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Islamic Development Bank

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2025 RESILIENCE REPORT

"CLIMATE, CONFLICT AND RESILIENCE: PATHWAYS TO SUSTAINABLE AND INCLUSIVE SOLUTIONS"

MAY 2025

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ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

CEOBS	Conflict and Environment Observatory
CFU	Climate Funds Update
COP	Conference of the Parties
ECOWAS	The Economic Community of West African States
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
GCF	Green Climate Fund
GEF	Global Environment Facility
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IDMC	Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre
IFAD	International Fund for Agricultural Development
IIED	International Institute for Environment and Development
IISD	International Institute for Sustainable Development
IsDB	Islamic Development Bank
ISFD	Islamic Solidarity Fund for Development
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IOM	International Organization for Migration
IPCC	Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
ISPI	Institute for International Political Studies
MBDs	Multilateral Development Banks
MCs	Member Countries
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
OCHA	United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
SPARC	Supporting Pastoralism and Agriculture in Recurrent and Protracted Crises
UN	United Nations
UNCCD	United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNEP	United Nations Environment Programme
UNESCWA	United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia
UNFCCC	United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
WFP	World Food Programme
WHO	World Health Organization

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PREFACE

We are living in an era defined by compounding crises, where conflict, climate shocks, and fragility increasingly converge to disrupt lives, reverse development gains, and threaten global peace and stability. Nowhere is this convergence more acute than in fragile and conflict-affected settings, where communities already grappling with violence and weak institutions now face the growing burden of a changing climate. Among the Islamic Development Bank's 57 Member Countries (MCs), 33 are classified as fragile and conflict affected countries. Though they have contributed the least to global climate change, they are among the most exposed to its most severe impacts; frequent, intense, and unpredictable shocks that strain essential services, disrupt livelihoods, and fracture social cohesion.

This third edition of the IsDB's Resilience Report, Climate, Conflict and Resilience: Pathways to Sustainable and Inclusive Solutions, reflects a joint commitment to addressing these intersecting challenges. Produced in collaboration with the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), and Qatar Charity, and the Islamic Solidarity Fund for Development (ISFD), the report underscores the value of cross-sectoral partnerships in generating evidence, fostering dialogue, and driving action.

The report explores the complex interplay between climate and conflict in fragile settings and how these dynamics shape the lived experiences of vulnerable communities. Grounded in the IsDB Resilience Index, it applies five analytical lenses, environment and natural disasters, health and pandemics, economic and livelihoods, human security, and forced displacement to assess resilience across nine conflict-affected countries namely, Afghanistan, Chad, Iraq, Mali, Nigeria, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, and Yemen. It identifies the opportunities and barriers to building resilience, and offers actionable recommendations to governments, development and humanitarian actors, and civil society.

Key findings confirm that conflict and climate risks are mutually reinforcing and intensifying existing vulnerabilities. In such contexts, building resilience requires integrated, flexible, and long-term approaches that move beyond siloed responses. The report highlights the importance of stronger coordination among peace, humanitarian, and development actors, as well as the need for financing models that match the complexity and longevity of the challenges at hand.

This report reflects the Bank's enduring commitment to supporting its MCs through an evidence-based approach, strategic guidance, and inclusive partnerships. By deepening our understanding of fragility and resilience, we aim to help chart a path toward more secure, sustainable, and equitable futures for the communities most at risk.

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Produced by the Resilience and Climate Action (RCA) Department, this report represents a significant milestone in the Bank's ongoing commitment to building resilience across its Member Countries. We are especially grateful for the leadership and encouragement of the Vice President, Operations, whose guidance has been critical in achieving this outcome.

The report was developed and finalized by a core team comprising Esra Sayhi, Abass Sheikh, Mohamed Al Amin Mohamed Al Hadi, and Moustapha Ibrahim Sambo Diallo, with coordination and logistical support provided by Ruba Bin Rabbaa. Their dedication and collaborative spirit were essential to the successful completion of the report.

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Dr. Issa Faye

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Director General- Global Practice & Partnerships (DG-GPP)
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DEFINITIONS OF KEY TERMS

Adaptation: The process of adjustment to actual or expected climate change and its effects, to moderate harm or exploit beneficial opportunities. Human intervention can facilitate this adjustment in human systems (IPCC, Glossary).

Armed Conflict: There is no standard definition of situations of armed conflict. Under international law, any resort to armed force between states constitutes an international armed conflict, regardless of the intensity of violence. Protracted armed violence between governmental authorities and organized armed groups or between such groups within a State is considered a non-international armed conflict when non-state parties are organized, and the violence reaches a certain level of intensity (ICRC, 2024). In social sciences, the primary factors to determine if a country is in active conflict are the number of fatalities and the frequency of violent events.

Climate Finance: Local, national, or transnational financing drawn from public, private and alternative sources of financing that seeks to support mitigation and adaptation actions that will address climate change (UNFCCC).

Climate Resilient Development: A process of implementing greenhouse gas mitigation and adaptation options to support sustainable development for all (IPCC Sixth Assessment Report, 18.1).

Conflict Prevention: The wide range of actions, interventions, programs, activities, mechanisms, and procedures that address structural threats, prevent the escalation of tensions into violent conflict in addition to preventing the continuation or recurrence of violent conflict (UNDP).

Environmental degradation: The reduction of the capacity of the environment to meet social and ecological objectives and needs (UN International Strategy for Disaster Reduction).

Fragility: Defined as the combination of exposure to risk and insufficient coping capacity of the state, system, and/or communities to manage, absorb, or mitigate those risks. Fragility can lead to negative outcomes, including violence, the breakdown of institutions, displacement, humanitarian crises, or other emergencies. It encompasses the inability of states to fulfil responsibilities as a sovereign entity because of the lack of legitimacy, authority, and/or capacity (IsDB).

Human security: According to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), human security is achieved when the essential aspects of human life are safeguarded, allowing individuals the freedom and ability to live with dignity. In the context of climate change, this vital core encompasses both universal and culturally specific material and non-material elements that enable people to pursue their interests (IPCC Fifth Assessment Report,12).

Resilience: The ability to positively adapt and transform households, communities, and state structures and the means to respond to risks, stresses, and shocks. Resilient states and communities are characterized by stable social and political contracts; functional, inclusive, and accountable institutions; and the provision of basic services. They can maintain political stability and prevent violent conflict (IsDB second Resilience Report).

Vulnerability: The propensity of exposed elements such as human beings, their livelihoods, and assets to suffer adverse effects when impacted by hazard events (IPCC Special Report, Managing the Risks of Extreme Events and Disasters to Advance Climate Change Adaptation). Vulnerability encompasses a variety of concepts and elements, including sensitivity or susceptibility to harm and lack of capacity to cope and adapt to shocks.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Growing climate risks and environmental degradation have a devastating impact on communities affected by armed conflict and fragility. Disruptions to weather patterns, agricultural productivity, and resource availability, coupled with the long-lasting negative impacts of conflict, create severe humanitarian needs and threaten international commitments to leave no one behind and achieve sustainable development outcomes for the most vulnerable.

This third edition of the Islamic Development Bank's biennial resilience report is the result of a collaboration between the IsDB, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), and Qatar Charity, highlighting the value of cross-sectoral partnerships and knowledge exchange. It explores the nexus between climate change, conflict, and resilience, and its impact on communities.

Fragile and conflict-affected countries are among the most vulnerable and least ready to adapt to climate shocks. This group includes 33 of the IsDB's Member Countries, making these compound risks of high relevance to the Bank's efforts. This report examines these issues through the IsDB Resilience Index and its five sectoral frames and their related themes: Environment and Natural Disaster; Health and Pandemics; Economics and Livelihoods; Human Security; Forced Displacement.

These frames are applied to nine country case studies namely, Afghanistan, Chad, Iraq, Mali, Nigeria, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, and Yemen. These case studies were selected to represent diversity in region, size, geographic, and demographic profiles, while bringing out common themes, challenges, and opportunities for action in countries affected by conflict and fragility.

Before exploring risks and opportunities for building resilience in the case study countries, the report opens with a review of the challenges and necessity of addressing climate risks in conflict settings more broadly, recognizing the impact they have on humanitarian needs and drawing on the expertise and experience of the Bank's partners. Across diverse contexts, instability, insecurity, high levels of humanitarian need, and limits on development hamper the resilience of communities and institutions, placing people at heightened risk from shocks including climate hazards and slow-onset changes to environmental conditions and variability. Addressing these risks requires comprehensive strategies that integrate climate adaptation, conflict sensitivity, prevention and resolution, and resilience-building.

The report also takes stock of the evolving climate finance landscape—the essential pool of resources through which climate risks are addressed and vital adaptation support is drawn. It highlights the current gap in climate finance reaching conflict settings, drawing from new research into this gap, which indicates the institutional and organizational barriers to scaling up finance considering the global aid and financing constraints experienced in early 2025. The report acknowledges the prior commitments already made by the international community.

Through a global analysis of trends in resilience, vulnerability and risk rooted in the IsDB's resilience index, and through desk literature and interviews with communities, experts, and academics across the country's case studies, the report surfaces a series of recommendations that build on those provided in previous IsDB Resilience Report editions, which are gathered into three clusters:

Areas of focus for the IsDB and its partners:

- Focus on local and regional efforts that are sensitive to conflict risks, climate resilience, and incorporate clear adaptation strategies,
- Support the development of adaptation plans and strategies that are equitable, sustainable, and avoid exacerbating or contributing to marginalization,
- Participate in and facilitate global, regional, and cross-sectoral mechanisms for cooperation and knowledge sharing,
- Support and lead by example on scaled-up climate finance.

Considerations for project design and operationalization, applying this focus for teams working to deliver comprehensive, inclusive projects:

1. Community engagement is essential at every step of the project,
2. Ecosystem-based adaptation and nature-based solutions are cost-effective and can have long-term impact,
3. Investing in developing early warning systems and projects enable proactive risk reduction,
4. Strengthening infrastructure resilience to both climate and conflict impacts pays dividends for communities and development outcomes,
5. Promoting livelihood diversification strategies can reduce communities' dependence on climate-sensitive sectors,
6. Establishing risk financing mechanisms that are contextually suited and accessible provide certainty and reassurance to communities,
7. Integrating conflict-sensitivity and "do no harm" approaches is an integral part of project delivery.

Implications for policy and partnership development as critical to strategic engagement on climate action, via:

- Institutional and strategic reform
- Policy engagement with communities
- Support for shared environmental and climate services
- Knowledge sharing and regional learning
- Fostering partnerships and multilateral collaboration

This report aims to serve operational teams, policymakers, and strategic leaders within the IsDB and its partners by offering clustered and concrete recommendations, as well as providing country case studies for comparison and analysis. While findings paint a stark picture of the challenges faced by many communities, they also highlight capacities for resilience that persist, even in highly unstable settings. These capacities call for a concerted effort across sectors to strengthen their resource base and provide support. Doing so is an imperative, to avoid further development reversals and build towards sustainable development for communities that are among the most vulnerable in the world.

BACKGROUND OF THE REPORT

IsDB's biennial resilience report serves as part of the Bank's contribution to generating knowledge and understanding around resilience to inform both its own practices and those of its partners. Building on the urgency and momentum around ensuring climate action is implemented in countries affected by conflict and fragility, this third edition investigates how dynamics of conflict and violence intersect with climate change to influence communities' capacity to adapt to and withstand climate-related stressors. It draws on the IsDB's Resilience Index to examine elements of resilience-building across five key dimensions: 1) Environment and Natural Disasters, 2) Health and Pandemics, 3) Economics and Livelihoods, 4) Human Security, and 5) Forced Displacement.

The report features nine country case studies – Afghanistan, Chad, Iraq, Nigeria, Mali, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, and Yemen – selected to represent a wide range of conflict dynamics, regions, risk profiles, populations, and demographics from across the IsDB's membership. Through the case studies, each of the five key dimensions is explored, highlighting the complex, context-specific ways in which climate and conflict dynamics interact, and surfacing lessons and good practice in addressing climate risks in different environments.

In this resilience report, the IsDB has partnered with the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), and Qatar Charity. This partnership reflects the differing skillsets and mandates necessary to comprehensively respond to climate risks in situations of armed conflict and violence. It supports the Bank's approach to partnership and collaboration and echoes the call in the COP28 Declaration for actors across sectors and mandates to work together to generate knowledge and deliver results.

Methodology

This report employed a triangulated approach, that integrated the collection and collation of raw quantitative data, a desk review of available reports and analysis, and field research with key informants across nine case studies. This approach was used to analyze the consequences of intersecting climate change and armed conflict in diverse contexts. It used an updated version of the IsDB Resilience Index as a baseline for both desk and field-based research, providing a foundational benchmark across the five Resilience Index dimensions, allowing for consistent comparison and tracking of resilience capacities in the selected case studies.

The desk research was conducted between January and May 2024, revieing scholarly and grey literature across the Bank's 57 Member Countries while focusing on the five key dimensions. The aim of the desk research was to identify broad trends to frame and inform field research. Field research took place between February and June 2024 and involved key informant interviews based on purposive and snowball sampling methods in case study countries. In total, 87 individuals were interviewed, including government officials, traditional and religious leaders, representatives of youth and women's groups, civil society representatives, and professionals within the humanitarian, development, and private sectors.

Limitations

While this report offers valuable insights into the intersection of climate change, conflict, and resilience, several limitations must be acknowledged. First, access to reliable and up-to-date data remains a significant challenge in fragile and conflict-affected settings, leading to critical gaps, particularly in climate, conflict, and socioeconomic indicators, that affect the robustness of the analysis. Second, the attribution of outcomes to specific drivers remains complex, as the impacts of climate change and conflict are deeply intertwined and mutually reinforcing, making it difficult to isolate causal pathways or assess the individual influence of each factor on resilience outcomes. Third, the highly heterogeneous nature of fragile and conflict-affected contexts limits the generalizability of findings – local governance structures, social dynamics, and unique drivers of fragility differ across settings, constraining the applicability of conclusions and recommendations.

Finally, the report primarily relies on a limited range of resilience frameworks, which may not fully reflect the spectrum of local coping mechanisms or informal adaptation strategies. Future research would benefit from deeper exploration of local and indigenous knowledge systems and community-led approaches to resilience.

INTRODUCTION

INTRODUCTION

The disruptions to weather patterns, seasonal cycles, and the frequency and intensity of extreme weather events that define global climate change affect people's lives, livelihoods, health, and societies in profound ways. Changes to the productivity of agricultural land, environmental degradation, unpredictable rainfall, longer periods of extreme heat and other changes disrupt economies and undermine stability, compromise people's health, and fuel poverty. In some cases, they play a part in people's decision to leave their homes.

