, a digital cash transfer program was implemented during the three-month curfew period from April to June 2020 to support workers in the informal economy, who comprise a majority of Togo's workforce, in particular women and youth.

In Mozambique, severe natural disasters and a growing insurgency were also compounded by the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic, causing internal displacement and driving migration. However, as highlighted in the case study on Mozambique, the country also had learned from years of experience managing multiple compounding crises, which allowed it to show some notable resiliencies this past year. Particularly in terms of coordination, like Cote d'Ivoire, the Mozambican government has been proactive in coordinating across sectors for national and international efforts alike. Additionally, Mozambique has also empowered local actors who have specific contextual knowledge and a capacity to mobilize for a faster response, particularly in the areas of education and disaster risk management. The government's investment in emergency preparedness, coordination, empowering local response, and specifically empowering women and girls proved highly valuable during the COVID-19 pandemic, which might have otherwise caused further destabilization.

In other IsDB MCs, even beyond the ones spotlighted in the case studies, strong community support systems, a history of coordination and civil society engagement, and experience managing multifaceted humanitarian crises helped weather the COVID-19 pandemic without widespread destabilizing effects. As noted in the chapter on Forced Displacement, Uganda, despite having shut its borders early to prevent the spread of the virus, recognized the simultaneous humanitarian emergency brewing in neighboring DRC and opened its borders to receive those fleeing the violence. Turkey, which currently hosts the largest refugee population in the world, also has a strong history of domestic and international coordination in the face of crises and was able to provide critical cash assistance to those who had lost their jobs and livelihoods during the pandemic. A widespread public information campaign, targeted specifically at Syrian refugee communities who do not share a common language with their host nation, was also crucial in raising public awareness around the risks and necessary preventative measures to control the spread. Jordan, another country hosting one of the largest refugee populations per capita in the world, ensured continued access to free public education during the pandemic, and coordinated with international donors such as UNHCR and UNICEF to institute distance learning courses that have now been fully integrated into the Ministry of Education's national education platform.

As the IsDB's operational strategy for fragility and resilience focuses on investing in prevention, the above examples, plus others throughout this report, highlight where strategic investment could strengthen national resiliencies for preparedness. Additionally, in highlighting where IsDB's MCs lie on a continuum of relative stability to potential escalation, it helps identify countries that may not currently be in active crisis but would be highly vulnerable in the event of a future shock and benefit from strategic and targeted investments. As noted in the introduction, resilience is not just the ability to bounce back from a shock but also the ability to manage and mitigate pressures that present an ongoing and sustained source of stress on the overall system. If allowed to compound, these pressures degrade the capacity of countries to respond to shocks such as a global pandemic or weather emergency.

In the near term, the focus of development and humanitarian actors will be on managing the ongoing pandemic and access to vaccines, especially through investments in health infrastructure and social protection systems. Then, prioritizing governance and social cohesion, and investing in other identified areas of resilience, efforts can build upon the necessary capacities for recovery and preparedness for the next shock, whether that be a global pandemic, weather crisis, or another humanitarian emergency. Investing in initiatives that simultaneously shore up both national and local resiliencies, as well as promote collective action and shared sacrifice are key to helping build capacities for both prevention, mitigation, and management in the face of a future shock like the COVID-19 pandemic.

Recommendations: The first resilience report identified 22 recommendations within three broad categories: 1) Understanding Resilience, 2) Investing in Resilience, and 3) Programming for Resilience. Similarly, this report highlights the need for improved statistics and analysis regarding health, market systems/value chain analysis, and stakeholder network mapping. Investing in preparedness, education, and rural development to include the role of faith-based institutions and the private sector are vital for broad-based, inclusive systems of resilience. Programs and strategies should be conflict- and gender-sensitive, at the level of design, hiring, procurement, monitoring and evaluation, implementation, and close-out. To ensure relevance, effectiveness and sustainability, projects and programs can be piloted, before being scaled and replicated for wider impact. Private sector resources can be leveraged, through public-private initiatives, as well as setting conditions for loans to mainstream resilience into the business practices of companies. But the most important finding to come out of this report is that resilience to a health crisis must go far beyond a narrow focus on the health system itself. Some countries with very strong health systems did worse than those with weak health systems. A health crisis is not just a health crisis and preparedness must include everything from governance, to education, the role of civil society, social protection, infrastructure, and security, among others.

Given these complexities, there is a need for an integrated, strategic approach to resilience promotion that links relief, recovery, as well as development, and creates an enabling environment for a catalytic effect on the one hand and a crowding-in effect on the other, so that development accumulates naturally over time, in a way that is organic, contextual, relevant, and therefore resilient.