Where conflict and violence cause damage to lives, livelihoods, property, and social ties, climate change and environmental degradation bring compounding, additional risks. In places where governance over scarce resources is weak, climate shocks can further exacerbate tensions and increase inequalities. The negative impact on economies in areas where livelihood options are reduced due to conflict and violence can lead people to engage in unhealthy or dangerous coping mechanisms. Those who have been displaced due to conflict or violence are often more susceptible to repeated displacement caused by extreme weather events and climate shocks. In these and other ways, climate change and environmental degradation compound vulnerabilities, reinforcing social, economic, and political challenges, and escalating risks to people's security.

This is a reality faced by far too many already. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) estimates that 3.6 billion people –45% of the world's population – currently reside in areas experiencing high risk of harmful impacts from climate change[1]. Yet without a dramatic change in the international community's approach to climate adaptation and mitigation, and as the world continues on a path towards additional warming, the consequences for those who are most vulnerable and least ready to adapt are likely to become more severe, while the number of people exposed to increasing climate risk also climbs.[2]

Addressing Climate Risks in Conflict Settings

In recent years there has been a significant shift in global recognition of the need for greater climate action in situations of conflict. In 2023, during the first dedicated Climate, Relief, Recovery, and Peace day at COP28, over 90 states and 40 institutions including Multilateral Development Banks, development, and humanitarian organizations signed a Declaration calling for ambitious collective action to build climate resilience in vulnerable countries and communities, including those affected by armed conflict, fragility, or facing severe humanitarian needs.[3] This document has been followed by significant commitments on the part of donors and international financial institutions to scale up action, including from the Islamic Development Bank and several of its partners

Transforming this political recognition into concrete changes requires comprehensive strategies and approaches that integrate climate adaptation, conflict sensitivity, prevention and resolution, and resilience-building, and will require the international community to leverage the complementary skills and expertise of the humanitarian, development, peacebuilding, and climate sectors. While this will come with challenges, comprehensive climate action also generates opportunities for cooperation and external co-benefits. Climate action offers an umbrella under which neighboring countries and regions can work together to manage shared resources; ensuring that development and climate action builds on emergency relief can yield more sustainable outcomes for communities; and integrating conflict-sensitive practices and environmental sustainability into these programs can promote social cohesion, strengthen institutions, and limit drivers of conflict and tension.[4]

The failure to do so risks increasing humanitarian consequences for people already among those most affected by emergencies around the world. In the absence of comprehensive approaches to address development gaps and systemic risks, default reversion to humanitarian responses is poised to overwhelm a system that already struggles to respond to needs, and that is not equipped or able to work over longer timescales and at larger scales. To avoid this, it is necessary to identify capacities for resilience in situations of conflict and fragility that can be strengthened and reinforced by actors across different sectors and over longer timescales via local, national, regional, and international institutions.[5]



Figure 2: Intersecting Climate Risks, Conflict, and Fragility

> **In 2023, during the first dedicated Climate, Relief, Recovery, and Peace day at COP28, over 90 states and 40 institutions including Multilateral Development Banks, development, and humanitarian organizations signed a Declaration calling for ambitious collective action to build climate resilience in vulnerable countries and communities, including those affected by armed conflict, fragility, or facing severe humanitarian needs.**

The Importance of a "Do No Harm" Approach

To ensure programs and assistance respond to the relevant issues, do not increase vulnerability, and work towards reducing humanitarian needs, plans must contextualize climate-conflict specific issues within each country, region, and community. The IsDB, regional organizations, and member countries can conduct localized conflict and climate assessments that consider compounding climate and conflict risks. Localized assessments gather context-specific information to inform programs, apply the Do No Harm principle, and consider potential negative consequences, including maladaptation, across diverse communities and landscapes. As noted in IsDB's Environmental and Social Safeguards Policy, "Devising and applying measures to mitigate adverse impacts of development projects helps to avoid additional transaction costs that may constitute an intergenerational burden."[6]

Engaging local communities as central participants in adaptation endeavours improves the effectiveness of adaptive measures and diminishes the likelihood of maladaptive responses. Those directly affected by climate change, including displaced individuals and those affected by conflict, often possess unique insights into the most critical risks and challenges they face. All stakeholders, including donors and those delivering projects directly, can benefit from decentralized decision-making, providing support to legitimate community-led structures independent of central governments, addressing underlying structural inequalities, and channelling resources into enhancing local capacities and adaptable programming.

Close collaboration and communication between international and local actors are essential to ensure programs do not enhance existing inequalities or create new ones. issues. Transparency and anti-corruption mechanisms are essential to minimize the risk of malpractice and mismanagement. Moreover, to ensure responsive, sustainable, and effective responses, countries and organizations must implement inclusive methods in projects and programs, monitoring the progress on inclusion initiatives within planning.

CLIMATE FINANCE IN FRAGILE AND CONFLICT-AFFECTED COUNTRIES

LIMATE FINANCE IN FRAGILE AND CONFLICT-AFFECTED COUNTRIES

Climate finance refers to finance to support mitigation and adaptation actions to address climate change. It includes public and private sources of funding investments aimed at reducing greenhouse gas emissions and building resilience to climate impacts.[7] There is significant diversity in the types of funding that fall under the umbrella of climate finance.

Figure 1: Differing and overlapping types and approaches to climate finance (Bhandary, Rishikesh Ram, Kelly Sims Gallagher, and Fang Zhang. "Climate Finance Policy in Practice: A Review of the Evidence." Climate Policy 21, No. 4 (April 21, 2021): 529–45

Yet across all sources, a significant gap remains in countries affected by conflict and fragility.[8] This blind spot is expected to continue, or even grow, between now and 2030,[9] despite commitments to scale up climate finance in conflict settings by many actors, including the Islamic Development Bank.



Figure 2: The proportion of overall climate finance received by fragile and conflict-affected countries in 2022. (ODI Global, 2025)

Scaling up Access and Effectiveness

Tailored climate finance mechanisms can play a crucial role in supporting resilience-building efforts within communities affected by violence and climate change by providing funding for targeted interventions that address both environmental and conflict-related challenges. Increasing access to climate financing, particularly for communities affected by conflict and climate change, requires a multifaceted approach that addresses barriers to funding, strengthens local capacities, and fosters inclusive and transparent processes.

Efforts are being made to address this gap. At COP28, the IsDB announced a commitment of over $1 billion in climate finance to support its member countries affected by fragility and conflict over the next three years. This initiative prioritizes high-impact adaptation finance, aligning with broader development objectives to address fragility. The IsDB aims to deploy significant concessional finance, including through its Lives and Livelihoods Fund, to foster resilience and sustainable development. The Bank emphasizes the importance of transformative climate action, particularly for vulnerable populations such as women and children, who

are disproportionately affected by climate change and conflict. This commitment reflects the IsDB›s role in enhancing climate resilience and promoting sustainable development in its member countries.[10]

Mechanisms that can help scale up access and use include making finance more accessible to local governments, community organizations, and small and local NGOs by simplifying application processes and providing clear guidance on how to access and manage finance. Partnerships, targeted capacity building, and technical assistance can further enhance local stakeholders› ability to design, implement, and manage climate projects by raising awareness around available sources of financing. Strengthening local institutions and governance structures also improves the management and allocation of funds, promoting transparency, accountability, and participatory decision-making, and are important in the design of inclusive mechanisms tailored to the most vulnerable and marginalized.

On the supply side, enhanced coordination and partnerships among international donors and climate finance institutions are critically needed, especially considering global financial and aid challenges experienced in early 2025. A greater focus on aid efficiency in this regard is needed to: (i) avoid duplicating efforts, (ii) allow funders to derisks investment, (iii) build on the expertise; and (iv) strengthen different actors to direct funds towards impactful projects.

Finally, integrating conflict-sensitive approaches into climate finance allocation ensures that funds do not exacerbate existing tensions and are used to promote peace and stability, with thorough conflict assessments and community engagement to design context-specific interventions. Implementing these strategies will enable more communities, especially those affected by violence and climate change, to benefit from the resources needed to build resilience and sustainable development.

Snapshot: Innovative Financing Instruments

Innovative approaches such as green bonds, climate insurance, and blended finance models, can serve to increase private sector investment and provide flexible funding options for climate adaptation and resilience projects. To take one example: green bonds are instruments used to fund projects with positive environmental impacts, such as renewable energy, sustainable agriculture, and climate resilience. These bonds enable governments, corporations, and development banks to raise capital specifically for environmentally friendly initiatives, aligning financial markets with sustainability goals.

At the intersection of climate and conflict, green bonds can play a pivotal role by:

- Promoting Climate Resilience: By funding projects that mitigate the effects of climate change, green bonds help reduce environmental stressors like droughts or floods that often exacerbate conflict.
- Supporting Fragile Economies: In conflict-affected regions, green bonds can finance infrastructure and renewable energy projects that not only boost economic stability but also reduce reliance on resource-intensive industries, which can fuel tensions.
- Encouraging Sustainable Livelihoods: Projects funded by green bonds can create jobs in sustainable sectors, offering economic alternatives to communities impacted by conflict and environmental degradation, reducing the likelihood of conflict escalation.

This approach bridges environmental sustainability with peacebuilding, making green bonds an essential tool for tackling both climate risks and conflict in vulnerable regions.

GLOBAL TRENDS IN RISK, RESILIENCE AND VULNERABILITY

GLOBAL TRENDS IN RISK, RESILIENCE AND VULNERABILITY

Vulnerability, risk and resilience mean different things and have different impacts across sectors, communities, and countries. Vulnerability varies within countries and across communities and is shaped by far more than exposure to climate risks; different segments of society such as women and girls, farmers, and displaced persons experience the impacts of the same climate event differently. Understanding the historical and socio-political factors that have made certain groups more vulnerable is crucial to addressing the root causes of vulnerability, and failing to do so may inadvertently reinforce existing inequalities and lead to maladaptive outcomes.[11]

At a macro level this is also true: countries affected by conflict are often vulnerable due to the negative impacts of conflict on their adaptive capacities – governance and social systems, economies, infrastructure – rather than to their pure exposure to climate hazards.

The IsDB Resilience Index assesses resilience across five dimensions: 1) Environment and Natural Disaster, 2) Health and Pandemics, 3) Economics and Livelihoods, 4) Human Security, 5) Forced Displacement. Each of these dynamics exhibit specific macro trends, and can be the central driver, compounding dynamic, or peripheral issue in assessing risk, resilience and vulnerability. Trends across all five dimensions are often extreme in situations of conflict, where authorities, communities, and institutions face additional pressures such as destroyed infrastructure and disrupted systems and economies, environmental damage due to the conduct of hostilities, and negative health and social indicators. This in turn can have profound humanitarian consequences, growing the level and urgency of needs; and impacts the responses to these needs, often leading to long-term, entrenched humanitarian operations.[12]

Environment and Natural Disasters

Many environmental trends have followed negative trajectories in recent decades. Both the amount of available arable land and renewable freshwater resources available per capita have declined, with the declines more acute in countries affected by conflict. While not solely driven by climate change, climate variability – including desertification, changing precipitation patterns, and more intense heat and cold spells – compounds the impacts of urbanization, over-irrigation, and monoculture farming that have overstretched resources in many parts of the world.

Health and Pandemics

Global health indicators have in recent decades generally shown improvement, as seen in rising literacy rates, better access to sanitation, reduced poverty, and increased life expectancy. However, countries in fragile and conflict-affected situations have lagged, facing significant challenges that threaten these gains. For instance, while sanitation and healthcare access have improved globally, fragile states often lack the infrastructure and resources to keep pace, resulting in disparities that leave vulnerable populations more exposed to preventable diseases and poverty. Studies found that both flood and drought conditions increase mosquito populations, and lead to increased infections.[13] Malaria kills over 500,000 people each year, many of them children. Increased climate variability threatens to expand the geographic and seasonal range of the mosquitos that carry the parasite.[14]

In fragile regions, negative health outcomes compound. Situations of conflict and violence often feature limited health facilities and personnel due to the damage conflict can have on critical facilities and the risks faced by staff and their families.

Economics and Livelihoods

In many countries affected by compounding climate and conflict risk, rain-fed agriculture and other highly climate-sensitive industries play an outsized role in the national economy and individual livelihoods of people and communities. These industries are sensitive because they rely on reliable, seasonal variations in weather and climate conditions, and operate within an optimal meteorological band that is in many countries being more frequently and severely interrupted. Yet fragile countries face significant barriers to diversifying economic opportunities for their populations, due to restrictions on trade, weak state and governance capacity, and gaps in essential services, infrastructure, and systems.

Human Security

Following a period in which global patterns indicated improvements in both the number of conflicts and their level of destructiveness, recent data has gone against this trend. The number of conflicts has steadily risen since the 1990s; worryingly, since the year 2000, the number of non-international armed conflicts has tripled from under 30 to around 100; the number of international armed conflicts is also on the rise. As of 2024, the ICRC records over 120 armed conflicts around the world, involving over 60 states and 120 non-state armed groups. [15] The number of conflict-related deaths has also seen a recent increase.[16]

Increased impacts of conflict often occur in regions already facing significant climate risks, creating a dangerous convergence of pressures on vulnerable populations and affecting their ability to adapt and cope with shocks. Countries affected by conflict often see negative impacts on their adaptive capacities – governance, and social systems, economies, and infrastructure – making them particularly vulnerable to climate hazards. These compounding pressures also weaken institutions' ability to plan and respond. This calls for urgent and comprehensive action to prevent further escalation and mitigate the consequences for vulnerable people and communities.

> While sanitation and healthcare access have improved globally, fragile states often lack the infrastructure and resources to keep pace, resulting in disparities that leave vulnerable populations more exposed to preventable diseases and poverty. Studies found that both flood and drought conditions increase mosquito populations, and lead to increased infections.17 Malaria kills over 500,000 people each year, many of them children. Increased climate variability threatens to expand the geographic and seasonal range of the mosquitos that carry the parasite.

Forced Displacement

While conflict remains the most common reason for people's displacement, in 2023 nearly 8 million people were displaced due to disasters, with climate risks playing a part in exacerbating and increasing the number of disasters around the world (a slight decrease from 2022) .[17] As climate change brings more frequent shocks, exacerbates resource scarcity, and contributes to environmental degradation, these pressures can compel people to move. In fragile and conflict-affected settings, climate pressures often intersect with existing situations of displacement. Displaced individuals may have limited access to resources and services in host communities or are forced to settle in climate-vulnerable land – such as flood plains or areas far from water sources. This puts displaced people at heightened risk of secondary or repeated displacement. [18]

RESILIENCE IN CONTEXT: A SELECTION OF MEMBER COUNTRY CASE STUDIES



RESILIENCE IN CONTEXT: A SELECTION OF MEMBER COUNTRY CASE STUDIES

This report looks at risks to and capacities for resilience in nine countries – Afghanistan, Chad, Iraq, Nigeria, Mali, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, and Yemen – affected by compounding climate and conflict risks. These dynamics intersect in context-specific ways in each country and between different regions within countries. Yet throughout the case studies, commonalities also emerge. Similarities exist in national reliance on highly climate-exposed industries, notably rain-fed agriculture. In many case study countries, the impact of protracted conflict and long-running humanitarian emergencies on community resilience have contributed to low state capacity to provide services and a lack of systemic investments in infrastructure and services; in some countries, these impacts are compounded by the imposition of restrictions on economic participation, trade, and multilateral institutions. In all countries, communities report a need for stronger mediation and governance over access and use of resources, which for many reasons, including those associated with climate change, are becoming scarcer, and serve often as focal points of tension.

These case studies offer illustrations of how resilience is threatened by compounding climate and conflict risks. Yet they also provide insight into capacities for resilience that have been sustained and adapted by communities through evolving and protracted periods of crisis, where collaboration and cooperation has been prioritized within and between communities even in the absence of formal or state mechanisms. These insights can guide the approaches of international financial institutions, humanitarian and development actors, and governments towards climate action and development strategies that are contextual, sustainable, and avoid maladaptation.

Resilience in AFGHANISTAN

RESILIENCE INDEX

Environment/ Disasters
1.4/10

Health/Pandemics
2.5/10

Economy/ Livelihoods
1.4/10

Security
1.1/10

Forced Displacement
1.4/10

FACTS AND FIGURES

- **Population:** 41.45 million[19]
- **Life expectancy at birth:** 63 years[20]
- **GDP per Capita:** 415.71 USD[21]
- **Key economic sectors:** Agriculture, small-scale industry[22]
- **Reliance on agriculture:** 71-80% depend on agriculture and related businesses for their livelihoods.[23]

KEY CLIMATE AND ENVIRONMENTAL RISKS: [24]

- Increased frequency and intensity of periodic floods and landslides
- Depleted groundwater reserves due to insufficient precipitation and increased water demand.
- Urban stresses due to increasing populations, water scarcity, more intense heat waves, and lack of health infrastructure

Country overview

Periods of intense conflict, internal tensions, and social and economic instability over several decades have created immense challenges for Afghanistan and its people. The current situation follows decades of international and domestic conflict; over six million Afghan refugees have left the country[25], constituting one of the world's largest refugee populations, and as of the end of 2024 over four million people remained internally displaced.[26] Affected by periodic climate and environmental risks including landslides, earthquakes, flooding, and drought, and largely isolated by global markets and economic opportunities, Afghanistan is among the poorest countries in the world.[27] Over half of the country's population requires humanitarian assistance. [28,29]

Environment and Natural Disasters

Afghanistan is highly exposed to the impacts of climate change and environmental shocks. Between 1980 and 2015, disasters related to natural hazards have affected 9 million people, and caused over 20,000 deaths.[30] Average temperatures have increased by 1.67 degrees Celsius since 1970, and the incidence and severity of extreme weather

events have both increased in recent decades.[31] This exposure varies regionally within the country, with the eastern regions – the more populated parts of the country – having warmed significantly more than other areas. [32]

These impacts are felt acutely by communities. People in the most affected parts of the country speak of feeling increased temperatures and draw links between these impacts and overburdened services and resources. Civil society representatives speak of the risk cautious of the potential of tensions from competition over land and water and monitor for potential escalations; land-related disputes are significant and can result in violence, and a significant number of people connect these disputes and increasingly evident environmental stressors. [33]

Rainfall is increasingly erratic, oscillating between periods of drought and extremely heavy rain. Long dry spells can leave the soil hard and compacted, unable to absorb floodwater when the rain comes. As the country urbanizes, more of the population has become exposed to urban flood risks as cities expand in unplanned ways. Deforestation and the removal of natural flood defenses, arising from the conflict and from gaps in governance and planning for land usage, have increased the exposure of many communities to floods in rural areas as well.[36]

These challenges can contribute to existing tensions or exacerbate competition over resources. In central Afghanistan, nomadic Kuchi populations and sedentary Hazara communities have more frequently come into contact over water and land resources, in some cases resulting in tensions.

Health and Pandemics

Changes to Afghanistan's climate have compounding impacts on health outcomes. The type and prevalence of disease in the country has changed, including the emergence of dengue fever in recent years, mirroring a global rise in cases that may be affected by global climate change.[37] Extreme weather events also cause widespread death and injuries, while displacement due to conflict and extreme weather events can expose displaced populations to unsanitary, crowded and unsafe conditions, both in camps and in cities.[38] Health infrastructure, already significantly degraded and affected by the conflict, has additionally been impacted by environmental shocks both climate and non-climate related. [39]

Economics and Livelihoods

Farmers are often among those most vulnerable to environmental pressures and water scarcity. In Afghanistan, four of every five people rely on agriculture for their livelihood, placing a huge segment of the population at risk from climate-induced disruptions. Yet the extent to which these stressors negatively impact people's lives is mediated in large part by their access to and capacity for adaptive approaches. In Bamyan Province, and in Balkh, relatively wide adoption of measures such as crop diversification, drought-tolerant seeds, and wastewater conservation has helped farmers to preserve yields.[40]

Conversely, the lack of adaptation and limited socio-economic opportunities can have severe consequences. In areas such as the Yangi Qala District in the north-eastern province of Takhar, lack of access to agricultural inputs, electricity, and infrastructure have seen farmers struggle to move beyond subsistence agriculture.[41] More broadly across the country, crackdowns on the illicit production of opium has curtailed people's incomes and further exposed them to economic difficulty in the event of poor seasons for licit, less lucrative crops – the per hectare value of wheat can be more than 20 times less than opium.[42]

Human Security

The changes in Afghanistan's society and political landscape since 2021, and the impacts of decades of conflict, have had serious and persistent impacts on human security. Conditions have worsened for some, with recent restrictions on opportunities, education, and livelihoods for women and girls dramatically increasing certain risks faced by half of the population of the country.[43] At the same time, instances of violence and conflict-related deaths have declined since their peaks in 2021 and earlier in the 2000s.[44]

Forced Displacement

More than 4 million Afghans are internally displaced, living largely in urban settings, as well as camps and informal settlements.[45] Many more are living as refugees in neighboring countries and abroad.

Although most displacement in recent decades has been a result of the conflict, since 2021 climate shocks and environmental events have become the chief driver: nearly three million people were temporarily displaced due to extreme weather events between 2021 and 2024.[46]

Importantly, climate pressures are also causing long-term, slow-onset displacement that can be harder to detect and measure than acute instances of forced displacement.[47] This is part of the story in Hazarajet, where Kuchi herders have moved to search for new grazing lands and water sources, and where this movement has in some cases led to tensions with Hazara farmers. It is part of the story too of increased migration from rural areas to Afghanistan's cities, putting increased pressure on services and limited livelihood opportunities.

Opportunities

Despite its vulnerability, Afghanistan still receives very little finance dedicated to climate action and projects to boost resilience [48], largely due to the lack of international recognition of the de facto authorities. The lack of recognition prevents access to the Green Climate Fund and other climate financing. In 2025, after the participation of the President of the National Environment Protection Agency to COP29, USD 9.98m has been granted by the Global Environment Facility through the Least Developed Countries Fund to Afghanistan.

Since 2021, development support has dramatically decreased, and international assistance is for the most part confined to humanitarian support. However, despite these constraints, more than USD 40 million in climate finance remains

"frozen" in multilateral mechanisms such as the Global Environment Facility (GEF) and the Adaptation Fund. With technical support from organisations like UNDP, Afghanistan is actively working to regain access to these resources in 2025, aiming to unlock project pipelines that can strengthen resilience and climate adaptation at scale.

Yet there are examples of efforts to adapt to climate risks – largely led by local actors – that offer promise for building future resilience, such as Afghanistan's Mirab system, a person or group nominated by landowners to manage traditional irrigation systems and mediate disagreements. Mirabs manage contextual systems such the Karez networks of underground wells and canal in southern and western regions.[49] Their underground nature prevents evapotranspiration, and ensures reliable access to water; yet these systems have become degraded through direct damage from the conflict and official neglect, [50] while Mirabs' own role has simultaneously declined.[51] Supporting these networks' rehabilitation and expansion could be an effective way of building local resilience to environmental pressures and shocks.

Efforts to adapt and build resilience to shocks can become maladaptive if they entrench or reinforce existing marginalization and inequalities; effective interventions actively address this. In Sayad Village in Balkh Province, women took their own initiative to set up an Early Warning system and establish communication with an upstream village to warn them about flash flooding events. [52]

Larger scale opportunities also exist. In the north, construction of the Qosh Tepa Canal aims to provide sustainable water to the Balkh, Jawjan, and Faryab provinces. [53] Unless carefully managed, this project also risks raising tensions with bordering Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, who share water resources, and to exacerbating inequalities internally.

Resilience in CHAD



RESILIENCE INDEX

Environment/ Disasters
1.6/10

Health/Pandemics
1.2/10

Economy/ Livelihoods
1.2/10

Security
1.6/10

Forced Displacement
1.2/10

FACTS AND FIGURES

- **Population:** 19.3 million[54]
- **Life expectancy at birth:** 53 years[55]
- **GDP per Capita:** 680.6 USD[56]
- **Key economic sectors:** Agriculture, oil production, services[57]
- **Reliance on agriculture:** Employs 69 % of the population, accounting for 25% of national GDP.[58]

KEY CLIMATE AND ENVIRONMENTAL RISKS: [59]

- Droughts and heat waves, projected to occur on a recurring basis approximately every five years.
- Increasing fluvial flooding, particularly in the southern regions
- Aggravated incidents of endemic diseases due to heatwaves and flooding, with existing high risks due to cholera, malaria, measles and meningitis

Country overview

Chad's predominantly rural population is spread across three major climatic zones, from the Sahara Desert in the north, through the semi-arid Sahelian middle region, its western end marked by the country's namesake Lake and N'Djamena, the capital, to grassland savanna in the south. For decades, Chad has been affected by inter-communal clashes, ,tensions between government forces and non-state armed groups – in particular in the Lake Chad region – and cross-border impacts of the Sudanese conflict, notably in the neighboring Sudanese region of Darfur.[60] Following the passing away of President Déby in 2021, the country went through a political transition period leading to presidential and legislative elections in 2024 and 2025.

Degraded and collapsing natural resources, including unreliable access to water and arable land, have simultaneously decreased the resilience of communities struggling with violence and limited access to services, which are concentrated in the capital. Even as the country has increased its export of valuable natural resources including oil and gold, communities have seen few benefits.

Environment and Natural Disasters

This fragility is reflected in its high vulnerability and low readiness to the impacts of climate change and other environmental risks. Severe risks[61] of flooding and drought, rising temperatures, and an increase in disease put severe pressures on fragile ecosystems, which provide the opportunities for agriculture and livestock rearing that are the backbone of Chad's

economy. With 58 percent of its area classified as desert, and 30 percent at high risk of desertification, the country is vulnerable to small changes to the environment that further limit access to arable and fertile land. Between 1976 and 2013 sandy regions have increased by 22 percent, due to a combination of climate impacts and unsustainable grazing and land-use patterns, with woodlands shrinking by nearly a third over the same period as demand for timber and vegetation for animal herds increased.[62]

Flooding has also increased in severity. Even though floods are part of the natural rhythm of many of Chad's major biospheres, providing seasonal irrigation and water for animals, revitalizing soil and replenishing fish stocks, more extreme and less predictable floods – for example those seen in 2024 -have posed hazards that have led to displacement and damage, and have outweighed or prevented communities from accessing their benefits.[63] This is made worse by the parallel increase in droughts, with notable dry periods in 2005, 2008, 2010, 2012, and 2022 that have reduced crop production, exacerbated food insecurity, and weakened people's reserves and resilience against a backdrop of escalating conflict and political instability.[64]

Health and Pandemics

Rising temperatures and variability are projected to have increasing implications for disease in Chad – where endemic disease is among the most acute risks to people's health. Indicators for malaria, meningitis, cholera, and other communicable diseases highlight the risk of increasing flooding on water contamination and subsequent infection, while heat stress and food insecurity negatively impact people's baseline health and resistance to disease.[65] Conflict, displacement, and persistent difficulties in providing services in remote parts of the country contested governance have resulted in a health system that is under-resourced and largely absent in high-risk areas, such as those around Lake Chad, rural and remote populations, refugee camps, and their host communities.[66] Only two percent of Chad's population report holding health insurance, leaving the vast majority of the population having to pay for treatment that is often inaccessible and unaffordable.[67]

Economics / Livelihoods

Since 2022, Chad has faced a food and nutrition crisis worsened by a 13.9 percent inflation rate in 2023, driven largely by the Sudan conflict and an increased number of refugees accessing markets and goods.[68] Since 2003, Chad's GDP he GDP has significantly increased due to increased oil production: the country holds the tenth-largest reserves in

Africa. Over-reliance on oil, coupled with inadequate reinvestment in broader economic development, poses significant challenges, from the single points of failure and security vulnerability of oil infrastructure, to external price fluctuations, to the negative impact of greenhouse gas production on global climate change.[70]

Yet alternatives are limited: given Chad's predominantly rural population and its reliance on climate-exposed agricultural sectors such as rice, millet, and livestock husbandry, climate shocks can severely impede the reliability of people's income, and the value of their assets held in yields, land, and animals. [71]

Human Security

The declines in economic opportunities, food security and livelihood prospects since 2010 mirror the deteriorating human security landscape. While fatalities due to conflict had declined since their peak in 2021,[72] conflict in Chad, notably in the Lake Chad Basin, continues to negatively impact the security of proximate communities and to harm the resilience of the country's social fabric and institutions. Government response to the conflict has had unintended negative consequences on resilience capacities: examples include restrictions on tall crops to prevent their use as cover by armed actors, and limitations on fertilizers to prevent the production of explosive devices, that have led to declining and less lucrative yields.[73]

Forced Displacement

Refugees and displaced populations in Chad face additional risk.[74] Displaced communities lack adequate shelter, water, and facilities, and have faced repeat displacement due to environmental and climate shocks, particularly around the lake.[75] Communities report the role of droughts in driving migration from rural areas to cities, and the subsequent challenges that arise including tensions between newcomers and residents.[76] Growing numbers of refugees have also impacted markets, with increased competition for goods and services increasing the cost of living for both displaced people and host communities.