The Resilience Index which was used to structure this report, can serve as a baseline for evaluating the success of IsDB's resilience agenda. But while quantitative metrics are useful for impact assessment, for evaluating the effectiveness of resilience programming, it is very important and to also undertake process evaluations equally, to capture the highly contextual factors and to determine if what worked in one country can be applied in another, or to better understand how a strategy can be better contextualized to succeed in a particular environment.

Recognizing the need for contextually grounded, flexible, and adaptive approaches to building resilience, eight possible areas of policy focus are as follows.

- 1. Track 1 and 2 Regional Cooperation** are key to preparedness and effective response to pressures and shocks. Given shared water basins, cross-border affinity groups, migration, power grids, infrastructure corridors, and trade, countries must have platforms and mechanisms to coordinate policies regionally and mobilize resources to address matters of urgent concern if a crisis in one country is to be mitigated before it grows and spreads. Togo's membership in WACOM is an excellent example of such regional cooperation. Due to the potential regional impacts of coastal erosion in West Africa – such as displacement, spread of disease, and disruption of trade – regional agreement on guidelines to reduce erosion promotes resilience and decreases the risk of crises. Countries should seek similar cooperation on the unique issues impacting their respective regions. In addition to formal inter-governmental partnerships, emphasis should be placed on relationships among regional and cross-border communities and grassroots organizations. This may include exchanges of shared education or health resources or exchanges in remote villages or civil society organizations which are establishing Global South-South connections using lessons learned in similar political or environmental circumstances.
- 2. Mainstream key resilience lessons and findings, and strategies across and among diverse stakeholder networks**, including government, the private sector, the non-profit sector, and local communities. This should include sensitizing critical concepts, incorporating resilience into national and local strategies, and providing an appropriate budget to strengthen resilience. This mainstreaming across sectors can enhance cross-program synergies and proper accounting for, and targeting of, second- and third-order impacts for maximum resilience promotion. For example, climate adaptation programs can also be structured to empower women and stimulate the economy. Green jobs programs, such as Pakistan's nationwide tree planting initiative, are particularly well-positioned to stimulate the economy, provide incomes, and build environmental resilience.
- 3. "Brain drain," or out-migration of skilled workers, should be mitigated** through incentives, jobs programs, and localized resilience building. But at the same time, in cases where net migration is high, remittances should be leveraged for development and humanitarian response. Programs like the IsDB-France and IsDB-McGill Scholarship programs provide opportunities for students to attend some of the most elite colleges in the world while promoting their return to IsDB regions at the conclusion of their studies. Programs like these award high performing individuals and incentivize using their talents to improve regional development and resilience building.
- 4. Scale and localize rural health infrastructures and delivery systems with a focus on pandemic response.** Systems developed over the course of the COVID-19 pandemic should be maintained. Rather than being treated as ad-hoc emergency expenses, countries should solidify their pandemic response structures and incorporate them into their permanent public health systems. This will not only render them better able to handle the inevitable flare-ups and new COVID variants that will emerge over the coming years, but it will also build their capacity to deal with other endemic diseases and health pressures. Pre-existing health infrastructures in West Africa, developed over the past decade in response to the Ebola virus have proven crucial to the region's relative resilience to the COVID 19 pandemic. In the same way, structures and practices being developed now can increase preparedness for the next epidemic or pandemic. Innovations include mobile health clinics that meet people where they are to improve access. This should be scaled up as it will be crucial in increasing the uptake of vaccines and the provision of a range of basic health services to rural and marginalized populations.