Opportunities

Despite these challenges, Chad has taken steps to enhance its resilience to both the impacts of conflict and to climate risks. Chad's National Action Plan 2017-2021 has focused on strengthening climate risk management by integrating adaptation into medium-and long-term planning in key sectors including agriculture, cattle rearing, and fisheries.[77] The government has expanded meteorological stations and forecasting capacity, and establishing flood early warning systems.[78] The National Plan for Development for Farming 2017-2021 and the National Investment Plan for the Rural Sector in Chad 2016-2022 provide strong baselines for more sustainable agriculture and water management. [79]

Communities often lead the efforts to build resilience to the specific risks and challenges they face. Local initiatives like the Chad Guinea Worm Eradication Program, and other partnerships between the government, local leaders and religious figures have enhanced health communication and trust-building, although efforts are needed to ensure these initiatives reach the most remote and hard to reach communities. [80]

Regional and international efforts are also well-established, including the Lake Chad Basin Commission created in 1964 to manage water resources, protect the environment, and advance peace and security.[81] The Commission's Regional Strategy for Stabilization, Recovery, and Resilience, launched in 2018, emphasizes addressing root causes of the conflict, such as limited services and environmental shocks, and promotes a shift from military responses to the conflict to resilience building. [82]

Resilience in IRAQ



RESILIENCE INDEX

Environment/ Disasters
4.0/10

Health/Pandemics
6.2/10

Economy/ Livelihoods
1.0/10

Security
3.9/10

Forced Displacement
4.2/10

FACTS AND FIGURES

- **Population:** 45.1 million[83]
- **Life expectancy at birth:** 71[84]
- **GDP per Capita:** USD 5565.1[85]
- **Key economic sectors: oil and gas, agriculture, services**[86]
- **Reliance on agriculture: 30% directly or indirectly employed in agriculture, accounting for 6% of GDP.**[87]

KEY CLIMATE AND ENVIRONMENTAL RISKS: [88]

- Rising temperatures, notably in the south, coupled with increased water scarcity
- Decreasing rainfall contributing to prolonged dry spells
- Sand and dust storms, desertification and land degradation
- Ecosystem degradation and biodiversity loss

Country overview

Iraq has seen gains in institutional stability and capacity during its recovery from decades of internal and international conflict. Iraq's oil and gas industries play an important role in its economy, yet it faces significant and accelerating climate and environmental risks with impacts on people's capacity to preserve their livelihoods and withstand shocks.

Aside from the Mediterranean climate in the north and northeast, Iraq is mostly subtropical semi-arid, with cool, wet winters and hot, dry summers.[89] This climate makes Iraq extremely vulnerable to climate change.[90] Many parts of the country are significantly water-stressed, due to both changing weather patterns and infrastructure development in Iraq and neighbouring countries that have reduced its natural water sources in the Tigris and Euphrates rivers by approximately 40 percent.[91] In areas of especially acute water stress, tensions have been exploited by non-state armed groups, further depressing economic opportunities and negatively affecting communities. [92]

Environment and Natural Disasters

Rising temperatures and decreasing rainfall in Iraq are expected to worsen,[93] decreasing water availability and leading demand to outstrip supply by a projected 15 percent by 2035.[94] Iraq also faces severe environmental shocks including droughts, desertification, dust storms, and flooding, all of which are exacerbated by climate change.[95] Basra, Iraq's second-largest city located at the confluence of the Tigris and Euphrates, has come under increasing threat of incursion

of the adjacent Persian Gulf.[96] Droughts severely impact food and water security, damage the economy, and contribute to displacement. A 2023 study linked the 2020-2023 drought directly to climate change. [97]

These challenges compound local tensions and frustrations around water shortages, with local authorities and other communities often the target of protest. Communities have reported disputes over water, with cases of illegal wells and water theft exacerbating existing tensions or providing additional grievances. These dynamics exist against a backdrop of compounding, long-term environmental degradation due to armed conflict, with significant land contamination and environmental transformation overlapping substantially with areas of the country affected by more intense periods of conflict and violence. [98]

Health and Pandemics

Both the impacts of conflict and extreme weather events, accelerated by climate change, pose significant risks to Iraq's healthcare system. More frequent and severe sand and dust storms lead to heightened acute and chronic respiratory issues. [99] These shocks compound the long-term, structural consequences of protracted conflict: Iraq has seen increased morbidity, mortality, injuries, and mental health problems, many of which are directly linked to the conflict, while its medical system is marked by inequalities in access and outcomes that often reflect geographic and sectarian tensions and divides.[100] This can be seen in Kirkuk, where ongoing intercommunal tensions have inhibited the reconstruction of healthcare facilities.[101] As climate risks increase, and people continue to face health challenges, these inequalities and disparities risk becoming entrenched and exaggerated.

Economics and Livelihoods

Iraq's economy is marked by a series of imbalances and contradictions that compromise its resilience. Despite its exposure to climate risks, Iraq's economy is dominated by fossil fuel extraction and export. This poses risks and strong disincentives to move towards strategies for climate adaptation and mitigation, given the sector constituted nearly two thirds of Iraq's real GDP and 99 percent of exports in 2022.[102]

Yet while oil and gas dominate the country's GDP, most of its population work in other sectors. Nearly 30 percent of Iraqis depend on agriculture for their livelihoods, even as the sector contributes less than 3 percent to national GDP. [103]

The impacts of conflict help explain some of these imbalances. Conflict limits opportunities for livelihood diversification and development. High rates of unemployment and inadequate public services incentivize reliance on existing sectors that offer high economic returns, despite the risks they generate – in the case of oil and gas dependency, the risk of continued global warming and environmental degradation, and in the case of agriculture, high exposure to accelerating climate shocks.

Resilience is also compromised by existing inequalities and marginalization, which feed tension and limit growth and diversification. [104] In Basra, which generates 70 percent of Iraq's oil revenue, 50 percent of the population lives in extreme poverty. Youth unemployment is high – at 35 percent in 2022, doubling over a decade[105] – and over 60 percent of women in Iraq are unemployed, and of those employed, the majority are highly exposed to variance in agricultural productivity.[106]

Human Security

Despite an overall downward trend in conflict-related risks, underlying issues of social cohesion in Iraq persist.[107] These combine with climate-related risks to increase threats to human security. This can be seen in Basra, where climate-related resource scarcity, underemployment, and high populations of displaced persons arriving in the city have contributed to urban and social unrest, and the lack of capacity from the state to provide services and security has seen the emergence and proliferation of armed groups. [108]

Forced Displacement

Iraq still hosts over one million internally displaced persons and 300,000 refugees, primarily from Syria.[109] Between 2016 and September 2023, an estimated additional 130,000 people were displaced due in part to the effects of climate change, largely moving from the south-eastern governorate of Dhi-Qar with a significant percentage seeking better conditions in urban centres in neighbouring provinces (including Najaf).[110] Key displacement drivers include water scarcity, drought, air and water pollution, heat waves, and flooding.[111] During the peak of the 2020-2023 drought, 7 percent of surveyed households in Anbar, Basra, Duhok, Kirkuk, Ninawa, Salah Al-Din, and Dhi-Qar reported a family member had migrated in the previous month alone; in the same survey, one in 15 households reported a family member that had migrated due to the impacts of drought.[112] This dynamic can contribute to tensions, including between displaced and host communities Cities bear this most acutely, with increased populations straining services, and pressure on cities to absorb internally displaced populations leaving camps closed by authorities.

Opportunities

There are many reasons for optimism that building resilience to both climate and conflict risks is possible in Iraq. Initiatives to conserve water, prepare for disasters, and reduce conflict risks are already underway in various parts of the country. In the conflict-affected governorates of Anbar, Ninawa, Salah al Din, and Kirkuk, local leaders – mukhtars –were able to negotiate with armed groups to improve access to health facilities in the face of both conflict-and-climate-related health risks.

These leaders can bridge the gap between government and communities, and play vital roles in disaster management, and in addressing existing and new grievances or tensions. In Anbar, community, tribal, and religious leaders played a central role in deciding whether to accept or reject returning IDPs perceived to be affiliated with ISIS, highlighting the importance of local leadership in community resilience.

Iraq has been able to access support for dedicated climate adaptation. Between 2018 and 2020, Iraq accessed the Green Climate Fund's Readiness Programme to help build and strengthen national capacities to access, absorb, and disburse climate finance. Since then, it has also partnered with the UN Environment Programme to develop a National Adaptation Plan, with funding from the Green Climate Fund. The project is focused on integrating medium and long-term adaptation needs into the country's development planning cycle, with a specific focus on ensuring rural communities are prepared for and can respond to climate conditions. The challenge moving forward will be to consolidate capacity gains, ensure incentives for climate action are factored into national strategies and development plans, and factor in the historic and persistent impacts of conflict to ensure climate action addresses inequalities and generates positive economic and social outcomes.

Resilience in MALI



RESILIENCE INDEX

Environment/ Disasters	Health/Pandemics	Economy/ Livelihoods	Security	Forced Displacement
2.4/10	2.3/10	2.8/10	2.6/10	3.9/10

FACTS AND FIGURES

- **Population:** 23.8 million[119]
- **Life expectancy at birth:** 59 years[120]
- **GDP per Capita:** 869.3 USD[121]
- **Key economic sectors:** Gold mining and export, cotton[122]
- **Reliance on agriculture:** 65% directly employed, accounting for 15% of national GDP[123]

KEY CLIMATE AND ENVIRONMENTAL RISKS: [124]

- Droughts due to more frequent hot spells in most areas of the country
- Flooding in the Niger river flood plain

Country overview

Mali is among the largest countries in West Africa, and confronted by socio-economic conditions exacerbated by intercommunal tensions, the consequences of armed conflict between the government and non-state armed groups, and extreme climatic conditions.[125] Short-term climate variability, notably in temperature, and demographic pressures that have led to unsustainable land use in environmentally sensitive regions such as the Niger river delta, have magnified its risk. The dynamics of a conflict that sometimes fall along communitarian lines between groups with different relationships to the environment – regional divisions between the north and the south, livelihood contestation between farmers and pastoralists, sectarian division, and conflict between armed groups, the state, and international actors – have further highlighted the scarcity of resources and the challenges in mediating tensions. [126]

While long-standing farmer-herder conflicts in Mali are not rooted in climate change, they can be indirectly impacted by increasing variability and environmental degradation. In Liptako-Gourma, where floods and droughts have taken a compounding toll on small-holder farmers, conflict and increased tensions over land ownership have led to a marked decline in security. [127]

Environment and Natural Disasters

Irrigated agriculture is currently feasible in only two of Mali's four climatic zones – the Sudanian and Sudanian-Guinean regions in the south, characterized by savannah and forests.[128] Most of the rest of the country, and its vast northern regions, are desert and semi-arid.[129] This dispersion concentrates people's exposure to the country's major climate risks;

droughts and extreme heat in the north, where reserve capacity is highly stressed, and flooding in the south, around the river deltas, where agriculture is clustered. Flood vulnerability is estimated to affect over 500,000 Malians each year and cost approximately $600 million in crop damage. [130]

Climate change has contributed to longer and more frequent droughts as rainfall patterns have changed. People report seeing the desert advance, spreading into areas that were previously productive, and putting increased pressure on resources.[131] With little choice, faced with unreliable yields, and unable in some cases to travel to areas with better prospects due to the risk of violence from the conflict or tensions with neighboring groups or communities, people have turned to livelihoods that further degrade the environment, cutting trees for fuel or over-grazing smaller plots of land. [132]

Health and Pandemics

Livelihood options that degrade the environment contribute to health risks as well. Charcoal production has been reported to increase exposure to respiratory disease, including in children who gather firewood to supplement their family's income. This is an additional layer on an already overburdened and severely under-resourced health system that struggles to respond to some of the highest cases of severe malaria in the world, [133] as well as treating those injured due to conflict even as health facilities have been the direct targets of violence.[134] People who rely on healthcare services in parts of the country affected by conflict and other situations of violence note that threats faced by healthcare workers and facilities have a significant impact on their capacity to access services. These threats serve as a deterrent to local and international organizations, in some cases causing them to cease or limit their operations and support.[135]

Economics and Livelihoods

Most Malians reside in the southern parts of the country.[136] The majority of Mali's agricultural activities - on which three-quarters of Mali's labour force is dependent – take place in the south.[137] These activities are highly exposed to climate shocks, with consequences that vary depending on individual characteristics. They can be particularly harmful to women and youth who are often at the forefront of agricultural activities,[138] yet are often excluded from opportunities for formal economic participation or from accessing the economic gains of their work.[139] Interviewees emphasized that women›s contributions to the formal economy have also decreased due to the risks and violence associated with armed conflict and insecurity.[140] Intermittent electricity supply reportedly affects business continuity in some areas.

In the north, opportunities for livelihoods are even further constrained. In places where the environment can no longer sustain traditional agricultural practices, people increasingly turn to options such as deforestation that further degrade the environment, and that can put their personal safety at risk as they travel longer distances or enter competition with others.

Human Security

Communities speak of a weakened social fabric, where insecurity has added to existing environmental stressors to decrease people's trust and magnify personal grievances and tensions. In some cases, individuals report turning to armed groups in search of protection and livelihoods, seeing few options elsewhere,[141] even as the conflict continues to result in fatalities for both combatants and civilians. [142]

Forced displacement

In conflict-affected areas, a family describes the practice of sending children – especially young girls – to safer areas where their schools and homes are not threatened.[143] As of May 2024, there were over 350,000 internally displaced persons in Mali, largely those fleeing conflict.[144] These circumstances illustrate the multiple risks to people's security brought on by an unforgiving environment and a complex, protracted conflict. They are made worse by insecurity and pressure on public services in parts of the country, leaving communities to adapt as they can, expending energy and resources that could otherwise be used to build resilience and prepare for shocks.