5. **Leverage the public education system for resilience promotion, beyond individual learning.** The public education system may be the single most important institution at the intersection of the state and the population, for integration, social cohesion, prevention of radicalization, psychosocial support, and as a platform for deploying social protection services, in addition to the longer-term income generation potential for the most vulnerable and the economic outlook of the country. Countries with fewer natural resources often invest heavily in education as a tool for building social and human capital, which multiplies dividends in remittances and regional influence policy and attracts foreign investment. Programs like the PNDSE in Mauritania have helped the country capitalize on its youthful population and prevent radicalization. Similar programs, particularly focusing on public education for rural communities and women, should be developed and promoted. Further, It is essential that the schools not only exist in places reachable by student populations, but that the education system is prepared for further shocks, such as a pandemic that closes all public gathering spaces. Schools, teachers, and students in many areas were forced to put their education on hold while more developed countries shifted online. Thus, public education access includes increased internet saturation rates, digital literacy, technology adoption, and community socialization.
6. **Leverage civil society for social cohesion and collaboration.** Civil society networks are vital, not just for accountability and governance, but as a critical tool for bridging ethnic, communal, and religious divides and reducing group-based polarization, which otherwise could lead to conflict. In the event of a shock, a divided population tends to become even more divided. Civil society networks should be cultivated and empowered to promote social cohesion, which is a prerequisite to resilience, even before health and emergency response systems. In turn, empowered local communities are often the first line of defence in responding to shocks such as natural disasters. Early warning and rapid response systems at the local level can be crucial tools in building a bottom-up resilience structure better able to respond when disasters strike.
7. **Prepare Social Protection Systems.** Social Protection should be well in place before a shock occurs. As natural or human-made disasters disrupt livelihoods, insurance schemes, unemployment benefits, cash and food distribution, loans, and utility assistance should all be prepositioned with clear financing and rapid deployment plans. In particular, direct digital cash transfers and micro-credit institutions geared toward women have proven to be crucial lifelines throughout the pandemic. These are essential tools that should remain in the arsenal of governments moving forward.
8. **Invest Strategically in Digitalization for Education and Livelihoods.** Digitization proved to be a lifeline for vulnerable populations during the worst of the pandemic, facilitating much-needed cash transfers within and across borders; improving access to digital banking; improving and expanding the reach of social welfare and healthcare systems; enabling educational continuity; limiting the impacts on livelihoods; providing innovative app-based solutions to myriad challenges; providing assistance to GBV victims; and contributing to the economic inclusion of women by boosting e-commerce. The COVID-19 pandemic proved to be a stress test for many countries' digital infrastructure, fostering innovation. Efforts must be made to continue this path, while ensuring that digitization does not paper over cracks – such as education access disparity – at the expense of addressing underlying institutional and societal issues. Furthermore, disparities in internet access will only deepen inequalities as digitization takes hold, and so internet penetration should be inclusive. At the same time, consider potential issues of cyber-security, privacy, social alienation/mental health, and radicalization/hate speech that gain salience in a more online world.

Finally, Multilateral Development Banks and Regional Organizations are a vitally important cohort in this space of resilience promotion. Many of these are increasingly proactive in the development of and innovation on indices and analysis tools for diagnosis and prognosis of risk and resilience, to set priorities and frame deliberations on strategic and operational plans. The IsDB Resilience Index is the latest contribution to this space and presents an opportunity for joint, comparative analysis with other institutions and tools. Drawing on these resources, Resilience Working Groups with other MDBs and regional organizations, and collaborative research will go a long way toward problem identification, synergy, and planning for a more responsive and forward-looking development agenda in 2022 and beyond. In support of these and other platforms and dialogues, the IsDB will be producing a series of resilience reports focused on specific dimensions of resilience, to explore how to build on existing systems and structures more strategically, and to promote sustainable development in a rapidly changing world.

Dimension	Key Corresponding Recommendations	Examples of Programs that are Scalable and Cross-Cutting/Interdimensional
Environment and Natural Disasters	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Track 1 and 2 Regional Cooperation Mainstream key resilience lessons, findings, and strategies across and among diverse stakeholder networks Leverage the public education system for resilience promotion Leverage Civil society for social cohesion and collaboration 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Green Jobs Programs Regional Cooperation Programs and Regional Cooperative Agreements/ Commitments to reduce impacts of climate change and confront harmful environmental practices. Youth Training and Education/ Awareness-Raising Programs on Environmental Sustainability Community Training and Awareness-raising campaigns for Early Warning on Natural Disasters and Natural Disaster Preparedness Climate Adaptation Programs that engage women and youth specifically
Health and Pandemics	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Track 1 and 2 Regional Cooperation Mainstream key resilience lessons, findings, and strategies across and among diverse stakeholder networks Scale and Localize Rural Health infrastructures and Delivery Systems Leverage Civil society for social cohesion and collaboration 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Mobile health clinics able to access rural and isolated populations Direct digital cash transfer programs Microcredit and financing schemes, with a focus on women
Economy and Livelihoods	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Mainstream key resilience lessons, findings, and strategies across and among diverse stakeholder networks Mitigate brain drain Leverage the public education system for resilience promotion Leverage Civil society for social cohesion and collaboration Prepare Social Protection Systems Invest Strategically in Digitalization 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Microfinance programs and establishment of microfinance institutions with focus on women and youth Jobs and skills training programs Investment and training in clean energy and alternative technology programs, particularly in sectors like artisanal and small-scale gold mining (ASGM).
Human Security	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Track 1 and 2 Regional Cooperation Mainstream key resilience lessons, findings, and strategies across and among diverse stakeholder networks Leverage the public education system for resilience promotion Leverage Civil society for social cohesion and collaboration Prepare Social Protection Systems 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Civil society engagement and network building. Jobs and skills training across sectors. Establishing/building/coordinating local early warning and disaster preparedness networks
Forced Displacement:	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Track 1 and 2 Regional Cooperation Mainstream key resilience lessons, findings, and strategies across and among diverse stakeholder networks Leverage Civil society for social cohesion and collaboration Prepare Social Protection Systems 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Microcredit programs and lending schemes for refugees and IDPs, especially women and youth. Education programs, language and jobs training programs.