Opportunities

Despite Mali's lasting fragility and climate vulnerability, wells of resilience are evident. Malian households have found numerous strategies for adapting to climate change: pastoralists have adapted to changes in bodies of water and reductions in pastures by splitting herds to decrease risk, supplementing natural food sources by buying feed, and taking advantage of urban and industrial water infrastructure.[145] Farmers experiment with planting drought tolerant vegetation that grows quickly. Local understanding of soil and water management has assisted households in preserving soil moisture, enhancing soil fertility, and preventing erosion: traditional methods like zaï – the digging of small pits filled with organic matter to encourage growth in dry conditions[146] -- using stone bunds to conserve water runoff, and composting have helped rehabilitate some agricultural areas.[147] Fishing communities have responded to changes and reductions of fish species and seasons by fishing in intensive seasons. Communities and local authorities have successfully contained health risks, including by implementing community-based surveillance systems to guard against the spread of Ebola during the outbreak in neighbouring Guinea. These capacities and activities offer avenues through which resilience to climate risk, and to the challenges of conflict, may be strengthened.

Resilience in NIGERIA



RESILIENCE INDEX

Environment/ Disasters
2.1/10

Health/Pandemics
2.5/10

Economy/ Livelihoods
2.3/10

Security
2.4/10

Forced Displacement
3.7/10

FACTS AND FIGURES

- **Population: 227.9 million**[148]
- **Life expectancy at birth: 54**[149]
- **GDP per Capita:1569.60 USD** [150]
- **Key economic sectors: Resource extraction, notably oil and gas, services, manufacturing, agriculture**[151]
- **Reliance on agriculture: Over 70 % of the population engage in agriculture, mostly subsistence, contributing 22 % of total GDP** [152]

KEY CLIMATE AND ENVIRONMENTAL RISKS: [153]

- Heavy precipitation events projected to increase in the coming decades, generating flash floods
- Mean temperatures are projected to increase, with more very hot days projected for all regions of the country.
- Significant sea-level rise, and flood impacts in heavily-populated coastal regions and potential saltwater intrusion into groundwater reservoirs.

Country overview

Nigeria's population and economy are the largest in Africa and among the fastest growing in the world.[154] Despite its significant human and natural resources, the country is facing significant challenges in adapting to climate change;[155] this is due in large part to persistent infrastructure and system gaps, weak institutional capacity, and high rates of poverty, all of which are exacerbated in regions of the country affected by internal armed conflict, intercommunal violence, and organized crime. [156]

The geographic and demographic diversity of Nigeria mean it is exposed to a range of climate risks, both in the form of shocks and long-term pressures; from flooding in the densely populated coastal regions, to desertification in the northern Sahelian states; to measurable ecosystem decline and land degradation across all of Nigeria's ecological zones.[157] Despite abundant water resources, clean water scarcity remains a concern, with notable disparities in water access between regions.[158] Northeastern Nigeria faces acute water scarcity, driven by escalating demands for urban and agricultural use,[159] while nationwide, water sources face threats from over-abstraction, salinization, pollution, mismanagement, drought, and flooding.[160] Water contamination is most severe in the Niger Delta where both surface and groundwater have been significantly contaminated by oil extraction and processing operations. [161]

Environment and Natural Disasters

Nigeria grapples with escalating environmental pressures, particularly in the arid Northern regions. A combination of a changing climate, overgrazing, and over-cultivation has intensified the rate of deforestation, and subsequent desertification.[162] People report that deforestation has "contributed to tensions between communities whose livelihood is dependent on forests for resources and those involved in logging or land development." [163]

Additional environmental degradation can come from instances of conflict themselves. In the northeastern part of the countries, communities report instances of sabotaged infrastructure and conflict events that have detrimental impacts on the environment, and commented on the negative impact these events can have on community trust, cooperation, and resilience.[164]

Health and Pandemics

It is not only community resilience that suffers in Nigeria's north. Health issues are persistent, with only 30 percent of the population reporting safe access to water and sanitation.[165] The lack of infrastructure in this part of the country is due in part to conflict, with attacks on water infrastructure, health workers and facilities, notably in the northern states of Borno and Kaduna.[166] Humanitarian organizations have made dedicated efforts to rebuild or repair damaged health centres and improve people's access to them, but access to health services remains insufficient. [167]

In this context, where access to healthcare is compromised and people's confidence in the authorities to protect their safety and security low, climate shocks and longer-term environmental changes can have disproportionate impacts on health. Air and water-borne diseases, pollution-related respiratory issues, and heat-related health impacts are all present, and disparities between conflict-affected areas of the country and other regions risk increasing without efforts to bolster access to and quality of health care.

Economics and Livelihoods

Climate-related challenges pose a severe threat to Nigeria's agricultural economy.[168] Civil society organizations and government agencies that work with farmers blame poorer environmental conditions for lower agricultural productivity

and wasted crops.[169] The dependence of nearly three quarters of Nigeria's population on rain-fed agriculture for their livelihoods has huge repercussions for the country's resilience and future growth, as youth unemployment rises as a result of unpredictable and unproductive job prospects. [170]

As with other outcomes, such as health, differences in social conditions and exposure to conflict drive regional disparities within the country: in the northeast, in the Lake Chad Basin, the poverty rate of 72 percent is nearly double the national rate. [171]

Human Security

Environmental degradation and resource scarcity can exacerbate grievances and fuel violence amongst communities, further increasing socio-economic inequalities,[172] observes a humanitarian worker commenting on risks to human security resulting from converging conflict and climate risks in Nigeria. Armed conflict, violence, and crime disrupt people's livelihoods, impede access to markets, negatively impact their health, and can directly harm people. Access to services such as education is compromised, and sexual and gender-based violence have been recurring features of the conflict in Northeast Nigeria.

Climate events can worsen these dynamics. In the Middle Belt region, where conflict between herders and other communities has assumed elements of sectarian and religious tensions, communities reported climate and environmental shocks as exacerbating factors that have influenced where herders search for new grazing land, leaving them little choice but to increase their dependence on contested resources as traditional areas become less productive. [173]

Forced displacement

Conflict remains the major driver of displacement in Nigeria. In 2023, nearly 300,000 people were newly displaced due to conflict, largely in Borno, Adamawa, and Yobe states in the north-east, bringing the total number of people displaced across the country by conflict, farmer herder violence, and organized crime to 3.3 million people.[174] Yet climate and environmental events are significant drivers of specific displacement events: in 2022, severe flooding triggered over 2 million displacements; this included the repeat displacement of those living in camps in Borno, forcing thousands of people who had been displaced due to conflict to move once again.[175] In late 2024, in Borno state, hundreds of thousands were affected and nearly half the capital city of Maiduguri flooded when heavy rains caused the Alau Dam to collapse. [176]

Opportunities

Despite these vulnerabilities, Nigeria has made progress in building environmental resilience. The introduction of the 2012 Nigeria Erosion and Watershed Management Project enhanced flood response and resilience by establishing early warning systems for floods, as well as improving drainage systems and planning.[177] Completed in 2022, the project reduced the vulnerability to floods of over 12 million people across 23 states. [178]

Traditional and religious leaders are also well-placed to mediate tensions and advise on tailored, contextual approaches to climate and conflict risks. Interviewees spoke of the impact these leaders have in the health sector, as "active change agents for shaping norms and informing behaviours about health in Nigeria."[179] In IDP camps in northern Nigeria, camp committees of women and men have been established to help coordinate access to services and goods, and to organize preparation and responses to potential shocks and hazards.

Similar reliance on local leaders will be essential to build resilience, with evidence of community success in flood mitigation in Lagos and livelihood adaption in the Lake Chad Basin, with communities adapting and diversifying traditional livelihoods to the changing climate, for instance, through seasonal livelihood rotation, with fishermen taking on the role of farmer and trader in response to productive fishing yields. [180]

Resilience in SOMALIA

RESILIENCE INDEX

Environment/ Disasters
1.0/10

Health/Pandemics
1.0/10

Economy/ Livelihoods
1.5/10

Security
1.5/10

Forced Displacement
1.0/10

FACTS AND FIGURES

- Population: 18.3 million[181]
- Life expectancy at birth: 56 years[182]
- GDP per Capita: 597.5 USD[183]
- Key economic sectors: Livestock raising and export, agriculture, fisheries, services
- Reliance on agriculture: 80 % employed in the agricultural sector, contributing approximately 70% of national GDP and 50 % of exports.[184]

KEY CLIMATE AND ENVIRONMENTAL RISKS: [185]

- Increasing temperatures and an increasing number of annual very hot days.
- Overall increasing precipitation, concentrated in an increased intensity and frequency of heavy rains, leading to a higher incidence of flash flooding
- Increased frequency and intensity of drought.

Country overview

In 2022, Somalia was ranked the most at risk country in the world by the INFORM risk index.[186] This ranking reflects the multifaceted crisis that grips the country: an ongoing, complex humanitarian crisis generated by decades of missed development, political instability, displacement, and armed conflict; a diverse geography exposed to recurrent climate shocks and environmental hazards; and widespread and persistent poverty. [187]

Climate and environmental risks play a role in exacerbating the vulnerability of people and communities across Somalia. Somalia is highly impacted by the El Niño-Southern Oscillation (ENSO), with droughts associated with La Niña and heavy rain and flooding with El Niño. Recurrent drought has contributed to widespread agricultural failure and food insecurity;[188] the longest drought on record in 2022 led to 6.8 million people in Somalia experiencing hunger and brought the country to the brink of famine. [189]

Impacts on agricultural yields and livestock have severe impacts on livelihoods within Somalia, and on the country's livestock exports, which dominate its national GDP. Climate risks and the protracted conflict have led people to seek out livelihoods that further degrade the environment and that contribute negatively to the conflict's political economy, including charcoal production. Intercommunal violence, disputes over access to land, water, and fuel sources are occurring in the absence of effective government interventions, and large areas of the country are under the partial or full control of various non-state armed groups.

Environment and Natural Disasters

Somalia is exposed to recurrent droughts, desertification, and unpredictable rainfall patterns, riverine and flash floods, which have devastated agriculture and pastoralist livelihoods, contributing to food insecurity and displacement. Overgrazing, deforestation, and land degradation further strain the limited natural resources, leading to reduced agricultural productivity and loss of biodiversity.[191] Coastal areas are also threatened by groundwater salinization, rising sea levels, and overfishing, impacting marine ecosystems and the communities that depend on them.

These environmental stresses are compounded by decades of conflict, weak or inexistent critical infrastructure, and areas of the country with limited government access and control. These dynamics compromise the country's capacity to effectively manage natural resources.[192] Complex, compounding conflicts can reveal the vulnerabilities created in the absence of effective governance: the 2020-2022 drought overlapped with some of the worst flooding events in decades because of ENSO resulting in 43,000 excess deaths. These events highlighted the dearth of adequate infrastructure and the barriers to accessing populations outside of government control.[193]

Health and Pandemics

Compromised by decades of fragility and under-resourced health systems, in 2021 Somalia ranked in last place on the Global Health Security Index.[194] Its high levels of infant, child, and maternal mortality illustrate the extreme risks faced by people without access to sufficient health services, as do high levels of malnutrition and exposure to water-borne diseases. These adverse health outcomes constitute one corner to a "triple threat" in Somalia of health emergencies, conflict, and climate risks: conflict and violence increase the need for emergency health assistance and limit the capacity of health facilities, while climate risks change patterns of disease transmission and jeopardize nutrition and health by compromising agricultural yields and making it difficult to access markets.[195]

Somalia's large agro-pastoral community shows how these dynamics can play out. The community has a high susceptibility to disease, with high rates of malnutrition and food insecurity.[196] Community members report climate-

related impacts on their livestock and crops, making livelihoods more precarious and increasingly vulnerable to illness. Many also report risks to medical and humanitarian aid from the conflict, and the limiting impact this can have on people's access to relief from already poor essential services.

Economics and Livelihoods

The combined impacts of conflict and of recurrent climate shocks, along with demographic pressures, have dramatically limited Somalia's economic options and constrained livelihood opportunities for its population. Compounding impacts on fishing, traditionally among the country's most important sectors, helps understand how.

As global temperatures have increased, Somalia has seen its fish stocks decline and witnessed changes in staple species' migration patterns. Seasons have become irregular and erratic. Concurrently, the conflict has resulted in damage to fishing boats and the displacement of fishing communities; a lack of law enforcement has resulted in the proliferation of foreign illegal and unregulated fishing, undermining the economic viability of traditional fishing communities, while the increase in piracy – in part as a response to illegal fishing – has only increased insecurity and the potential for violence to traditional fishing areas.[198]

These dual pressures have resulted in fishing production that has significantly decreased, with downstream effects on the country's exports and national food security.

Pastoralism, another key sector, reveals a different but comparable set of negative pressures. Pastoralism's significance extends beyond providing livelihoods: it supports important value chains, provides critical ecosystem services, and contributes to landscape maintenance along with furthering the historically milk-based economy and providing meat across the Horn of Africa and East Africa.[199] However, erratic weather patterns, drought, flooding, and increased incidents of locust infections – compounded with the effects of the conflict and inter-clan violence - have taken a dramatic toll on pastoralist communities, with people reporting the loss of the majority or even all of their herds.[200] For communities who, due to conflict, have sometimes had to travel to unfamiliar areas, and whose livestock is often their only assets, these losses are devastating.

Human Security

In some parts of Somalia, where the central authorities are not present or only have a limited presence, non-state armed groups can sometimes offer attractive avenues towards reliable services and economic, food, and physical security. While this can help people meet their daily needs, this dynamic also illustrates the long-lasting nature of the conflict, which continues to claim lives and create insecurity. [201]

Poverty, intra-and inter communal violence, and tensions between pastoral and sedentary communities also pose risks to people's lives and safety. People report limited faith in authorities, who are constrained by insufficient resources, poor resources management, and a limited capacity to enforce the law, maintain a presence and deliver services. In the absence of enforcement, violence – including gender-based violence and violent discrimination based on clan affiliation or other characteristics – persists. Amid these competing forces are communities who face increasing scarcity – notably due to a changing climate – and a lack of economic opportunity, without clear avenues to turn for support. [202]

Forced displacement

This is sometimes even more pronounced among the millions of people displaced inside Somalia in camps, informal settlements, and in cities. Forced displacement as a result of conflict and floods, and migration to cities in response to unreliable weather and environmental degradation, has a specific impact on pastoralists and farmers, as conflict and erratic weather force these groups to separate from and lose access to their ancestral land and grazing areas.[204] Displaced pastoralists can lose their livestock, placing them and their families at risk of insolvency and extreme poverty.[205] Displaced women and girls face a higher risk of gender based violence, barriers to education, forced marriage, and maternal health issues than the general population, as do marginalized groups including the elderly and disabled.[207]

Opportunities

In the face of all these risks, Somali communities have found ways to design adaptation methods and build resilience at the local, regional, and international levels. Within communities, strong familial and communal networks and leaders provide mediation and assistance during crises. Community members in positions of trust, such as health workers, can help overcome gaps and tensions over governance: during instances of disease outbreak, community health workers proved to play a significant role, particularly in pastoral groups, and were characterized by people as trusted, available, and responsible for improving livelihoods. [207]

At the regional level, Somalia, Sudan, South Sudan, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Djibouti, Kenya, and Uganda have worked through IGAD to address drought and deforestation in a cross-border manner. IGAD has also developed multiple drought mitigation methods and formed "cross-border linkages for better monitoring and assistance of the drought-vulnerable people in coordinated ways."[208] Other capacities such as the Regional Climate Outlook Forum; the Greater Horn of Africa Climate Outlook Forum, and the African Drought Monitor system based in Kenya and Niger, and the Combined Drought Index by the Somalia Water and Land Information Project and the FAO, gives users in the region access to information, forecasts, and warnings. In-country climate monitoring mechanisms, aided by global tools, offer the opportunity to better anticipate and proactively engage with climate shocks. To be most effective, affected populations need to understand and trust such sources of information if they are to be acted on. Building this trust is an important and often overlooked component of preparedness and action. [209]

With respect to global efforts to scale up climate action in settings affected by conflict and fragility, Somalia has played a key role as an early recipient of scaled up climate finance from the Green Climate Fund. A recent USD134 million investments in climate action in Somalia represents a step-change in scaling up support in complex settings and offers opportunities for other crisis-affected countries to learn lessons around accessing additional support. [210]

Resilience in SUDAN

RESILIENCE INDEX

Environment/ Disasters
1.5/10

Health/Pandemics
1.6/10

Economy/ Livelihoods
2.1/10

Security
2.3/10

Forced Displacement
1.7/10

FACTS AND FIGURES

- Population: 50 million[211]
- Life expectancy at birth: 66 years[212]
- GDP per Capita: 2183.4 USD[213]
- Key economic sectors: Agriculture, oil, commodity export (cotton, gum, sorghum, sesame)[214]
- Reliance on agriculture: Over 50% of employment, contributing 33% of national GDP.[215]

KEY CLIMATE AND ENVIRONMENTAL RISKS: [216]

- El Niño–Southern Oscillation (ENSO), creating irregular and periodic extreme weather events including droughts, floods and heatwaves.
- Increasing overall temperatures, with an increasing number of very hot days.
- Intense and frequent heavy rains are likely to lead to higher flood risks
- Drought duration, frequency, intensity, and geographic area of concern all likely to increase

Country overview

The protracted civil war that has engulfed the country in recent years has had a devastating impact on Sudan's population, economy, and capacity for resilience, and has created one of the largest humanitarian emergencies in the world. In 2025, over half of the country's population – 30 million people – are expected to require humanitarian assistance, among them over 15 million children.[217] Over 12 million people have been forced to flee their homes. [218]

This crisis is unfolding in a country ranked the sixth most vulnerable and least ready to adapt to climate change[219] , where desertification, heat waves, droughts, and irregular and extreme rain have made parts of the territory difficult for people to survive in, even before the environmental degradation resulting from the current conflict. [220] These compounding risks are overwhelming traditional, longstanding approaches to managing resources and environments, further straining social ties, and contributing to tensions between Sudan's many diverse communities in a country with a history of protracted inter-ethnic tensions.

Environment and Natural Disasters

In Sudan's mountainous south and southwestern regions, flash floods and landslides are common; in the central, midwestern, and northern regions, communities are affected by drought and heat risks. Sudan's immense size and diversity mean that environmental risks differ by region, as do the ways in which they coincide and interact with conflict. In Darfur, where decades of conflict have had profound impacts on people's lives and displaced millions, communities reported environmental degradation due to desertification and a decrease in arable land as important stressors to the social and community fabric.[222] Longstanding symbiotic relationships between grazing patterns and sedentary agriculture in Darfur have been disrupted by the conflict; Now, as fertile land becomes less available due to deforestation and desertification, these systems are seeing an additional breakdown, and have become points of tension between different communities. [223]

Health and Pandemics

In Sudan's cities, notably Khartoum prior to most recent escalation in the conflict people have reported an increase in pollution and worsened air quality, as urban growth has progressed in unplanned ways. Sudan's energy grid is mixed, with a large proportion of its power coming from hydroelectricity. Yet this fluctuates depending on the condition of the power grid, which is affected by the conflict. When the conflict leads to damaged infrastructure, the reliance on fossil fuels for energy grows. Compounding this problem, desertification in rural and suburban regions increases the prevalence of dust storms and reduces the filtering capacity of natural vegetation, further decreasing air quality and increasing the risk of respiratory disease – particularly among displaced populations who have fled the conflict, and who more frequently suffer from poverty and unreliable access to healthcare. [225]

This is one concrete, and relatively fast-acting, vector by which compounding risks affect the resilience of Sudan's populations to negative health outcomes. Longer-term and slower-onset vectors also exist rising temperatures are a contributing factor to the spread of infectious diseases, including dengue fever, diphtheria, malaria, chikungunya, and rift valley fever.[226] Heightened cases of many of these diseases have been observed in both Khartoum and Blue Nile States, as more virulent diseases meet degraded water and sanitation systems of two regions highly impacted by the conflict.[227]

Economics and Livelihoods

As with other countries with similar IsDB resilience index metrics, Sudan is heavily reliant on rainfed agriculture. Approximately 60 percent of the population depends on naturally irrigated agriculture to sustain their livelihoods.[228] Without reserve water and irrigation system, this dependency exposes farmers and their families to variation in productivity caused by erratic rainfall and enduring dry spells. In the absence of early warning, due to a lack of state capacity and the impacts of conflict on state services, farmers report losing their crops due to storms and floods, in some cases leading to temporary or longer displacement and heightened economic insecurity. [229]

As in other instances of conflict, some environmental degradation in Sudan is due directly to hostilities, as is the destruction of farming and other essential infrastructure which has, in some cases, been directly targeted.[230] The economics of conflict can also contribute to environmental degradation, such as in Blue Nile state, where parties to the conflict have sold and competed over access to resources including gum Arabic and gold. [231]

Human security

Over decades of conflict in Sudan, including the recent period since 2023, human security has been threatened through violations of humanitarian and human rights law, as well as systemic factors like poverty, marginalization, and protracted displacement. Alongside increasing civilian deaths, the use of child soldiers has been documented by many parties to the conflict, as have increases in sexual and gender-based violence against women and girls.

Forced displacement

Historic and ongoing conflict-related displacement is a severe threat to human security. In 2023 the escalation of conflict led to approximately 6 million new displacement events, and by the end of the year Sudan was home to the largest population of internally displaced people in the world[234] This has coincided with higher-than-average disaster-related displacement between 2017 and 2022, with over one million people displaced due to floods and wildfires in that time. IDPs are particularly exposed to threats related to climate change, exposed to extreme weather events due to inadequate shelter and maladaptive displacement sites located in potential floodplains.[235] Social dynamics also threaten the resilience of displaced communities, as when host communities exhibit negative reactions to the perceived and real costs associated with large, displaced communities. In parts of Sudan, in the absence of effective means to mediate these tensions, communities report instances of hate speech, ostracization, and violence against IDPs as communities struggle to make ends meet and are forced to compete for scarce livelihoods, resources, and services.[236]

Opportunities

Even amid one of the most severe humanitarian emergencies in the world, community networks remain the foundation of resilience in Sudan. Mutual aid initiatives such as Emergency Response Rooms which emerged from the 2019 revolution have used social media to coordinate the delivery of humanitarian assistance, despite real risks to the lives and safety of organizers.[237] These mechanisms, which were built by communities themselves and were able to modify their approaches according to what people needed, were able to respond even in places where international actors could not, amid intense conflict and governance collapse. International organizations such as UNEP, with support from international donors, have worked with local actors to support mutual ownership over natural resources, encouraging locally adapted conservation approaches that were designed to include IDPs and privileged indigenous and traditional knowledge.[238]

While the conflict continues to devastate the lives and livelihoods of Sudanese people, and climate shocks degrade their resilience to additional shocks, these and other structures of mutualized support represent real and powerful reserves of resilience and offer opportunities for expanded impact with the right level and type of support.

Resilience in SYRIA

RESILIENCE INDEX

Environment/ Disasters	Health/ Pandemics	Economy/ Livelihoods	Security	Forced Displacement
1.6/10	4.0/10	4.6/10	5.3/10	2.1 /10

FACTS AND FIGURES

- Population: 22. million[239]
- Life expectancy at birth: 72 years[240]
- GDP per Capita: 1,300 USD[241]
- Key economic sectors: Agriculture, oil and gas and services[242]
- Reliance on agriculture: 46 % of the population with some reliance, and over 31% of exports come from the agriculture sector [243]

KEY CLIMATE AND ENVIRONMENTAL RISKS: [244]

- Drought and water scarcity.
- Heat waves and increasing temperatures and overall number of very hot days.
- Land degradation and desertification, with impacts on agriculture and animal health

Country overview

Syria is currently emerging from its extreme levels of exposure to humanitarian crises, long-standing conflict, and limited institutional capacity to manage risks and build resilience as per the INFORM Risk Index.[245] More than a decade of protracted armed conflict has devastated the country's infrastructure, economy, and governance systems. Between 2010 and 2020, Syria's GDP contracted by more than 50% due to widespread destruction of physical capital, loss of life, mass displacement, and the collapse of economic networks. The sharp drop in Gross National Income per capita led the World Bank to reclassify Syria as a low-income country starting in 2018. [246]

In parallel to the political and security crisis, Syria faces increasing exposure to climate-related hazards.[247] The country has experienced more frequent and severe droughts, diminishing rainfall, extreme heat, and increasing desertification.[248] These environmental stressors have had a direct impact on agricultural productivity and water availability critical components of rural livelihoods and food security. Notably, climate-related grievances, particularly the 2006–2010 drought, were a contributing factor to rural-urban migration and social unrest before the onset of the conflict. The gradual deterioration of natural resources, coupled with fragmented governance and limited institutional capacity, is subtly reshaping local power dynamics, and intensifying competition over land and water factors that are steadily eroding rural livelihoods and amplifying existing vulnerabilities within fragile communities.

Environmental and Natural Disasters

Prior to the armed conflicts, Syria already faced substantial environmental challenges including water scarcity, water pollution, soil degradation, air pollution, inappropriate treatment of solid waste. [254] Widespread soil and land degradation has contributed to the loss of arable land across Syria, deepening food shortages and heightening food insecurity. Poor infrastructure, particularly in irrigation systems, is exacerbating the effects of environmental challenges.

In north-west Syria more than 500,000 olive trees[255] have been destroyed due years of hostilities, and wheat production has been particularly affected by drought and water scarcity. [256] Deforestation during conflict is driven by both intentional and socio-economic factors: forests may be deliberately burnt to gain territorial control or deny resources to opponents, while local communities, cut off from formal energy supplies, often turn to charcoal as a cheaper fuel alternatives. This has resulted in protected national areas affected by severe cuttings, fires and theft and other prohibited acts. [257] These practices diminish already limited vegetation cover, increase soil erosion and desertification, and reduce biodiversity. As forests and woodlands play a crucial role in regulating the water cycle, stabilizing soil, and maintaining local climates, their destruction directly compromises the land's long-term viability for human use.[258]

Scarcity of safe and clean water is a key driver in the spread of water-borne diseases, including large outbreaks. Environmental factors, such as shrinking water sources and wastewater pollution, were likely contributors to the cholera outbreak in Syria in September 2022.[259]

While a comprehensive assessment of the environmental damage of the crisis has yet to be conducted, damage to oil production and processing areas, and to other industrial areas, has had direct and indirect negative effects on the environment. In addition, destruction of critical infrastructure, including wastewater treatment plants, has affected the government›s ability to secure essential services. Further environmental hazards have been caused by the collapse of waste management, and debris from destroyed infrastructure. Cities such as Aleppo, Homs, and

Deir ez-Zor have seen industrial facilities damaged due to conflict, resulting in the contamination of soil, surface water, and groundwater with oil residues, heavy metals, and combustion by-products. [260]

Health and Pandemics

In Syria, communities face growing health risks, including malnutrition, micronutrient deficiencies, anemia, and stunted growth in children. Years of war have severely damaged industrial and petrochemical infrastructure, releasing hazardous substances into the environment.[261] The makeshift refineries in areas like Deir ez-Zor and Hassakeh have created widespread pollution affecting both workers and surrounding communities. Alarmingly, camps for internally displaced persons (IDPs) have been established near or directly on these contaminated sites, compounding residents› exposure to harmful substances. In Al-Hol camp (Hassakeh governorate) and other IDP sites, overcrowding, inadequate sanitation, and proximity to oil-polluted sites have caused outbreaks of waterborne diseases and chronic respiratory illnesses. Fires in camps, particularly in the winter, have led to injuries and deaths, and pose longer-term health impacts du do smoke and chemical inhalation. Similarly, in Homs and Aleppo, industrial zones suffered extensive bombing, releasing pollutants into agricultural lands and urban areas.[262] These pollutants pose serious risks to public health, contributing to respiratory diseases, cancers, and long-term ecological degradation.

Damage to petrochemical installations has also created long-lasting «toxic hotspots,» where hazardous residues linger in the environment long after hostilities cease. [263] Fires and oil spills not only trigger acute health emergencies such as toxic inhalation, and poisoning, but have also made it unsafe for displaced families to return to their homes, prolonging displacement and vulnerability.[264]

Economics and Livelihoods

Syria's oil sector, once a critical source of public revenue and employment, has been crippled by the conflict.[265] The informal, artisanal refining industry that emerged in northeast Syria has polluted land and water, while providing dangerous, low-paying jobs that expose workers and nearby populations to serious health risks.[266] Fuel shortages, coupled with a breakdown in public electricity supply, have hampered recovery efforts and limited the expansion of productive sectors like manufacturing and irrigation-dependent agriculture.[267]

Before the war, agriculture contributed up to 25% of Syria's GDP and employed over 40% of the workforce, especially in rural areas. [268] However, the 2006-2010 drought, one of the worst in recorded history, drove rural migration to cities, which overlapped with the onset of the conflict.[269] As conflict erupted, farmland was abandoned, irrigation infrastructure was destroyed, and access to inputs (seeds, fuel, water, fertilizer) collapsed. The sector is now a fraction of its former size.[270] In recent years, increasing climate volatility has further reduced agricultural productivity, triggering chronic food insecurity with over 12.1 million Syrians food insecure as of 2024.