APPENDIX: RESILIENCE SCORES BY COUNTRY

Country	Environment/ Natural Disasters	Health/ Pandemics	Economy/ Livelihoods	Human Security	Forced Displacement	Total
Afghanistan	2.3	3.4	3.5	3.6	3.1	16.0
Albania	7.2	7.6	6.5	6.3	7.3	34.9
Algeria	5.7	6.7	5.1	7.1	7.0	31.5
Azerbaijan	7.2	7.7	6.0	6.8	5.7	33.5
Bahrain	7.0	8.5	6.5	7.0	5.8	34.9
Bangladesh	5.0	4.8	5.4	5.3	3.8	24.3
Benin	4.1	3.6	4.9	4.4	5.1	22.1
Brunei Darussalam	8.3	8.8	7.0	8.6	6.9	39.7
Burkina Faso	3.7	3.3	4.7	5.1	6.1	23.0
Cameroon	4.1	3.7	4.3	3.3	5.3	20.6
Chad	2.5	1.5	2.6	3.9	2.4	12.9
Comoros	2.7	4.0	4.0	4.2	2.1	16.9
Cote d'Ivoire	4.7	4.0	4.7	3.7	4.1	21.2
Djibouti	4.2	4.6	4.8	5.7	4.4	23.6
Egypt	5.1	6.4	5.5	5.5	4.7	27.2
Gabon	5.8	4.8	5.0	4.4	4.7	24.7
Gambia	4.0	4.0	4.4	3.9	5.4	21.6
Guinea	3.6	3.6	3.2	3.9	3.7	18.1
Guinea-Bissau	3.2	3.3	3.6	4.6	3.8	18.5
Guyana	6.1	6.4	5.2	5.3	6.3	29.3
Indonesia	6.6	5.2	7.1	5.9	6.1	30.9
Iran	5.7	7.5	5.5	5.8	5.6	30.1
Iraq	3.8	5.3	3.7	5.0	4.8	22.6
Jordan	6.7	7.0	6.4	8.3	5.5	33.8
Kazakhstan	8.1	7.9	6.2	6.4	6.4	34.9
Kuwait	7.4	9.4	6.0	6.7	7.7	37.2
Kyrgyzstan	6.6	7.3	6.0	5.6	7.2	32.7
Lebanon	5.0	6.5	6.0	6.4	6.2	30.1
Libya	3.4	7.0	3.5	3.7	5.5	23.0
Malaysia	8.1	7.6	7.8	6.7	6.7	36.9
Maldives	6.9	8.9	6.0	5.7	7.2	34.6
Mali	3.6	3.1	4.5	4.3	5.1	20.6

Mauritania	4.1	3.8	4.0	4.1	3.2	19.2
Morocco	6.1	6.0	7.1	6.6	5.7	31.4
Mozambique	3.4	3.1	4.1	3.6	5.4	19.6
Niger	3.0	2.6	3.9	3.9	5.5	19.0
Nigeria	3.1	2.6	3.8	3.6	4.4	17.4
Oman	7.1	8.1	6.2	6.7	7.6	35.7
Pakistan	4.1	4.0	4.3	5.1	4.9	22.4
Palestine	3.8	6.3	5.5	4.4	4.6	24.7
Qatar	7.3	9.2	6.8	5.3	6.7	35.2
Saudi Arabia	7.5	8.5	6.1	7.6	7.2	36.9
Senegal	4.4	4.1	5.0	5.4	5.6	24.5
Sierra Leone	3.2	3.2	3.7	3.6	4.9	18.7
Somalia	1.3	1.6	2.9	3.0	1.9	10.6
Sudan	2.6	3.1	3.6	3.7	2.9	15.9
Suriname	6.7	7.7	4.8	6.0	6.2	31.4
Syrian Arab Rep.	3.6	5.7	4.2	5.0	3.7	22.2
Tajikistan	5.7	5.8	4.9	4.8	5.0	26.2
Togo	3.4	3.2	4.9	4.6	4.1	20.3
Tunisia	6.3	6.9	6.7	6.6	6.9	33.4
Turkey	6.7	7.6	6.9	5.8	6.6	33.6
Turkmenistan	5.8	7.4	4.1	6.4	5.4	29.1
Uganda	4.2	3.9	5.4	4.0	4.9	22.4
United Arab Emirates	8.1	8.9	7.0	7.2	7.7	38.9
Uzbekistan	6.6	8.0	5.9	5.5	6.5	32.4
Yemen	2.2	2.4	3.4	2.5	1.8	12.2

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