In many areas of the country, pastoralists have been forced to rely more heavily on supplementary fodder to keep their herds alive. But this alternative is both limited and expensive. Domestic agricultural yields have declined due to water scarcity and land degradation, while rising fuel prices and border challenges have made fodder imports prohibitively costly. The combined effect is eroding an ancient livelihood system, increasing food insecurity, and pushing vulnerable households closer to destitution.[271]

Inflation is rampant, and the Syrian pound has collapsed in value, pushing basic goods out of reach.[272] Climate shocks, such as droughts, increase pressure on government spending, while reducing tax revenue from agriculture and small enterprises. Additionally, conflict and environmental degradation hinder foreign investment and development aid, particularly in agriculture, energy, and infrastructure, which are key sectors for recovery.

Human Security

Women and girls bear a disproportionate burden of the crisis. Their access to resources, land rights, and decision-making remains constrained, while conflict and environmental stress multiply their vulnerability. Illustrating a reality in many parts of the country, in rural Aleppo women-headed households displaced by conflict face restricted access to land and income-generating activities, increasing dependence on humanitarian assistance. This situation increases exposure to gender-based violence, loss of livelihoods and rising dependence on male relatives or aid and undermines their ability to accessing health, education, and protection services. [273] Gender-based violence cases in displacement sites have increased, especially in areas lacking secure shelters and lighting. [274]
Children face disrupted schooling, exposure to trauma, and food and health insecurity. Consequences include long-term cognitive and physical development impacts due to malnutrition, higher risk of early marriage or child labour as coping mechanisms and lack of safe environments and education opportunities.[275] In Homs, in Eastern Ghouta, and in many urban and rural areas severely damaged by the conflict, many children live amid ruins and attend makeshift schools, often without safe water or sanitation, increasing vulnerability to disease and psychosocial distress.[276]

Prolonged violence and weakened rule of law left people vulnerable to arbitrary violence, exploitation, and abuse. Without addressing human security for the most vulnerable, resilience in Syria will remain fragile and recovery efforts incomplete.

Forced displacement

Approximately 7 million Syrians remain internally displaced. Since November 2024, around 1.1 million IDPs have returned to their areas of origin.[277] Many of those who have returned reside in damaged or unfinished buildings, and likely in villages and neighborhoods with no essential service. The displacement crisis in Syria is driven by a complex interplay of factors. Continued violence remains the primary cause of displacement. Entire neighborhoods have been rendered uninhabitable due to the deliberate targeting of civilian infrastructure, including homes, hospitals, and water systems.[278] In parallel, the destruction and contamination of oil facilities and industrial sites, have created toxic environmental conditions that pose severe health risks and drive people away from their places of origin.[279]

Climate-related stressors such as prolonged droughts and declining water availability, especially in the Euphrates basin, have severely undermined agricultural livelihoods, pushing rural communities into displacement or urban slums in search of survival. [280] Hyperinflation, currency collapse, and widespread unemployment as further deepened vulnerability and created conditions of chronic insecurity. With public services either absent or unaffordable in many areas, families face little choice but to move in search of food, healthcare, and income-generating opportunities. [281] Together, these factors form a self-reinforcing cycle that perpetuates instability and displacement, often preventing safe and voluntary returns.

Opportunities

Recent developments in Syria's political situation have suggested that increased engagement between development actors and the national government may become possible. National authorities have met with representatives from international organizations and foreign governments and engaged in international conversations with donors.

This opens opportunities for investment and support for infrastructure that can power the economy, such as electricity, waste, and water systems. A re-configuration of Syria's pre-war economy, which was marked by unequal access to support such as water and irrigation services, is possible. Revitalizing and repairing water infrastructure in an inclusive manner will help build resilience across a broader swath of the country's population rather than "locking in" existing and persistent vulnerabilities.[282]

Resilience in YEMEN



RESILIENCE INDEX

Environment/ Disasters	Health/Pandemics	Economy/ Livelihoods	Security	Forced Displacement
1.1/10	1.3/10	2.1/10	1.0/10	1.1/10

FACTS AND FIGURES

- Population: 39.4 million[283]
- Life expectancy at birth: 64[284]
- GDP per Capita: 447.41 USD[285]
- Key economic sectors: Oil and gas, agriculture, fisheries[286]
- Reliance on agriculture: 75.3% rely on agricultural activities, employing 50% of the population and contributing 15% of GDP[287]

KEY CLIMATE AND ENVIRONMENTAL RISKS: [288]

- Extreme precipitation expected to significantly increase in quantity and extreme events in all but one governorate
- More intense and frequent flooding
- Coastline degradation due to sea-level rise, inundation and erosion

Country overview

Over a decade of conflict in Yemen has generated one of the world's largest and most severe humanitarian emergencies. More than 17 million people face food insecurity, with half of all children under five suffering from malnutrition. Over half the country's population, 18.2 million people, required humanitarian and protection assistance in 2024. [289]

Yemen is highly vulnerable to climate risks through both direct exposure to hazards and due to its geopolitical positioning. According to the ND-GAIN index, the country is ranked 182nd in terms of readiness to respond and adapt climate change, and the 39th most vulnerable: this reflects the corrosive impacts of the conflict on its institutions, its fragmented governance structure, and its increasing exposure to storms, erratic rainfall, and sea level rise. As a net importer of food, with limited domestic food production, the country is also highly exposed to price fluctuations on staple food sources due to shocks, including climate-related ones, in other parts of the world. With this compounding exposure, building the country's resilience to shocks is essential.

Environment and Natural Disasters

As in many countries, water is an important vector through which the combined impact of climate shocks and conflict on people's lives, resilience, and livelihood is visible. Yemen suffers from high water scarcity: it has little natural fresh water and changing precipitation patterns threaten rainwater collection strategies.[290] It is also at risk of groundwater degradation, salinization, and contamination. These exposures, due to a combination of climate shocks, weather events, and demographic pressures, are exacerbated by the conflict, which has led to suboptimal management of growth and land use, particularly in and around major cities.

This is clearly observed in Sanaa, the capital, where in the past water infrastructure delivered supplies directly to households and businesses via the local water utility. Since the beginning of the conflict, the city's population has changed, with displaced people increasing the number of water users, violence and conflict destroying water infrastructure, and competition over resource management compromising the ability of the utility to deliver services. Nearly 40 percent of the country's water infrastructures, including desalination plants, cisterns, water tanks and sewage pumps, have been damaged by the conflict.[291] Many people in the city report relying on water tanks.

Impacts are felt in rural areas too. With all the challenges facing governance, land-use planning, and enforcement, the cultivation of Khat, a widely used narcotic, has increased. Khat is the most lucrative crop in the country – yet it requires large amounts of water, straining irrigation and putting pressure on local aquifers, and is controlled by a small, landowning elite. [292]

Similar dynamics exist in the production of firewood for fuel. Restrictions on the import of fuel, and conflict-induced shortages, have increased demand for firewood: Between 2014 and 2020, deforestation grew substantially. [293] This has resulted in an increase in deforestation and desertification with reports indicating that over 5 million trees have been chopped down since 2018. [294] The lack of tree cover has also contributed to a decline in biodiversity, as birds and other species continue to lose their natural habitat, [295] and key ecological areas – including protected wetlands near Aden – are damaged and degraded. [296]

Health and Pandemics

The humanitarian crisis is also a health crisis. Nearly half the population of Yemen lacks access to reliable sanitation facilities or clean water,[297] and over one third of the country's health infrastructure has been damaged by conflict. [298] Compounded by frequent and extreme flooding that has contaminated water sources and further destroyed health centers and sanitation infrastructure, this destruction has led to a surge in disease: Between 2015 and 2021, the country experienced one of the largest cholera outbreaks in recent history, with 4000 reported deaths and over 2 million cases. [299]

Disease and sanitation are not the only health-related outcome of the crisis. Unexploded ordinance continues to pose a threat to public health and safety – and impede the use of some agricultural land.

Economics and Livelihoods

Opportunities to move beyond the long and complex set of emergencies facing Yemen lie in ensuring people have access to reliable, safe, and sustainable livelihoods. In this domain again, we see the inhibiting impact of compounding climate and conflict risks. As a result of the conflict and the series of restrictive measures placed on many actors within the country, Yemen faces high barriers to participating in international markets and trade. Opportunities that exist are largely centered on fossil fuels, which make up 90 percent of the country's exports and 30% of GDP. Alternatives are constricted, due to the conflict's impact on industrial and economic activity, and on the increasing unsustainability of Yemen's agricultural and fisheries sector – which employs 60 percent of the population.[300]

These limits impose a feedback loop. Maladaptive livelihood choices – most dramatically illustrated by fossil fuel production and export, but evident also in agricultural changes and the increase in deforestation – are often seen as people's only options. Previously reliable sectors such as fishing have been largely decimated:[301] before the war, the fishing industry was the second largest economic sector in Yemen and supported the livelihoods of about 2.5 million Yemenis; presently less than one in five fishermen remain in the industry.[302]

Human Security

While the ongoing conflict is the major risk to security, resource scarcity exacerbated by climate change and the lack of effective mechanisms to manage competition can magnify existing risks and increase marginalization. In Yemen, this can be seen in the case of the marginalized group composed of people who are often in lower-status socio-economic positions.[303] [304] In competition over scarce resources such as water, they may be unable to access traditional tribal or informal mediation and patronage networks, further putting them at risk.

Forced Displacement

In other cases, changing weather patterns and the collapse of traditional sectors such as agriculture and fishing, and new, largescale patterns of mobility in response to the conflict may have implications for the security of certain groups or populations. Since the beginning of the conflict,[305] the percentage of women-headed households has increased to nearly 30 percent, as men move to cities in search of work, or have been injured, killed, or imprisoned during the conflict. Limits on women's ability to access markets, economic inputs, and finance can put these communities at heightened risk of poverty, violence, and unsafe conditions.[306]

Displacement remains a significant threat to the livelihoods and security of millions of Yemenis. As of June 2023, there are approximately 4.5 million internally displaced persons in Yemen,[308] 3.1 million of whom are children, making it one of the largest displacement crises globally.[308] Many Yemenis displaced by the conflict reside in flood prone regions, which increases their vulnerability to further displacement, protracted displacement and physical insecurity.[309]

Opportunities

Yemen has adopted a range of policy initiatives that can help address the impacts of climate change, but implementation is limited. This is due to the conflict, weakened institutions, the lack of effective planning and project management, and the lack of public awareness. A focus on emergency humanitarian assistance has come at the expense of longer-term, comprehensive efforts to address and mitigate systemic and residual risks.

There is, however, evidence that local level environmental initiatives have been effective. For example, the national Environmental Protection Agency has established local teams with the purpose to establish plans for mitigating disasters, trained associations in disaster management and spate irrigation and for addressing improper waste disposal.[310] Moreover, supporting traditional knowledge of established indigenous practices can support proper land management.[311] Humanitarian organizations have also implemented climate-sensitive programs in parts of the country, working to lay the conditions for a longer-term, more comprehensive response. [312] Investments in building local capacities, with a focus on particularly vulnerable and marginalized groups, can help strengthen the country's ability to adapt to climate and conflict shocks in the future.

Lessons Learned and Recommendations

It was often repeated in interviews and in desk research reports from practitioners that no single policy in isolation will be enough to address the impacts of the climate/conflict nexus. Rather, policies, programs, and interventions must approach the challenge strategically and comprehensively, going beyond mitigation and risk management, for countries to successfully bounce back from crisis, adapt, transform, and thrive.

Areas of focus for the IsDB and its partners

The IsDB's previous two Resilience reports outlined six suggestions for strengthening resilience. The first report noted:

- the need to empower youth as a force for resilience,
- the opportunity of using the education system as a tool for resilience across all five dimensions,
- the need to leverage the human and social capital of women,
- water access and water management as necessary for resilience,
- the critical role of disaster preparedness, and
- the importance of anticipating regional spillover effects.

These implications held true in the second report, with the addition of a further eight recommendations on:

- strengthening Regional Cooperation,
- mainstreaming key resilience lessons and strategies across and among diverse stakeholder networks,
- mitigating "Brain drain," or out-migration of skilled workers
- Scaling rural health infrastructures and delivery systems with a focus on pandemic response,
- leveraging the public education system for resilience promotion
- leveraging civil society for social cohesion and collaboration,
- preparing and strengthening social protection systems, and
- investing strategically in digitalization.

Based on the case studies and literature regarding the compounding impacts on the resilience of people, systems and communities of conflict and climate risk, this report reinforces the previous recommendations, and adds **four additional areas of focus:**



Figure 4: Broad areas of focus for the IsDB moving forward on climate action in conflict and fragile settings

1. Local and regional efforts that are sensitive to conflict risks, climate resilient, and incorporate adaptation strategies

Supporting local leadership and community initiatives is crucial in settings where conflict has compromised the capacities of central governments, and where in some cases significant populations live in areas controlled by non-state actors. In Afghanistan, the Mirab system and locally led early warning systems demonstrate how local actors can effectively manage environmental pressures and mediate tensions, even in places with limited access to external supports and where climate risks are recurring and often severe. Examples from non-climate action provide similar lessons: in Iraq, local leaders have played a vital role in improving access to health facilities and managing community tensions. Chad's Guinea Worm Eradication Program and partnerships with religious leaders illustrate how culturally embedded initiatives build trust and extend reach to remote populations.

Nigeria's Erosion and Watershed Management Project has successfully enhanced flood resilience through improved drainage systems and early warning systems, showing how climate-resilient infrastructure can protect communities effectively.

2. Adaptation plans and strategies that are equitable and avoid exacerbating or contributing to marginalization

Efforts to build resilience should address existing inequalities and ensure that interventions do not exacerbate marginalization. In Afghanistan, women in Sayad Village established their own flood early warning system, directly engaging a traditionally excluded demographic in disaster preparedness, while the Mirab irrigation networks highlight how revitalizing traditional water management systems can empower local leadership and reduce vulnerabilities. Chad's partnerships with religious figures and local leaders in health programs illustrate the effectiveness of culturally resonant trust-building to reach remote communities. Sudan's Emergency Response Rooms and Yemen's locally managed disaster plans demonstrate how marginalized groups can lead adaptive efforts even amid acute instability, provided they receive targeted support.

3. Global, regional, local, and cross-sectoral mechanisms for cooperation and knowledge sharing

International, regional and local cooperation between actors working to respond to climate and conflict risks are essential to share resources and knowledge, and to coordinate responses both inside countries and across borders. Local collaboration can improve early warning systems, disaster preparedness, and adaptive strategies, thereby reducing vulnerabilities and promoting sustainable development. It can attract and mobilize climate finance investments, ensuring that resources are efficiently allocated to address the multifaceted challenges posed by climate change more effectively. The Lake Chad Basin Commission and IGAD's drought mitigation efforts show how regional collaboration can enhance resilience.

Humanitarian, development, and peace actors can contribute to this by more proactively engaging with regional bodies and mechanisms to share insight and recommendations around risks, and the elements of resilience that exist and could be strengthened via longer-term, sustained support. In many contexts, humanitarian actors continue to demonstrate that climate action is possible in situations of conflict and fragility. They can feed into projects to ensure that a "do no harm" approach is incorporated into climate action and resilience-building in a contextually specific, conflict sensitive manner.

4. Scaled Up Climate Finance

Access to climate finance is critical for fragile states to build resilience. Somalia›s recent investment from the Green Climate Fund demonstrates the potential for scaled-up climate action in conflict-affected settings: yet continued improvement and learnings are necessary if this and other efforts are to result in more of the investments required, and lead to the equitable and effective delivery of support to those most in need. Making climate finance more accessible to local governments, community-based organizations, and smaller NGOs by simplifying application processes, reducing bureaucratic barriers, and offering clear guidance with technical support could all support this objective, and are key areas in which the Islamic Development Bank can provide technical and political guidance and leadership. Partnerships with international institutions that support local government capacity building, and technical assistance can further enhance local stakeholders› ability to access, absorb, and disburse climate finance.

Considerations for Project Design and Operationalization

To ensure the effectiveness of climate investments, it is essential to tailor responses to local circumstances, as approaches designed for stable environments often fail in unpredictable settings. Adaptation pathways can vary significantly both between and within conflict-affected countries; what can be accomplished in regions with functioning infrastructure and basic services differs greatly from what is feasible in areas where such resources are lacking, damaged, or where conflict is more acute.

Based on the report, several recommendations emerge for teams inside the IsDB and partners to deliver comprehensive, inclusive projects:

1. Community engagement is essential at every step of the project process	Prioritize a participatory and inclusive approach based on local and endogenous knowledge in the design, implementation, and evaluation of projects. Empower local communities, particularly marginalized groups, to actively contribute to decision-making processes, ensuring that interventions are contextually appropriate and socially inclusive. Build on current and diverse partnerships, as outlined in the following section.
2. Ecosystem-based Adaptation/ Nature-based solutions are cost-effective and have long-term impacts	Supporting nature-based solutions (NbS) strategies leverage the protective and adaptive capacities of natural ecosystems. NBS build local, national, and regional resilience by mitigating tensions arising from competition over natural resources, supporting livelihood security, building social cohesion, and promoting dialogue among conflicting parties.
3. Investing in developing early warning systems	These provide timely information, enabling proactive measures to reduce disaster impacts. Investing in capacity development and enhancement equips communities and institutions with the necessary knowledge and resources to respond effectively to climate-related challenges. Integrating climate resilience into project planning processes ensures that infrastructure and critical sectors can adapt to changing conditions, stabilizing the operating area, minimizing disruptions, and improving longer-term outcomes.
4. Strengthen nfrastructure resilience to climate and conflict impacts	Invest in the construction and maintenance of green, resilient and sustainable infrastructure, including flood defenses, water supply systems, and renewable energy facilities, to minimize vulnerability and ensure continuity of essential services during crises. Furthermore, these facilities provide a pipeline for employment and training opportunities in both rural and urban sectors.
5. Promote Livelihood Diversification strategies that reduce communities' dependence on climate-sensitive sectors	Agriculture, especially rain-fed agriculture, forms the basis of the economies of many IsDB MCs, leaving populations vulnerable to both environmental pressures and shocks. In addition to economic resilience, diversification builds resilience to recruitment and resource racketeering by non-state armed groups.
6. Establish Risk Financing Mechanisms, such as insurance schemes	Guaranteed funds from Islamic social finance sources, resilience and catastrophe bonds, risk pools, and contingency funds, to provide financial assistance to communities affected by climate-related disasters and conflicts. Ensure that vulnerable populations have access to timely and adequate support to recover from shocks and build back better. MCs experiencing environmental and conflict shocks are likely to experience them again, making the need for resilience infrastructure even more pressing.
7. Integrate conflict sensitivity and «Do no Harm» approaches	Conflict considerations are essential to environmental programs, and environmental considerations—including potential future effects of climate change—are pivotal to conflict resolution, mitigation, transformation, and prevention. To build resilience, the IsDB and its member countries should also be conscious of and ensure any construction and buildings, new technology and techniques, and responsive infrastructure is sustainable and does not have negative downstream effects on people, resources and ecosystems.

Implications for Policy and Partnerships

The case studies underscore the importance of local leadership, community initiatives, and cooperation, all of which are aligned with the Islamic Development Bank's strategic approach to climate action and development. They also point to the critical need for collaborative policy development and strong partnerships.

Institutional and Strategic Reform

- Institutionalize holistic climate change and disaster response policies to enhance preparedness, response, and recovery mechanisms
- Support MCs Developing and reinforcing climate-conflict adaptation laws at local and national levels in IsDB member countries

Policy engagement with communities and local leaders

- Support trainings, including on land/ resource sharing mechanisms, to prevent disputes and reduce vulnerability linked to climate change
- Train local leaders in peacebuilding and conflict mitigation with a climate-conflict lens to boost community resilience
- Encourage community-driven programs to promote collaborative land, water, and resource management, while reducing tension and enhancing agricultural productivity
- Strengthen local-state communication to ensure climate laws and responses reflect community-specific needs and risks

Investing in Environmental and Climate Services

- Prioritize investment in climate and environmental services in fragile, remote, and informal areas to improve anticipatory measures and response capabilities
- Incorporate culturally sensitive mechanisms for longer-term recovery, such as disaster insurance, into humanitarian programs
- Strengthen early warning systems by restoring weather stations and using mobile technology to reach remote communities with SMS alerts

Fostering partnerships and collaborations between governments, international and multinational organizations, private sector actors, and civil society can leverage additional resources and expertise, pooling funds, sharing risks, and ensuring a coordinated approach to climate challenges.

Policy engagement with communities and local leaders

- Facilitate regional knowledge-sharing to capture best practices, lessons learned, and improve the design of community-level resilience programs
- Establish climate-conflict nexus working groups bringing together governments, local leaders, academia, private sector, and civil society

Investing in Environmental and Climate Services

- Promote partnerships among governments, multilateral institutions, civil society, and the private sector to pool resources, share expertise, and coordinate climate-resilience efforts.
- Leverage IsDB's convening power to support regional and bilateral collaboration among member countries, including planning, financing, research, and monitoring
- Utilize regional platforms including ECOWAS, IGAD, and cross-border initiatives such as the Great Green Wall (GGW) to expand climate-and-conflict-sensitive resilience programs.

Conclusion

Understanding the intersection of climate, conflict, and resilience remains a complex and highly context-specific challenge. The evolving nature of these crises, combined with limited empirical evidence, makes it difficult to establish clear causal links or design one-size-fits-all interventions. Yet, what is increasingly evident is that in many of the IsDB's Member Countries, particularly those affected by fragility and conflict, the compounding effects of climate shocks and insecurity are pushing communities to the limits of their resilience.

The analysis and evidence presented in this report paint a stark picture of the humanitarian and development challenges these communities face. They call also for an urgent response, because the convergence of climate change, conflict, and fragility is not a looming threat, but the reality for many people across the world. This intersection is magnifying vulnerabilities, deepening human suffering, and straining already overstretched systems. In a global context where humanitarian and development actors are struggling to meet growing needs, the urgency of delivering coordinated, long-term, and inclusive responses cannot be overstated.

The implications of this are far-reaching: absent a decisive, well-coordinated shift toward climate-resilient and conflict-sensitive strategies, the development gains of recent decades risk being reversed. Even in the face of these challenges, the report also highlights important sources of resilience within communities themselves. Local knowledge, traditional practices, and community-driven governance mechanisms offer valuable pathways for adaptation and recovery. These endogenous capacities must be recognized, supported, and integrated into formal systems, particularly in climate adaptation and resilience programming.

Yet local action alone is not enough. Sustained, coordinated support from national governments, international organizations, and multilateral partners is critical.

A central conclusion of the analysis is the urgent need to transform global recognition of climate risks into fragile settings into operational and strategic action. This requires a dramatic scaling-up of climate finance, targeted resilience-building investments, and inclusive governance mechanisms tailored to local realities. The findings call for a break from fragmented, short-term, and siloed approaches toward integrated solutions that account for the multifaceted nature of vulnerability in conflict-affected states.

Notably, while there is a growing international consensus on the need for climate action in fragile and conflict settings, as evidenced by commitments from COP28 and institutions like the IsDB, there remains a significant gap between political will and actual resource allocation. Current climate finance flows to fragile and conflict-affected countries remain critically low and poorly adapted to the complex needs on the ground. Without targeted, accessible, and conflict-sensitive financing mechanisms, the most vulnerable will continue to be underserved.

The report's proposed critical areas of focus and its practical and policy recommendations serve not as a reinvention of existing commitments, but as a practical framework for delivering them more effectively. If implemented with the necessary resources, these priorities can help move from fragmented interventions to sustained impact.

The cost of inaction is high. Without decisive, coordinated efforts, millions of people across the globe risk being trapped in a cycle of protracted crisis, environmental degradation, and dependence on insufficient humanitarian aid. Investing in resilience is not just the right thing to do, it is an urgent imperative to prevent further development reversals and enable a more secure and sustainable future. The IsDB and its partners have an essential role to play, not just as financiers, but as catalysts of change who can drive integrated, people-centered solutions that align climate resilience with peace, stability, and long-term development.

Appendix: IsDB Resilience Index metrics by country

Member Country	Environment/ Natural Disasters	Health/ Pandemics	Econ/ Livelihoods	Security	Forced Displacement	TOTAL
Afghanistan	1.4	2.5	1.4	1.1	1.4	7.9
Albania	9.2	9.2	9.3	8.1	9.5	45.3
Algeria	5.2	7.5	3.1	6.2	8.8	30.7
Azerbaijan	8.7	9.2	7.4	8.0	6.9	40.4
Bahrain	9.0	9.4	8.8	9.1	6.5	42.8
Bangladesh	5.3	4.9	6.0	4.4	3.5	24.2
Benin	4.3	2.2	4.8	3.5	5.7	20.4
Brunei Darussalam	10.0	8.8	8.1	10.0	9.1	46.0
Burkina Faso	2.8	2.2	4.2	4.5	7.8	21.4
Cameroon	2.9	2.4	2.8	1.7	4.0	13.8
Chad	1.6	1.2	1.2	1.6	1.2	6.8
Comoros	2.3	4.5	4.5	4.2	2.3	17.8
Cote d'Ivoire	6.5	2.3	5.8	3.5	5.2	23.2
Djibouti	3.0	2.6	2.1	7.6	2.4	17.7
Egypt	5.5	6.9	5.6	5.8	4.1	27.8
Gabon	6.9	3.1	7.7	3.5	4.2	25.4
Gambia	3.0	3.3	3.7	3.7	6.7	20.5
Guinea	3.8	2.1	1.3	1.6	2.1	10.9
Guinea-Bissau	2.9	2.1	2.2	3.9	2.0	13.2
Guyana	8.7	7.6	6.3	7.2	9.4	39.2
Indonesia	8.7	6.0	9.4	7.9	8.3	40.2
Iran (Islamic Rep. of)	6.1	8.0	8.0	5.0	6.0	33.1
Iraq	4.0	6.2	1.0	3.9	4.2	19.2
Jordan	8.3	7.5	8.5	9.5	5.7	39.7
Kazakhstan	9.9	9.6	8.5	8.2	9.8	46.0
Kuwait	9.2	9.9	7.4	9.1	10.0	45.6
Kyrgyzstan	8.2	8.6	8.4	6.0	9.5	40.9
Lebanon	3.7	8.6	6.3	8.3	6.2	33.1
Libya	1.7	5.1	1.3	2.3	2.8	13.2
Malaysia	9.8	7.9	10.0	8.6	9.5	45.7
Maldives	8.4	9.2	8.5	5.7	9.8	41.6
Mali	2.4	2.3	2.8	2.6	3.9	14.0
Mauritania	4.3	2.6	2.2	2.7	1.5	13.2
Morocco	7.5	5.9	8.8	8.4	7.2	37.9
Mozambique	2.7	2.0	2.7	2.2	6.7	16.3
Niger	2.7	1.9	2.3	2.5	5.3	14.7
Nigeria	2.1	2.5	2.3	2.4	3.7	13.0
Oman	8.6	8.6	9.1	8.7	9.3	44.3
Pakistan	4.1	3.7	3.6	4.1	5.0	20.4
Palestine	3.8	7.2	6.7	3.5	6.5	27.6
Qatar	9.6	10.0	8.8	7.1	7.8	43.2
Saudi Arabia	9.7	9.2	9.0	9.7	9.5	47.2
Senegal	5.9	4.0	6.4	6.4	7.2	29.9
Sierra Leone	2.7	2.0	2.2	2.9	5.1	14.8
Somalia	1.0	1.0	1.5	1.5	1.0	6.0
Sudan	1.5	1.6	2.1	2.3	1.7	9.2
Suriname	8.1	8.3	3.8	8.3	8.1	36.7
Syrian Arab Rep.	1.6	4.0	4.6	5.3	2.1	17.7
Tajikistan	8.0	6.8	5.0	4.0	7.1	31.0
Togo	3.0	3.0	5.1	2.8	2.7	16.5
Tunisia	7.8	8.0	9.5	7.2	8.4	40.9
Turkey	8.5	8.8	9.5	6.8	7.6	41.2
Turkmenistan	5.8	8.7	2.5	9.8	5.7	32.5
Uganda	3.8	2.9	4.0	1.8	3.3	15.8
United Arab Emirates	9.9	9.9	9.8	9.3	9.9	48.9
Uzbekistan	9.0	9.3	7.3	7.0	9.2	41.9
Yemen	1.1	1.3	2.1	1.0	1.1	6.7

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